Not without significance was the fact that, while the war in France for three months remained in a fluid state, the British achieved some success in it; that is to say, while the operations in 1914 bore some resemblance to others with which the British Army was familiar, that army proved its superior skill. Great Britain's original army, altho small, consisted of the most seasoned soldiers in Europe, and the demands made on generalship were demands with which that generalship was familiar. History may find in the part which the small British Army played in the retreat to the Marne one of the momentous single facts of the war. The Kaiser there flung the spear-head of his army at the British, and the attack virtually failed, despite its mass and impetus, not only because of the hard stuff of which the British Army was composed, but because in that phase of the war Sir John French, Sir Douglas Haig, and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien showed themselves masters of certain kinds of craft in war. Apprenticeship at Colesberg in South Africa where French and Haig had served together, the one as commander, the other as chief of staff, had prepared them for such an emergency. It would be no extravagant claim to say that this played a real part in saving France in a moment of supreme crisis. Hardly less momentous was the act of French which led him in the nick of time to transfer his army from the Aisne to Flanders. Here was an act of consummate daring, one which compelled him to spread out his line so thin that, as one might say, one could see rents in it. The risk was as great as any ever taken up by a general in the field; but it saved Calais, and much more than Calais. Few know how narrow that margin of safety was, how near at the end of ten days' struggle before Ypres the power of resistance had approached the exhaustion point; how in that moment it was the courage of French that inspired men and officers alike to "hold on" until aid came from Foch and the surging tide of the German attack was forced to fall back shattered and prone. French, who had led the British Army into France in August, 1914, commanded it from Mons to the Marne, and from the Marne to the Aisne and the Yser. He retired after the battle of Loos in December, 1915. He was sixty-two years of age when the war began. With two exceptions, Roberts and Kitchener, he was probably the most striking military figure in England. An eventful career had led him to India, Africa, and Canada, and with brilliant results. In the Boer War he was the one British general who was uniformly successful. His soldiers were popularly supposed to have had no sleep. During the siege of Kimberley he was shut up in Ladysmith, with Boer lines ever circling closer when no retreat was possible for English troops even if they had sought it. If Kimberley, with its treasure of diamonds, was to be saved from the Boers, its beleaguered troops had to be relieved, and French apparently was the only man who could accomplish that feat. The Boers were then permitting trains to run out of Ladysmith in order to carry women and children to safe places. In one of these, by squeezing himself under the seat of a secondclass carriage, French managed to make his escape. Once outside Boer lines, he made his way to the Cape when he was put in charge of about eight thousand cavalrymen. With horses dropping out about every mile, and stopping only long enough to annihilate any Boer force that was sent to impede their progress, these cavalrymen swept through the Free State, riding day and night until they reached Kimberley, which was just in time to save the place. Two days more would have seen its surrender. French's family intended him for the Church but when he was fourteen he chose the Navy instead, and joined the Britannia, but he left the Navy for the Army in 1874. He commanded the Nineteenth Hussars from 1889 to 1893, rising steadily in rank until, in 1907, he was made Inspector-General of the Forces, and in 1913 Field-marshal. His once fair hair had now become gray, but his Irish blue eyes had not lost their sparkle. Devotion to long tramps kept down the extra pounds which his short, stocky figure had showed a tendency to put on. It had been said that South Africa, where French served so conspicuously, was the grave of military reputations, a saying older than the second Boer war, but it was that war which gave the saying the significance that attached to it afterward. Buller's failure, altho most conspicuous, was only typical of what had happened in earlier stages of the war. In later ones Roberts and Kitchener, tho more successful, can not be said to have added to their reputations in that field. There was, however, one exception to a depressing rule-one reputation which had found in South Africa not a grave but a birthplace. That was French, who went into the Boer war unknown, and emerged from it with the most secure reputation as a fighting general in the British Army. This was no reflection on Kitchener, whose success was that of an organizer of war rather than of a general in the field. Until the Boer War brought the British Empire to a crisis, French had languished for lack of promotion. He was judged on the whole an unsafe man because of an apparently reckless gift for originality, and unsound because of the departures he had made from traditional military methods. The War Office disliked certain theories he had regarding the use of cavalry-for example, his suggestion to his men that they learn to fight on foot. He was passed over at a critical moment of his career by the Duke of Cambridge who could understand nothing about war unless Napoleon had endorsed it. Even his successes discredited him with the pedants of militarism, because those successes had been gained by means that were new and strange, and he had taken gamblers' chances. French's spirit, however, was not that of the gambler, but that of adventure itself. For this reason his boldness was never a bet on a proposition, but an intuitive perception of the chances that were in his favor. That was the impression French conveyed to Parisian journalists who strove afterward to explain him to the Boulevards. Anybody could see, remarked the Figaro, that French was essentially Irish. He had the merry Irish eye, the merry Irish laugh, even the Irish brogue. His gestures were quick, nervous, and eloquent. Not being a large man, French did not show his sixty-two years conspicuously. He shared the taste of the Duke of Wellington for cold meat, and was noted for a sweet tooth and a fondness for fiction. His favorite authors were French. He found satisfaction in the fact that his name itself was French, since his favorite authors, his favorite landscapes, and his favorite viands were all French. His success was the more enduring because it was won in a human and unpretentious way. He had not the grim aloofness of commanders like Wellington or Kitchener, nor did he cultivate Napoleonic arts. But he was hardly inferior to famous commanders in conveying one impression which is essential to all successful generals an impression that he had in him the secret of victory. Without that an army goes into battle robbed of its most powerful asset. French did not convey this impression by enveloping himself in an atmosphere of remoteness and mystery, but by showing a sane, balanced, daylight-mind, firm in judgments, yet open to conviction; masterful, yet without the blemish of vanity or ambition; profoundly informed, yet free from the taint of the mere doctrinaire. Cooperation among allies has always been a delicate and difficult operation. The relations of French and Joffre were therefore susceptible to strain and something like strain appears at times to have occurred. French was not only a field-marshal, and therefore at that time Joffre's superior in rank, but he had entered the war with a reputation established on the field of battle, while Joffre, his chief, had had no experience of war on a great scale. Nevertheless, the English commander gave the world an example of loyalty, not merely in deed and word, but in spirit."1 11 Compiled from articles by A. C. Gardiner in The Daily News (London), Alexander Harvey in Current Opinion and from The World's Work. JOSEPH SIMON GALLIENI, FRENCH GENERAL AND MILITARY GOVERNOR OF PARIS Gallieni's death in the midst of the war, while not unexpected, for he had long been seriously ill, created a deep impression in France, where he had been idolized by the people, particularly the poor, and was regarded as the savior of Paris in those critical days of August and September, 1914. He died at Versailles after a painful illness that culminated in an operation for transfusion of the blood, which gave only momentary hope. On the morrow of the defeat of the British and French at Mons-Charleroi, Gallieni was made Military Governor of Paris and during the first fortnight that he held this office a turning-point occurred in modern history. Because of the magnitude of the issues at stake, millions of people in those two weeks suffered anguish day after day-a period crowded with private and public tragedies. No one who was then in Paris could ever forget his sensations, nor could he forget the slight, nervous, yet dominating figure of the man who, well knowing that the old circle of Paris forts was unequal to the task that seemed about to fall to them, boldly announced that he would defend the city to the last. Following was the proclamation Gallieni issued : ARMY OF PARIS! INHABITANTS OF PARIS! The members of the Government of the Republic have left Paris, to give a new impetus to the national defense. I have received the order to defend Paris against the invader. This order I will carry out to the end. GALLIENI. The last few words of that manifesto became a popular French war cry, "Jusqu'au bout." Later he had a conversation with M. Millerand, the Minister of War. "I have come for your orders, Monsieur le Ministre," said he, as he entered. "If, unfortunately, the enemy should succeed in entering Paris, what am I to do?" To which Millerand replied: "Defend Paris quarter by quarter, house by house." "And if it becomes necessary to retire to the south side of the river?" asked Gallieni. "Then you will destroy the bridges," said the minister. "You can count on me," replied Gallieni, and the conversation ended. A witness of the scene compared Gallieni's manner to that of Rostopchin when he decided to burn Moscow rather than yield the city intact to Napoleon. The French Government had removed to Bordeaux, and with it had gone many foreigners, the idle rich, and a good many of the middle class. Parisians in general, however, remained with, and were faithful to, their Governor. Never before nor since had the city presented an air such as it did then and in ensuing months— an air of quiet dignity, of serene and spacious self-possession. Paris was not in a position to defend herself against a German flood. Modern artillery, if nothing else, had rendered her circle of forts little more than a nominal defense. As the public had known nothing of what was being done in preparation for a counterstroke on the Marne, the appointment of Gallieni came as a great relief. It meant a defense to the end. Every morning gangs of laborers left Paris in tourist motor char-à-bancs to work in throwing up trench-defenses. Countless indications showed that Gallieni was preparing to defend the city inch by inch. When finally Kluck swept down to the southeast, ignoring the capital and exposing his flank, Maunoury's army was hurried forward by every available means of transport until, on the Ourcq, it played a momentous part in winning the coming victory. All the organizing and administrative ability of Gallieni had been displayed in that flanking operation. The circumstances in which Gallieni did so much to save Paris were capable of two interpretations. All military critics admitted that he saved the city, but some declared that if he had carried out Joffre's orders exactly he would have done more he would have captured Kluck. Joffre, with "clairvoyant strategy,". had foreseen that the German right would press on until it reached the outer fortifications of Paris and then would swing to the southeast in an attempt to encircle the city. He knew that German lines of communication could not at once supply the necessary men, nor the heavy guns, for a siege, and that in the interval he could capture Kluck's army. For this eventuality, he had caused Gallieni to prepare a picked body of fighting menmostly colonials from Tunis-who at the critical moment were to deploy east of the capital in the direction of Châlons, thereby cutting off the Germans south of the line. The Germans advanced exactly as Joffre had foreseen. They reached the outer fortifications on September 3, and then swung to the southeast, enveloping La Ferté, Sézanne, and Vitry on September 5. Next day Joffre sent an order to division commanders, "Prepare to advance," intending that they should stiffen their lines and await further orders. On that day Maunoury, who commanded the French left north of Paris, sent word to Gallieni that his positions were in jeopardy, and Gallieni, collecting every available motor-car in Paris, rushed all his reserve troops to |