the second place, the primeval man was round and had four hands and four feet, back and sides forming a circle, one head with two faces, looking opposite ways, set on a round neck and precisely alike; also four ears, two privy members, and the remainder to correspond. Terrible was their might and strength, and the thoughts of their hearts were great, and they made an attack upon the gods; and of them is told the tale of Otus and Ephialtes who, as Homer says, dared to scale heaven, and would have laid hands upon the gods. Doubt reigned in the councils of Zeus and of the gods. Should they kill them and annihilate the race with thunderbolts, as the had done the giants, then there would be an end of the sacrifice and worship which men offered to them; but, on the other hand, the gods could not suffer their insolence to be unrestrained. At last, after a good deal of reflection, Zeus discovered a way. He said: "I have a notion which will humble their pride and mend their manners; they shall continue to exist, but I will out them in two and then they will be diminished in strength and increased in numbers; this will have the advantage of making them more profitable to us ". . . . He spoke and cut men in two, like a sorb-apple which is halved for pickling, or as you might divide an egg with a hair; and as he cut them one after another he bade Apollo give the face and half of the neck a turn in order that the man might contemplate the section of himself: this would teach him a lesson of humility. He was also to heal their wounds and compose their forms. . . . After the division the two parts of man, each desiring his other half, came together, and threw their arms about one another eager to grow into one, and would have perished from hunger without ever making an effort, because they did not like to do anything apart. . . . And this was being the distruction of them, when Zeus in pity invented a new plan he turned the parts of generation round in front . . . and after the transposition the male generated in the female in order that by the mutual embraces of man and woman they might breed, and the race continue . . . so ancient is the desire of one another which is implanted in us, reuniting our original nature, making one of two, and healing the state of man. 1 In the description of love which Lovel expands from his definition, there are a great many details which are not to be found in the Symposium; however, the kernel of the ideas expressed is present in Plato's work, as I shall further proceed to demonstrate. Lovel's principal points are embodied in the following lines: 1 Symposium 189-91. Loue is a spirituall coupling of two soules, True loue hath no vnworthy thought, no light, They are the earthly, lower forme of louers, Nor doe they trespasse within bounds of pardon, The bating of affection soone will follow: In the passages from the Symposium which follow, these same conclusions are reached, though Plato's purpose, of course, was not the same. He was concerned with the relation of man with man, while Jonson's conception of love is based upon nothing but the relation of the sexes-the love of man for woman. But the Love who is the son of the common Aphrodite is essentially common, and has no discrimination, being such as the meaner sort of men feel, and is apt to be of women as well as of youths, and is of the body rather than of the soul-the most foolish beings are the objects of this love which desires only to gain an end, but never thinks of accomplishing the end nobly, and therefore does good and evil quite indiscriminately. The goddess who is his mother is far younger, and she was born of the union of male and female, and partakes of both sexes." Evil is the vulgar lover who loves the body rather than the soul, and who is inconstant because he is a lover of the inconstant, and therefore when the bloom of youth which he was desiring is over, he takes wings and flies away, in spite of all his words and promises; whereas the love of the noble mind, which is in union with the unchangeable, is everlasting.' 'Well,' she said, 'I will teach you;-love is only birth in beauty, whether of body or soul.'' And when he perceives this he will abate his violent love of the one, which he will despise and deem a small thing, and will become a lover of all beautiful forms; this will lead him on to consider that the beauty of the mind is more honorable than the beauty of the outward form.3 Lovel's discourse on valor in the fourth scene of Act 4 has been recognized as decidedly superior to that on love delivered at the earlier session of the court in Act 3. Ward writes: The notion of a trial of Lovel's passion by a declamatory test would have better suited a masque than a comedy; but no Miltonic afflatus buoys up the noble morality of the appellant's speeches. The oration in honor of true valor is however finer than that in praise of "Platonic " love, which must be described as cold and colourless.' This is a very just criticism; but the reason for the superiority of Jonson's treatment of valor does not lie in the originality of the fundamental conception. For sources of this nature we must look to Aristotle's Ethics, just as in the case of love we found the wellspring of the poet's ideas in Plato's Symposium. The superior worth of Lovel's second discourse lies in the fact that we have there the universal truths concerning valor which were expounded by the philosopher, applied by Jonson to the particular case of his own time. There is consequently much more force, vigor, and reality where he has opportunity to give free rein to his propensity for satire. The speeches concerning love, on the other hand, were put into Lovel's mouth with no contemporary allusions, expressing with but little expansion the generalities of Plato. 1 Ibid. 183. 2 Ibid. 206. 3 Ibid. 210. Hist. Eng. Dram. Lit. 2. 328. d The result, then, is very aptly described as 'cold and colourless.' Before attempting to trace a debt to Aristotle on the subject of valor, I must state that, taking the matter as a whole, the Protagoras and the Laches of Plato might be considered as probable a source as the Nicomachean Ethics, since the points touched upon by Jonson are to be found in the discourses of both the Greek philosophers. But inasmuch as the poet follows Aristotle's method, by first defining true valor, and then disposing of the approximations of courage, and since some of the parallels approach the exactness of translations, there is no question that the Ethics was first in his mind when he wrote this portion of The New Inn. There is no reason, of course, for his not being familiar with the writings of both Aristotle and Plato. In the following pages, in addition to quoting the parallels from Aristotle, I have recorded in the foot-notes references to those dialogues of Plato which treat of the same subject. Lovel begins with a definition of valor: It is the greatest vertue, and the safety Of all mankinde, the obiect of it is danger. What's good or euill. It springs out of reason, Is alwayes honour, and the publique good: These ideas are expressed in the third book of the 4. 4. 39-48. 2 Quotations are from Walter M. Hatch's The Moral Philosophy of Aristotle: Consisting of a Translation of the Nicomachean Ethics, &c. References are to the book and chapter of the Greek, and to the page in Hatch's translation. ['The aspect of virtue to be treated first is Courage. Not only is this virtue the earliest in historical development: it is psychologically also the basis of the whole superstructure of manliness, without which the other virtues would not be possible.'-Hatch, p. 116.] Now it has been already explained that Courage' is a mean state in regard to subjects of confidence or fear.' But what is fearful is not the same under all circumstances, nor to all persons, though of course there is a form of fear which we speak of as past human endurance,' and such as would be terrible to any one who was in his right senses. Still, looking to things which are fearful and yet within the limits of endurance, these differ in magnitude and in their relative degrees of intensity, as also do things which inspire confidence. In face even of these the brave man, though dauntless and undaunted, has still the feelings of a man: he will not be unmoved at the sight of things terrible, though his fear will be tempered by regard for the fitness of things and kept within the limits which Reason will allow, his aim being the attainment of honour as the ideal of virtue. Yet it is possible to entertain fears of this kind excessively or insufficiently, and again to regard things which are not fearful as though they were. Of the errors committed in these respects, one form arises from the fear being an unworthy one, another from the fear being immoderate, another from its being inopportune, and so on through manifold conditions. The same principle applies to the circumstances upon which we ground confidence. That man therefore is a brave man who endures hardship or yields to fear when it is right to do so, though always with a noble motive and to a proper degree and on fitting occasions. Under opposite conditions again he is equally confident. In a word, the brave man is one whose inward feelings and outward actions are in harmony with a true dignity, and with the standard which Right Reason prescribes. Now the 'end' of every activity, (in order to be either virtuous or vicious,) must be one which correspondents with the fixed attitude of mind in the agent. To the mind of the brave man the display of his bravery is a source of pride and honour. The end' of his every activity, therefore, is a feeling of honour, since the character of every action is determined by its end.' It follows that the motive for which the brave man incurs perils, and performs the acts of bravery, is a sense of honour or a feeling of noble pride." Beaufort asks if fighting for reputution is not entitled to the name of valor. Lovel is most emphatic in his denial : 1 Nic. Eth. 3. 6, p. 152. Cf. Plato, Laches 195. Ibid. 3. 7, p. 155. Cf. Plato, Laches 193, 199. |