Adams agt. Fort Plain Bank. to wit: 1. That the attorneys in the respective causes stated in the complaint and in the several exhibits, have never been requested by the plaintiff in such causes to perform any services charged in such bills for prospective services or prospective disbursements. 2. That the said attorneys therein have always been ready to perform those prospective services. 3. That the services charged in those bills for prospective services have never been rendered. 4. That no notice has ever been given to the attorneys, or either of them, that their services were no longer wanted in either cause or matter. 5. Also that the Fort Plain Bank is a corporation organized under the general banking laws, and has been ever since 1839. 6. Also the retainer of the attorneys and counsel in the respective causes and matters stated in the complaint, in this action, by the plaintiff in those causes and matters. Thereupon the plaintiff rested. 7th. The defendant's counsel then offered to prove that at the time of the assignment to the plaintiff he was an attorney and counsellor and practiced as such in the supreme court, and ever since has been. To this evidence the plaintiff objected upon the grounds that it was immaterial and improper, and that it proved no material fact in and of itself. These objections were overruled by the referee, and plaintiff excepted. The plaintiff then admitted the facts proposed to be proved, but subject to the objections, rulings and exceptions stated. And thereupon the defendant rested. 8th. The defendant's counsel then insisted that the plaintiff should not recover in this action, on the following grounds: 1. That the plaintiff, being at the time an attorney and counsellor in this court, purchased the demands for the purpose of prosecuting, contrary to the statute in such case made and provided. Also, 2. That all the demands in the first count of the complaint, except the 2d Adams agt. Fort Plain Bank. and 3d items, and all the demands mentioned in the second count, were barred by the statute of limitations. The plaintiff held the converse of the propositions insisted upon by the defendant's counsel, and insisted, 1. That upon the facts proved and admitted, he was entitled to recover for each and all of the demands set forth in the complaint. 2. That the statute of limitations had no application to demands of the character set forth in the complaint; and 3. That there was no evidence that he had purchased the demands for the purpose of prosecution. 9th. And upon the record and other evidence of the plaintiff, and the admission of facts by defendant's counsel, (see ante, 6th,) and the evidence on the part of defendant, (see ante, 7th,) and the ground stated, (see ante, 8th,) the cause was submitted to the referee. 10th. The referee in his report, from the 1st to the first portion of the 16th and the 17th paragraphs of his report inclusive, has found all the facts stated in the complaint under both counts, (except the amounts claimed, he makes less than the bills and records show were taxed in each cause and matter.) The referee found the services and disbursements up to and including the entry of the respective judgments, as due to the attorneys therein, at the time of entering each judgment, and excluded the charges for prospective services. And the referee therein finds as facts: "That at the time of the assignment, &c. to the plaintiff, he was a practicing attorney and counsellor at law in this state, and that he has continued such attorney and counsellor ever since such assignment." (And see 7th fact, ante.) "That none of the items or demands so assigned to the plaintiff and embraced in the complaint, accrued within six years preceding the commencement of this action, except those mentioned in the 2d and 3d paragraphs of this report." (See 8th, ante.) These are the only facts found adverse to the plaintiff. The referee thereupon determined and decided as mat Adams agt. Fort Plain Bank. ters of law upon the facts found that as to each and every item or demand mentioned in the 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th 10th and 11th paragraphs of his report, the plaintiff could not recover. These embrace the 1st and 4th in the first count, and all the items in the second count. "And that the plaintiff is entitled to recover for the demands in the 2d and 3d paragraphs of the report (being the 2d and 3d in the first count) amounting to $78.10," and ordered judgment for that amount in favor of the plaintiff, with costs. From that judgment the plaintiff appealed to the general term of this court. HENRY C. ADAMS, plaintiff, in person. I. The referee erred in overruling the plaintiff's objections to the evidence that at the time of the assignment, &c. plaintiff was an attorney and counsellor, &c. (See ante, fact 7th, and see also 8th and 10th.) 1st. The statute forbids attorneys and counsellors from buying demands and choses in action, with the intent and for the purpose of bringing any suit thereon. (2 R. S., m. p. 288, § 58, [§ 71.]) 2d. The impropriety of the evidence is apparent. The proposition of defendant's counsel did not cover the statute by proposing to show an illegal intent or purpose of bringing any suit upon the assigned demands. 3d. Nor did it propose to prove that plaintiff bought the demands. Nor did he in fact buy them, for he was equitably an owner of a part of the demands, and upon good consideration he became the assignee of the whole. He was not, therefore, a purchaser in any sense. 4th. The extent of the injury inflicted upon the plaintiff by this evidence is fully seen in the report. In the latter part of the 16th paragraph (10th, ante,) the referee has found the identical fact referred to; and in the 19th paragraph decided, &c. " upon the facts found," (this being one VOL. XXIII. Adams agt. Fort Plain Bank. of the two findings adverse to plaintiff-see ante facts, 10th) that plaintiff could not recover upon the 1st and 4th items in the first count, nor any of the items in the second count. Where the error is in the admission of illegal evidence which bears in the least degree on the result, it cannot be disregarded. (Morrell agt. Parmlee, 1 N. Y. R., 519.) Where evidence, bearing with directness and force upon the question at issue, has been erroneously admitted by a referee, a new trial must be granted, although there may be unobjectionable evidence sufficient to sustain his conclusion. (Williams agt. Fitch, adm'r, &c., 18 N. Y. R., 546.) 5th. This evidence was given to support the 4th defence, i. e. that at the time of the assignment to plaintiff he was an attorney and counsellor, &c. (See ante, 7th, 8th, 10th.) This defence is peculiar, and if the evidence was in the least degree material, the referee should have disposed of it as a preliminary question. And if, in his opinion, it established the 4th defence, he should have non-suited the plaintiff; otherwise he had nothing to do with it, and he had no right to take it into his deliberations, and render a general decision upon it. (Orcutt agt. Pettit, 4 Denio, 233.) II. The referee's decision, excluding all the demands except the 2d and 3d, appears to be based in part upon his erroneous finding, to the effect that the statute of limitations, six years, barred those claims; and upon the theory that the relation of attorney and client was dissolved upon the entry of the respective judgments. (See 10th, ante.) 1st. The records show that the attorney's costs, in the several causes, were included in the respective judgments, and they were liens upon and co-extensive in time with the judgments; hence twenty years, at least, is the period of limitation. NOTE. The attorney's lien upon the judgment has long and uniformly been upheld. (See Rooney agt. Second Av. R. R. Co., 18 N. Y. R., 368, 369, and cases cited; Graham's Pr., 61, 62, and cases.) Does that lien cease after two years, the period limited by statute (2 R. S., 362, § 22) for the attorney to satisfy the judgment; or after the period for issuing execution (2 R. S., 363, § 1; Code, Adams agt. Fort Plain Bank. §§ 283, 284;) or after ten years, the period within which scire facias must be brought, &c., (2 R. S., 576, § 1-3;) or after twenty years, the period within which an action of debt upon the judgment may be brought? (2 R. S., 301, § 471.) Where is the period of time? We insist that while the judgment is in life, the lien continues as a security for a debt which the client owes to his attorney, and which debt to the attorney is embraced in the client's judgment, as due to him of record; and so long as the client can enforce the judgment for costs as well as damages, so long necessarily the attorney has a lien, and can enforce payment of his costs against his client, and the statute of limitations for any period less than twenty years is no bar to the attorney's claim against his client. (See Foster agt. Jack, 4 Watts, 334-340, and other cases under this point.) 2d. The several taxed bills contain charges for not only past and present, but for prospective services and disbursements, (an execution, the sheriff's return, clerk filing the same, and entering satisfaction.) These entered into and made the contract in each case an entire contract, and the attorneys were bound to perform them, and until performed the statute cannot apply. NOTE. Upon the terms of the several bills as taxed and entered in the several judgment records, the contract of the attorneys was not simply to obtain judgments, but also to do all necessary services in the collection and satisfaction of the judgments. The contract was entire and continuous, and in short the work contracted for remains unfinished to this day. (Rankin agt. Woodworth, 3 Pennsyl. 48; Mc Dowell agt. Potter, 8 Barr. 109; Ziegler agt. Hunt, 1 McCord, 577; Martindale agt. Faulkner, 2 C. B., 706; Walker agt. Goodrich, 16 Ill., 341.) 3d. Nor has there ever been, by any act whatever, a dissolution of the relation of attorney and client in either of those causes and matters, but on the contrary it is apparent that such relation still exists. (See the admissions of facts, ante, 6th; and the report, 15th paragraph, finds these facts.) a. Where a client employs an attorney to conduct a suit, it is an entire contract to carry on the suit to its termination, (i. e., the satisfaction of the judgment,) and determinable by the attorney only on reasonable notice; and where no such notice has been given the statute of limitations is no bar to that part of the demand which is for business done more than six years before the commencement of an action by the attorney for business done in the suit, which was not brought to a termination till within six years of the commencement of the action. (Harris agt. Osborn, 2 Cromp. & Meeson's Exch. R., 629.) Lord LYNDHURST in that case says: "I consider that when an attorney is retained to prosecute or defend a cause, he enters into a special contract to carry it on to its termination. I do not mean to say that under no circumstances can he put an end to this contract; but it cannot |