Clear in my convictions of right, strong in the consciousness that I have ever been, and still am, actuated solely by love of my country, knowing that no ambitious or selfish motives have influenced me from the commencement of this war, I do now, what I never did in my life before: I entreat that this order may be rescinded. If my counsel does not prevail, I will, with a sad heart, obey your orders to the utmost of my powers, devoting to the movement, one of the utmost difficulty, whatever skill I may possess, whatever the result may be; and may God grant that I am mistaken in my forebodings. I shall at least have the internal satisfaction that I have written and spoken frankly, and have sought to do the best in my power to arrest disaster from my country. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, Major General. Major General HALLECK, Commander-in-Chief. HEADQUARTERS ARMY, Washington, D. C., November 23, 1862. Official copy. No. 2. WASHINGTON, August 6, 1862. GENERAL: Your telegram of yesterday was received this morning, and I immediately telegraphed a brief reply, promising to write you more fully by mail. You, general, certainly could not have been more pained at receiving my order than I was at the necessity of issuing it. I was advised by high officers, in whose judgment I had great confidence, to make the order immediately on my arrival here; but I determined not to do so until I could learn your wishes from a personal interview, and, even after that interview, I tried every means in my power to avoid withdrawing your army, and delayed my decision as long as I dared to delay it. I assure you, general, it was not a hasty and inconsiderate act, but one that caused me more anxious thought than any other of my life. But after full and mature consideration of all the pros and cons, I was reluctantly forced to the conclusion that the order must be issued. no alternative. There was to my mind You and your officers, Allow me to allude to a few of the facts of the case. at our interview, estimated the enemy's force, in and around Richmond, at two hundred thousand men. Since then, you and others report that they have received and are receiving large re-enforcements from the south. General Pope's army, now covering Washington, is only forty thousand. Your effective force is only about ninety thousand; you are thirty miles from Richmond, and General Pope eighty or ninety, with the enemy directly between you, ready to fall with superior numbers upon one or the other, as he may elect. Neither can re-enforce the other in case of such an attack. If General Pope's army be diminished to re-enforce you, Washington, Maryland, and Pennsylvania would be left uncovered and exposed. If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope, you will be too weak to even hold the position you now occupy, should the enemy turn round and attack you in full force. In other words, the old army of the Potomac is split into two parts, with the entire force of the enemy directly between them. They cannot be united by land without exposing both to destruction; and yet they must be united. To send Pope's forces by water to the peninsula, is, under present circumstances, a military in possibility. The only alternative is to send the forces on the peninsula to some point by water, say Fredericksburg, where the two armies can be united. Let me now allude to some of the objections which you have urged. You say that to withdraw from the present position will cause the certain demoralization of the army, "which is now in excellent discipline and condition." I cannot understand why a simple change of position to a new and by no means distant base will demoralize an army in excellent discipline, unless the officers themselves assist in that demoralization, which I am satisfied they will not. Your change of base, from your extreme right at Hanover Court-House to your present position, was over thirty miles, but I have not heard that it demoralized your troops, notwithstanding the severe losses they sustained in effecting it. A new base on the Rappahannock, at Fredericksburg, brings you within about sixty miles of Richmond, and secures a re-enforcement of forty or fifty thousand fresh and disciplined troops. The change, with such advantages, will, I think, if properly represented to your army, encourage, rather than demoralize, your troops. Moreover, you yourself suggested that a junction might be effected at Yorktown, but that a flank march across the peninsula would be more hazardous than to retire to Fort Monroe. You will remember that Yorktown is two or three miles further from Richmond than Fredericksburg is; besides, the latter is between Richmond and Washington, and covers Washington from any attack by the enemy. The political effect of the withdrawal may at first be unfavorable; but I think the public are beginning to understand its necessity, and that they will have much more confidence in a united army than in its separate fragments. But you will reply, why not re-enforce me here, so that I can strike Richmond from my present position? To do this, you said at our interview that you required fifty thousand additional troops. I told you that it was impossible to give you so many. You finally thought you would have "some chance" of success with twenty thousand. But you afterwards telegraphed to me that you would require thirty-five thousand, as the enemy was being largely re-enforced. If your estimate of the enemy's strength was correct, your requisition was perfectly reasonable, but it was utterly impossible to fill it, until new troops could be enlisted and organized, which would require several weeks. To keep your army in its present position until it could be so re-enforced would almost destroy it in that climate. The months of August and September are almost fatal to whites who live on that part of James river; and even after you should get the re-enforcements asked for you admitted that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries before you could advance on Richmond. It is by no means certain that the reduction of these fortifications would not require considerable time, perhaps as much as those at Yorktown. This delay might not only be fatal to the health of your army, but in the meantime General Pope's forces would be exposed to the heavy blows of the enemy, without the slightest hope of assistance from you. In regard to the demoralizing effect of a withdrawal from the peninsula to the Rappahannock, I must remark that a large number of your highest officers, indeed a majority of those whose opinions have been reported to me, are decidedly in favor of the movement. Even several of those who originally advocated the line of the peninsula now advise its abandonment. be I have not inquired, and do not desire to know, by whose advice or for what reason the army of the Potomac was separated into two parts, with the enemy tween them. I must take things as I find them. I find the forces divided, and I wish to reunite them. Only one feasible plan has been presented for doing this. If you or any one else had presented a better one, I certainly should have adopted it; but all of your plans require re-enforcements, which it is impossible to give you. It is very easy to ask for re-enforcements, but it is not so easy to give them when you have no disposable troops at your command. I have written very plainly, as I understand the case, and I hope you will give me credit for having fully considered the matter, although I may have 'arrived at different conclusions from your own. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. Major General MCCLELLAN, Official copy. J. C. KELTON, Assistant Adjutant General. No. 3. No. 58.] HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA, The column of the enemy alluded to in my despatch of 12.30 p. m. to-day passed Gaines's Cross Roads, and when last seen, near sunset, was passing to the northeast under the east base of Buck mountain, in the direction of Salem and Rectortown. I am inclined to believe that this column is only covering the flank of the main body, which is moving towards Front Royal and Thornton's Gap, though of this I am not certain. I shall push a strong reconnoissance across the river at Waterloo bridge and Sulphur Springs early in the morning, to ascertain whether the main body of the enemy has really left, and if so, to push forward on their rear. There is certainly no force opposite Rappahannock station. McDowell's is the only corps that is at all reliable that I have; Sigel, as you know, is perfectly unreliable; and I suggest that some officer of superior rank be sent to command his army corps. His conduct to-day has occasioned me great dissatisfaction. Banks's corps is very weak, not amounting to more than five thousand men, and is much demoralized. Kearney's division is the only one that has yet reached me from Alexandria. I shall, at all events, push McDowell's corps and Kearney's division upon the enemy's rear, if I find my suspicions confirmed in the morning. I shall also put Reno across the river, at Rappahannock station, and direct him to move cautiously upon Culpeper. Banks's corps must be left somewhere in the rear, to be set up again. Sigel's corps, although composed of some of the best fighting material we have, will never do much service under that officer. I will communicate further with you in the morning. Major General HALLECK, General-in-Chief. Official copy. JOHN POPE, Major General. J. C. KELTON, Assistant Adjutant General. No. 6. WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington City, October 27, 1862. GENERAL: It has been publicly stated that the army under General McClellan has been unable to move during the fine weather of this fall for want of shoes, clothing, and other supplies. You will please report to this department upon the following points: 1st. To whom, and in what manner, the requisitions for supplies to the army under General McClellan have been made since you assumed command as general-in-chief, and whether any requisition for supplies of any kind has since that time been made upon the Secretary of War, or communication had with him, except through you? 2d. If you, as general-in-chief, have taken pains to ascertain the condition of the army in respect to supplies of shoes, clothing, arms, and other necessaries, and whether there has been any neglect or delay, by any department or bureau, in filling the requisitions for supplies, and what has been, and is, the condition of that army, as compared with other armies, in respect to supplies? 3d. At what date after the battle of Antietam the orders to advance against the enemy were given to General McClellan, and how often have they been repeated? 4th. Whether, in your opinion, there has been any want in the army under General McClellan of shoes, clothing, arms, or other equipments or supplies, that ought to have prevented its advance against the enemy when the order was given? 5th. How long was it after the orders to advance were given to General McClellan before he informed you that any shoes or clothing were wanted in his army, and what are his means of promptly communicating the wants of the army to you, or to the proper bureaus of the War Department? Yours truly, SIR: In reply to the several interrogatories contained in your letter of yesterday, I have to report: 1st. That requisitions for supplies to the army under General McClellan are made by his staff officers on the chiefs of bureaus here—that is, for quartermaster's supplies by his chief quartermaster on the quartermaster general; for commissary supplies by his chief commissary on the commissary general, &c. No such requisitions have been, to my knowledge, made upon the Secretary of War, and none upon the general-in-chief. 2d. On several occasions General McClellan has telegraphed to me that his army was deficient in certain supplies. All these telegrams were immediately referred to the heads of bureaus, with orders to report. It was ascertained that in every instance the requisitions had been immediately filled, except one, where the quartermaster general had been obliged to send from Philadelphia certain articles of clothing, tents, &c., not having a full supply here. There has not been, so far as I could ascertain, any neglect or delay, in any department or bureau, in issuing all supplies asked for by General McClellan, or by the officers of his staff. Delays have occasionally occurred in forwarding supplies by rail, on account of the crowded condition of the depots, or of a want of cars; but, whenever notified of this, agents have been sent out to remove the difficulty. Under the excellent superintendence of General Haupt, I think these delays have been less frequent and of shorter duration than is usual with freight trains. Any army of the size of that under General McClellan will frequently be for some days without the supplies asked for, on account of neglect in making timely requisitions, and unavoidable delays in forwarding them, and in distributing them to the different brigades and regiments. From all the information I can obtain, I am of opinion that the requisitions from that army have been filled more promptly, and that the men, as a general rule, have been better supplied than our armies operating in the west. The latter have operated at much greater distances from the sources of supply, and have had far less facilities for transportation. In fine, I believe that no armies in the world, while in campaign, have been more promptly or better supplied than ours. On 3d. Soon after the battle of Antietam, General McClellan was urged to give me information of his intended movements, in order that, if he moved between the enemy and Washington, re-enforcements could be sent from this place. the 1st of October, finding that he purposed to operate from Harper's Ferry, I urged him to cross the river at once and give battle to the enemy, pointing out to him the disadvantages of delaying till the autumn rains had swollen the Potomac and impaired the roads. On the 6th of October he was peremptorily ordered "to cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south. Your army must move now, while the roads are good." It will be observed that three weeks have elapsed since this order was given. 4th. In my opinion, there has been no such want of supplies in the army under General McClellan as to prevent his compliance with the orders to advance against the enemy. Had he moved to the south side of the Potomac, he could have received his supplies almost as readily as by remaining inactive on the north side. 5th. On the 7th of October, in a telegram in regard to his intended movements, General McClellan stated that it would require at least three days to supply the first, fifth, and sixth corps; that they needed shoes and other indispensable articles of clothing, as well as shelter tents. No complaint was made that any requisitions had not been filled, and it was inferred from his language that he was only waiting for the distribution of his supplies. On the 11th he telegraphed that a portion of his supplies sent by rail had been delayed. As already stated, agents were immediately sent from here to investigate this complaint, and they reported that everything had gone forward. On the same date (the 11th) he spoke of many of his horses being broken down by fatigue. On the 12th he complained that the rate of supply was only one hundred and fifty horses per week for the entire army there and in front of Washington. I immediately directed the quartermaster general to inquire into this matter, and to report why a larger supply was not furnished. General Meigs reported, on the 14th, that the average issue of horses to General McClellan's army in the field and in front of Washington, for the previous six weeks, had been 1,450 per week, or 8,754 in all; in addition, that a large number of mules had been supplied, and that the number of animals with General MeClellan's army on the upper Potomac was over 31,000. He also reported that he was then sending to that army all the horses he could procure. On the 18th, General McClellan stated, in regard to General Meigs's report |