§ 21. but without accepting. C. did not comply with the conditions, but indorsed the bill to D., with notice thereof. D. sent the bill to B. for acceptance, which was refused by B., who retained the bill. Held, in an action for delivery by D., that B. was entitled to retain, as there had been no delivery to give effect to bill, Martini & Co. v. Steel & Craig, 18th Dec. 1878, 6 R. 342. Delivery must be made by or under the authority of the party drawing, accepting, or indorsing. authority to deliver a bill may be verbal, Bell's Prin. 216. A bill may be delivered either to a transferee, or to some third party on his behalf. Delivery is inferred from the bill being found in the possession of the transferee, or of an agent for him, but if the transferor hand the bill to his own agent, delivery is not held to have taken place. If the transferor and the transferee's agent is the same there is a presumption, which, however, may be reargued, that the bill was delivered. to him as agent for the transferee, while if it is in the possession of a neutral third person, the presumption is for delivery, if the bill be for value, but not if it is gratuitous, Bell's Prin. 23. Constructive delivery-i.e., where the bill, though in the actual possession of the granter, or of some person selected by him, Anderson v. Robertson, 21st Feb. 1867, 5 M. 507, requires proof of intention of the granter, Miller v. Miller, 27th June, 1874, 1 R. 1107. (c.) The effect of delivery is (1) to transfer the existing contracts on the bill, if any, to the transferee; and (2) to complete a new contract between the drawer, acceptor or indorser, and the holder. Delivery by an indorser thus transfers the engagements of the acceptor, vide § 54; of the drawer, vide § 55 (1); and of all prior indorsers, vide § 55 (2); and in addition to transferring the right to these contracts completes the new engagement which is implied in indorsation, vide § 55 (2). The effect of delivery may, however, be limited by the terms of the indorsation. Delivery, for example, of a bill indorsed without recourse, transfers the already existing contracts on the bill, but does not complete any new contract on the bill. Delivery, in this case, is the fulfilment of the prior contract to make or indorse and deliver a bill or note; where a bill is indorsed "for my use," or "for collection," delivery neither transfers the contracts, nor completes a new one on the bill, vide § 35. In the case of a bill payable to bearer, delivery transfers the contracts on the bill to the transferee, but no new contract on the bill by the transferor is completed, unless he indorse the bill, vide § 58. Delivery fixes the date of issue, vide § 2, and is presumed to be of the date the bill or acceptance bears, vide § 13. (d.) Where a drawee intimates to the holder that he has accepted, but retains the bill undelivered without writing his acceptance thereon, he will probably be held to be precluded from denying that he has accepted. (e.) E.g., A finder, or a person who has received the bill on a condition, or for a special purpose directly from the holder. (f.) Vide § 29. (g.) Where a bill bears on the face of it, to be transferred conditionally, or for a special purpose only, a holder in due course is affected thereby, vide § 35. The contract on the bill cannot be varied even with an immediate party by parole proof that the contract entered into is different from that implied by law from subscription followed by delivery, Abrey v. Crux, L. R. 5, C. P. 42; but in a question with anyone except a holder in due course, it may be shown that the delivery was conditional—e.g., that it was not to have the effect of completing the contract, until the happening of a specified event, Wallis v. Lettel, 31 L. J., C. P. 100; or for a special purpose-e.g., for collection or safe custody. The law was stated as follows in Castrique v. Buttigiez, 10 Moore, P. C. 94, where an agent had indorsed to his principals, bills for the price of goods due to them, without limiting his indorsement, but in reality only for the purpose of transferring the bills to them. "The liability of an indorser to his immediate indorsee arises out of a contract between them, and this contract in no case consists exclusively in the writing called an indorsement, and which is necessary to the existence of the contract in question, but that contract arises out of the written indorsement itself, the delivery of the bill to the indorsee, and the intention with which that delivery was made and accepted as evinced by the words either spoken $ 21. § 21. or written of the parties and the circumstances, such as the usage at the place, the course of dealing between the parties, and their relative situations under which the delivery takes place thus a bill with an unqualified written indorsement. may be delivered and received for the purpose of enabling the indorser to receive the money for account of the indorser, or to enable the indorser to raise money for his own use on the credit of the signature of the indorser, or with an express stipulation that the indorsee though for value, is to claim against the drawer and acceptor only, and not against the indorser, who agrees to sell his claim against the prior parties but stipulates not to warrant their solvency. In all these cases the indorser is not liable to the indorsee." The question of liability of an agent on the indorsation of a bill turns on the question, whether he is under liability to his principals apart from the bill, La Fevre v. Lloyd, 5 Taunton, 749, and Goupy v. Harden, 7 Taunton, 159. As explained in Castrique v. Buttigiez, supra (p. 121), the written indorsement is indeed unqualified in its terms, but the delivery to the indorser, from which, together with the written, and not from the written indorsement alone, the contract between the parties is to be inferred, may be so circumstanced as to show that the indorser does not make himself liable to his indorsee. Where, however, a bill with such an indorsement passes into the hands of a holder in due course, the indorser cannot plead that delivery has not taken place, and there is therefore nothing to prevent the contract taking effect. In Wilson v. Scott, 11th June, 1874, 1 R. 1003, it was averred that the holder received a bill blank indorsed from the petitioner in order to discount it, and hand over the proceeds, less £5, to him. This statement was held relevant, but in the then state of the law could only be proved by the writ or oath of the holder. See § 100, and note (b) thereon. (h.) This provision will apparently not apply where it is shown that the bill though ex facie complete, was filled up by the person in possession of it, above a blank signature. In such a case delivery by the signer in order that it may be converted into a bill must be proved, and the presumption in favour of delivery only applies to the case of a bill, or an incomplete bill, and not to a signature which can only be used for a bill on proof that § 21, Capacity and Authority of Parties. 22. (1.) Capacity to incur liability (a) as a party to Capacity of a bill is coextensive with capacity to contract (b). Provided that nothing in this section shall enable a corporation to make itself liable as drawer, acceptor, or indorser of a bill unless it is competent to it so to do under the law for the time being in force relating to corporations (c). (2.) Where a bill is drawn or indorsed by an infant, minor, or corporation having no capacity or power to incur liability on a bill, the drawing or indorsement entitles the holder (d) to receive payment of the bill, and to enforce it against any other party thereto (e). (a.) Vide 53-58. (b.) Pupils, minors, married women, and persons of unsound mind are held to be unable to give a full consent to contracts, and the law has therefore imposed certain restrictions on them. The powers of companies are also restricted. 1. Pupils.-Pupils are incapable of consent, and therefore cannot bind themselves by any obligation. All deeds which a pupil requires to grant, are executed for him by his tutors, who may draw bills or take promissory notes payable to him, but the pupil can neither indorse them nor discharge them, Fraser on Parent and Child, pp. 149, 150. 2. Minors.-Minors are by law capable of consent, and may contract freely with respect to moveables. If a minor, who has no curators, accept or indorse a bill, he can be sued on it, but may have it set aside on the ground of minority and lesion within four years after reaching majority. If a minor, having curators, incurs liability under a bill or note, he parties. § 22. can also have it set aside at any time on proof of minority, unless the creditor prove that the consideration in money or effects was in rem versum of the minor. A minor, however, is not entitled to reduce or set aside a bill which he has granted in the course of a trade or business in which he is engaged, or where he has fraudulently held himself out as of full age. Bills granted by a minor with consent of his curators are valid, but are liable to be set aside if challenged before expiry of four years after his reaching majority, on proof that the transaction has been to his injury. A father is the administrator-in-law of his pupil and minor children, Fraser on Parent and Child, pp. 336, 376, 383. By the law of England, all contracts, whether by specialty or by simple contract, entered into by infants (i.e. minors) for the repayment of money lent or to be lent, or for goods supplied or to be supplied, other than contracts for necessaries, are absolutely void, 37 & 38 Vict. c. 62, § 1; Byles on Bills, pp. 59-61. 3. Married Women.-Personal obligations by a married woman are null, and cannot be enforced against her or her separate estate, either during the marriage or after its dissolution. Even a bill granted by a wife for the price of necessaries furnished to her, has been held to be null. To this rule there are the following exceptions :-(1) Contracts of a married woman are effectual against her separate estate, where the subject of the contract has been applied for her own benefit, and is not such that the husband is liable for it-e.g., debts incurred for improvements on the wife's separate estate. (2) Where a married woman fraudulently represents herself to be unmarried, she will be liable on`a bill granted by her. (3) If the husband be abroad, insane, outlawed, or imprisoned for a term of years, his wife may bind herself by personal obligations, Fraser on Husband and Wife, i. 535-553. (4) Where a wife has obtained decree of judicial separation or a protection order under the Conjugal Rights Act, 1861, or the Conjugal Rights Amendment Act, 1874, she is capable of entering into obligations and of suing and being sued, as if she were not married, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 86, §§ 5, 6. In England, by 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, § 1, it is provided that “a married woman shall be capable of entering into and rendering |