diction of the claim of this Belgian corporation to whom Venezuela had delivered bonds payable to bearer, notwithstanding that some of the stockholders of the corporation were not Belgians, and also that the present ownership of all the bonds was not shown to be Belgian. The award was for 10,565,199.44 bolivars, or something more than two million dollars. The claim of Ballistini v. Venezuela, presented by France, was disallowed, first, because the claimant was unable to produce the "original bonds or any part of them" and, secondly, because they were "nothing else but bonds of a public debt of the Venezuelan State of Guayana" for the recovery of which "Ballistini, like any other holder of the internal debt of the State of Guayana, is obliged to submit himself to the laws or decrees which govern the extinguishment of the said debt." The first reason being sufficient for the disallowance of the claim, the second must be taken as a dictum of Dr. Paul, the Venezuelan commissioner. This latter point appears to have come up in the claim of Boccardo v. Venezuela, presented by Italy. It was decided by the umpire, Mr. Ralston, without an opinion, though as a reporter Mr. Ralston states with respect to this claim: "Judgment was given on internal bonds on the authority of Aspinwall Case, Moore, page 3616." It is understood from the umpire that the bonds of Boccardo were national in character; they were delivered to him in payment of a debt, and, though payable to bearer, were never transferred by him. Boccardo was allowed 267,480.82 bolivars, or about fifty thousand dollars. The fourth bond claim, arbitrated at Caracas in 1903, was presented by the United States in behalf of one Jarvis. The bonds in this case were issued by a temporary ruler of Venezuela in payment for service and supplies rendered several years before to an unsuccessful revolution which he had led. The commission decided that the fact that the United States had not recognized the legal character of the Government of Venezuela at the time the bonds were issued was conclusive upon its own citizens," and the claim was disallowed. 66 Such were the claims against Venezuela arising from the "public debt" due to the subjects of ten Powers, excepting, of course, those of the three blockading Powers, which were specially arranged for in the peace treaties. Judging from the character of these bond claims, Venezuela might well have accepted the proffer of arbitration, or even have proposed it, instead of writing long, evasive replies to the repeated requests of the three blockading Powers that she should give heed to the claims of their respective subjects. Instead of manifesting "surprise" each time that they had not assented to her arguments regarding the finality of her national law in such matters and going on to rehearse afresh those arguments, Venezuela might better, it would seem, have proposed arbitration by an impartial tribunal; for this can be set down as certain: sooner or later the powerful states are bound to insist upon the consideration of the claims of their subjects against a debtor state. The debtor states would do well to remember that though international law postulates the equal independence of states and the equality of their rights and obligations under its rules, it has, as yet, developed no formal superior judicial or administrative authority, and that, as a consequence, to every state is accorded the right to determine for itself whether its international rights have been invaded. According to both practice and principle every state which considers itself aggrieved enjoys the sole right to decide the redress which it shall exact and, also, whether in a given case it has exhausted all the peaceful remedies it should pursue in order to secure redress. The use of force is a recognized legal remedy by which states may settle their differences. The debtor states should remember that states, like individuals, are entitled to maintain a reputable existence and to protect themselves from debilitation and destruction; that their dignity and reputation, their economic and social welfare, are so intimately bound up in the maintenance of the person and property of their subjects that they are compelled to guard jealously every invasion of the international rights to which their subjects, as nationals of a sovereign state, are entitled. The proposition of Dr. Drago, which the Secretary of State, Mr. Hay, characterized as "ably expounded," attracted considerable attention during the years 1903-1905 and was supposed to have been given a place on the program of the Third Pan-American Conference held at Rio de Janeiro in July, 1906. As scheduled for the consideration of the conference it read: A resolution recommending that the Second Peace Conference at The Hague be requested to consider whether and, if at all, to what extent the use of force for the collection of public debts is admissible. Dr. Drago has said that his proposal was "above all a statement of policy" for the states of the American continents to adopt. The resolution prepared for discussion at Rio de Janeiro proposed the question whether or not there should be submitted to the Second Hague Conference a question of law to which there was but one answer. For there is not the slightest doubt that as a matter of legal right, based on the practice and the principles applicable to the question proposed, each state determines for itself both the conditions under which it is justified in using force, and the extent to which it will go in the use of force, to collect the "public debts" due its subjects by another state. The Third Pan-American Conference in committee discussed the topic of its program and as a result of its deliberations formally resolved: To recommend to the governments represented therein that they consider the point of inviting the Second Peace Conference at The Hague to consider the question of the compulsory collection of public debts; and, in general, means tending to diminish between nations conflicts having an exclusively pecuniary origin. As a consequence of the action taken at Rio de Janeiro in 1906, the United States reserved the right to introduce to the consideration of the Second Hague Conference, as an addition to the regular program prepared by Russia, the question of an "agreement to observe certain limitations in the use of force in collecting public debts accruing from contracts.' The history of the subject in the Second Hague Conference has some interest. It was originally submitted to the conference in the following form: Dans le but d'éviter entre nations des conflits armés d'une originie purement pécuniaire, provenant de dettes contractuelles, réclamées comme dues aux su jets ou citoyens d'une pays, par le gouvernement d'un autre pays et afin de garantir que toutes les dettes contractuelles de cette nature qui n'auraient pu être réglées à l'amible par voie diplomatique, seront soumises à l'arbitrage, il est convenu qu'um recours à aucune mesure coercitive impliquant l'emploi de forces militaires ou navales pour le recouvrement de telles dettes contractuelles ne pourra avoir lieu jusqu'à ce qu'une offre d'arbitrage n'ait été faite par le créancier et refusée ou laissée sans réponse par le débiteur, ou jusqu'à ce que l'arbitrage n'aie eu lieu et que l'Etat débiteur ait manqué à se conformer à la sentence rendue. The obvious effect of this language was to recognize the legality of the use of force except in the cases enumerated. An examination of the official reports of the proceedings shows that the delegation of Sweden was the only one to raise an objection on this point, though Italy and Spain reserved a favorable vote on the convention till the language in which it was formulated was explained and made more explicit. Reservations of one sort or another were made by some twenty-four delegations. This was a surprise to General Porter, who had introduced the proposal with a clear and searching inquiry into the advantages which, he believed, would accrue to all the states. from the adoption of such a convention. He had called attention to the "growing impression that the employment of armed force to collect unadjusted contractual debts from a debtor nation, unless restricted by some general international agreement, may become the most fruitful source of wars, or at least give rise to frequent blockades, threats of hostilities, and rumors of warlike intentions calculated to interrupt commerce, affect the markets of the world adversely, create a feeling of uneasiness, and disturb not only the countries concerned in the dispute but neutral nations as well." He showed that the disposition of neutral states. to refuse to recognize the "pacific blockade," undertaken by a creditor state to compel the payment of such claims, necessarily leads to the effective blockade of actual war, and that the seizure of property and territory may naturally lead to a prolonged occupation, which may tend to disturb "the balance of power" and menace the world's peace. General Porter further pointed out that hostilities against a debtor state inevitably interrupt its foreign commerce, cut down its revenues from customs, and put it to the expense of resisting force by force-all of which merely diminished its means of paying its debts and aroused the anxiety of the subjects of other states respecting their claims against the common debtor to such an extent that their governments are frequently compelled to join in coercive measures against a debtor state whose finances may have become temporarily deranged from such natural causes as insurrections, loss of crops, floods, and earthquakes, and which, while without the means of making immediate payment, could meet all its obligations if given a reasonable time. * * * He quoted English and American statesmen to show that there is no absolute obligation on the part of a state to protect its subjects. in their transactions with a foreign state, and that intervention in every case is entirely a matter of "expediency." He showed how easy it is for a state to be imposed upon by the ex parte statements of an unprincipled speculator who "is playing a game" in which "if he gains millions his Government does not share, but if he loses he demands that it go even to the extent of war to secure sums claimed to be due and often grossly exaggerated." He spoke of "the early consideration and profound study given the general subject" by Dr. Drago, "one of our highly esteemed colleagues in this conference," and concluded by summing up the advantages which would accrue to the creditor, the neutral, and the debtor states, respectively, were the present convention against the use of force agreed to by all states. The certainty that "all disputed claims would be subject to adjudication by an impartial tribunal," he stated, would eliminate the speculators who "trade upon the necessities of feeble and embarrassed governments," and he might have added (if it had been diplomatic to do so) it would tend, also, to eliminate the improvident stipulations to which debtor states had been accustomed to agree. Of the reservations offered by the various delegations to the original convention submitted by the United States, there were two in particular which received the concurrence of several of the Latin American states: First, "recourse to arbitration should be permitted only in the case of denial of justice after the judicial remedies of the debtor state had been exhausted;" second, "claims arising from the public bonds of a debtor state should in no case be cause for a military attack or the actual occupation of American territory." The delegation of Venezuela led in insisting upon the first reserva |