$86 Presentmen of note for payment. maker is the principal debtor, and the first indorser is a surety. No payment of the note by the makers at any immediate date or specific date was contemplated, and therefore the note was meant to be a continuing security. The defendant's partner left Colombo, where the transaction took place, about the end of March, and before leaving had a conversation with the appellant's manager in regard to this note, but he did not indicate any wish that the appellants should press it against the makers. The defendant's partner returned to Colombo in August, and found the account of A. B. in an unsatisfactory position, and on 22nd September sent to A. B. an account setting out, i.a., the note guaranteed to the appellants as a claim which they might have against them. Up to that date there was no unreasonable delay. Negotiations went on with the defendant's firm, which was then being wound up in consequence of a dissolution of the partnership. The defendants were clearly interested in keeping A. B. on foot, and in not bringing any pressure to bear. The appellants were never asked to present the note for payment, and did not do so till 14th December, 1864, when A. B. had become irretrievably insolvent. The Privy Council held that, considering all these facts and the actings of parties, the note was presented in reasonable time. See also Brooks v. Mitchell, 9 M. and W. 15. (f.) Vide § 2. (g.) The effect of this subsection is to give a holder, whether for value or not, the rights of a holder in due course, so far as defects of title to the note are concerned, vide §§ 29 (2), 38 (2), when a note is overdue, vide subsection 1, but will not put him otherwise in the position of a holder in due course. 87. (1.) Where a promissory note is in the body of it made payable at a particular place, it must be presented for payment (a) at that place in order to render the maker liable. In any other case presentment for payment is not necessary in order to render the maker liable (b). (2.) Presentment for payment is necessary in order to render the indorser of a note liable (c). (3.) Where a note is in the body of it made payable at a particular place, presentment at that place is necessary in order to render an indorser liable; but when a place of payment is indicated by way of memorandum only, presentment at that place is sufficient to render the indorser liable; but a presentment to the maker elsewhere, if sufficient in other respects, shall also suffice (d), (a.) Where a note is payable at a fixed or determinable future time, it must be presented for payment on the day on which it is due, but, if it is payable on demand, any time within six years of its date will be a reasonable time for presentment to the maker, vide § 45, Brooks v. Mitchell, 9 M. and W. 15. (b.) It is not necessary to protest a note against the maker either of a foreign or of an inland note, vide §§ 51 (1), 52 (2), 89. (c.) Vide § 45 and § 86 and note (e) thereon. (d.) This differs from the rule as to presentment for payment of a bill. § 87. 88. The maker of a promissory note by making Liability of it (1.) Engages that he will pay it according to its tenour (a); (2.) Is precluded from denying to a holder in due course (b) the existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse (c). (a.) The contract of the maker of a note is the same as that of an acceptor, vide §§ 54 and 89, subject to two qualifications-(1), It cannot be conditional, vide §§ 19 and maker. § 88. Application of notes. 83 (1); and (2) any number of persons, by signing below the maker's signature, may become bound, jointly and severally, with the maker, for the sum in the note, while any one signing his name below that of the drawee does not become a co-acceptor, vide §§ 7, 85 (2). (b.) Vide § 29 (1). (c.) The maker of a note is deemed to correspond to the acceptor of a bill, and the first indorser of a note is deemed to correspond with the drawer of an accepted bill payable to drawer's order, vide § 89 (2). In the case of a note payable to maker's order, and bearing his indorsement, he corresponds both to the acceptor and to the drawer, but his signature as maker does not preclude him from challenging the genuineness of the indorsement. Sections 54 and 55 (1) are inapplicable, as this section defines the allegations which he is precluded from denying, but subsection 2 of section 55 defines the engagement of an indorser. See note on § 22 with respect to capacity to indorse. 89. (1.) Subject to the provisions in this part and, except as by this section provided, the provisions of this Act relating to bills of exchange apply, with the necessary modifications, to promissory notes (a). (2.) In applying those provisions the maker of a note shall be deemed to correspond with the acceptor of a bill, and the first indorser of a note shall be deemed to correspond with the drawer of an accepted bill payable to drawer's order. (3.) The following provisions as to bills do not apply to notes; namely, provisions relating to― (a.) Presentment for acceptance (b); (b.) Acceptance (c); (c.) Acceptance supra protest (d); (d.) Bills in a set (e). (4.) Where a foreign note is dishonoured, protest thereof is unnecessary (ƒ). (a.) See the provisions in § 3 (1), 6, 45 (2), 45 (4), and 52 (1-3), which are superseded by the provisions in § 83 (1), 85, 86, 87, 88. (b.) Vide $$ 39-44. (c.) Vide §§ 17-19. (d.) Vide $$ 65-67. (e.) Vide § 71. (f) Vide § 51 (2); but where the makers of a note, payable in the United Kingdom, are to be sued abroad, or where any note has been indorsed abroad and the indorser is to be sued, it is advisable to protest. In Germany-e.g., a domiciled note must be protested to render the maker liable, and protest is also required in the case of an indorsed note. Where a note is paid by a referee in case of need, or a payer for honour, it must first be protested, vide § 68. $ 89 PART V. SUPPLEMENTARY. 90. A thing is deemed to be done in good faith, Good faith. within the meaning of this Act, where it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not (a). (a.) An act is not done honestly, when a person has notice and knowledge of some fact which should lead him to refrain from doing. Knowledge does not mean only express knowledge, but knowledge or the means of knowledge, at which the party wilfully shuts his eyes. If there be a suspicion in his mind, and the means of knowledge in his power are wilfully § 90. Signature. disregarded, he is not acting in good faith. But if he have no suspicion, though negligent in making inquiries, so long as he does not purposely refrain from making them, he will be held to be acting in good faith, May v. Chapman, 16 M. and W. 355; Raphael v. Bank of England, 17 Scott, C. B. 174; Jones v. Gordon, 2 Ap. Cases, 616 (622-624 and 626). 91. (1.) Where, by this Act, any instrument or writing is required to be signed by any person (a), it is not necessary that he should sign it with his own hand, but it is sufficient if his signature (b) is written thereon by some other person by or under his authority (c). (2.) In the case of a corporation, where, by this Act, any instrument or writing is required to be signed, it is sufficient if the instrument or writing be sealed with the corporate seal (d). But nothing in this section shall be construed as requiring the bill or note of a corporation to be under seal (e). (a.) Vide (a). (b.) Vide note (a) (5) on § 3. (c.) A signature written by or under the authority of a party may be either C. D. per A. B., or pp. C. D, A. B., or in any other way expressing that the A. B. is acting as the agent of C. D., will be held equivalent to his signature; but a mere description of a person as agent, director, &c., will not make his signature that of the principal or company, vide §§ 25, 26. Thus it has been held that bankers paying a draft bearing indorsement by the unauthorised agent of a principal in these terms-viz., a "Smith & Co. per S. Kingsford, agent," were protected under 16 & 17 Vict. c. 59, |