145 N. E. 272; Ex parte Fiske, 72 Cal. 125, 13 Pac. 310; Re Yick Wo, 68 Cal. 294, 58 Am. Rep. 12, 9 Pac. 139; Chicago v. Ripley, 249 Ill. 466, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1186, 94 N. E. 931, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 160; Buffalo v. Chadeayne, 134 N. Y. 163, 31 N. E. 443; Morton v. Wessinger, 58 Or. 80, 113 Pac. 7; King v. Davenport, 98 Ill. 305, 38 Am. Rep. 89; Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 267 Ill. 344, 108 N. E. 340, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 488; Chicago v. Washingtonian Home, 289 Ill. 206, 6 A.L.R. 1584, 124 N. E. 416; Hartman v. Chicago, 282 Ill. 511, 118 N. E. 731; People ex rel. Busching v. Ericsson, 263 Ill. 368, L.R.A.1915D, 607, 105 N. E. 315, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 183.

Even if a part of § 1416 of the said Code be held invalid, the validity of the remaining portion of the ordinance is not affected, and the complaint must pursue the remedy of mandamus to obtain a permit under the valid portion of the ordinance.

Chicago Cold Storage Warehouse Co. v. People, 127 Ill. App. 179; People ex rel. Dwight v. Chicago R. Co. 270 Ill. 278, 110 N. E. 394; Depue v. Banschbach, 273 Ill. 574, 113 N. E. 156; Spring Valley v. Chicago, O. & P. R. Co. 200 Ill. App. 352; Consumers Co. v. Chicago, 208 Ill. App. 203; Pochco v. Illinois Terminal R. Co. 210 Ill. App. 598; Fishbain v. Chicago, 237 Ill. App. 631; Klever Shampay Karpet Kleaners v. Chicago, 238 Ill. App. 291.

Farmer, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal prosecuted by the Klever Shampay Karpet Kleaners, a corporation, from a decree of the superior court of Cook county dismissing for want of equity a bill filed by the appellant in behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, against the city of Chicago, its mayor and superintendent of police, for an injunction against the enforcement of an ordinance for licensing and regulating the business of dry cleaning, and against interference with the appellant in constructing and maintaining on its premises the building and equipment for carrying on the business of dry cleaning.

The ordinance, which is article. 13 of chapter 31 of the Chicago Municipal Code of 1922, consisting of

§§ 1412 to 1421, inclusive, was enacted July 22, 1912. Section 1412 declares it unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to carry on within the city of Chicago dry cleaning or spotting in which gasoline, naphtha, benzine, or other volatile oils are used to clean or renovate clothing or fabric of any kind, without obtaining a license for that purpose. Every person, firm, or corporation keeping or using more than two quarts of gasoline, naphtha, benzine, or other volatile oils for the purposes mentioned, for profit or reward, is defined as a dry cleaner, and every person, firm, or corporation keeping or using two quarts or less of such oils for the purposes mentioned, for profit or reward, is declared to be a spotter.

The amended bill alleged that the appellant had, since March 22, 1924, carried on a general cleaning and dyeing business otherwise than by the dry cleaning method; that it had made plans for the reconstruction and remodeling of its building, upon which it had a lease expiring in 1934, to be used in the dry cleaning process, and that the proposed reconstruction and remodeling were in accordance with the requirements of a general comprehensive city ordinance governing the storage of gasoline, benzine, naphtha, and other inflammable liquids; that the appellant had presented to the commissioner of buildings of the city plans for the alteration of its building and business, and applied for a permit to make the alteration and to conduct the dry cleaning business, but the permit was refused solely on the ground that the benzine building which the appellant proposed to construct according to its plan was not detached at least 50 feet from any other building or structure or the line of adjoining property which might be built upon, and the defendants threatened to arrest and imprison the appellant's employees, if the appellant proceeded to operate and maintain the dry cleaning business in its building without a compliance with the dry

appellees, and continued to, that term to vacate the decree of October 13th, and entered a decree dismissing the bill for want of equity. This appeal is prosecuted from that decree.

Municipal corporations-extent of powers.

The first contention of the appellant is that the city had no authority from the Legislature to enact an ordinance licensing and regulating a dry cleaning business. It is well settled and generally understood that a municipality possesses only such powers as the legislature has expressly conferred upon it, or such as are necessarily incident to the powers expressly granted, and no authority need be cited upon that question. In the various subsections of ¶ 65 (Smith-Hurd's Rev. Stat. 1925, chap. 24, p. 312) will be found no express power conferred upon municipalities to license and regulate the dry cleaning business. Express powers are conferred upon municipalities to guard against fire, prevent dangerous constructions, and to regulate and prevent the carrying on of manufactories dangerous in promotion of fires, to cause all dangerous buildings to be made safe, to provide fire prevention equipment and the use of the same, to regulate and prevent storage of gunpowder, tar, pitch, resin, coal oil, benzine, turpentine, hemp, cotton, nitroglycerine, petroleum, and other combustible or explosive material, and to enforce all necessary police ordinances.

The powers conferred on municipalities by the Cities and Villages Act (Smith-Hurd's Rev. Stat. 1925, chap. 24) to prevent fires and to regulate the construction of buildings and the handling and storage of inflammable materials would authorize the passage of the dry cleaning ordinance, if the establishment and conduct of that business created greater dangers of fire than the storage and handling of those liquids in other lines of business. John Plant, chief of the bureau of fire protection, testified, and the mas

ter found, that dry cleaning as conducted creates danger of fires. He testified there were more fires in dry cleaning establishments than in any other business where large quantities of inflammable liquids are used. The record warrants the conclusion that the business creates greater danger of fire than other businesses using large quantities of inflammable liquids, and justifies classifying the dry cleaning business as a special subject of regulation to prevent fires, and the power to adopt reasonable and proper ordinances for that pur- -power to regupose is a necessary ing establishincident to the ex- ments. ercise of the powers expressly granted. The fact, if it is a fact, as contended by the appellant, that many of the provisions of the general ordinances upon the subject of the use of large quantities of inflammable liquids are similar to the dry cleaning ordinance cannot affect the validity of the latter.

late dry clean

While a city has no inherent power to license any occupation or exact a license fee from any person, it may do so under

License-mu

a power expressly nicipal power. granted to it by the

legislature or necessarily incident to a power so granted. In order to justify an ordinance requiring a license to engage in a particular occupation as a proper exercise of the police power, it must appear that justified. the requirement of

-when

a license tends to promote the public health, safety, or welfare. Wilkie v. Chicago, 188 Ill. 444, 80 Am. St. Rep. 182, 58 N. E. 1004; Westville v. Rainwater, 294 Ill. 409, 128 N. E. 492. Where the power is not directly granted, it need not be absolutely indispensable, but it must be reasonably necessary to make effective a power expressly granted. Potson v. Chicago, 304 Ill. 222, 136 N. E. 594. If the regulation of certain conditions affecting the public safety has been delegated to a city, and the efficient regulation of such conditions requires the conduct of

Municipal corporations-police powerstorage of combustibles.

prevention of the storage of coal oil, naphtha, benzine, petroleum, or any of the products thereof, and other combustible or explosive material. Standard Oil Co. v. Danville, 199 Ill. 50, 64 N. E. 1110. Such regulation may properly include the provision of meth

-ordinances

ods of installation

controlling in- and use of tanks flammables. for the the handling and storage of volatile inflammable liquids therein, pumps, or devices for the removal and conveyance of the contents of such tanks, and where, in a building in which such liquids are stored, a business is conducted in connection with which such liquids are used, the regulation may include provision for the lighting and ventilation of the building, the manner of construction, and may require the persons in charge of such volatile inflammable liquids, and of the handling and using thereof, and of the room in which, and the equipment with which they are used, to be competent persons, and may provide for the examination of such persons and the inspection of the places, instrumentalities, methods, and means of storing and using such volatile inflammable liquids. The ordinance in question contained provisions of this character.

requires the construction of buildings and the conduct of business therein to be regulated and the method of such regulation, where such regulation is committed by the legislature to a city, are questions which are left to the judgment and discretion of the city council to determine, and, unless the exercise of such judgment and discretion is manifestly unreasonable, the courts will not interfere with it. A court will not hold an ordinance void as unreasonable, where there is room for a fair differ- -refusal to inence of opinion on terfere with the question, even though the correctness of the legislative judgment may be doubtful, and the court may regard the ordinance as not the best which might be adopted for the purpose. Hartman v. Chicago, 282 Ill. 511, 118 N. E. 731; Chicago v. Mandel Bros. 264 Ill. 206, 106 N. E. 181; Chicago v. Washingtonian Home, 289 Ill. 206, 6 A.L.R. 1584, 124 N. E. 416.

ordinance.

The appellant contends that the proper remedy is by injunction; that, where an entire ordinance is void, and many persons are threatened with attempted enforcement of it, a court of equity may, to avoid a multiplicity of suits, enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance. In our opinion, the case is not one for the exercise of the powers of a court of equity. The whole ordinance is not void, but only paragraph (b) of § 1416 is invalid. The situation is not essentially different from the situation in Grace Missionary Church v. Zion, 300 Ill. 513, 133 N.

E. 268, except that in that case the bill did not allege there was any prosecution threatened suits

against others than the complainant. Workmen for Grace Church had been arrested, released on bail, and, when they returned to work on the building, were again arrested and put in jail. The lower court sustained a demurrer to the bill, and dismissed it for want of equity. This court affirmed the decree, and held Grace Church had a complete and adequate remedy at law by mandamus.

If appellant complies with the

It cannot be questioned that the state, under its police power, has the right to regulate any and all kinds of business, and to protect the public health, morals, and welfare, subject to the restrictions of reasonable classification. 6 R. C. L. 217.

An extended search has disclosed but few cases dealing specifically with the question under annotation.

The reported case (KLEVER SHAMPAY KARPET KLEANERS v. CHICAGO, ante, 103), affirming (1925) 238 Ill. App. 291, holds, it is to be noted, that city having statutory authority to enact ordinances designed to guard against fire, and to regulate the storage of combustible and explosive material, as well as to enforce all necessary police ordinances, has authority reasonably to license and regulate the business of dry cleaning, the business being one creating greater danger of fire than other businesses using large quantities of inflammable liquids; and that an ordinance providing for the licensing and regulation of such business-among other things, requiring the persons in charge to be competent persons, and making provision for the methods of installation and use of tanks for the handling and storage of volatile and inflammable liquids, as well as regulating the matter of the construction, lighting, and ventilation

of the building in which the business is carried on, etc.-is valid as a proper exercise of the police power thus delegated to city (except as to certain provision hereinafter to be noted). The lower court, in its opinion, refers to the earlier case of Fishbain v. Chicago (1925) 237 Ill. App. 631, a memorandum decision from the report of which the facts do not appear, as having held that the city had power to enact reasonable regulations in regard to the business of dry cleaning.

A provision (in a statute defining and regulating the business of dry cleaning and dyeing in cities of the first and second class) to the effect that no one shall advertise as dry cleaner and dyer, or either, as defined by preceding section, until he shall have made application to the state fire marshal for permission to engage in such business and paid inspection fee of $25, cannot be sustained as to one who does dry cleaning and dyeing through another, to whom the clothing received by him is transmitted for doing the work, on the ground that it was enacted to prevent false advertising, since (1) an advertisement that one is a cleaner and dyer is not necessarily false or misleading merely because he does the work through another, and not at an establishment owned and conducted