leasing at public auction so-called fishing tracts. Fishing, however, for whale or cod, or other fish which can not be taken within special tracts, is given to such subjects on sea-going vessels provided with special permits." Within the licensed tract the lessees are given free use of the coast for numerous purposes, such as that of making repairs, salting, drying, and preparing of fish, as well as of erecting cabins and storehouses. Furthermore, no restriction is made as to the nationality of the person to be employed by the lessees, except in tracts in the "Liman of the Amour." 10

11

Russia agrees to accord equal treatment to Japanese and Russian subjects regarding imposts or taxes levied on the fishing industry; and expressly contracts not to collect duties on fishing products intended for export to Japan.12 Russia retains the right to make necessary laws and regulations concerning the protection and culture of fish, subject to

See also A. H. Charteris, "Territorial Jurisdiction in Wide Bays," Proceedings of International Law Association, twenty-third report, 1906, 103.

The opinion of Mr. Bates, umpire, in the case of The Washington, under convention between the United States and Great Britain of February 8, 1853, in denying that the Bay of Fundy was a British bay adverted to the fact that one of the headlands thereof was in the United States. (Moore, Inter. Arbitrations, 4342, 4344.) The precise problem before the umpire was whether that body of water was a "bay" within the meaning of the word as used in the treaties of 1783 and 1818. It is to be observed that the issue between the United States and Great Britain with reference to the proper signification of the term "bays," as employed in article 1 of the treaty of 1818, is unrelated to the question as to the extent of bays over which a state may, according to international law, exercise control.

Compare article 1, fishery convention between Great Britain and France of 1867, N. R. G., XX, 455; Art. II of North Sea Convention, May 6, 1882, N. R. G., 2d series, IX, 556, 557; sec. 1, art. 2, treaty between Spain and Portugal, Oct. 2, 1885, N. R. G., 2d series, XIV, 77, 78.

See also resolution of the Institute of International Law (1894-1895) with reference to the extent of control which a state should be permitted to exercise over adjacent waters, and particularly the preamble and article 3, with reference to bays. Annuaire, XIII, 328, 329.

See also communication of Mr. Olney, Secretary of State, to Mr. de Weckerlin, Dutch Minister, February 15, 1896. Ms. Notes to the Netherlands, VIII, 359; Moore Inter. Law Dig., I, 734.

6 Article II.

7 Id.

8 Article III.

9 Article VI.

10 Reciprocal declarations, Article II.

11 Article IV.

12 Article V.

the stipulation, however, that their operation shall apply equally to the subjects of the two Contracting States, and that the Government of Japan shall be notified, six months beforehand, of newly enacted laws.13 Japan, on her part, agrees not to levy import duties on fishing products taken on the Russian coast and the Amour.14

The procedure to be followed by Japanese fishermen is carefully specified. A certificate of navigation to and from the Russian fisheries is to be issued by the Russian consuls in Japan, on the presentation of documents showing the right of the fishermen to lease a particular tract, and giving fullest information as to the purpose of the voyage, the persons interested therein, as well as the individuals and cargo on board the vessel. A fishing vessel, upon receipt of its certificate, may only enter and call at points named therein. Such vessel is, however, given access to Russian ports having a custom-house. 15 When the vessel is in pursuit of cod or whale, it is obliged to call provisionally at a Russian port specially designated, where the authorities will issue a special permit to fish.16 All Japanese steam vessels must be provided with a ship's journal, translated into Russian or English. Sailing vessels also must, as far as possible, comply with this regulation.17

The convention is to remain in force for twelve years, and is to be renewed or modified at the end of every twelve years thereafter.18 The duration of the leased fishing tracts is from one to five years, according to a specified classification. 19

Notwithstanding the extent of the area within which fishing tracts may be secured, it must be apparent that the grantor retains largest powers of regulation and control of the industry within its waters. Russia yields no permanent right to Japan or its subjects, but simply agrees, within a stated period, to grant licenses of limited duration.20

13 Article IX, and Article IV of protocol.

14 Article XII.

15 Article XI of protocol.

16 Id.

17 Reciprocal declarations, Article V.

18 Article XIII.

19 Article VIII of protocol.

Provision is made that in case a lease shall not have expired at the expiration of the treaty, the former shall remain valid until the end of the term, irrespective of the decision of the High Contracting Parties as to the convention itself (Article IX of protocol).

20 In this respect the rights acquired by Japan contrast sharply with those which, by the provisions of Article I of the treaty of October 20, 1818, between the United States and Great Britain, are declared to belong to American citizens.

Should war unfortunately again disturb the friendly relations between the High Contracting Parties, the convention of 1907 would not withstand the shock.

MACEDONIAN RAILWAYS AND THE CONCERT OF EUROPE

The announcement by Baron Aehrenthal, on January 27, of the proposal to construct a railway, under Austro-Hungarian auspices, from Uvac, the southern terminus of the Bosnian system, through the Sandjak of Novibazar to Mitrovitsa, the northern terminus of the Salonika line, opens a new chapter in the history of the Near Eastern Question. In 1897 Austria-Hungary and Russia substituted for their traditional rivalry in the Balkan Peninsula an entente whose purpose was the maintenance of the political status quo. The emergence of the Far Eastern Question was Russia's reason for coming to an agreement in the Near East; while Austria was impelled to consent to a policy of inaction by her serious domestic troubles. These causes have now largely disappeared and the old rivalry is again revived. It is true that the proposal to build the Novibazar railroad is not strictly a breach of the entente, since only the political, not the economic, status quo was guaranteed; nor is Austria-Hungary probably transcending her rights under the Treaty of Berlin, which confers upon her the privilege of building roads in Novibazar, although there is a difference of opinion as to whether the term route employed in that instrument may be interpreted as including railroads or should be confined to highways; nevertheless the entente is shattered. In spite of Baron Aehrenthal's insistence on the purely economic character of the road, the fact that it is to be narrow gauge and that all goods shipped from Central Europe will, therefore, require to be handled twice en route, as well as its greater length, makes it certain that it can never compete on equal terms with the existing line via Belgrade. On the other hand, its strategic importance, in giving AustriaHungary a railway connection with Salonika, not liable to interruption by a hostile Servia, can not be gainsaid.

The Russian press at once accepted Baron Aehrenthal's announcement as equivalent to a change of policy, and the Russian Government has virtually acknowledged that the entente is at an end by actively supporting the proposal for a Danube-Adriatic railroad, which Servia has long sought. This road, after traversing Roumania, will probably find its northeastern terminus at Odessa, thus bringing Russia herself

into direct railway connection with the Adriatic. On March 10 the Servian minister presented a note to the Porte asking authorization for the construction of the Macedonian section of this line. Far more serious difficulties are presented, both to the engineer and to the diplomatist, by this line than by the Novibazar road. Two routes are discussed. The shorter, and that which would penetrate the richer country, crosses Montenegro and terminates at Antivari, which is an excellent port, but unfortunately subject to certain rights of occupation by AustriaHungary under the Treaty of Berlin. One of the manifest strategic advantages of the Danube-Adriatic line would be the linking together of the Slav states, but this probably constitutes a potent reason why Turkey may refuse any concession through Macedonia which would secure this object. The alternative route avoids Montenegro entirely and terminates at the Macedonian port of San Giovanni di Medua, whose harbor is shallow and insecure and the improvement of which would be very costly. Much stronger policing would also be required for this route, against Albanian attack, than for the other. The Sultan might conceivably consent to the San Giovanni route, as it would really possess considerable strategic value for Turkey; but the prospect of commercial success is not so certain and the financing of the undertaking might prove difficult. It is, however, quite possible that Austrian and German influence at Constantinople may, in the present circumstances, be employed to block every railroad project which would have for its ultimate effect the development of a strong Slav barrier to the Drang nach Osten. Other railroads in the Balkan Peninsula are being just now seriously mooted, including one which will connect Salonika directly with the Adriatic, either at Durazzo or Avlona, and one running south from Sofia to the Ægean. Athens is also to be brought into connection with the European system by the completion of the Larissa-Salonika section of road.

An era of railroad development is, in all probability, about to open for the Balkans which will go far toward solving the problems of disorder and lack of security in Macedonia. The rupture of the AustroRussian entente also offers some prospect of constitutional reforms in Macedonia, which seemed utterly hopeless so long as the two powers. chiefly interested pursued a common policy of inaction.

THE BALTIC AND THE NORTH SEAS

On November 2, 1907, Great Britain, France, Norway, Germany, and Russia, "animated by the desire to secure to Norway, within her present frontiers and with her neutral zone, her independence and territorial integrity, as also the benefits of peace" (preamble), concluded a treaty to this effect, by the terms of which Norway undertook not to cede any portion of its territory to any power, whether the cession in question should be based upon occupation or on any ground whatsoever. In consideration of this promise on the part of Norway, the British, French, German, and Russian Governments recognized and undertook to respect the integrity of Norway, and further bound themselves that if the integrity of Norway is threatened or impaired by any power whatsoever the Governments in question bind themselves, on the receipt of a previous communication to this effect from the Norwegian Government, to afford to that Government their support by such means as may be deemed the most appropriate with a view to safeguarding the integrity of Norway. This obligation was undertaken for a period of ten years. (For a further discussion of the treaty and its antecedents, see Editorial . Comment, II, 176, and for the text of the treaty, see Supplement (the present number, p. 267).

The importance of this treaty is hard to overestimate, because the separation of Norway from Sweden led not a few political prophets to believe that the new Kingdom might fall a prey to its stronger neighbors. Its integrity is guaranteed by the great and interested powers, and one less cause of war exists. But if Norway were weak, Sweden was weakened by the separation from Norway, and as Sweden has gradually been absorbed by Russia, it was feared, perhaps unjustly, that the process of the past might continue in the future until the absorption of Sweden became, in the language of diplomacy, a fait accompli.

A guaranty of integrity may be looked upon as a confession of weakness, and it may be humiliating to a nation which has long been independent and played a conspicuous part in the world's affairs to confess that it needs to have its integrity assured. The new-born Norway may court such a guaranty; the country of Gustavus Adolphus dare not. Hence, all nations of Europe bordering upon the Baltic entered into a solemn agreement on the 23d day of April, 1908, based upon a desire to strengthen the friendship between them and "to contribute thereby to the maintenance of universal peace," "to preserve intact the rights of