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troversy brought forward by Clarke and Wilson against the doctrine of the Trinity, or by Collins and Woolston against the Christian revelation, the innovators had altogether the worst of the argument. Yet fifty years after the agitation of these controversies, their effects could scarcely be traced, and things appeared on all sides as if the controversies had never existed. Perhaps it will be said that though the effects of truth may be obscured for a time, they will break out in the sequel with double lustre. But this, at least, depends upon circumstances. No comet must come in the meantime and sweep away the human species; no Attila must have it in his power once again to lead back the flood of barbarism to deluge the civilized world; and the disciples, or at least the books, of the original champions must remain, or 20 their discoveries and demonstrations must be nearly lost upon the world.

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The third of the propositions enumerated is that truth is omnipotent. This proposition, which is convenient for its 25 brevity, must be understood with limitations. It would be absurd to affirm that truth unaccompanied by the evidence which proves it to be such, or when that evidence is partially and imperfectly 80 stated, has any such property. But it has sufficiently appeared from the arguments already adduced, that truth, when adequately communicated, is, so far as relates to the conviction of the understanding, 35 irresistible. There may, indeed, be propositions which, though true in themselves, may be beyond the sphere of human knowledge, or respecting which human' beings have not yet discovered sufficient arguments for their support. In that case, though true in themselves, they are not truths to us. The reasoning by which they are attempted to be established, is not sound reasoning. It may, perhaps, be found that the human mind is not capable of arriving at absolute certainty upon any subject of enquiry; and it must be admitted that human science is attended with all degrees of certainty, from the highest moral evidence to the slightest balance of probability. But human beings are capable of apprehending and weighing all these degrees; and to know the exact quantity of probability which I ought to ascribe to any proposition, may be said to be in one sense the possessing certain knowledge. It would farther be absurd, if we regard truth in relation to its empire over our

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conduct, to suppose that it is not limited in its operations by the faculties of our frame. It may be compared to a connoisseur, who, however consummate be his talents, can extract from a given instrument only such tones as that instrument will afford. But within these limits the deduction which forms the principal substance of this chapter, proves to us that whatever is brought home to the conviction of the understanding, so long as it is present to the mind, possesses an undisputed empire over the conduct. Nor will he who is sufficiently conversant with the science of intellect be hasty in assigning the bounds of our capacity. There are some things which the structure of our bodies will render us forever unable to effect; but in many cases the lines which appear to prescribe a term to our efforts will, like the mists that arise from a lake, retire farther and farther, the more closely we endeavor to approach them.

Fourthly, the vices and moral weakness of man are not invincible. This is the preceding proposition with a very slight variation in the statement. Vice and weakness are founded upon ignorance and error; but truth is more powerful than any champion that can be brought into the field against it; consequently, truth has the faculty of expelling weakness and vice, and placing nobler and more beneficent principles in their stead.

Lastly, man is perfectible. This proposition needs some explanation.

By perfectible it is not meant that he is capable of being brought to perfection. But the word seems sufficiently adapted to express the faculty of being continually made better and receiving perpetual improvement; and in this sense it is here to be understood. The term perfectible, thus explained, not only does not imply the capacity of being brought to perfection, but stands in express opposition to it. If we could arrive at perfection, there would be an end of our improvement. There is, however, one thing of great importance that it does imply; every perfection or excellence that human beings are competent to conceive, human beings, unless in cases that are palpably and unequivocally excluded by the structure of their frame, are competent to attain.

This is an inference which immediately follows from the omnipotence of truth. Every truth that is capable of being communicated is capable of being brought

home to the conviction of the mind. Every principle which can be brought home to the conviction of the mind will infallibly produce a correspondent effect upon the conduct. If there were not something in the nature of man incompatible with absolute perfection, the doctrine of the omnipotence of truth would afford no small probability that he would one day reach it. Why is the perfection of man impossible?

The idea of absolute perfection is scarcely within the grasp of human understanding. If science were more familiarized to speculations of this sort, we should perhaps discover that the notion itself was pregnant with absurdity and contradiction.

It is not necessary in this argument to dwell upon the limited nature of human faculties. We can neither be present to all places nor to all times. We cannot penetrate into the essences of things; or rather, we have no sound and satisfactory knowledge of things external to ourselves, but merely of our own sensations. We cannot discover the causes of things, or ascertain that in the antecedent which connects it with the consequent, and discern nothing but their contiguity. . With what pretence can a being thus shut in on all sides lay claim to absolute perfection?

The

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But not to insist upon these considerations, there is one principle in the human mind which must forever exclude us from arriving at a close of our acquisitions, and 35 confine us to perpetual progress. human mind, so far as we are acquainted with it, is nothing else but a faculty of perception. All our knowledge, all our ideas, every thing we possess as intelli- 40 gent beings, comes from impression. All the minds that exist set out from absolute ignorance. They received first one impression, and then a second. As the impressions became more numerous, and 45 were stored by the help of memory, and combined by the faculty of association; so the experience increased, and with the experience, the knowledge, the wisdom, every thing that distinguishes man from 50 what we understand by a "clod of the valley." This seems to be a simple and incontrovertible history of intellectual beings; and if it be true, then as our accumulations have been incessant in the time that is gone; so, as long as we continue to perceive, to remember or reflect, they must perpetually increase.

1 See Job, 21:33.

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From Book V. OF LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER

CHAPTER IV. OF A VIRTUOUS DESPOTISM

There is a principle frequently maintained upon this subject, which is well entitled to our impartial consideration. It is granted by those who espouse it, "that absolute monarchy, from the imperfection of those by whom it is administered, is most frequently, attended with evil;" but they assert, that it is the best and most desirable of all forms under

a good and virtuous prince. It is exposed," say they, "to the fate of all excellent natures, and from the best thing frequently, if corrupted, becomes the worst. This remark is certainly not very decisive of the general question, so long as any weight shall be attributed to the arguments which have been adduced to evince, what sort of character and disposition may be ordinarily expected in princes. It may, however, be allowed, if true, to create in the mind a sort of partial retrospect to this happy and perfect despotism; and if it can be shown to be false, it will render the argument for the abolition of monarchy, so far as it is concerned, more entire and complete.

Now, whatever dispositions any man may possess in favor of the welfare of others, two things are necessary to give them validity: discernment and power. I can promote the welfare of a few persons, because I can be sufficiently informed of their circumstances. I can promote the welfare of many in certain general articles, because for this purpose it is only necessary that I should be informed of the nature of the human mind as such, not of the personal situation of the individuals concerned. But for one man to undertake to administer the affairs of millions, to supply, not general principles and perspicuous reasoning, but particular application, and measures adapted to the necessities of the moment, is of all undertakings the most extravagant and absurd.

The most simple and obvious of all proceedings is for each man to be the sovereign arbiter of his own concerns. If the imperfection, the narrow views, and the mistakes of human beings render this in certain cases inexpedient and impracticable, the next resource is to call in the opinion of his peers, persons who from their vicinity may be presumed to have some general knowledge of the case, and

who have leisure and means minutely to investigate the merits of the question. It cannot reasonably be doubted that the same expedient which men employed in their civil and criminal concerns, would by uninstructed mortals be adopted in the assessment of taxes, in the deliberations of commerce, and in every other article in which their common interests were involved, only generalizing the deliberative assembly or panel in proportion to the generality of the question to be decided.

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Monarchy, instead of referring every question to the persons concerned or their neighbors, refers it to a single individual placed at the greatest distance possible from the ordinary members of the society. Instead of distributing the causes to be judged into as many parcels as they would conveniently admit for the sake of pro- 20 viding leisure and opportunities of examination, it draws them to a single centre, and renders enquiry and examination impossible. A despot, however virtuously disposed, is obliged to act in the dark, to derive his knowledge from other men's information, and to execute his behests by other men's instrumentality. Monarchy seems to be a species of government proscribed by the nature of man; and those persons who furnished their despot with integrity and virtue forgot to add omniscience and omnipotence, qualities not less necessary to fit him for the office they have provided.

Let us suppose this honest and incorruptible despot to be served by ministers, avaricious, hypocritical, and interested. What will the people gain by the good intentions of their monarch? He will mean them the greatest benefits, but he will be altogether unacquainted with their situation, their character, and their wants. The information he receives will frequently be found the very reverse of the truth. He will be taught that one individual is highly meritorious and a proper subject of reward, whose only merit is the profligate cruelty with which he has served the purposes of his administration. He will be taught that another is the pest of the community, who is indebted for this report to the steady virtue with which he has traversed and defeated the wickedness of government. He will mean the greatest benefits to his people; but when he prescribes something calculated for their advantage, his servants under pretence of complying shall in reality perpetrate dia

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metrically the reverse. Nothing will be more dangerous than to endeavor to remove the obscurity with which his ministers surround him. The man who attempts so hardy a task will become the incessant object of their hatred. However unalterable may be the justice of the sovereign, the time will come when his observation will be laid asleep, while malice and revenge are ever vigilant. Could he unfold the secrets of his prison houses of state,' he would find men committed in his name whose crimes he never knew, whose names he never heard of, perhaps men whom he honored and esteemed. Such is the history of the benevolent and philanthropic despots whom memory has recorded; and the conclusion from the whole is, that wherever despotism exists, there it will always be attended with the evils of despotism,-capricious measures and arbitrary infliction.

"But will not a wise king take care to provide himself with good and virtuous servants?" Undoubtedly he will effect a part of this, but he cannot supersede the essential natures of things. He that executes any office as a deputy will never discharge it in the same perfection as if he were the principal. Either the minister must be the author of the plans which he carries into effect, and then it is of little consequence, except so far as relates to his integrity in the choice of his servants, what sort of mortal the sovereign shall be found; or he must play a subordinate part, and then it is impossible to transfuse into his mind the perspicacity and energy of his master. Wherever despotism exists, it cannot remain in a single hand, but must be transmitted whole and entire through all the progressive links of authority. To render depotism auspicious and benign it is necessary, not only that the sovereign should possess every human excellence, but that all his officers should be men of penetrating genius and unspotted virtue. If they fall short of this, they will, like the ministers of Elizabeth, be sometimes specious profligates, and sometimes men who, however admirably adapted for the technical emergencies of business, consult on many occasions exclusively their private advantage, worship the rising sun, enter into vindictive cabals, and cuff down newfledged merit. Wherever the continuity is

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broken, the flood of vice will bear down all before it. One weak or disingenuous man will be the source of unbounded mischief. It is the nature of monarchy under all its forms to confide greatly in the discretion of individuals. It provides no resource for maintaining and diffusing the spirit of justice. Everything rests upon the permanence and extent of personal virtue.

Another position, not less generally asserted than that of the desirableness of a virtuous despotism, is, "that republicanism is a species of government, practicable only in a small state, while monarchy is best fitted to embrace the concerns of a vast and flourishing empire." The reverse of this, so far at least as relates to monarchy, appears at first sight to be the truth. The competence of any government cannot be measured by a purer standard than the extent and accuracy of its information. In this respect monarchy appears in all cases to be wretchedly deficient; but if it can ever be admitted, it must surely be in those narrow and limited instances where an individual can, with least absurdity, be supposed to be acquainted with the affairs and interests of the whole.

CHAPTER XI. MORAL EFFECTS OF ARISTOCRACY

There is one thing, more than all the rest, of importance to the well-being of mankind,-justice. Can there be any thing problematical or paradoxical in this fundamental principle,-that all injustice is injury; and a thousand times more injurious by its effects in perverting the understanding and overturning our calculations of the future, than by the immediate calamity it may produce?

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All moral science may be reduced to this one head,-calculation of the future. We cannot reasonably expect virtue from the multitude of mankind if they be induced 45 by the perverseness of the conductors of human affairs to believe that it is not their interest to be virtuous. But this is not the point upon which the question turns. Virtue is nothing else but the pursuit of 50 general good. Justice is the standard which discriminates the advantage of the many and of the few, of the whole and a part. If this first and most important of all subjects be involved in obscurity, how 55 shall the well-being of mankind be substantially promoted? The most benevolent of our species will be engaged in crusades of error; while the cooler and more phleg

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matic spectators, discerning no evident clue that should guide them amidst the labyrinth, sit down in selfish neutrality, and leave the complicated scene to produce its own dénouement.

It is true that human affairs can never be reduced to that state of depravation as to reverse the nature of justice. Virtue will always be the interest of the individual as well as of the public. Immediate virtue will always be beneficial to the present age, as well as to their posterity. But though the depravation cannot rise to this excess, it will be abundantly sufficient to obscure the understanding and mislead the conduct. Human beings will never be so virtuous as they might easily be made, till justice be the spectacle perpetually presented to their view, and injustice be wondered at as a prodigy.

Of all the principles of justice there is none so material to the moral rectitude of mankind as this: that no man can be distinguished but by his personal merit. Why not endeavor to reduce to practice so simple and sublime a lesson? When a man has proved himself a benefactor to the public, when he has already by laudable perseverance cultivated in himself talents which need only encouragement and public favor to bring them to maturity, let that man be honored. In a state of society where fictitious distinctions are unknown, it is impossible he should not be honored. But that a man should be looked up to with servility and awe because the king has bestowed on him a spurious name, or decorated him with a ribband; that another should wallow in luxury because his ancestor three centuries ago bled in the quarrel of Lancaster or York;-do we imagine that these iniquities can be practiced without injury?

Let those who entertain this opinion converse a little with the lower orders of mankind. They will perceive that the unfortunate wretch, who with unremitted labor finds himself incapable adequately to feed and clothe his family, has a sense of injustice rankling at his heart.

One whom distress has spited with the world,
Is he whom tempting fiends would pitch upon
To do such deeds as make the prosperous men
Lift up their hands and wonder who could do
them.1

Such is the education of the human species. Such is the fabric of political society.

1 John Home, Douglas, III, 109-13.

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Let us for a moment give the reins to reflection, and endeavor accurately to conceive the state of mankind where justice should form the public and general principle. In that case our moral feelings would assume a firm and wholesome tone, 15 for they would not be perpetually counteracted by examples that weakened their energy and confounded their clearness. Men would be fearless because they would know that there were no legal snares lying in wait for their lives. They would be courageous because no man would be pressed to the earth that another might enjoy immoderate luxury, because every one would be secure of the just reward of 25 his industry and prize of his exertions. Jealousy and hatred would cease, for they are the offspring of injustice. Every man would speak truth with his neighbor, for there would be no temptation to falsehood and deceit. Mind would find its level, for there would be everything to encourage and to animate. Science would be unspeakably improved, for understanding would convert into a real power, no longer an ignis fatuus, shining and expiring by turns, and leading us into sloughs of sophistry, false science, and specious mistake. All men would be disposed to avow their dispositions and actions; none would endeavor to suppress the just eulogium of his neighbor, for so long as there were tongues to record, the suppression would be impossible; none fear to detect the misconduct of his neighbor, for there would be no laws converting the sincere expression of our convictions into a libel, Let us fairly consider for a moment what is the amount of injustice included in the institution of aristocracy. I am 50 born, suppose, a Polish prince, with an income of £300,000 per annum. You are born a manorial serf or a Creolian negro, attached to the soil and transferable by barter or otherwise to twenty successive 55

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lords. In vain shall be your most generous efforts and your unwearied industry to free yourself from the intolerable yoke. Doomed by the law of your birth, to wait at the gates of the palace you must never enter, to sleep under a ruined weatherbeaten roof while your master sleeps under canopies of state, to feed on putrified offals while the world is ransacked for delicacies for his table, to labor without moderation or limit under a parching sun while he basks in perpetual sloth, and to be rewarded at last with contempt, reprimand, stripes, and mutilation. In fact the case is worse than this. I could endure all that injustice or caprice could inflict, provided I possessed in the resource of a firm mind the power of looking down with pity on my tyrant, and of knowing that I had that within, that sacred character of truth, virtue, and fortitude, which all his injustice could not reach. But a slave and a serf are condemned to stupidity and vice as well as to calamity.

Is all things nothing? Is all this necessary for the maintainance of civil order? Let it be recollected that, for this distinction, there is not the smallest foundation, in the nature of things; that, as we have already said, there is no particular mould for the construction of lords; and that they are born neither better nor worse than the poorest of their dependents. It is this structure of aristocracy in all its sanctuaries and fragments against which reason and philosophy have declared war. It is alike unjust, whether we consider it in the castes of India, the villainage of feudal system, or the despotism of the patricians of ancient Rome dragging their debtors into personal servitude to expiate loans they could not repay. Mankind will never be in an eminent degree virtuous and happy till each man shall possess that portion of distinction, and no more, to which he is entitled by his personal merits. The dissolution of aristocracy is equally the interest of the oppressor and the oppressed. The one will be delivered from the listlessness of tyranny, and the other from the brutalizing operation of servitude. How long shall we be told in vain, "that mediocrity of fortune is the true rampart of personal happiness?"

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