State v. Ritter. 78 Mo. 327, which was subsequently given express approval in State v. Fogg, 206 Mo. 1. c. 716, in which the court said: "It is urged by counsel for appellant that the court committed error in exclusion of the testimony offered to prove the defendant's reputation, in the neighborhood in which he resided, for truth and veracity. This testimony was properly excluded for the reason that the defendant's reputation for truth and veracity had not been assailed, and the mere fact that there was a conflict beween his testimony and that of the prosecuting witness is not in contemplation of law such an attack upon his reputation for truth, and veracity as would warrant the court in admitting the testimony as to such reputation, for the purpose of bolstering up the testimony of the defendant, when such reputation had been in no way assailed. As applicable to this proposition we know of no rule of law which makes any distinction between the defendant as a witness and any other witness in the case; therefore, we take it that the rule as announced in State v. Thomas, 78 Mo. 327, is decisive of this question." We, therefore, overrule this contention. VII. We have carefully reviewed the instructions, not only those given, but those refused; while the former are numerous and somewhat prolix in verbInstructions. iage, they correctly present the applicable law under the evidence and are not subject to such criticism as to warrant a reversal. The instructions refused, where not covered by those given, are subject to such objections as to prevent our interfering with the ruling of the trial court in regard thereto; they are either not authorized by the facts, or are a comment on same, or incorrectly declare the law. We do not deem it necessary, therefore, to review them separately. The testimony as to the appellant's guilt is ample to sustain the verdict. He was fairly tried and the judgment is, therefore, affirmed. All concur. State v. Carroll and Jocoy. THE STATE v. JOHN CARROLL and CHARLES W. JOCOY, alias JOSEPH COYLER, Appellants. Division Two, June 23, 1921. 1. INFORMATION: Affidavit: Omission of Statement of Official Character. Where the information states that it is upon the official oath of the prosecuting attorney and is signed by him and the affidavit by which it is verified is signed by him, the omission of a statement of his official character in connection with his signature to the oath is immaterial, not prejudicial to defendant and constitutes no ground to quash. 2. : Murder: Aiding and Abetting. The information charged that one of the defendants "feloniously, deliberately, premeditatedly and with malice aforethought did make an assault with a dangerous and deadly weapon, to-wit, an automatic pistol," etc., and that the other two defendants, "before the said felony and murder was committed in the manner and form aforesaid and by the means aforesaid, at the time and place aforesaid, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously, deliberately, premeditatedly and of their malice aforethought, incite, move, procure, abet, aid, counsel, hire and command him," etc., "to do and commit the said felony and murder aforesaid," etc., and then proceeded to charge that the three defendants, in the manner and form aforesaid, did murder deceased. Held, that the allegation that the two defendants were present aiding and abetting properly charged that they committed the murder. 3. EVIDENCE: Other Crimes. Evidence of crimes committed by a defendant other than that for which he is on trial is proper for the purpose of showing a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that the proof of one tends to establish proof of the other. 4. -: Untimely Cbjection. Where defendants had full knowledge that their written statements were in existence, to the effect that the three had entered into a common plan to rob and had been for three days before they killed deceased while robbing him engaged in various attempts to rob others, but waited until the statements were read to the jury before objecting, their objection came too late, even though the evidence were not competent. Where 5 CONSPIRACY: Not Charged: Evidence and Instruction. defendants are charged with the commission of a crime, a conspiracy to commit crime may be shown, although the existence of the conspiracy is not charged. A charge that three defendants murdered deceased, one actually shooting him and the other two as present aiding and abetting the murder, is a charge of a conspiracy as an incident, and evidence to prove the conspiracy and an instruction directing the jury's attention to it, were proper. 6. MURDER: Instruction for Second Degree. Where there is no evidence tending to show that the homicide was murder in the second degree, but it indicates that the crime was murder in the first degree or nothing, it is not error to refuse an instruction on murder in the second degree. 7. VERDICT: Omitting Words "As Charged in the Information.'' Where the information charged the defendants with murder in the first degree, a verdict finding them "guilty of murder in the first degree," but omitting the words "as charged in the information," even if conceded to be irregular, was in no sense prejudicial to defendants. 8. - Three Defendants: Joint Verdict of Guilty: Correction. Under the statute (Sec. 4046, R. S. 1919) when several defend ants are jointly tried, the punishment of each, if all are con victed, must be separately assessed. And a verdict that "we. the jury, find all of the defendants and each of them guilty of murder in the first degree and assess the punishment of John Carroll and Charles W. Jocoy at death, and assess the punishment of Walter F. Shirer at imprisonment in the penitentiary for life" does not comply with the statute. But another statute (Sec. 4048, R. S. 1919) provides that where the jury assesses a punishment not authorized by law "the court shall assess and declare the punishment," and thereunder the court is empowered to correct said erroneous verdict by assessing separate punishment against the defendants in pronouncing sentence; and there being no other error in the case, the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to bring the defendants before it and separately assess and declare the punishment of each. Appeal from Franklin Circuit Court.-Hon. R. A. Breuer, Judge. REVERSED AND REMANDED (with directions). State v. Carroll and Jocoy. T. W. Breid, Jesse M. Owen and Jesse H. Schaper for appellants. (1) The trial court erred in overruling the motion. of defendants Carroll and Jocoy to strike out all that part of the written statements made by them to the prosecuting attorney and his assistants and read in evidence by the State relating to the acts of said defendants in holding up the taxi in the City of St. Louis, and in holding up the Ford automobile in St. Louis County, and in robbing a man in Washington of six dollars in money and in appropriating the money to themselves, for the reasons: (a) The statements of the acts of defendants so sought to be stricken out were crimes separate and independent of the crime charged against defendants in the information in this case. (b) There was no such connection between the crimes mentioned in said statements and the one charged in the information that, in proving the one, the evidence necessarily tended to prove the other. (c) There was only one crime charged in the information and the state had no legal right, proceeding by ambush, to attempt to prove other independent crimes of a different nature against defendants. (d) There was no intimation given by the State to counsel for defendants at or before the admission in evidence of the statements so made by defendants, that parts of said statements relating to other crimes were contained in said statements and were going to be read in evidence by the State. Therefore there was no opportunity afforded to counsel for defendants to make a timely objection against the admissibility of the parts of the statements relating to other crimes, and the motion to strike out did not come too late, for there was no waiver of the right to move to exclude. State v. Foley, 144 Mo. 600. (e) Counsel for defendants in making their motion to strike out the statements relating to other crimes, not only pointed out the parts of said statements sought to be stricken out, but also stated the specific grounds or defects on which State v. Carroll and Jocoy. the same was based, and also at the time stated that they had no knowledge or information that the statements so read in evidence contained statements of other crimes committed by defendants and that therefore they did not make an objection to the evidence before it was read to the jury. (f) The trial court passed the motion of defendants to strike out and stated in the presence and hearing of the jury that it would cure the admission of said evidence by an instruction to the jury, but later overruled said motion to strike out, and at the close of all the evidence refused an instruction offered by defendants to direct the jury to disregard all said evidence relating to other crimes. (g) In thus overruling the motion of defendants to strike out the parts of the statements made by defendants and read in evidence by the State, the court deprived the defendants of a fundamental right guaranteed to them under Section 12 of Article 2 of the Constitution of Missouri, which provides that "no person shall be prosecuted criminally for felony or misdemeanor otherwise than by indictment or information, which shall be concurrent remedies," and also under Section 22 of the same article which provides that "in criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to demand the nature and cause of accusation." State v. Harris, 222 S. W. 420. (h) The general rule is that evidence of the commission of offenses other than the one charged is inadmissible. State v. Spray, 174 Mo. 376; People v. Molineaux, 61 N. E. 293. (2) The trial court erred in refusing to give legal and proper instructions asked by appellants. (a) Instruction One, if given, would have properly submitted to the jury the question whether the defendants or either of them was guilty of murder in the first or second degree. R. S. 1919, sec. 3232. (b) Instruction Two, if given, would properly have submitted to the jury the question whether or not defendants, or either of them, was guilty of murder in the second degree. There was evidence on which to base the instruc |