IMPERIAL STRATEGY AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES TOWNSHEND, K. C.B., D.S.O. Before the Empire Club of Canada, Toronto. THE PRESIDENT, in introducing General Townshend, said: Gentlemen, you will agree with me that this is a very proud occasion in the history of the Empire Club. (Applause) It is a remarkable, but nevertheless a true fact that in all crises in connection with the Empire, whether they relate to the civil government the foreign and domestic policy of it-or to commerce and finance, there always arises the man of the hour. We have seen various instances of that. Take the Premier, Mr. Lloyd George. (Applause) Regardless of politics or anything else, can anyone say that he was not the man of the hour? In the navy, Admiral Jellicoe and Admiral Beatty will go down in history for all time. (Applause) Admiral Jellicoe himself declared in our presence that it was the army that won the war, while men in the army will tell you that it was the navy who really won the war. Well, Gentlemen, we have with us to-night an equally great man in the Empire, a brave and true man. (Applause) The campaign in Mesopotamia will go down in history as a highly important part in the out-come of the war, and upon the future status of the different people and races affected by the issues. In connection with that campaign, I think our distinguished and illustrious guest is entitled to every honour that can be bestowed upon him by a grateful people. It was fortunate for Great Britain, fortunate for us that we had a General Townshend who was available; it is fortunate for the Empire Club that General Townshend is going to look us in the eye to-night and talk to us for a few minutes and let us understand something of what he has done and experienced. It requires no stretch of imagination to go back to the time when you and I would get up at four or five o'clock in the morning to find out what was becoming of General Townshend and his army. You remember it well. He is here to-night to tell us the story. I ask him to allow neither modesty nor time, nor anything else, to interfere with his telling of that story. Let him tell the whole story and we will be very grateful and delighted to hear him. We want him to know that we are good Britishers here. (Applause) (Applause) We want him to know that we are trying to live for the Britain that he was willing to die for. I have great pleasure in introducing to you General Townshend of whom you have heard and read so much. (Applause) GEN. SIR CHAS. TOWNSHEND, K.C.B., D.S.O. Mr President and Gentlemen, I am going to take the president at his word and talk ahead. Since I came to Toronto I have talked far more than I thought I was going to, but all I can say is that I am very glad and proud at the treatment I have received here. This place is indeed truly British, and when one crosses the border he soon realizes that it is Britain he is in. (Applause) We don't want to hear any more that a man is a Canadian, an Australian, or a New Zealander; we want to know he is British, and that is all. You know the smallest part of this great Empire is our little island itself. (Laughter) You can imagine the feelings I have for Canada; for I may say I have some connection with Canada myself, as it was my greatgreat-grandfather who received the fall of Quebec in 1769. I may say also that it was my great-great-uncle, Charles Townshend, who passed the Stamp Act which caused a bit of a stir at that time. (Laughter) Now, Gentlemen, let us proceed to business. I may tell you that just prior to the war, I was given a command in India. Everybody said that war would soon be coming, but we were told in perfect confidence that such was not the case, and even men of finance appeared to know nothing about it. Well, I arrived in India, and to my horror as soon as I had taken over command of my depot at Rawal Pindi war broke out. I thought to myself, here have I been wasting years of my life training and studying hard in the art of warfare and ready and anxious to fight the Germans, and now to think that Great Britain has declared war on Germany and I out here. You can imagine how pleased I was, when I suddenly received orders to proceed to Tigris and to take over command of an expedition to that place. My force consisted of some 13,000 men, and as you know, I was ordered up the Tigris. I will just skip over that part, as it would take too long to describe and it is all given in my book which I hope some of you will read. I think you will find much in that book that will interest you. Well, after we had got as far as Amara and settled things there, I went back to India to have a talk with. my Commander-in-Chief, and see what he wanted me to do. After considerable discussion I mentioned the fact to him that, if he wanted me to take Bagdad, I hoped he would make my forces up to 30,000 or 40,000 men. I pointed out to him that to take the offensive with an inadequate force was simply asking for disaster. He told me I was quite right, and that not one inch should I go beyond Kut-el-Amara unless I could make my forces up to 40,000 men. He wanted me to take Kutel-Amara and I told him I would if I had sufficient troops. He was a very fine man and knew the difficulties that were in front of me. I had very fine troopsmy 30,000 men the pick of the British regiments in India consisting of the Dorsets, Norfolks, and the 57th Oxford Light Infantry, the late 43rd-a name well known to Canada-and my Indian regiment, a great regiment also. Well, I moved north from Amara and came into contact with the enemy whom I found entrenched in a very strong position. He was in a very strong position indeed with every modern convenience as regards warfare, such as trenches, redoubts, and so forth. Of course you can readily imagine that I was not going to put my head into a noose by making a frontal attack against a position like that, so I made a big detour in the night and got on the right flank and rear of him and rolled him up like we would roll up a blanket. Directly we got in the midst of him with bayonet and grenade, the trick was done. I thought that there I would take things a little easy, until my forces were increased and something decisive had taken place in the principal theatre of the war which was in France. You must understand that in war your principle theatre must-have every force available. I knew that every soldier that could be spared was wanted in France. If everything went on well there, I knew that all other operations would fall into our lap like ripe apples off a tree. You can then understand my astonishment when I was ordered to advance on Bagdad with the small forces at my command, now reduced after the battle of Kut-el-Amara to 8,500 bayonets. want you to realize what that meant. You know it is your bayonets you have to depend upon to win a battle. No matter how much good work the artillery has done in smashing the trenches, and so forth, there comes a time when the infantry has to advance if it is going to win that battle. Well, the enemy had been giving it to us pretty hot, and I knew that the worst was yet to come, but I went on with my unfortunate infantry. I advanced where the Turks were very strongly entrenched, and consisting of a force of 24,000 men. I had hoped before then to hear that reinforcements were arriving, but having been ordered to advance I lost no time in deciding this battle. Before I proceeded, however, I warned the Commander-in-Chief in Mesopotamia that to advance with my small force meant disaster. It was against my own wishes, but I had to obey orders. In civil life if a man is not satisfied and disagrees with his superiors, well, he can resign. That cannot be done in army life. Imagine on the eve of a big battle if John Jones or Sammy Snooks said, "I am not going on!" Can you imagine the results? Why there would be nothing but disaster. However, I had done my duty in warning my superiors, and I was ready to carry out any order I might be given. That was my view, and if you place me in such a position to-morrow I will do the same thing again. (Applause) Well, after that battle the battle of Ctesiphon, in my opinion, one of the bloodiest battles in the war-I was in a very desperate situation, but I did not consult anyone as to what I should or should not do. A man who is in sole command, on his shoulders alone rests all the responsibilities. I certainly listened to all that my officers had to say, but I never told them that I would do this, that, or the other thing. If the result turns out satisfactorily, the leader will get all the credit, but if he is defeated, he gets all the after-blow. If a man is instructed in the art of war and understands his business, he does not want anyone to prompt him. If, in a situation like that, you mistrust your own mind and your own judgment, you can only preserve authority by letting your men see that you have entire confidence in your own ability to pull through. If you have reason to think that there is anything wrong with your own judgment, you might send for this man or that man and talk over the situation with him, but you would never tell him your opinion of what you are to do. After talking over the situation with him, you would then dismiss him and consult somebody else and get his opinions on the matter, but you would never tell them what your thoughts were, and whose opinions you considered best. In that way you always preserve your authority. It is the same in business; once you start to listen to the opinions of your subordinates and ask for their advice you lose your authority. To proceed to the battle of Ctesiphon. I occupied |