Downing agt. Marshall. Shotwell, supra,) that the revisers in their notes make no reference or allusion to charitable uses, and it is assumed that they would not have been silent had they meant to abolish them; but it seems far more reasonable to say, that had they meant to except them from the universal terms of the enactment which they proposed, they would certainly have done so, since, had such been their intention, the necessity of a positive exception, in order to prevent misconstruction, could not possibly have escaped them; on the other hand, if they meant not to except but to include charitable uses, the explanation of their silence is easy and obvious. They may have deemed it unnecessary to speak; they may have thought that the provisions which they recommended spoke for themselves in a language that neither the legislature nor judges could fail to understand. The article in relation to uses and trusts commences with this declaration: Uses and trusts, except as authorized and modified in this article, are abolished.' And the addition of a note, telling the legislature that all uses and trusts not excepted were meant to be included, would have been an idle repetition of the text, which, if words have a meaning, could have no other interpretation." This is the emphatic language of one of the revisers, and, as it is generally understood, of the author and framer of this article of the statutes. It was stated on the argument of this cause, by the learned counsel for the respondents, (Mr. PORTER,) that he was present at the argument of the case of Yates agt. Yates, (9 Barb., 324;) that Mr. J. C. SPENCER, also one of the revisers, and of counsel in that cause, stated that he entirely concurred in the views expressed by Mr. Justice DUER in the case of Ayres agt. The Methodist Church, as to the construction put by him upon the statute abolishing uses and trusts, and the intentions of the revisers in preparing and submitting that statute to the legislature. Mr. Spencer at the same time read a letter from Mr. BENJAMIN F. BUTLER, the other reviser, expressing Downing agt. Marshall. his concurrence in the same views. We have thus the united testimony of the three revisers, gentlemen of the highest position in the profession, that in preparing this article of the statutes, it was their intention, and which intention they thought they had given expression to clearly and unmistakably, as they have declared, to insure the abolition of all uses and trusts, except as authorized and modified therein; and it is quite reasonable, in view of the language employed, to infer that the legislature, in adopting the article submitted, were governed by a like intent. The point now under consideration is most ably and satisfactorily discussed by WRIGHT, J., in Yates agt. Yates, (supra.) It would seem to be a work of supererogation to attempt to add anything to the powerful and conclusive reasoning of that opinion. That case was decided in the general term of the third district, and the views then enunciated have been since adhered to in that district, and doubtless formed the rule of decision in the present case. To the same effect is the decision of the general term of the fourth district, in Voorhies agt. Pres. Church of Amsterdam, (17 Barb., 103,) and which has ever since, as it is understood, been the doctrine of the supreme court of that district. HAND, J., in his opinion, concurred in by Justices CADY and C. L. ALLEN, says: "The statute of uses and trusts is express, positive and distinct, and abolishes every use and trust except as authorized and modified by the same article." The opinions of WRIGHT, J., in Yates agt. Yates, and DUER, J., in Ayres agt. Methodist Church, on this point, are very able, and show that there is no qualifi cation or exception, express or implied, in favor of public trusts or charitable uses. No stronger or broader language could well be used than that "uses and trusts, except as authorized and modified in this article, are abolished; any specification or enumeration would almost necessarily have weakened its effect." The same subject has received a full and critical review in McCaughal agt. Ryan, (27 Barb., Downing agt. Marshall. 376.) I am unable to add anything to the learned opinions of Justices STRONG and EMOTт, and both of those eminent judges arrive at the clear and decided conclusion, that trusts in real estate for pious and charitable uses are not sanctioned, but on the contrary are absolutely prohibited by the provisions of the Revised Statutes relative to uses and trusts. King agt. Randle, (15 Barb., 139,) is to the same point. COWEN, J., in his opinion in Kane agt. Gott, (24 Wend., 664,) clearly holds that the provisions of the Revised Statutes, now under consideration, abolish all trusts in real estate, except as therein authorized, including charitable trusts. The same doctrine is affirmed by Chancellor WALWORTH in Potter agt. Chapin, (6 Paige, 650,) where he says that the court of chancery will sustain and protect a dedication of personal property to public or charitable uses, provided the same is consistent with local laws and public policy, when the object of the gift or dedication is specific and capable of being carried into effect according to the intention of the donor. That a devise or conveyance of real estate, under the provisions of the Revised Statutes, might perhaps form an exception to the general principle, as a devise of real estate can only be made to a person capable of holding the same for the purposes of the charity, and all general trusts are abolished. As authority for the position that a devise of real estate can only be made to a person capable of holding for the purposes of the charity, he cites 2d Revised Statutes, (1st ed., p. 57, § 3,) which declares that no devise to a corporation shall be valid, unless expressly authorized by its charter or by statute to take by devise; and for the last position, section 49, (1 R. S., 1st ed., p. 728,) which enacts that every disposition of lands, whether by deed or devise, thereafter made, shall be directly to the person in whom the right to the possession and profits shall be intended to be invested, and not to any other to the use of or in trust for such person; and Downing agt. Marshall. if made to one or more persons to the use of or in trust for another, no estate or interest, legal or equitable, shall vest in the trustee; and section 62, (p. 729,) which declares that where an express trust is created, every estate and interest not embraced in the trust and not otherwise disposed of, shall remain in or revert to the person creating the trust, as a legal estate. In the case of Boyce agt. The City of St. Louis, (29 Barb., 657,) Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND expresses his dissent to that portion of the opinion in the case of Beekman agt. The People, (27 Barb., 272,) which held that the statutes of this state abolishing uses and trusts, except as therein authorized, prohibited the creation of trusts in real estate for charitable purposes, trusts of that character not being authorized by the Revised Statutes. This opinion, and that of vice-chancellor SANDFORD, and some views expressed by assistant vice-chancellor HOFFMAN, in Wright agt. Trustees of Methodist Church, (Hoff. Ch. Rep., p. 202,) are the only additional authority or dicta which I have been able to find in this state, holding that trusts in real estate for charitable purposes, since the enactment of the Revised Statutes, may be created. The whole current of judicial authority in this state, as I understand it, with these exceptions, holds the opposite doctrine; and I think the views expressed in those opinions which have been referred to, are maintained with such an array of authority, research and learning, as to commend them to our approval, and with a force of reasoning which cannot be overthrown. I have met with two cases which seem to me quite decisive of the views already expressed, and fully sustain the doctrine enunciated, that trusts for charitable objects are not to be exempted from the sweeping language of our Revised Statutes. The case of Donations agt. Wybrants, (2 Jones & La Touche Rep., 182,) was decided by Lord Chancellor SUGDEN, in Ireland, in 1845. The statute of 3 and 4 Will. IV, (ch. 27,) was held in this case to be a bar to a Downing agt. Marshall. suit in aid of a charity. The Lord Chancellor said the statute was a bar to all legal rights, and does not contain any saving clause in favor of charities. By it no person was to make any entry or distress, except within the period therein specified, and this word "person," it was held, extended to a body politic, corporate or collegiate, and to a class of creditors or other persons, as well as an individual. He further said : "The new statute no longer left courts of equity to act by analogy, but expressly enacted that no person claiming any land or rent in equity, should bring any suit to recover the same but within the period during which, by virtue of the provisions of the act, he might have made an entry or distress, or brought an action to recover the same, if he had been entitled at law to such estate, right or interest in or to the same, as he shall claim in equity. This, therefore, is quite as imperative as the enactments binding legal estates. No person can bring any suit within the legal limitation. This leaves to equity no discretion. Now it appears to me, that unless the case can be brought within this saving (that of the 25th section) which operates between trustee and cestui que trust, it would fall within the general prohibition of section twenty-four. For charities were only saved in equity from the operation of former statutes, as trusts, although highly favored ones, and now all trusts are barred by section twenty-four, unless saved by twenty-five, and I am not at liberty to introduce an exception into the act which the legislature, providing generally for all trusts, have not thought it proper to enact." The same question was before the House of Lords in the case of Magdelen College, Oxford agt. The Attorney-General, (6 House of Lords Cases, p. 189.) The head note to the case is, "Charities are trusts, and are as such within the operation of 3 and 4 Will. IV, (ch. 27.") This case was decided in 1857, and the Lord Chancellor, in giving the opinion, says: "With respect, however, to that particular |