to support itself. It says, Hitherto SHALT thou come, and no further." And if Congress can do this, can it not make the local law itself? Can aught be more preposterous? As if we could command others to do what we have no right to do ourselves, and prohibit others from doing what lies beyond our own jurisdiction. Surely, to decree on what subjects a community shall legislate, and on what they shall not legislate, is the exercise of the highest power.

But Congress has not stopped with the exercise of the constitution-making power. In various forms, and at all times, it has legislated for the Territories, in the strictest sense of the word legislation. It has legislated again and again, and ten times again, on this very subject of slavery. See the act of 1794, prohibiting the slave trade from " any port or place" in the United States. Could any citizen of the United States, under this act, have gone into one of our Territories and there have fitted out vessels for the slave trade? Surely he could, if Congress had no right to legislate over Territories only as so much land and water.

By statute 1798, chapter 28, § 7, slaves were forbidden to be brought into the Mississippi Territory from without the United States, and all slaves so brought in were made free.

So the act of 1800, chapter 51, in further prohibition of the slave trade, applied to all citizens of the United States, whether living in Territories or in organized States. Did not this legislation cover the Territories?

By statute 1804, chapter 38, § 10, three classes of slaves were forbidden to be introduced into the Orleans Territory.

Statute 1807, chapter 22, prohibiting the importation of slaves after January 1, 1808, prohibited their importation into the Territories in express terms. Statute 1818, chapter 91, statute 1819, chapter 101, and statute 1820, chapter 113, prohibiting the slave trade, and making it piracy, expressly included all the Territories of the United States.

Statute 1819, chapter 21, authorized the President to provide for the safe-keeping of slaves imported from Africa, and for their removal to their home in that land. Under this law, the President might have established a depôt for slaves within the limits of our Territories, on the Gulf, or on the Mississippi.

By statute 1820, chapter 22, § 8, Congress established what has been called the Missouri compromise line, thereby expressly legislating on the subject of slavery. So of Texas. See Jo. Res. March 1, 1845.

By statute 1819, chapter 93, statute 1821, chapter 39, § 2, and statute 1822, chapter 13, 9, Congress legislated on the subject of slavery in the Territory of Florida.

Does it not seem almost incredible that a defender and champion of slavery should deny the power of Congress to legislate on the subject of slavery in the Territories? If Congress has no such power, by what right can a master recapture a fugitive slave escaping into a Territory? The Constitution says: "No person held to service, or labor, in one State, escaping into another," that is, another State, "shall be discharged from such service, or labor," &c. The act of 1793, chapter 7, § 3, provides that when a person "held to labor," &c., "shall escape into any other of the said States, or Territory," he may be taken. By what other law than this can a runaway slave be retaken in a Territory? If Congress has no power to legislate on the subject of slavery in any Territory, then, surely, it cannot legislate for the capture of a fugitive slave in a Territory. The argument cuts both ways. The knife wounds him who would use it to wound his fellow.

Further than this. If slavery is claimed to be one of the common subjects of legislation, then any legislation by Congress for the Territories, on any of the common subjects of legislation, is a precedent, going to prove its right to legislate on slavery itself. If Congress may legislate on one subject belonging to a class, then it may legislate on any other subject belonging to the same class. Now, Congress has legislated for the Territories on almost the whole circle of subjects belonging to common legislation. It has legislated

on the elective franchise, on the pecuniary qualifications and residence of candidates for office, on the militia, on oaths, on the per diem and mileage of members, &c. &c. By statute 1811, chapter 21, § 3, authorizing the Territory of Orleans to form a constitution, it was provided that all legislative proceedings and judicial records should be kept and promulgated in the English language. Cannot Congress make provision for the rights of the people, as well as for the language in which the laws and records defining those rights shall be expressed? Any language is sweet to the ears of man which gives him the right of trial by jury, of habeas corpus, of religious freedom, and of life, limb, and liberty; but accursed is that language, and fit only for the realms below, which deprives an immortal being of the rights of intelligence and of freedom; of the right to himself, and the dearer rights of family.

But all this is by no means the strongest part of the evidence with which our statutes and judicial decisions abound, showing the power of Congress to legislate over Territories. From the beginning, Congress has not only legislated over the Territories, but it has appointed and controlled the agents of legislation.

The general structure of the Legislature in several of the earlier Territorial Governments was this: It consisted of a Governor and of two Houses, an upper and a lower. Without an exception, where a Governor has been appointed, Congress has always reserved his appointment to itself, or to the President. The Governor so appointed has always had a veto power over the two Houses; and Congress has always reserved to itself, or to the Presi dent, a veto power, not only over him, but over him and both the Houses besides. Congress has often interfered also with the appointment of the upper House, leaving only the lower House to be chosen exclusively by the people of the Territory; and it has determined even for the lower House the qualifications both of electors and of elected. Further still: The power of removing the Governor, at pleasure, has always been reserved to Congress, or to the President.

Look at this: Congress determines for the Territory the qualifications of electors and elected, at least in the first instance. No law of the Territorial Legislature is valid until approved by the Governor. Though approved by the Governor, it may be annulled by Congress, or by the President; and the Governor is appointed, and may be removed at pleasure, by Congress or by the President.

To be more specific, I give the following outline of some of the Territorial Governments:

Ohio Territory, statute 1789, chapter 8. A governor for four years, nominated by the President, approved by the Senate, with power to appoint all subordinate civil and military officers.

A Secretary for four years, appointed in the same way.

Three Judges, to hold office during good behavior. Governor and Judges the sole Legislature, until the district shall contain 5,000 free male inhabitants. Then,

A House of Assembly, chosen by qualified electors, for two years.

A Legislative Council of five, to hold office for five years. The House of Assembly to choose ten men, five of whom are to be selected by the Presi dent and approved by the Senate. These five to be the "Legislative Council."

A Governor, as before, with an unconditional veto, and a right to convene, prorogue, and dissolve the Assembly.

Power given to the President to revoke the commissions of Governor and Secretary.

Indiana Territory, statute 1800, chapter 41.- Similar to that of Ohio. At first the lower House to consist of not more than nine, nor less than seven. Mississippi Territory, statute 1800, chapter 50.- Similar to that of Indiana. · Michigan Territory, statute 1805, chapter, 5.- Similar to that of Indiana. Illinois Territory, statute 1809, chapter 13. Similar to that of Indiana. Alabama Territory, statute 1817, chapter 59. - Similar to that of Indiana.