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his orders. The President cites the laws by which this department of the administration was created, and the rules laid down for the duties pertaining to it; prominent among which are: that the Secretary shall "conduct the business of the department in such manner as the President of the United States shall from time to time order and instruct;" and that he should "hold the office during the pleasure of the President;" and that Congress had no legal right to deprive the President of the power to remove the Secretary. He was, however, aware that the design of the Tenure-of-Office Bill was to vest this power of removal, in certain cases, jointly in the Executive and the Senate; and that, while believing this act to be unconstitutional, yet it having been passed over his veto by the requisite majority of two-thirds, he considered it to be his duty to ascertain in how far the case of Mr. Stanton came within the provisions of this law; after consideration, he came to the conclusion that the case did not come within the prohibitions of the law, and that, by that law he still had the right of removing Mr. Stanton; but that, wishing to have the case decided by the Supreme Court, he, on the 12th of August, issued the order merely suspending, not removing, Mr. Stanton, a power expressly granted by the Tenure-of-Office Act, and appointed General Grant Secretary of War ad interim. The President then recites the subsequent action in the case of Mr. Stanton; and, as he avers, still believing that he had the constitutional power to remove him from office, issued the order of February 21st, for such removal, designing to thus bring the matter before the Supreme Court. He then proceeds formally to deny that at this time Mr. Stanton was in lawful possession of the office of Secretary of War; and that, consequently, the order for his removal was in violation of the Tenure-of-Office Act; and that it was in violation of the Constitution or of any law; or that it constituted any official crime or misdemeanor.

In regard to the seven succeeding articles of impeachment the President, while admitting the facts of the order appointing General Thomas as Secretary of War ad interim, denies all and every of the crimnal charges therein set forth. So of the ninth article, charging an effort to induce General Emory to violate the law, the President denies all such intent, and calls attention to the fact that while, for urgent reasons, he signed the bill prescribing that orders to the army should be issued only through the General, he at the same time declared it to be, in his judgment, unconstitutional; and affirms that in his interview with General Emory he said no more than he had before officially said to Congress-that is, that the law was unconstitutional.

As to the tenth article, the first of the supplementary ones, the President, while admitting that he made certain public speeches at the times and places specified, does not admit that the passages cited are fair reports of his remarks; denies that he has ever been unmindful of the courtesies which ought to be maintained between

the executive and legislative departments; but he claims the perfect right at all times to express his views as to all public

matters.

The reply to the eleventh article, the second supplementary one, is to the same general purport, denying that he ever affirmed that the Thirty-ninth Congress was not a valid Congress of the United States, and its acts obligatory only as they were approved by him; and denying that he had, as charged in the article, contrived unlawful means for preventing Mr. Stanton from resuming the functions of Secretary of War, or for preventing the execution of the act making appropriations for the support of the army, or that to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel States. In his answer to this article the President refers to his reply to the first article, in which he sets forth at length all the steps, and the reasons therefor, relating to the removal of Mr. Stanton. In brief, the answer of the President to the articles of impeachment is a general denial of each and every criminal act charged in the articles of impeachment.

The counsel for the President then asked for a delay of thirty days after the replication of the managers of the impeachment should have been rendered, before the trial should formally proceed. This was refused, and the managers of the impeachment stated that their replication would be presented the next day: it was that,

"The Senate will commence the trial of the President upon the articles of impeachment exhibited against him on Monday, the 30th day of March, and proceed therein with all dispatch under the rules of the Senate, sitting upon the trial of an impeachment."

The replication of the House of Representatives was a simple denial of each and every averment in the answer of the President, closing thus:

"The House of Representatives. . . . do say that the said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, is guilty of the high crimes and misdemeanors mentioned in the said articles, and that the said House of Representatives are ready to prove the same."

The trial began, as appointed, on March 30. There being twentyseven States represented, there were fifty-four Senators, who constituted the Court, presided over by Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, of Ohio. SENATORS: California, Cole, Conness; Connecticut, Dixon, Ferry; Delaware, Bayard, Saulsbury; Indiana, Hendricks, Morton; Illinois, Trumbull, Yates; Iowa, Grimes, Harlan; Kansas, Pomeroy, Ross; Kentucky, Davis, McCreery; Maine, Fessenden, Morrill (Lot M.); Maryland, Johnson, Vickers; Massachusetts, Sumner, Wilson; Michigan, Chandler, Howard; Minnesota, Norton, Ramsay; Missouri, Drake, Henderson; Nebraska, Thayer, Tipton; Nevada, Nye, Stewart; New Hampshire, Cragin, Patterson (J. W.); New Jersey, Cattell, Frelinghuysen; New York, Conklin, Morgan; Ohio, Sherman, Wade; Oregon, Corbett, Williams; Pennsylvania, Buckalew, Cameron; Rhode Island, Anthony, Sprague; Tennessee, Fowler, Patterson (David);

Vermont, Edmunds, Morrill (J. S.); West Virginia, Van Winkle, Willey; Wisconsin, Doolittle, Howe.

Managers for the Prosecution: Messrs. Bingham, Boutwell, Butler, Logan, Stevens, Williams, Wilson.

Counsel for the President: Messrs. Curtis, Evarts, Groesbeck, Nelson, Stanbery.

The following was the order of procedure: The Senate convened at 11 or 12 o'clock, and was called to order by the president of that body, who, after prayer, would leave the chair, which was immediately assumed by the Chief Justice, who wore his official robes. The prosecution was mainly conducted by Mr. Butler, who examined the witnesses, and, in conjunction with the others, argued the points of law which came up. The defense, during the early part of the trial, was mainly conducted by Mr. Stanbery, who had resigned the office of Attorney-General for this purpose, but, being taken suddenly ill, Mr. Evarts took his place. According to the rule at first adopted, the trial was to be opened by one counsel on each side, and summed up by two on each side; but this rule was subsequently modified so as to allow as many of the managers and counsel as chose to sum up, either orally or by filing written argu

ments.

THE PROSECUTION.

The whole of the first day (March 30) was occupied by the opening speech of Mr. Butler. After touching upon the importance of the case, and the wisdom of the framers of the Constitution in providing for its possible occurrence, he laid down the following proposition, supporting it by a copious array of authorities and precedents:

"We define, therefore, an impeachable high crime or misdemeanor to be one, in its nature or consequences, subversive of some fundamental or essential principle of government, or highly prejudicial to the public interest, and this may consist of a violation of the Constitution, of law, of an official oath, or of duty, by an act committed or omitted, or, without violating a positive law, by the abuse of discretionary powers from improper motives, or for any improper purpose."

He then proceeded to discuss the nature and functions of the tribunal before which the trial is held. He asked: He asked: "Is this proceeding a trial, as that term is understood, so far as relates to the rights and duties of a court and jury upon an indictment for crime? Is it not rather more in the nature of an inquest?" The Constitution, he urged, "seems to have determined it to be the latter, because, under its provisions, the right to retain and hold office is the only subject to be finally adjudicated; all preliminary inquiry being carried on solely to determine that question, and that alone." He then proceeded to argue that this body now sitting to determine the accusation, is the Senate of the United States, and

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not a court. This question is of consequence, he argued, because, in the latter case, it would be bound by the rules and precedents of common-law statutes; the members of the court would be liable to challenge on many grounds; and the accused might claim that he could only be convicted when the evidence makes the fact clear beyond reasonable doubt, instead of by a preponderance of the evidence. The fact that in this case the Chief Justice presides, it was argued, does not constitute the Senate thus acting a court for in all cases of impeachment, save that of the President, its regular presiding officer-presides. Moreover, the procedures have no analogy to those of an ordinary court of justice. The accused merely receives a notice of the case pending against him. He is not required to appear personally, and the case will go on without his presence. Mr. Butler thus summed up his position in this regard: "A constitutional tribunal solely, you are bound by no law, either statute or common, which may limit your constitutional prerogative. You consult no precedents save those of the law and custom of parliamentary bodies. You are a law unto yourselves, bound only by the natural principles of equity and justice, and that salus populi suprema est lex."

Mr. Butler then proceeded to consider the articles of impeachment. The first eight, he says, "set out, in several distinct forms, the acts of the President in removing Mr. Stanton and appointing General Thomas, differing, in legal effect, in the purposes for which, and the intent with which, either or both of the acts were done, and the legal duties and rights infringed, and the Acts of Congress violated in so doing." In respect to all of these articles, Mr. Butler says, referring to his former definition of what constituted an impeachable high crime:

“All the articles allege these acts to be in contravention of his oath of office, and in disregard of the duties thereof. If they are so, however, the President might have the power to do them under the law. Still, being so done, they are acts of official misconduct, and, as we have seen, impeachable. The President has the legal power to do many acts which, if done in disregard of his duty, or for improper purposes, then the exercise of that power is an official misdemeanor. For example, he has the power of pardon; if exercised, in a given case, for a corrupt motive, as for the payment of money, or wantonly pardoning all criminals, it would be a misdemeanor."

Mr. Butler affirmed that every fact charged in the first article, and substantially in the seven following, is admitted in the reply of the President; and also that the general intent to set aside the Tenure-of-Office Act is therein admitted and justified. He then proceeded to discuss the whole question of the power of the President for removals from office, and especially his claim that this power was imposed upon the President by the Constitution, and that it could not be taken from him, or be vested jointly in him and

ihe Senate, partly or in whole. This, Mr. Butler affi ed, was the real question at issue before the Senate and the Am ican people. He said.

"Has the President, under the Constitution, the more than royal prerogative at will to remove from office, or to suspend from office, all executive officers of the United States, either civil, military or naval, and to fill the vacancies, without any restraint whatever, or possibility of restraint, by the Senate or by Congress, through laws duly enacted? The House of Representatives, in behalf of the people, join issue by affirming that the exercise of such powers is a high misdemeanor in office. If the affirmative is maintained by the respondent, then, so far as the first eight articles are concernedunless such corrupt purposes are shown as will of themselves makė the exercise of a legal power a crime-the respondent Lust go, and ought to go, quit and free."

This point as to the legal right of the President to make removals from office, which constitutes the real burden of the articles of impeachment, was argued at length. Mr. Butler assumed that the Senate, by whom, in conjunction with the House, the Tenure-of-Office Act had been passed over the veto of the President, would maintain the law to be constitutional. The turning point was whether the special case of the removal of Mr. Stanton came within the provisions of this law. This rested upon the proviso of that law, that

"The Secretaries shall hold their office during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed, and for one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate."

The extended argument upon this point, made by Mr. Butler, was to the effect that Mr. Stanton having been appointed by Mr. Lincoln, whose term of office reached to the 4th of March, 1869, that of Mr. Stanton existed until a month later, unless he was previously removed by the concurrent action of the President and Senate. The point of the argument is, that Mr. Johnson is merely serving out the balance of the term of Mr. Lincoln, cut short by his assassination, so that the Cabinet officers appointed by Mr. Lincoln held their places, by this very proviso, during that, term and for a month thereafter; for, he argued, if Mr. Johnson was not merely serving out the balance of Mr. Lincoln's term, then he is entitled to the office of President for four full years, that being the period for which a President is elected. If, continues the argument, Mr. Stanton's commission was vacated by the Tenure-of-Office Act, it ceased on the 4th of April, 1865; or, if the act had no retroactive effect, still, if Mr. Stanton held office merely under his commission from Mr. Lincoln, then his functions would have ceased upon the passage of the bill, March 2, 1867; and, consequently, Mr. Johnson, in “employing" him after that date as Secretary of War, was guilty of a high misdemeanor, which would give ground for a new article of impeachment.

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