H. OF R.

FEBRUARY, 1809.

I understood the American Commissioners to say that, in addition to whatever passed in writing between you, they received from your Lordships an informal assurance of something that "should, in its practical effect, remove the grievance complained of." By "the grievance complained of," I understood the Commissioners to mean the practice of impressment itself, not any abuses of that practice.

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Your Lordships deny that any forbearance was promised, in the sense of any suspension or discontinuance of the practice," and your Lordships refer to your note of the 8th of November, as containing the correct statement of what you communicated to the American Commissioners.

The note of the 8th of November certainly promises forbearance in the practice, but not a discontinuance of the practice of impressment.

I am therefore under the necessity of requesting your Lordships to have the goodness to state to me whether the note of the 8th of November does, according to your Lordships' recollection and belief, contain the whole of what was promised or held out by your Lordships to the American Commissioners upon this point?

Whether whatever else passed (if anything else did pass) in conversation, was in strict conformity to that note; implying no further concession or forbearance, on the part of Great Britain, and authorizing no further expectation on the part of the United States!

If this be so, it does appear to me that the American Commissioners have misconceived the effect of your Lordships' communication to them; and must have represented it to their Government as implying a much larger concession than was in fact in your Lordships' contemplation.

I have the honor to be, &c.

GEORGE CANNING.

R. Hon. Lords HOLLAND and AUCKLAND.

understand, nor do we now understand that, by that note, we pledged our Government to abstain in future from the practice of impressing British seamen from American vessels. We certainly, however, did mean to pledge the British Government to make its cruisers observe the utmost caution, moderation, and forbearance, in the exercise of that practice; but we never either expressed or implied that they were to desist from taking British seamen from American merchant ships. We farther engaged, that our Government would be at all times ready to take into its serious consideration any proposal made to it by the American Government, for the recovery of deserters from the British Navy, who take refuge in the American territory or on board of American ships, without having recourse to the means which are at present resorted to for that purpose.

Whatever passed in conversation was, we conceive, in strict conformity to that note, and implied no farther concession nor forbearance, on the part of Great Britain, than extreme caution and moderation in the exercise of the right, which alone, without any discontinuance, much less renunciation of the practice, we expressed our confident hope would be sufficient to prevent such inconveniences and outrages as the American Commissioners represented, and contended, had frequently arisen from it.

We have the honor to be, &c.

VASSAL HOLLAND. AUCKLAND.

Right Hon. GEORGE CANNING. Nothing can be more explicit, and prove the mistake of our Ministers more unequivocally; nay, more, the Commissioners say, "the treaty was in itself complete and unconditional, and subject to no reservation on either part, except what was 'expressed in the note of the 30th of December," wherein Great Britain reserved the right, not withstanding the treaty, to chastise us if we did not

Letter from Lords Holland and Auckland to Mr. Secretary Canning, dated August 10, 1807. SIR: In answer to your letter of the 6th instant, we have the honor to repeat our former assurances that it is our desire, as it is our duty, to give you every possible information respecting the negotiation with the American Commissioners, which His Majesty was lately pleased to entrust to us.

As the points in which our answer to your letter of the 25th ultimo has not appeared to you sufficiently clear and satisfactory, we must again refer you to our official note, of the 8th of November last, as containing

a full and authentic statement of what was settled be

tween us and the American Commissioners, with regard to the impressment of British seamen from on board of American ships. That note was delivered after many fruitless conferences held for the purpose of devising some expedient that might reconcile the interests and pretensions of both nations on this important point. But finding, after much careful consideration of the different plans proposed to us, that the difficul

might prescribe; and Mr. Canning echoes the same sentiments. The information he obtained, was a prelude to his note, in reply to Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney, of the 22d of October, 1807. See page 224, of No. 3; therein Mr. C. states: "The treaty was considered, by those who signed it, as a complete and perfect instrument. No engagements were ever entered into, on the part of His Majesty, as connected with the treaty. he adds, that, with respect to impressments, it except such as appear upon the face of it." And. must be understood to have had in view the renewal of such discussions, not as forming any ceal my surprise, sir, at finding Mr. Monroe, who part of the treaty then signed." I will not condoubtless knew of the correspondence, and received the foregoing answer, persisting in his constructions, and urging upon the nation that it was understood, "that no impressment should be made upon the high seas." The gentleman quoted the documents to prove that the Government were satisfied with the exertions of our Ministers.

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No doubt they were-I believe every man in the nation was satisfied with their exertions; for I take a wide distinction between their exertions and their acts; and I wish not to be misunderstood in doing so. I give them credit for great talents and patriotism, pressed, as they were, by the convulsions in Europe, and the solicitude to settle our disputes; they assumed a latitude of discretion consistent with the genius of our Government, and its honorable conduct in the turmoils of diplomacy. European Ministers march by the plumb-line and square, of their limited instructions; whilst ours, having a wide latitude, may honestly transcend thir bounds. We, however, at a distance from the scene, can look more calmly at the passing events there, and refuse to shift our course, because of their supposed importance. I think they were mistaken, in making a treaty in express violation of their instructions; and I think they also erred, in exciting a hope that they had agreed, (see page 119, of No. 3,) on that day, "to conclude a treaty on all the points which had formed the object of their negotiation." I well recollect the pleasure that was excited here, when this information reached us; for it was communicated forthwith by a special message. But do I therefore doubt of their exertions? Assuredly not; I will be just to them, while I am performing my duty to my country. Sir, I am in the performance of a great duty. The awful situation of this nation, on the verge of war on the one hand, and the abyss of dishonor and destruction on the other, demands, at our hands, that no unjust charge shall be suffered to go out to the people, without its antidote; it is right that they should see and know what their Government has done to preserve peace; the grounds upon which our claims have been rested; and the offers which have been made. Mr. Monroe has complained, but I think it was without just cause; for who is most in fault, the Government, in conforming to their instructions, or he, in departing from

them?

The gentleman from Delaware accuses the Administration of inconsistency, in offering to place our whole relations upon an informal arrangement, after having rejected the treaty with the informal arrangement concerning seamen: and Mr. Monroe's letter (Doc. No. 4, p. 14) is referred to, urging the same charge. Sir, I make a most material distinction between placing the whole relations upon an informal understanding, and treating away everything we had to give, while the essential equivalents were merely informally reserved. In the former case, we should retain what we had to offer the quid pro quoand in the latter, success could not be expected by us, as no indulgence could be tendered to induce a relaxation on the part of Great Britain. But, I contend that Mr. Monroe is mistaken in what he asserts relative to this subject. Mr. Madison's letter of the 20th May, 1807, states explicitly that The President is constrained to decline any arrangement, formal or informal, which does not comprise a provision against impressments from American vessels." The gentleman from Dela

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ware says, Great Britain never will abandon the practice of impressment; she would rather go to war. Mr. Monroe says the same; for "the navy and country are opposed to it." And in Doc. No. 4, p. 11, he says Great Britain will not treat, unless the non-importation law is thereby repealed. Doc. No. 3, p. 139-They would not indemnify us for seizures, in violation of the law of nations. Same, p. 123-The East India Company will not give up anything in relation to the trade to the East Indies.

Same, p. 129-The West India merchants will not permit us to trade, under any restrictions, to the West Indies.

Same, p. 132-They would not agree to any definition, by treaty, concerning blockades. Same, p. 134-They would not permit us to enjoy the colonial trade, unless it was embarrassed by circuitous voyages and taxation.

Doc. No. 2, p. 6-They would not regulate the right of search by any reasonable stipulations. Doc. No. 4, p. 144-And they would rather fight us, than yield much.

Pray, Mr. Chairman, what are the claims of the American Government, and what are the points of collision or importance, to be considered in treating with Great Britain? Expressly those, and those alone, which have just been recapitulated; all of which are resisted; and we are officially informed they would rather have war with us than yield either. Gracious God! Are we a nation? Have we not already become base and degenerate in the very morn of our political existence, and unworthy of the liberty so dearly purchased? Why would we treat with any nation? I suppose, sir, that we may receive indemnity for the past and security for the future; and, regardless of both, with a rod suspended over our heads, we treat; and, tremble with pale fear; sacrificing all-obtaining neither. We give up everything-we receive nothing-with a knowledge, too, derived from the pages of experience, that the nation that consents to the surrender of one right, thereby invites attacks upon those remaining. The gentleman from Delaware says, we might have continued the Treaty of 1794, and avoided the embarrassments we are subjected to. The Treaty of 1794 has already passed the ordeal of public opinion. The Republicans of this country condemned it then, and few of them, I presume, would applaud it now.

But I will take a cursory view of that treaty, to see if it contained any security against those embarrassments, and if it is such an one as can be accepted.

The first ten articles are declared perpetual and irrevocable, and it is unnecessary to give any analysis of them.

The eleventh is a mere preamble to the commercial articles.

The twelfth article was rejected. It related to the West India trade.

The thirteenth permitted a trade to the British East Indies, embarrassed with restrictions incompatible with a liberal policy. It required that we should bring their products to the United States.

H. OF R.

FEBRUARY, 1809.

that they are not sufficiently restrained. The 20th relates to the punishment of piracynot objectionable.

The 15th provides that no prohibition shall be imposed on the exportation or importation of any articles that do not extend to all nations. Thus, if an equivalent were given by any other nation for certain commercial privileges, which may often occur in a young nation like this-as in the purchase of territory, &c., Great Britain became, ipso facto, entitled to them; whereas she having a redundant population and undergoing no change, and, permit me to add, never granting any indulgence in her European possessions to any, was sure to profit by it, while we gained nothing.

The 16th permits the residence of Consulstheirs in all our seaports-ours in Great Britain and Ireland only.

The 17th stipulates for captures in cases where there is a just suspicion of having enemies' property on board-this sanction to seizures on suspicion is objectionable, because the captors have so strong an interest to suspect, that they will not, living as they do upon plunder, have virtue sufficient to resist the bribe.

The 18th relates to contraband, and comprehends timber, hemp, plank, &c., which cught to be excluded from the list, upon every principle of right and justice. This is not all; it expresses that there is a difficulty in deciding in what cases provisions and other articles are contraband. It would be difficult, indeed, to decide the affirmative-but there never should have been a difficulty allowed to exist in so clear and palpable a case; and a case, too, of such immense interest to this nation, whereby Great Britain could with a single fiat cut off our great staples," our provisions and other articles," from their market. The stipulation that they shall pay the full value for them in cases of seizure is a flimsy security. Where? at what place is the value to be ascertained? None is mentioned; of course, then, at the British ports, already glutted with our produce, being made the emporium of our commerce. A more pernicious and anti-neutral article could not have been devised; and, immediately succeeding the seizure of our provision-vessels by the Orders of 1793, it gave a sanction to the principle, that Great Britain, when commanding the ocean, may starve other nations into submission.

The 19th article relates to privateers. The ob

The 23d article throws open all our ports to their armed vessels, and declares that those insulting the officers shall be punished-it further provides for our admission and stay until time to refit, when driven in by the dangers of the seas into their prohibited ports; let it be recollected that none of ours are prohibited-all are open to them. But to this article there are other insuperable objections. While the British navy have the right to enter our ports without limitation as to numbers; they hold us as much in their power as Bonaparte does Prussia, when his armies occupy all their strong fortresses, and their weak ones too-we are bound to punish the citizen who insults the British officer; and why not punish the officer, too, who insults the citizen? We have an awful lesson on this score in the murder of Pierce-the affair of the Cambrian, and many others-they were punished by promotion.

The 24th prohibits the arming of privateersno objection to it.

The 25th. This article permits their vessels to enter with their prizes wherever they please; exempts them from search or duties, and prohibits the like permission to any other nation-this is a most unneutral and partial stipulation.

The 26th provides that, in case of war, the merchants may remain as long as they please among us, to carry on trade. Sir, to this there are two strong objections. 1st. They are a curse to us in time of peace, and they would be far worse in a period of war-spies upon us, and moneyed spies too; their whole wealth and power would be brought to bear upon our people for the purpose of corrupting them. 2d. I will ever maintain the position that private property is no more justly liable to seizure at sea than on land; and, unless they would refrain from taking ours at sea, I would retaliate by sequestering theirs on land.

The 27th requires that fugitives shall be delivered up. Under this article, Jonathan Robbins was offered up, and sacrificed.

The 28th relates to the limitation of the articles; the first ten to be permanent, the others to be in force until two years after the signature of preliminary articles of peace. This being the import of the treaty, and the effect of all the articles, which I have separately considered, lest it might be supposed that those omitted contained something favorable, I ask any candid man, if it ought again to be renewed? And, if it were, wherein is to be "indemnity or security?" The good, if any, were contained in the first ten articles, and they were executed, except so far as re

lates to their permanency. They, indeed, contained much good; and one article, relating to the Western posts, swallowed up all that were obnoxious. You must recollect, Mr. Chairman, with what eloquence and effect that consideration was pressed upon Congress; gentlemen who never saw an Indian, all at once felt uncommon sympathy for us Western people; they painted, in vivid colors, the relentless barbarity of the savages, who waged a war of extermination against us; no age, no sex, no condition, exempting any from the indiscriminate murder of all; led on, too, by British officers, fighting in their ranks and commanding the expeditions-deriving supplies and protection from these posts, and stimulated there, to lay our country waste, and cut off its scattered population. It contemplated a lottery provision, too, for indemnity; five Commission ers were to be appointed; two by Great Britain, and two by the President, and if they could not agree upon the fifth, lots were to be cast. Well, sir, the British Commissioners decided against our merchants, the American ones in their favor; they could not agree upon the fifth, and accordingly drew lots, "and the lot fell upon Jonah;" we got the Commissioner, and our merchants were paid for unlawful spoliations. We had, to be sure, a hard bargain for this favor, as we engaged to pay the old British debts, due from individuals, to an enormous amount; but, through the provident management of the present Administration, we commuted them for a gross sum of £600,000 sterling.

Let it be recollected, sir, that we were then in the gristle; now we are hardened into the bone of manhood; and what might have been a good treaty then, while our resources and industry were merely unfolding themselves, would be a bad one now, that we are a great, free, and powerful nation. Such as I have rapidly reviewed them, are some of the inherent objections to the Treaty of 1794. It has many sins of omission to answer for. It contained no provision concerning impressments. The West Indies were shut to us. There was no regulation about the colonial trade, and nothing concerning blockades.

Well, sir, the Administration has been accused of error in refusing to accept the Treaty of 1806. It is worse than the former; and proceeding with my first design to make this a matter of fact argument, I will take a review of that treaty also."

H. OF R.

the United States. The great value of that trade, as regulated by the Treaty of 1794, consisted in carrying the produce of the United States to a market in Europe, receiving specie and other articles of traffic there, and going thence to the East Indies; thereby deriving all the benefits accruing from double freights and double profits. The same benefits resulted from the traffic on the return voyages. Under this article the trade would drain the country of specie, as with specie principally is it carried on. It, like the Treaty of 1794, prohibits our citizens from settling or residing there, and from going into the interior.

Article 4th relates to the trade with the United States and Europe-all our States and Territories are thrown open for Europe alone; it is precisely similar to the 14th article of the Treaty of 1794, and the objections urged to that, apply to it.

Article 5th is like the 15th of the Treaty of 1794. It repeals our non-importation act, and prohibits all other restrictive measures, which it may be politic to enact hereafter. There is no reciprocity in it; we are not a manufacturing people, and, through restrictions upon manufactures, we wield a potent engine-and the power of discriminating ought not to be relinquished.

Article 6th declares that the subject of intercourse with the West Indies shall be postponed. Sir, they cannot subsist without the supplies received from us; and yet they will not allow us to trade thither, at a time when every port we own is thrown open to them.

Article 7th relates to Consuls, and is similar to the 16th in the Treaty of 1794—the same objections apply to it; their Consuls are allowed to reside at any of our ports-ours are confined to Europe, and excluded from the East and West Indies, and all other places.

Article 8th concerns captures on just suspicion of being enemy's property. It is similar to the 17th of the Treaty of 1794, and liable to all the objections urged in relation to it.

Article 9th is on the subject of contraband, and includes timber, hemp, plank, &c., which should have been exempted, after the example of the Russian Treaty; and, being the growth and produce of our country, such exemption was the more important to us.

Article 2d renews the ten permanent articles of the Treaty of 1794, by way of brightening the chain of our recollection.

Article 3d regulates our trade to the East Indies, and is materially worse than that of 1794: by it we are confined to a direct trade from the United States to them, and directly from them to

substituted for real ones, and whole islands, kingdoms, and continents, were declared to be blockaded, when the combined fleets of Europe could not effect it.

Article 11th is on the subject of the colonial trade; the restraints upon it are incompatible with the character of independence, and, at first view, the mind is struck with the outrageous attempt of Great Britain to dictate to us in what manner we

H. OF R.

FEBRUARY, 1809.

Article 12th concerns maritime jurisdiction, but within the defined limits permits the right of search, to see if the vessel belongs to an enemy. Within our jurisdictional limits we must maintain exclusive jurisdiction, or fritter away our independence within them it is a universally acknowledged principle, that the national sovereignty is as complete at sea as on land: nay, so inviolable is that sovereignty, that even enemy's vessels are exempt from attack and capture. It is true, that in the case of the Impetueux, Great Britain trampled upon the law of nations; but it is not the less obligatory, although we submitted to the degradation of its violation. Once allow the right of search for the purpose expressed, and the most alarming abuses will follow. In this article there is no provision against hovering around our ports, and taking stations there, to surprise and vex our inward and outward bound trade-a provision of indispensable necessity, taught us by the melancholy lessons at New York; for that important place has been effectually blockaded by British vessels. Our jurisdic tion must be complete and exclusive.

Art. 13th regulates the right of search: it is to be exercised as favorably as the course of the war may permit, observing as much as possible the principles of the law of nations. This is a latitude, boundless as the universe; it is completely undefined; it is a mockery of our understandings. Great Britain may give new aspects to the war every day, and being sole judge of the favorable course which the war may permit, will riot upon our rights. It acknowledges the justice of, nay, sanctions a departure from the law of nations: better, therefore, be without the article entirely. Every man who has attended to the history of our humiliations at sea, must recollect the many complaints of abuses in relation to the right of search. Instead of keeping at a proper distance, and limiting the number allowed to visit our merchant vessel, for the purpose of examining her character and lading, our captain is ordered with his papers to come on board of the British ship, launched in his crazy boat upon a boisterous sea, |

cases and to restitution for unlawful captures: a copy of the sentence and proceedings of the admiralty courts shall be given, if required. Sir, it should have gone further, and compelled the admiralty judge to have stated the grounds of his opinion. Let it be recollected that the court is an ex parte one: we have no security for its integrity, and the abuses committed by them are alarming. Their forms of judgments are, "condemned as enemy's property, or otherwise"-and our courts, where cases depending upon those decisions have come before them, decide that the decree is conclusive, unless there is error apparent on the face of it. Indeed, I believe they go further, and condescend to be the mere registers of the British Admiralty edicts. How can an error in the opinion of the judge appear when he condemns on the ground of "enemy's property, or otherwise?" There is an extreme necessity for some checks. Sir William Scott, judge of the High Court of Admiralty, who has assumed to himself the high character of impartial expounder of the law of nations, for all nations, with all his great talents, has been unable to reconcile his inconsistent, time-serving, varying decisions; and, failing in that, has been at length compelled to take refuge under the orders of the British Privy Council: the laws of nations, of reason, morality, and everything else, being disregarded. Sir, there is no provision for a bona fide restitution; and in proof of the abuses practised, I will state a case which occurred last summer: A vessel belonging to an American merchant was dispatched in ballast to Guadaloupe, under a permission from the President, to collect a debt due to him there. Being prohibited by the embargo laws from carrying any lading, the owner drew bills upon his debtors, and not being able to obtain specie, or perhaps desiring to import some of the productions of the island into the United States, as he lawfully might, he received sugar, &c., in discharge of the debt. On the return voyage, the vessel was captured and carried into Antigua, and libelled there. The judge was disposed at first to condemn the property under the order of June; but finding a better expedient, he determined that it must be enemy's property, as there was no cargo to purchase it with; and inasmuch as drawing bills might be converted to the fraudulent cover of enemy's property, he determined it was enemy's property, and condemned it. Well, sir, although the cargo was worth, and would have sold here for $12,000, by being exposed to sale in a glutted market it brought only $3.400. The costs of prosecuting the claim, in the vice admiralty court, were $1,000; and it was admitted on all hands, that the expenses of appeal would be $2,000 more. Although it was most certain that the decree would be reversed, it was equally so that nothing would be restored but the proceeds of the sale: so that after succeeding, our citizen would lose his property, and $400 into the bargain. Suppose a vessel captured merely for