Opinion of the Court-SCOTT, J. [7 Wash. Drake, subject to the lien of Frost and Spinning for the balance of their purchase money and the contract of the Drakes with intervenors Cadwell and Parsons.” In rendering its opinion, the court also said: "They were claiming to be rightfully in possession of the land by a properly delivered deed of warranty, over against which they admit their liability to pay the balance of purchase money, and that their grantors were entitled to a lien on the property for such balance. What the amount of such a lien should be we are unable to determine in the condition of this case, as it may depend on questions of law and fact which were not presented by either side. The vendors' lien for purchase money exists, and whenever they make demand therefor it must be paid, or the property sold to satisfy it." In a petition for a re-hearing which was filed we were asked to foreclose the lien for the purchase money, which was refused for the reason stated in the first opinion. was also then said by us that It "The superior court might, perhaps, have done this upon additional evidence which it might have called upon the parties to produce. The evidence showed that a modification of the contract had been agreed to, so that the second $1,000 was not to be paid, or the mortgage given, until the title should be made clear. The contract also provided that the third $1,000 should be due in ninety days from August 1, 1889, but no time was fixed for the maturity of the note to be given for the balance of $3,000, to be secured by mortgage. The record is barren of any evidence which would enable us to adjust these matters. Application is now made to us for a writ of mandate to compel the lower court to enter a judgment decreeing that the title to the land in controversy be in the said Bertie Sherman Drake in fee simple, free and clear of any claims. thereupon by said plaintiffs or intervenors Gray and Gray, except that the said plaintiffs are adjudged to have a vendors' lien thereupon for such an amount as they may establish July, 1893.] Dissenting Opinion-STILES, J. in any proper action brought thereupon for any sum of money remaining due and unpaid upon the purchase price agreed to be paid by the said Bertie Sherman Drake for said land, subject to any defense to the whole or any part thereof which she, the said Bertie Sherman Drake, may have therein, if any," which judgment the relator had moved said court to enter. Upon the showing made for the writ it appears that said motion for judgment was denied, and that the court held that it had full power under the judgment of this court to hear evidence to determine plaintiffs' claim for a vendors' lien, and that such lien should be determined before the entry of judgment. The relator denies that the superior court has this right, and contends that such lien can only be established by the bringing of an independent action therefor. We are unable to agree with this contention. The superior court has jurisdiction of the parties, and it is a well settled principle of equity practice that the court will endeavor to give full and complete relief to the parties in a cause, and a multiplicity of suits is to be avoided. We think it was fairly contemplated in the opinions heretofore rendered by us in said cause that the superior court could determine and establish the vendors' lien, and that it had authority to take any and all necessary steps for that purpose. Writ denied. HOYT and ANDERS, JJ., concur. STILES, J. (dissenting).—I cannot concur in this disposition of the case. The original case was not brought or prosecuted on any theory of foreclosure, and neither the pleadings nor the evidence taken furnish any basis for further proceedings. It is not the province of this court to send parties back to the superior courts to try new cases for which there are, as yet, no pleadings. DUNBAR, C. J., did not sit at the hearing. THE LOMBARD INVESTMENT COMPANY, Appellant, v. AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF LAND- INDEFINITENESS -SPECIFIC A letter from the general land agent of a railroad company to a settler upon lands of the railroad, reciting that "answering yours of the 8th inst., I have to say that if you are the first settler upon [certain described land], and if you continue to reside upon and improve said land until it shall be offered for sale, the same being strictly agricultural in character, you will be entitled to the first privilege of purchase at the appraised valuation, which will be fixed without reference to your improvements. The mere fact that another party has written a letter applying for the purchase of said land does not in any way affect your rights in the premises. No rights can be acquired to lands of the company not in market, except by settlement upon or improvement thereof," does not constitute a valid contract for the conveyance of said land which can be specifically enforced, although the condition as to settlement and improvement may have been complied with. Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County. Crow & Richardson, for appellant. Fenton, Henley & Fenton, and C. F. Backus, for respond ents. The opinion of the court was delivered by STILES, J.-This action was brought to foreclose two mortgages upon certain land in Spokane county. These mortgages were executed by Lemuel O. Carter and wife on the 25th day of September, 1889, at which date the mortgagors had received from the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, then the owner of the land, a contract in writing to convey it in consideration of the sum of $635, over $500 of which was paid upon the delivery of the contract, and the balance of which was paid by the appellant in this July, 1893.] Opinion of the Court-STILES, J. action out of the money loaned to Carter and wife. Pursuant to the contract made with Carter, the Northern Pacific Railroad Company executed and delivered its deed for the land in question, which was delivered to Carter, and filed for record in the auditor's office of Spokane county February 10, 1890. The respondents Strong and wife defended against the proposed foreclosure by an allegation, contained in a cross complaint, that on the 21st day of April, 1884, they had entered upon and taken possession of the premises in controversy by consent and permission of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, and that immediately thereafter they commenced to make, and did make, valuable improvements thereon; and by the further allegation that on or about the 18th day of October, 1884, while still in the possession of the premises, Strong entered into a written contract with the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, wherein it was agreed between the parties that, if Strong should continue to reside upon and improve the land until the same should be offered for sale by the company, Strong should then and in that event be entitled to the first privilege of purchasing the land from the Northern Pacific Railroad Company at the then valuation, exclusive of the improvements made by him. The cross complaint further showed that Strong and wife had continued to live upon the land, and had made improvements thereon of the value of about $1,000. The further allegations of the cross complaint were, that the purchase made by Carter was with full knowledge of Strong's possession, and of his alleged right to purchase, and that the appellant and Carter contrived a scheme by which the Northern Pacific Railroad Company was deceived into selling the land to Carter; the appellant also being alleged to have had knowledge of the possession of Strong, and of all the facts relating to the alleged contract between him and the railroad company. Opinion of the Court-STILES, J. [ 7 Wash. We shall assume, for the purposes of this decision, that the cross complaint stated sufficient facts for the purpose of raising the issue tried by the court, although the terms of the pleading were somewhat indefinite. We shall also assume it to have been a proven fact that at all times subsequent to April 21, 1884, Strong was in the actual, open and notorious possession of this land, residing upon and cultivating it, until after Carter had procured his contract for the sale to him. Under such a state of things, it is a well established rule of law that where one is holding a valid contract for the sale of lands, from the owner thereof, and is in possession of the land, if a third person takes the title from the owner, he is in position to charge the grantee from the owner with knowledge of all his rights under his contract. This proposition is not controverted by appellant, and is held by all the authorities. 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 614. The only vital question in this case; then, is, did Strong have a valid contract with the Northern Pacific Railroad Company? To make a contract for the sale of lands, there must be an agreement in writing, subscribed by the party to be charged, subject to the well known exceptions which in equity relieve the purchaser from his failure to obtain such a contract in compliance with the statute of frauds. As before stated, Strong's settlement upon this land was made April 21, 1884, and it was begun after receiving oral assurance from a real estate agent in the city of Spokane, who sometimes sold land for the Northern Pacific Railroad Company on commission, that if he should be the first settler upon any lands of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company at the time they came into market the company would deal with him rather than with any other person choosing to buy that particular tract. But this agent had no authority to make any contract with the proposing purchasers of lands of the railroad company, and his statement to |