you can do so. If you don't like what we did, the legislature can change it." Now I have run into a couple of other arguments. Mr. MATHIAS. Would the gentleman yield? Mr. CORBETT. I would be happy to. Mr. MATHIAS. On that point, I believe certain other acts of Congress relative to membership in the House which must be complied with apply before the Clerk will recognize a Member-elect as the next Member of an incoming Congress. Now might that same requirement be laid upon the States in order to have a delegation recognized as bona fide Members-elect? Mr. CORBETT. I might say there have been numerous times when this issue was raised in the House because they said a Member was gerrymandered in or there was something wrong with the district. There have been motions made not to seat the Member. They have always failed. Now, Mr. Chairman, I have prepared a statement and as part of that statement I have asked the right to include two editorials, so might I just ask unanimous consent to file this statement and include extraneous material? Mr. WILLIS. The statement will be received. (The statement referred to is as follows:) STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT J. CORBETT IN SUPPORT OF H.R. 8075 Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I deeply appreciate this opportunity to present to you arguments in support of H.R. 8075 and companion bills introduced by Representatives Lesinski and Yates. Some such legislation is required to prevent a breakdown of representative government in some of our more important States. As of this date the Legislatures of Arkansas, Minnesota, Massachusetts, and Illinois have adjourned without passing congressional redistricting bills. The same deplorable situation is probable in Pennsylvania and could happen in other States. Why is this a very bad thing in States that lose one or more districts? Let us by way of answer imagine what will happen in Illinois if no remedy happens. On primary day the voter (Democratic or Republican) who goes to the poll will be handed a ballot containing the names of about 700 persons who seek to be nominated by his party for the office of Representative in Congress. The voter will be instructed to vote for up to 24 persons. He probably will not know that many of the candidates, let alone be able to intelligently consider the merits of the 700 aspirants. All kinds of voting would follow and the results would be a lottery or worse. However, each party would eventually emerge with 24 nominees and then would come the general election. The voter would be permitted to vote for 24 nominees out of a list of 48. It is quite possible that all the Democratic nominees would reside in the Chicago area and that all of the Republican nominees would be from "downstate." And it is further possible that all of the nominees of one party would be elected. This would automatically kill all of the acquired seniority of the losing party's incumbents and worse the principle of district representative government for Illinois would be suspended. A remedy for this travesty is simple. When a State (or States) which must redistrict fails to do its duty or to exercise this right given to it by the Congress of the United States, the Congress could and should exercise its power to provide for the redistricting of such State or States. Does the Congress of the United States have the power to redistrict a State? The Constitution of the United States clearly gives this power to the Congress. Clause 1, section 4 of article 1 of the Constitution states: "The time, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time, by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the place of choosing Senators." I now quote from the book "Congressional Apportionments," written by Lawrence F. Schmeckebier and published by the Brookings Institute, page 146 and following: "In 1884 in considering the power of Congress over elections the Supreme Court said: "It was not until 1842 that Congress took any action under the power here conferred, when conceiving that the system of electing all the Members of the House of Representatives from a State by a general ticket, as it was called, that is, every elector voting for as many names as the State was entitled to Representatives in that House, worked injustice to other States which did not adopt that system, and gave an undue preponderance of power to the political party which had a majority of the votes in the State, however small, enacted that each Member should be elected by a separate district, composed of contiguous territory' (5 Stat. 49). "There was no intimation that the act of 1842 or later acts were unconstitutional. "It was held in 1921 that the Federal corrupt practices did not extend to primary elections. In an opinion concurring in part, Justice Pitney, who was joined by Justices Brandeis and Clarke, made the following statement: "It is said that section 4 of article 1 does not confer a general power to regulate elections, but only to regulate "the manner of holding" them. But this can mean nothing less than the entire mode of procedure the essence, not merely the form, of conducting elections. The only specific grant of power over the subject contained in the Constitution is contained in that section; and the power is conferred primarily upon the legislatures of the several States, but subject to revision and modification by Congress * * "For if this section of the Constitution is to be strictly construed with respect to the power granted to Congress thereunder, it must be construed with equal strictness with respect to the power conferred upon the States. *** For the election of Senators and Representatives in Congress is a Federal function; whatever the States do in the mater they do under authority derived from the Constitution of the United States.' "On the implied powers of Congress, the Supreme Court has spoken in no uncertain terms. In 1884, it said: ""The proposition that it (the United States) has no such power is supported by the old argument often heard, often repeated, and in this court never assented to, that when a question of the power of Congress arises, the advocate of the power must be able to place his finger on words which expressly grant it. The brief of counsel before us, though directed to the authority of that body to pass criminal laws, uses the same language. Because there is no express power to provide for violence exercised on the voter as a means of controlling his vote, no such law can be enacted. It destroys at one blow, in construing the Constitution, the doctrine universally applied to all instruments of writing, that what is implied is as much a part of the instrument as what is expressed. This principle, in its application to the Constitution of the United States, more than to almost any other writing, is a necessity, by reason of inherent inability to put into words all derivative powers-a difficulty which the instrument itself recognizes by conferring on Congress the authority to pass all laws necessary and proper to carry into execution the powers expressly granted and all other powers vested in the government or any branch of it by the Constitution' (art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 18). "Again in 1921 we find the court spoke as follows: “‘As an incident to the grant (of the power to regulate the manner of holding elections) there is, of course, power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying it into effect' (art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 18). "This summary of the powers of Congress may be closed by a quotation from a discussion by Professor Bowman: ***** So, today it is clear that the Constitution contemplates representation of the States according to population. I would not be very fanciful to deduce from this a principle of representation among the districts into which the States are divided.' "State courts, construing and applying State constitutional provisions, have spoken in no uncertain terms ***. "It is not necessary to elaborate this point. Courts have described the rights as 'sacred' and the duty of officers to apportion so as to confer equality of representation as no less 'sacred'. "Nor would it be at all unreasonable to spell out of the 14th amendment in like manner a duty of State authorities to aportion so as to confer equality of representation. "In the case of Ex Parte Siebold (decided in 1879) the Supreme Court had said: 'Congress has partially regulated the subject heretofore. In 1842 it passed a law for the election of Representatives by the separate districts; and, subsequently, other laws fixing the time of election, and directing that the electionsshall be by ballot. No one will pretend, at least at the present day, that these laws are unconstitutional because they only partially cover the subject.' "Today it is possible to say with confidence that the source of whatever power Congress has in this regard is to be found in article I, section 4, and to say with hardly less confidence that the provisions of the act of 1911 and preceding acts concerning districting were all of them constitutional. The decision in Davis v. Ohio rendered in 1916, seems conclusive on these points, a conclusion strongly reinforced by the decision in Smiley v. Holm. "But what is the extent of the power of Congress? How much farther might it go than it has gone in control of redistricting? May Congress itself redistrict the State, and, if it attempts to do so, must it, for example, create districts that are equal in population as far as is practicable? "Finally we again refer to Smiley v. Holm, the latest expression of the Supreme Court on this subject. "In exercising this power the Congress may supplement these State regulations or may substitute its own. It may impose additional penalties for the violation of the State laws or provide independent sanctions. It "has a general supervisory power over the whole subject."' "It may be said that these statements of the Supreme Court fall short of a direct declaration that Congress itself may create congressional districts within a State. But the broad statements made in Ex Parte Yarbrough, Davis v. Ohio and Smiley v. Holm are made in connection with the very subject of districting or redistricting. Do the words, found in several of these cases, that it has a 'general supervisory power' in the premises, import any limitations? It seems not; especially as it is expressly declared that Congress may 'substitute its own' regulations for those of the State if it sees fit to do so." It seems to me that it is abundantly clear that Congress has the power to redistrict States for the purpose of electing Representatives in Congress. And it follows that the Congress can delegate this authority to any proper agency. The agency to which H.R. 8075 would delegate this authority is the Bureau of the Census. The Director is in possession of all the population statistics and maps necessary to do the work and his agency has historically been about as objective as it is possible to be. There is no reason to believe that with the standards imposed by the bill and considering the importance of the work that the Director would be anything but fair and just in his determinations. To those who fear he might be otherwise, consider these facts. If a Representative in Congress lives in a State whose government is in the hands of his opposing political party, he would probably get much fairer treatment from the Bureau of the Census than from his avowed political opponents. If he lives in a State whose government is in the hands of his own political party it is his duty to persuade his party to function. If he lives in a State where government control is divided and a deadlock on redistricting results he would be better off and so would his State and Nation to have the Director of the Census bound congressional districts than to run at large. Would such a law violate the theory of "States rights"? No. On the contrary, it would say to each of the several States, "Exercise the right we have given you to define the boundaries of congressional districts. But if you do not care to so do we will do it for you in order to preserve representative government." At this point, Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to include three editorials in support of this proposal at this point in my testimony. In conclusion, gentlemen of the committee, in urging you to report H.R. 8075or some similar bill, I would like to summarize. First, such a law would prod the State legislatures to act. Second, if they failed to act the Director of the Census would do the job for them. Third, the Congress has the power to redistrict States. Fourth, it is obviously unwholesome for Representatives in Congress to be serving without knowing whom or what they represent. Fifth, if any State legislature is not happy with the redistricting plan set forth by the Director of the Census, it may up to January 1 of any election year pass a law superseding the Director's plan. [From the Washington Daily News, July 14, 1961] WHAT'S WRONG WITH THIS IDEA? Redistricting is necessary in Pennsylvania, and in two dozen other States, because the 1960 census changed the number of House Members those States are entitled to. Some States gained; others lost. Pennsylvania lost three. If the Pennsylvania Legislature doesn't act, all 27 of the new Congressmen will have to be elected at large-in fantastic disregard of the constituents' right to representation of their own choosing, by districts. The same thing would happen in any other State which doesn't redistrict--and a number have not. In this case, Mr. Corbett anticipates, Pennsylvania very likely would elect all Republicans or all Democrats. (The present delegation is split, 16 Republicans, 14 Democrats.) Either way, Mr. Corbett thinks this would be bad, and so it would, in Pennsylvania, or any other two-party State. As a result, Mr. Corbett has introduced a bill in Congress to authorize the Census Bureau to divide a State into congressional districts wherever the legislature fails to act. He thinks this may goad recalcitrant legislators into doing their duty. Even if it didn't, what's wrong with this idea? The Census Bureau of necessity would be required to divide the State into compact districts, as evenly proportioned as possible under the census figures. Legislatures, being dominated by politicians with partisan axes to grind, rarely do a fair job, if they do it at all. We doubtless would get much more equitable representation in Congress if the Census Bureau did the apportionment. There are no gerrymanderers in that Bureau. [From the Washington Daily News, Aug. 1961] THE RIGHT TO FAIRNESS In the Constitution of the United States there is nothing to compel a State to divide its representation in Congress among districts equal in population. The Constitution simply says the membership of the House shall be divided among the States according to population. This assures each State a fair deal in Congress, but it does not necessarily assure the voters a fair deal. They seldom have had it. The present congressional districts, based on the 1950 census, range all the way from 159,000 to 618,000 in population. Unequal representation prevails in almost every State. Now as a result of the 1960 census, the division of Congressmen among the States must be changed. And political bickering is threatening to deprive the people of some districts even of the unequal representation they have had. Because legislatures can't agree on an apportionment plan, all Congressmen in some States may be elected at large. In Minnesota and Illinois, the legislatures already have quit without redistricting. Unless Congress itself acts, all eight Minnesota and all 24 Illinois House Members will be chosen at large. Pennsylvania, among others, is faced with a similar plight. But Congress can act. A bill now pending in the House Judiciary Committee would direct the Census Bureau to lay out equal congressional districts in any State in which the legislature failed to act. In view of the disregard most State legislatures habitually show for equality of representation, an automatic apportionment by the Census Bureau would be a much fairer system in any State. There is no constitutional bar to such a plan, and it would assure the voters the square deal they so rarely get. And for their own protection, Congressmen should be interested in this proposal. At-large election of delegations from big States could lead to trouble for the individual. Instead of being a big man in a district, well known to his neighbors, he would become merely another name on a statewide ballot, strange to most of the voters. Mr. CORBETT. I could conclude here in just 1 minute by just reading my summary. First, such a law would prod the State legislature to act. Second, if they failed to act the Director of the Census would do the job for them. Third, the Congress has the power to redistrict States. Fourth, it is obviously unwholesome for Representatives in Congress to be serving without knowing whom or what they represent. Fifth, if any State legislature is not happy with the redistricting plan set forth by the Director of the Census, it may up to January 1 of any election year pass a law superseding the Director's Plan. Now, gentlemen of the committee, all we are proposing in these bills is that if the States fail to do their duty, if representative government is being suspended in those States, that we set up an agency to do the job for them and I believe with the possibility of as many-oh, goodness, perhaps up to 100 Members running at large in this next election, that we are compelled to take positive action promptly. Mr. Chairman, I deeply appreciate the fact that the committee members would stay by and I hope they can view this bill as something that would be a remedy and would preserve representative government throughout the country. STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN LESINSKI, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN Mr. LESINSKI. I appreciate very much being here this morning. I have two bills. One provides for the seating of three additional memberships because of the situations on the mainland, in Alaska and in Hawaii. I have sent the chairman a letter requesting the bill be amended to four. As to what the committee decides as to membership in the House, the matter of cost has come to the attention of the committee. I just want to point out there is a matter of staffing, there is a matter of room space, there is a matter of the Military Academy, the appointments by Members of the Congress, and also allowances, and therefore the cost is quite a bit higher than has been proposed here in the past. Now also the matter of the membership having a 4-year term, I wish the committee would consider it very, very, very carefully. You will remember in 1954 the people decided to change the complexion of the House. It was Republican before that and they changed it to a Democratic House. Our Founding Fathers gave our country checks and balances. I know the difficulty of running every 2 years, but if you are going to change the term of the Member of Congress, please consider the thinking that it should be on a staggered term. That every 2 years, half of the membership shall run for reelection. What that does is that gives an opportunity for the people after 2 years' time to elect the administration and therefore they have a chance to change the thinking in Congress by opposing or supporting half the membership of the House. Otherwise I would be opposed to changing the term of a Member of Congress. |