No implied trust arises from a will by which testator gave his residuary estate to his wife, "to have and to hold to her my said wife and to my son Harry Steinhart such portion as my wife, Lena Steinhart, may see fit to give him." Steinhart v. Wolf (1923) 95 N. J. Eq. 132, 122 Atl. 886. The absolute interest of testator's widow is not affected by the precatory expressions in the following clauses: "I give and bequeath unto my wife all my real estate, to have and to hold the same to her, and to her heirs and assigns, forever, subject, however, to a distribution of the same among all my children in her discretion and when she may deem proper so to do. I give and bequeath also to my wife all my personal property which, together with my said real estate hereinbefore devised to her, shall be by her used and appropriated by her to the use of all my children, in such portions and at such time or times as she shall adjudge most practicable; but she to make no appropriation of my said property to deprive my children thereof, and also to divide the same among them in her discretion when she may deem proper." Parsons v. Best (1873) 1 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 211. In Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Shaw (1907) 56 Misc. 201, 107 N. Y. Supp. 337, affirmed on opinion below in (1908) 127 App. Div. 656, 111 N. Y. Supp. 1118, it was held that a bequest of a sum of money to an educational institution is not rendered anything other than an absolute gift by a clause suggesting that a fund be used as a memorial to a certain person and as a scholarship fund. Nothing more than a wish or desire as to the ultimate disposition of the property is expressed by a will in which the testatrix gave to her sister, who was her only heir at law and next of kin, "the sole disposition of all my possessions, to use as she may see fit during her life. And at the end, the said Edwin McGraw be entitled to anything my sister may feel disposed to give to him. . . In case of the decease of the said Edwin McGraw, his portion goes to his sisters." Re Enright (1919) 109 Misc. 337, 179 N. Y. Supp. 757. A widow is held to take an absolute estate under a will in which testator gave her all his property "for her support during her natural lifetime," adding: "Any remainder at her decease to be disposed of by her as she may think just and right among my children," the clause last quoted being held to have only precatory force. Boyle v. Boyle (1893) 152 Pa. 108, 34 Am. St. Rep. 629, 25 Atl. 494. Nothing less than an absolute estate is given to testator's daughter by a bequest of slaves "to be hers forever, to be disposed of as she may think proper amongst her children or grandchildren by will or otherwise." Thompson McKisick (1842) 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 631. V. Only precatory force is to be given to a provision in a will by which testator gave the whole of his property to his wife and her heirs, "to have and to hold in her own use and benefit until my heirs become of age, and for her to divide equally the amount due to each that she, in her judgment, shall be entitled to." Weller v. Weller (1899) 22 Tex. Civ. App. 247, 54 S. W. 652. No trust is created by a will in which testatrix bequeathed to her husband a certain sum "for his sole use, and all that is remaining in the stock that he has not necessary use for to be equally divided between" a brother and sister. Sprange v. Barnard (1789) 2 Bro. Ch. 585, 29 Eng. Reprint, 320. No trust is created by a will in which testator devised his estate to the wife of his brother, "for her to manage and appropriate in the best manner for the welfare of her family," and went on to state that, on account of the embarrassed condition of his brother's affairs, which might leave nothing to his family, he desired that the property devised be held in trust for the brother's wife for her sole and separate use. Crawfurd v. Crawfurd (1825) 3 L. J. Ch. (Eng.) 105. Words merely expressing an expectation, as in the case of a will in which testatrix, after speaking of the provision made for her two elder daughters, said: "If they die single of course they will leave what they have amongst their brothers and sisters,"will not create a trust. Lechmere v. Lavie (1832) 2 Myl. & K. 197, 39 Eng. Reprint, 919. No trust is created by a will in which testator gave his wife the residue of his estate, with power to her to dispose thereof unto and amongst all his children for such estate or estates or in such other shares, proportions, or interests as she should in her discretion deem most fitting and proper. Howarth v. Dewell (1861) 6 Jur. N. S. (Eng.) 1360. No trust is created by a will in which testator gave the residue of his estate to his wife, adding: "And for my dear wife, Ann Bond, to do justice to those relations on my side such as she think worthy of remuneration, but under no restriction to any stated property, but quite at liberty to give and distribute what and to who my dear wife may please." Re Bond (1876) L. R. 4 Ch. Div. (Eng.) 238. VI. Recommending the employment of an agent or attorney as creating a trust. It is uniformly held that a recommendation in a will that a certain person be employed, or continued in employment, creates no obligation. See Re Ogier (1894) 101 Cal. 381, 40 Am. St. Rep. 61, 35 Pac. 900; Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown (1926) 105 Conn. 261, 135 Atl. 555; Jewell v. Barnes (Jewell V. Louisville Trust Co.) (1901) 110 Ky. 329, 53 L.R.A. 377, 61 S. W. 360; Re Thistlewaite (1907) 104 N. Y. Supp. 264; Re Pittock (1921) 102 Or. 159, 17 A.L.R. 218, 199 Pac. 633, 202 Pac. 216; Shaw v. Lawless (1838) 5 Clark & F. 129, 7 Eng. Reprint, 353-H. L.; Finden v. Stephens (1846) 2 Phill. Ch. 142, 41 Eng. Reprint, 896; Foster v. Elsley (1881) L. R. 19 Ch. Div. (Eng.) 518. Thus, in Re Ogier (Cal.) supra, it was held that no obligation to employ the person named is imposed by a provision in the will: "I hereby select as the attorney of my estate John W. Mitchell and direct my executrix to consult and employ him in all matters pertaining to the distribution of my estate and the requirements of this, my last will." In Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown (1926) 105 Conn. 261, 135 Atl. 555, where testator gave his residuary estate in trust to raise money for the payment of annuities, charges, and legacies, and directed that the trustee should maintain an office for the benefit of persons having business with his estate, and further stated: "It is my wish that Blanche M. Pierce, having had twenty years and more experience and knowledge of my business, shall be retained during her lifetime as the principal and head of said office," and further requested that another person named be retained as janitor, it was held that the language employed with regard to the continuance in employment of the persons named, particularly when contrasted with the imperative nature of the testator's other instructions, could only be regarded as precatory. No trust is created by a provision in the will of one who, with his brothers, had conducted a jewelry business, that "I desire that my friend Robert M. Jewell be retained in the employ of the firm on such liberal terms as his long and faithful service entitles him to," so as to render it incumbent upon the testator's widow, who ultimately acquired the interest of the brothers in the business, to retain him in her employment at the salary which he received at the time of the testator's decease. Jewell V. Barnes (Jewell V. Louisville Trust Co.) (1901) 110 Ky. 329, 53 L.R.A. 377, 61 S. W. 360. The force of a direction or command is not to be given to a provision of a will by which testator directed and desired that a certain person who had been his legal adviser "shall be continued in the management of my estate so far as legal advice or assistance shall be necessary or had by my executors." Re Thistlewaite (1907) 104 N. Y. Supp. 264. Only precatory force is to be given the provisions of a will for the retention of certain employees, under a provision that "it is my desire and I request that" a person named "shall be elected manager of" a newspaper, "and shall be retained as such, and that" another person "shall be retained as managing editor . . . until he shall become incapacitated or until he may voluntarily resign." Re Pittock (1921) 102 Or. 159, 17 A.L.R. 218, 199 Pac. 633, 202 Pac. 216. No trust is created by a will providing: "It is also my particular desire that my said executors whilst acting in the management of all or any of my affairs under this my will shall continue [a person named] in the receipt and manage ment thereof, and shall likewise employ and retain him in the receipt, agency, and management of the rents and issues of all such other lands and premises as shall or may be purchased." Shaw v. Lawless (1838) 5 Clark & F. 129, 7 Eng. Reprint, 353H. L. No trust is created by a will in which the testator expressed his wish and desire that a certain person should be employed as agent and manager of his estate whenever his trustee should have occasion for the services of a person in that capacity, words of recommendation not being construed as trusts unless the subject be certain. Finden v. Stephens (1846) 2 Phill. Ch. 142, 41 Eng. Reprint, 896. A provision in a will that "my solicitor, William Edward Foster, shall be the solicitor to my estate and to my said trustees in the management and carrying out of the provisions of this my will," imposes no trust on the trustees to continue the solicitor in his position. Foster v. Elsley (Eng.) supra. E. S. O. Municipal corporations, § 117-power to regulate dry cleaning establish ments. 1. Power conferred upon municipal corporations to prevent fires and regulate the construction of buildings and the handling and storage of inflammable materials authorizes the regulation and licensing of the business of dry cleaning, where the evidence shows that more fires occur in buildings used for such business than in any other business where large quantities of inflammable liquids are used. [See annotation on this question beginning on page 110.] Municipal corporations, § 32 of powers. extent 2. A municipality possesses only such powers as the legislature has expressly conferred upon it, or such as are necessarily incident to the powers expressly granted. [See 19 R. C. L. 768; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 971; 4 R. C. L. Supp. 1288; 5 R. C. L. Supp. 1045; 6 R. C. L. Supp. 1136.] License, § 22-municipal power. 3. A city may license an occupation and exact a license fee under power expressly granted to it by the legislature, or necessarily incident to a power so granted. [See 17 R. C. L. 525; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 702; 6 R. C. L. Supp. 1021.] when justified. License, § 20 [See 19 R. C. L. 818; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 976; 4 R. C. L. Supp. 1294; 5 R. C. L. Supp. 1048; 6 R. C. L. Supp. 1142.] Municipal corporations, § 117 - police power storage of combustibles. 5. The police power of a city extends to the regulation and prevention of the storage of combustible fluids or explosive material. [See 11 R. C. L. 654, 655; 2 R. C. L. Supp. 1297.] Municipal corporations, § 117 — ordinances controlling inflammables. 6. The regulation of businesses using inflammable materials may include provision of methods for installation of equipment and handling of the product, the lighting, ventilation, and construction of buildings where they are used, the competency and examination of persons using them, and the inspection of places, instrumentalities, methods, and means of storing and using them. [See 2 R. C. L. Supp. 1297; 4 R. C. L. Supp. 714.] Courts, 183-interference with ordinance. 7. The court cannot interfere with requirements of an ordinance regulating the construction and use of build 8. A court will not hold an ordinance void as unreasonable where there is room for a fair difference of opinion on the question, even though the correctness of the legislative judgment may be doubtful, and the court may regard the ordinance as not the best which might be adopted for the purpose. [See 19 R. C. L. 809; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 975; 4 R. C. L. Supp. 1292; 5 R. C. L. Supp. 1047; 6 R. C. L. Supp. 1141.] Municipal corporations, § 117 — requiring detachment of buildings reasonableness. 9. Requiring a building in which inflammable materials are to be used in a dry cleaning business to be detached 50 feet from any other building, or possible building, is unreasonable. Injunction, § 137 — when denied. 10. Injunction will not lie against the enforcement of an ordinance providing for the licensing of dry cleaners, where only a portion of it is void, and the complainant, upon complying with the valid portion of the ordinance, may secure a license through a writ of mandamus. APPEAL by plaintiff from a decree of the Superior Court for Cook County (Hebel, J.) dismissing a bill filed to enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance for licensing and regulating the business of dry cleaning and interference with the construction and maintenance of a building for carrying on such business. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Messrs. Schuyler, Ettelson, & Weinfeld, for appellant: A municipality has no inherent power to regulate any business, but such power must be specifically conferred by the legislature. Barnard & Miller v. Chicago, 316 Ill. 519, 38 A.L.R. 1533, 147 N. E. 384; Aberdeen-Franklin Coal Co. v. Chicago, 315 Ill. 99, 145 N. E. 613; Arms v. Chicago, 314 Ill. 316, 145 N. E. 407; Chicago v. Murphy, 313 Ill. 98, 144 N. E. 802; Potson v. Chicago, 304 Ill. 222, 136 N. E. 594; Condon v. Forest Park, 278 Ill. 218, L.R.A.1917E, 314, 115 N. E. 825; People ex rel. Friend v. Chicago, 261 Ill. 16, 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 438, 103 N. E. 609, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 292; Chicago v. Ross, 257 Ill. 76, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 205, 100 N. E. 159; Chicago v. M. & M. Hotel Co. 248 Ill. 264, 93 N. E. 753; Earlville v. Radley, 237 Ill. 242, 86 N. E. 624; Wilkie v. Chicago, 188 Ill. 444, 80 Am. St. Rep. 182, 58 N. E. 1004. An ordinance which arbitrarily discriminates between persons similarly situated is unreasonable and void. (323 Ill. $68, 154 N. E. 131.) Elgin v. Winchester, 300 Ill. 214, 22 A.L.R. 1481, 133 N. E. 205; Carrollton v. Bazzette, 159 Ill. 284, 31 L.R.A. 522, 42 N. E. 837; Zanone v. Mound City, 103 III, 552; Tugman v. Chicago, 78 Ill. 405; Chicago v. Rumpff, 45 Ill. 90, 92 Am. Dec. 196; Chicago v. Gunning System, 114 Ill. App. 377; Monmouth v. Popel, 183 Ill. 634, 56 N. E. 348; Cairo v. Feuchter, 159 Ill. 155, 42 N. E. 308; Kilbourne v. Blakely, 184 Ill. App. 370; Peoria v. Gugenheim, 61 Ill. App. 374. An ordinance which tends to foster a monopoly is unreasonable and void. People ex rel. Roos v. Kaul, 302 Ill. 317, 134 N. E. 740; Meyers v. Baker, 120 Ill. 567, 60 Am. Rep. 580, 12 N. E. 79; Tugman v. Chicago, 78 Ill. 405; Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill. 84, 149 N. E. 784. Injunction will lie to restrain the enforcement of an invalid ordinance. Wilkie v. Chicago, supra; Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445, 49 L.R.A. 408, 67 Am. St. Rep. 224, 51 N. E. 907; Stevens v. St. Mary's Training School, 144 Ill. 336, 18 L.R.A. 832, 36 Am. St. Rep. 438, 33 N. E. 962; Spiegler v. Chicago, 216 I. 114, 74 N. E. 718; Rago v. Melrose Park, 161 Ill. App. 18; Chicago v. Banker, 112 Ill. App. 94. Messrs. Francis X. Busch, Roy S. Gaskill, Albert H. Veeder, and W. Arnold Amberg, for appellees: The Cities and Villages Act delegates full and complete power to the city to pass all reasonable fire prevention regulations, which delegation of power is sufficient to sustain any regulation which tends to lessen the damage and danger of fire and to prevent the spreading thereof in cities. Chicago v. Mandel Bros. 264 Ill. 206, 106 N. E. 181; Williams v. Chicago, 266 Ill. 267, 107 N. E. 599, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 514; Hartman v. Chicago, 282 Ill. 511, 118 N. E. 731; Chicago v. Washingtonian Home, 289 Ill. 206, 6 A.L.R. 1584, 124 N. E. 416; Fishbain v. Chicago, 237 Ill. App. 631. The city has full power to pass all reasonable fire prevention regulations pertaining to the storage and use of gasolene, oils, and similar inflammable liquids. Standard Oil Co. v. Danville, 199 Ill. 50, 64 N. E. 1110, 101 Ill. App. 65; Wright v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 27 Ill. App. 200; Fishbain v. Chicago, su pra. The city having been delegated the power to enact fire prevention ordinances, all presumption and intend ments favor the validity of the ordi nance. McCray v. Chicago, 292 Ill. 60, 126 N. E. 557; Chicago v. Mayer, 290 Ill. 142, 124 N. E. 842; Rock Island v. Wagner, 45 Ill. App. 444, affirmed in 146 Ill. 139, 21 L.R.A. 519, 34 N. E. 545; Plymouth v. McWherter, 152 Ill. App. 115; Springfield v. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. 164 Ill. App. 276, affirmed in 253 Ill. 346, 97 N. E. 672; People ex rel. Keller v. Oak Park, 266 Ill. 365, 107 N. E. 636; Biffer v. Chicago, 278 Ill. 562, 116 N. E. 182. The burden of showing an ordinance unreasonable is upon the person attacking it. People ex rel. Morrison v. Cregier, 138 Ill. 401, 28 N. E. 812; Swift v. Klein, 163 Ill. 269, 45 N. E. 219; Chicago v. Waldon W. Shaw Livery Co. 258 Ill. 409, 101 N. W. 588; Chicago v. Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. 146 Ill. App. 403; Plymouth v. McWherter, 152 Ill. App. 114; Consumers Co. v. Chicago, 208 Ill. App. 203. In determining the reasonableness of an ordinance the court should take into consideration all surrounding conditions and contemporaneous circumstances. Chicago v. Green Mill Gardens, 305 Ill. 87, 137 N. E. 126; McFarlane v. Chicago, 185 Ill. 242, 57 N. E. 12; Hawes v. Chicago, 158 Ill. 653, 30 L.R.A. 225, 42 N. E. 373; Lake View v. Tate, 130 Ill. 247, 6 L.R.A. 268, 22 N. E. 791; Endelman v. Bloomington, 137 Ill. App. 483. Section 1416 of the Chicago Municipal Code of 1922 is valid. Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill. 84, 149 N. E. 784; Freund, Pol. Power, §§ 685, 687; Re Stoltenberg, 165 Cal. 789, 134 Pac. 971; Glucose Ref. Co. v. Chicago (C. C.) 138 Fed. 209; State v. Fraternal Knights & Ladies, 35 Wash. 338, 77 Pac. 500; Millville Improv. Co. v. Pitman, G. & C. Gas Co. 75 N. J. L. 410, 67 Atl. 1005; Schostag v. Cator, 151 Cal. 600, 91 Pac. 502; Osborn V. Charlevoix Circuit Judge, 114 Mich. 655, 72 N. W. 982; New York v. Kelsey, 158 App. Div. 183, 143 N. Y. Supp. 41, affirmed in 213 N. Y. 638, 107 N. E. 1074; Lea v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 135 Tenn. 560, 188 S. W. 215; Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53; Inspector of Buildings v. Stoklosa, 250 Mass. 52, 145 N. E. 262; Spector v. Building Inspector, 250 Mass. 63, 145 N. E. 265; Brett v. Building Comr. 250 Mass. 73, 145 N. E. 269; Bamel v. Building Comr. 250 Mass. 82, |