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was crystallized by the chairman of the Republican National Committee into the phrase "Internationalism vs. Nationalism."
In Denver and again at Pueblo the President stated that he would declare the Peace Treaty rejected if the Senate adopted, in its present form, the proposed reservation of the majority of the Foreign Relations Committee to Article X of the League Covenant. He was variously quoted as saying:
"The negotiation of treaties rests with the Executive of the United States. When the Senate has acted, it will be for me to determine whether its action constitutes an adoption or a rejection.
“Qualified adoption is not adoption. It is perfectly legitimate by a multiplicity of words to make the obvious more obvious, but qualifying means asking special privileges for the United States. We can not ask that. We must go in or stay out.
“We go in on equal terms or we don't go in at all.”
White House officials in the Presidential party "permitted it to become known” that the proposed recervation which the President would regard as rejecting the Treaty, if adopted, was that quoted by him at Salt Lake City as one that he had been informed had been agreed on by several Republican leaders in the Senate. This "proposed form of reservation," which the President intimated would "cut out the heart of this Covenant,” he cited as follows:
"The United States assumes no obligation under the provisions of Article X to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country or to interfere in controversies between other nations, whether members of the League or not, or to employ military and naval forces of the United States under any article for any purpose unless in any particular case that Congress, which under the Constitution has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of military and naval forces of the United States, shall by act or joint resolution so declare.
On November 19 the Senate rejected, by an overwhelming vote, the peace treaty. This had been presented by Senator Lodge, coupled with the following resolutions of ratification:
Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate advice and consent to the ratification of the treaty of peace with Germany concluded at Versailles on the twenty-eighth day of June, 1919, subject to the following reservations and under: standings, which are hereby made a part and condition of this resolution of ratification, which ratification is not to take effect or bind the United States until the said reservations and understandings adopted by the Senate have been accepted by an exchange of notes as a part and a condition of this resolution of ratification
by at least three of the four principal allied and associated powers, to wit, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan:
1. The United States so understands and construes Article 1 that in case of notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations, as provided in said article, the United States shall be the sole judge as to whether all its international obligations and all its obligations under the said covenant have been fulfilled, and notice of withdrawal by the United States may be given by a concurrent resolution of the Congress of the United States.
2. The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the ter. ritorial integrity or political independence of any other country or to interfere in controversies between nations—whether members of the League or not-under the provisions of Article 10, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Con. gress, which, under the Constitution has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military or naval forces of the United States, shall by act or joint resolution so provide.
3. No mandate shall be accepted by the United States under Article 22, Part 1, or any other provision of the treaty of peace with Germany, except by action of the Congress of the United States.
4. The United States reserves to itself exclusively the right to decide what questions are within its domestic jurisdiction and declares that all domestic and political questions relating wholly or in part to its internal affairs, including immigration, labor, coastwise traffic, the tariff, commerce, the suppression of traffic in women and children, and in opium and other dangerous drugs, and all other domestic questions, are solely within the jurisdiction of the United States and are not under this treaty to be submitted in any way either to arbitration or to the consideration of the Council or of the Assembly of the League of Nations, or any agency thereof, or to the decision or recommendation of any other power.
5. The United States will not submit to arbitration or to inquiry by the Assembly or by the Council of the League of Nations, provided for in said treaty of peace, any questions which in the judgment of the United States depend upon or relate to its longestablished policy, commonly known as the Monroe Doctrine; said doctrine is to be interpreted by the United States alone and is hereby declared to be wholly outside the jurisdiction of said League of Nations and entirely unaffected by any provision contained in the said treaty of peace with Germany.
6. The United States withholds its assent to Articles 156, 157, and 158, and reserves full liberty of action with respect to any controversy which may arise under said articles between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan.
7. The Congress of the United States will provide by law for the appointment of the representatives of the United States in the Assembly and the Council of the League of Nations, and may in its discretion provide for the participation of the United States in
any commission, committee, tribunal, court, council, or conference, or in the selection of any members thereof and for the appointment of members of said commisions, committees, tribunals, courts, councils, or conferences, or any other representatives under the treaty of peace, or in carrying out its provisions, and until such participation and appointment have been so provided for and the powers and duties of such representatives have been defined by law, no person shall represent the United States under either said League of Nations or the treaty of peace wth Germany, or be authorized to perform any act for or on behalf of the United States thereunder, and no citizen of the United States shall be selected or appointed as a member of said commisions, committees, tribunals, courts, councils, or conferences except with the approval of the Senate of the United States.
8. The United States understands that the Reparation Commission will regulate or interfere with exports from the United States to Germany, or from Germany to the United States, only when the United States by act or joint resolution of Congress approves such regulation or interference.
9. 'The United States shall not be obligated to contribute to any expenses of the League of Nations or of the secretariat, or of any commission, or committee, or conference or other agency, organized under the League of Nations or under the treaty or for the purpose of carrying out the treaty provisions, unless and until an appropriation of funds available for such expenses shall have been made by the Congress of the United States.
10. If the United States shall at any time adopt any plan for the limitation of armaments proposed by the Council of the League of Nations, under the provisions of Article 8, it reserves the right to increase such armaments without the consent of the Council whenever the United States is threatened with invasion or engaged in war.
11. The United States reserves the right to permit, in its discretion, the nationals of a covenant-breaking State, as defined in Article 16 of the covenant of the League of Nations, residing within the United States or in countries other than that violating said Article 16, to continue their commercial, financial, and personal relations with the nationals of the United States.
12. Nothing in Articles 296, 297, or in any of the annexes thereto or in any other article, section, or annex of the treaty of peace with Germany shall, as against citizens of the United States, be taken to mean any confirmation, ratification, or approval of any act otherwise illegal or in contravention of the right of citizens of the United States.
13. The United States withholds its assent to Part XIII (Articles 387 to 427, inclusive) unless Congress by act or joint resolution shall hereafter make provision for representation in the organization established by said Part XIII, and in such event the participation of the United States will be governed and conditioned by the provisions of such act or joint resolution.
14. The United States assumes no obligation to be bound by any
election, decision, report, or finding of the council or assembly in which any member of the League and its self-governing dominions, colonies, or parts of empire, in the aggregate have cast more than one vote, and assumes no obligation to be bound by any decision, report, or finding of the council or assembly arising out of any dispute between the United States and any member of the League if such member, or any self-governing dominion, colony, empire, or part of the empire united with it politically has voted.
Jubilation reigned in some quarters when this emphatic rejection came as a sensational climax to one of the most bitterly fought political battles in our history. By the opponents of the Administration and its peace-making policy it was hailed as an “American victory.”
The attitude of those “mild reservationists” who had been looked upon to effect a compromise "ratification with reservations,” but who finally voted for the Lodge program and against straight ratification, was indicated by these words of Senator Kellogg (Rep., Minn.):
“The people of the United States are generous. We are willing to join a League of Nations to insure a world peace, but we are not willing to give up the control of our domestic questions; we are not willing to pledge this nation to go to war and to send its sons abroad without the judgment of the American people, which must be exprest through their Congress.
But those who had expected much from the League were saddened at “the end of a dream," and by the conviction that our allies were left without the directing hand of America to keep them out of the maze of intrigue in which Europe was at war's edge for centuries.22
Now that the Treaty, if not dead, was in a state of suspended animation, as far as this country was concerned, until the opening of the next session of Congress, there was at once evinced by the spokesmen of both sides a desire to shift the responsibility for its rejection. On the one side such expressions as "assassinated by Republican Senators,” “the United States Senate under the bankrupt leadership of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge has killed the Peace Treaty,” were heard, and the statement was made that it was a work of blind partizan recklessness done in callous disregard of the need and the suffering of nations.23
But Republican papers, including dailies of all shades of friendliness and hostility to the League of Nations joined in laying the responsibility for the failure of the Treaty at the President's own door, in effect charging him with “infanticide.” It was said that this country and the world are familiar with the record of how the 2 The Commercial (New York). 23 The Times (New York).
President refused to take counsel; of how he arrived in Europe without a plan; of how he adopted the theory, now an admitted blunder, of uniting in one instrument the distinct problems of settling one war and of creating safeguards for future peace; of how he boasted he had so cunningly arranged matters that the covenant could not have separate consideration and that the Senate must accept a covenant secretly written or not have peace at all; of how he revealed his ambition to be the sole treaty-making power, whereas the Constitution provides he shall have partners; of how in one breath he has conceded the just basis of the demand for reservations and in the next has said he would not accept them.24
Apart from the foregoing partizan expression it was felt by many that statesmanship had been lacking on both sides, and the conviction was hopefully exprest that the Senate's rejection was not final or that the ratification would not be very long delayed. It was hoped that before Congress met again in December the basis might be reached.
That the Allies intended to go on without American cooperation was shown by the fact that the day after the United States Senate rejected the Treaty, the Supreme Council at Paris decided that the nations which have already accepted the Treaty would exchange formal ratifications in time for the pact to become effective on December 1.
The Prince of Wales, who had been making an extended tour through Canada, arrived in Washington on November 11 as a guest of the nati The royal special tr was received by a guard of honor of Marines, and the Prince was welcomed by Vice-President Marshall, General Pershing, Viscount Grey, General March, and other prominent men. During his stay in Washington the Prince visited President Wilson at the White House and exprest his gratification at Mr. Wilson's improvement in health. On November 19 he went to New York, landed at the Battery and proceeded up Broadway to the City Hall where he was welcomed by Secretary of State Hugo and the Mayor. During his stay in New York he visited West Point and was a guest at a dinner given by the Pilgrims of the United States. He was most cordially received by the public wherever he went and it was remarked after his departure on H.M.S. Renown on November 22 that "he was the most successful ambassador that Great Britain had ever sent to this country.”
The practical dismissal of Mr. Lansing the Secretary of State, by President Wilson on February 13, 1920, startled the United States and Europe.
The correspondence which culminated in the President's acceptance * 'cbe Tribune (New York).