BOOK REVIEWS

International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish-American War. By Elbert J. Benton, Ph. D. The Johns Hopkins Press: Baltimore. This book contains the Albert Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History delivered at Johns Hopkins University during 1907. It is a particularly full treatment of the subject and contains no evidence of preconceived ideas which the author is determined to prove. He confines himself principally to facts, leaving interpretation to his readers. There is a generous amount of reference, principally to original sources.

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The work is divided into such broad heads as "American Neutrality," “Intervention," "Transition from Neutrality to Belligerency," " Relations of the Belligerents," "Belligerents and Neutrals," etc. The author states the principles of international law bearing upon each of these divisions and then shows the American and Spanish practice.

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The first chapter gives a concise and indispensable résumé of American relations with Cuba during the nineteenth century a relief from the usual wearisome introductory chapters.

In the discussion of fillibustering the author shows how far usage has been from conforming with the strict theory on the question and that America has given a particularly loose interpretation to these rules. Careful attention is given to the interpretation of the laws of neutrality during this period.

The chapter dealing with the causes leading to the abandonment of the nonintervention policy is carefully thought out and well presented. Spain is given full credit for the measures taken to avoid war and to pacify Cuba, and it is claimed that the reforms granted by the decrees of November 25, 1897, "were put forth as preliminary to fuller liberty to follow the successful operation of these." The author asserts that war might have been averted had it not been for several incidents, for none of which Spain was responsible, which were the direct causes of the war. Among these he enumerates the troubles in connection with the attempted establishment of autonomy in Cuba; the Dupuy de Lôme incident, which revealed the lack of confidence of each country in the sincerity of the other; the proposed Papal mediation, and finally the destruction of the Maine. A careful analysis is made of Spain's liability on account of the occurrence of this disaster within her jurisdiction

condemning the American Government for refusing the Spanish proposal of a mixed commission of inquiry, and voicing a regret that the Maine affair was not settled apart from the Cuban question.

The author analyzes the reasons for the American intervention in Cuba as set forth in the President's message, and decides that it was not justifiable on any single one of the grounds advanced by the President. While the raison d'être of the rules in restraint of intervention is to minimize the occasions upon which a state may be interfered with in solving its domestic problems, it is recognized that there are some cases "above and beyond the domain of law" when intervention may be justified on moral if not on legal grounds. The author evidently does not consider this such a case. He sums up the question thus:

If it can be established that the American Government exhausted every resource of diplomacy to avoid war, there is some technical ground upon which to rest intervention. Cuba presented in one century an exceptional case of misgovernment, of unfulfilled promises, of prolonged internecine war, of neutrals burdened by border warfare. But in the light of the resort to war in the face of the full concessions of Spain the technical basis becomes very weak indeed. In the opinion of nearly all writers on international law the particular form of intervention in 1898 was unfortunate, precipitate, and unjust to Spain. The same ends- peace in Cuba and justice to all people concerned - in themselves good, could have been achieved by peaceful means safer for the wider interests of humanity.

The author finds in the period of transition from peace to hostility the first opportunity of testing the application of the rules of war by two Powers that have been well outside the sphere of modern wars. The retroactive declaration of war made by the United States is discussed and condemned; the careful consideration of the necessity for a declaration of war has lost much of its practical value because of the convention recently concluded at The Hague. The auxiliary navy proposed by Spain and actually organized by the United States is approved on the ground that it forms an effective and legal mode of hostilities and that some such means of reserve force must remain essential until the capture of private property at sea is abolished.

Some space is given to the consideration of the captures made by American vessels during the war, and résumés of some of the more important cases are given. In one of these the case of the Benito Estenger the decision of the Supreme Court seems to be at variance with the joint resolution of Congress of April 26, 1898, which declares, in Article I, "That the people of the island of Cuba are and of right.

ought to be free and independent." In this case the Cuban defendant advanced in his defense a sympathy with the American cause, and the court turned to the status of the Cubans with the conclusion

That in war, the citizens or subjects of the belligerents are enemies to each other and that political status determines the question of enemy ownership.

While the Cuban Government had not been recognized, the freedom of the Cuban people had been proclaimed and it seems difficult to accept the decision of the Supreme Court as logical. The deduction of the author is that

Where a nation intervenes in an insurrection and allies itself with the insurgents, merchantmen belonging to the latter will be considered enemy property. Citizenship and not individual sentiments will be regarded as the test of nonenemy character.

There is a thorough consideration of the more important points of the different declarations of neutrality. The question of repairs seems to require more definition. The general time limit allowed for belligerent vessels in neutral ports was twenty-four hours, save in case of urgent need of repairs, when it might be prolonged. Serious repairs, especially of damages received in battle, really amount to an augmentation of warlike force, and logic would seem to demand that the neutral either compel the unseaworthy vessel to disarm and remain in port until the conclusion of hostilities or go out to sea and face the enemy. American practice in the Russo-Japanese war has strengthened this idea.

The negotiations, conclusion, and fulfillment of the treaty of peace are carefully presented, the author confining himself in the main to the bare facts, although he indulges in a discussion as to whether the Constitution follows the flag.

While the reader may differ with the author as to the inferences to be drawn from the facts presented, the work is an exceptionally thoughtful and instructive presentation of international practice during this period. HUGH S. GIBSON.

Manual of American History, Diplomacy and Government. By Albert Bushnell Hart, Professor of American History in Harvard University. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1908. pp. xvi, 554. Without attempting to treat the subject exhaustively, Professor Hart made a most valuable contribution to American bibliography, to which frequent discussion of methods in teaching and studying history and

of the relative value of historical material have added a distinctly pedagogical character. The book is a continuation of a series of previous publications by the author under the titles of "Outlines," "Suggestions for Students," and "Revised suggestions," which have proved singularly helpful and stimulating to students and teachers of American history in all parts of the country; and embodies the best features of them all. It is an improvement upon the author's Handbook of American History, Diplomacy and Government issued in 1901, in that it reflects more fully Professor Hart's experience as a teacher of American history, and continues the work from the Civil War to the present time.

The present work contains an outline bibliography of six different courses of American history in the three divisions of purely narrative history, diplomacy, and government, based upon methods pursued in the Department of American History in Harvard University. As these courses are intended to be training courses rather than information courses, the references to sources and authorities have been arranged with respect to their bearing upon the subjects under investigation rather than to chronological sequence.

In addition to bibliographical and pedagogical features, there is a list of more than a thousand subjects for library reports, embracing the whole field of American politics adapted for assignment to classes and calculated to train the student in the work of historical investigation and research. There is also a list of American statesmen and politicians arranged according to States. In short, the volume abounds with suggestions which render the book invaluable to the beginner and of great service to the more mature student of American history. Professor Hart's reputation rests upon much more ambitious work; but it is doubtful whether anyone could have given to the public, and especially to the student and teacher of American history, a more useful book. CHARLES C. SWISHER.

International Law in South Africa. By T. Baty. Published by Stevens & Haynes: London. 1900. pp. xii, 127.

This little book is one of the most interesting which has appeared. There is always something particularly vigorous about a book which is based upon a series of lectures, and in reading that "the following studies were originally delivered at Oxford," one is reminded of Sir Henry Maine's International Law, which had the same origin.

The first chapter, entitled "Contraband for Neutral Ports," is a

masterful criticism of the doctrine of continuous voyages as applied to contraband. In the first place, the author takes pains to explain away much unfounded reasoning which has been based upon certain decisions erroneously classed as cases of contraband, when in reality the condemnation was due to the hostile character of the cargo or else to trading with the enemy.

This confusion results from our forgetting that before the Declaration of Paris, and in accordance with the time-honored rule of the Consolato del Mare, English prize courts confiscated enemies' goods carried in neutral ships. Hence, there could be no question of contraband except in the case of a neutral cargo. Oftentimes, however, the question. of whether the destination of the cargo was not hostile was considered in the proof of ownership.

As for trade with the enemy, the author shows that in such cases the courts condemned the goods directed to a neutral port when convinced that the ultimate destination was to the enemy. But this was nothing except the enforcing of obedience to a municipal regulation on the part of citizens and has no connection with international law. In the case of the Imina (3 C. Robinson, 167), on the other hand, Sir William Scott refused to condemn a neutral cargo which he must have felt morally certain was intended for the enemy.

A luminous discussion of other cases is entered into. The decision of the Springbok is strongly condemned; and when we come to the diplomatic correspondence in reference to the seizure of the Bundesrath, the Herzog, and the General, neither Government is shown to have played a brilliant rôle. Incidentally, the embarrassing episode of the Manual of Naval Prize Law is touched upon. So closely knit is the argument against the seizure as contraband of goods bound for a neutral port that to summarize it would mean to repeat it. In passing, the abolition of contraband is advocated and the views of Lorimer and others taken up. In reading this chapter, one wonders if the date of publication can really be 1900, for it seems as though the writer must have been aware of certain events which have since taken place.

In discussing the "Status of the South African Republic," the difficult question of half-sovereignty is treated historically and from the point of view of modern authorities. In this connection, we find the characteristic sentences (page 47):

It is a question indeed, as will be seen hereafter, whether the promise to have no foreign relations does not operate ipso facto as a renunciation of the capacity