Where a person is employed to work, not at a particular plant, but throughout the streets of a city, he enters the course of his employment when he leaves his home instead of when he commences his first task, and leaves the course of his employment upon his return to his home rather than upon the completion of his last task, provided, of course, he has not abandoned his duties in the meantime.

United States Casualty Co. v. Superior Hardware Co. 175 Wis. 162, 184 N. W. 694; J. E. Porter Co. v. Industrial Commission, 301 Ill. 76, 133 N. E. 652; Harby v. Marwell Bros. 203 App. Div. 525, 196 N. Y. Supp. 729, affirmed in 235 N. Y. 504, 139 N. E. 711; Moran's Case, 234 Mass. 566, 125 N. E. 591; State ex rel. London & L. Indemnity Co. v. District Ct. 141 Minn. 348, 170 N. W. 219; Haddock v. Edgewater Steel Co. 263 Pa. 120, 106 Atl. 196; Reese v. National Surety Co. 162 Minn. 493, 203 N. W. 442; Duffield v. Peers, 37 Ont. L. Rep. 652, 32 D. L. R. 339; Stansberry v. Monitor Stove Co. 20 A.L.R. 324, note; State ex rel. McCarthy Bros. Co. v. District Ct. 141 Minn. 61, 169 N. W. 274.

At least, Craig entered the course of his employment at the moment he received his first bundle of papers, and continued therein during his de

liveries and while returning by direct route through his working territory. The going trip and return trip are correlative and of the same legal nature.

Wabash R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 294 Ill. 119, 128 N. E. 290; Stacey's Case, 225 Mass. 174, 114 N. E. 206; J. E. Porter Co. v. Industrial Commission, 301 Ill. 76, 133 N. E. 662; Re Raynes, 66 Ind. App. 321, 118 N. E. 387; Martin v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. 197 App. Div. 382, 189 N. Y. Supp. 467; State ex rel. London & L. Indemnity Co. v. District Ct. 141 Minn. 348, 170 N. W. 219.

Mr. W. S. Angwin, for petitioner employer:

The commission exceeded its jurisdiction in making an award to the employee in that the injury did not occur in the course or arise out of the employment.

California Highway Commission v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 61 Cal. App. 284, 214 Pac. 658; California Casualty Indemnity Exch. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 190 Cal. 433, 213 Pac. 257; Ocean Acci. & G. Co. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 173 Cal. 313, L.R.A.1917B, 336, 159 Pac. 1041; Echman v. Globe Indemnity Co. 20 Ind. Acci. Comm. 244; N. K. Fairbanks Co. v. Industrial Commission, 285 Ill. 11, 120 N. E. 457.

Seawell, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

The petition of respondent Industrial Accident Commission praying for a hearing by this court after decision by the District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, having been granted, the proceeding is properly before us for final determination. The respondent commission made an award in favor of respondent George A. Craig, a youth 15 years of age, who was injured by a traffic collision that occurred upon Grove street, city of Oakland, this state. The commission found that said George A. Craig was employed by petitioner, J. N. Makins, as a deliverer or distributor of newspapers, and that the injury sustained by said George A. Craig occurred in the course of, and arose out of, his employment. The circumstances of the injury and the contentions of the respective parties to the proceeding are well stated by Mr. Justice Cashin, author of the opinion adopted by said District Court of Appeal, and we hereby adopt it in part as follows:

"The compensation claimant was, on December 6, 1924, in the employ of petitioner as a carrier of newspapers in the city of Oakland, his route of delivery being within a definite territory, which began at Fourteenth street, and included the section between San Pablo and Telegraph avenues, extending north to the intersection of Grove street with San Pablo avenue, and thence covered the section between Grove street and Telegraph avenue to Thirty-Sixth street in that city.

"Claimant in the course of his employment received each morning at the corner of Sixteenth street and San Pablo avenue a portion of the newspapers to be delivered, being supplied with additional papers at points along his route, and from Fourteenth street proceeded with such delivery in a northerly direction to the southeasterly corner of Grove and Thirty-Sixth streets, at which point the last delivery by him in the course of such employment

was made; no deliveries being made by him at any place west of the east side of Grove street. Claimant was paid a stated sum each month for the service rendered, furnished his own means of conveyance, which in this case was a bicycle owned by him, and his duties in every respect ceased each day upon the last delivery being made at the point above mentioned. On December 6, 1924, claimant, after the last delivery on his route, and with the purpose of proceeding to his home, which was situated several blocks to the south and west, crossed to the west side of Grove street at or near its intersection with Thirty-Sixth street, and proceeded thence in a southerly direction along said street, remaining, in accordance with the traffic regulations, on the west side thereof, to its intersection with ThirtyFirst street, at which point he received injuries from an automobile being driven westerly across such intersection.

"Respondent, as its conclusion from the above facts, found that the injuries occurred in the course, and arose out, of the employment, and awarded compensation therefor.

"Petitioner in this proceeding bases his application for relief upon the contention that the facts shown, and which are not disputed, do not support such conclusion, and that, therefore, respondent acted in excess of its powers in making the award.

"Respondent contends that, the injuries having occurred on Grove street, though the westerly side thereof had not been traversed by claimant in the course of his employment in making deliveries, and at a point approximately five blocks south of the point where the last act in the rendition of services to petitioner was performed, claimant was still within his working territory, and that until he passed the corner of Sixteenth and Grove streets, where the first papers for delivery were received, he remained within the protection of the compensation act.

some point along the route of his travel.

It is the contention of petitioner that the facts of this case bring it within the rule generally known as the "going and coming rule." This rule has been considered and applied by this court in numerous cases where the person injured was employed to perform service at or in a particular plant or upon particular premises, and the injury claimed to be compensable was inflicted while he was going to, or returning from, his place of employment, or where the employee had left the place of employment on an errand personal to himself. The general rule, subject to many exceptions, however, is that injuries inflicted under the foregoing circumstances are not compensable. California Casualty Indemnity Exch. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 190 Cal. 433, 213 Pac. 257; London Guarantee & Acci. Co. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 190 Cal. 587, 213 Pac. 977. Awards have been affirmed by this court, however, where the facts of the case showed that the injured employee was not at the time he was injured upon his master's premises. Judson Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 181 Cal. 300, 184 Pac. 1. Each case must be adjudged by the facts which are peculiarly its own. Industrial accidents are produced by so many varying circumstances that it is rather unusual to find any two or more cases that may be ruled by the same legal precedent. While the facts of this case present a situation that has not heretofore come to the attention of this court, we are of the opinion that the principles of law applicable to the decision of an ordinary case of injuries received by an employee while upon the master's premises, and who is thus injured within the course of his within territory. employment, must rule the instant case. It is true that no physical wall or barrier circumscribed the area or district which was adopted

Workmen's compensationnewsboy returning home

by the master as the place of the respondent's employment and to which he had been assigned; nevertheless, the limits of his working district were as definitely fixed by the employer as if it had been inclosed by a physical structure. The area thus definitely marked by reference to designated streets as fixing its boundary was adopted by the employer with full knowledge of all its attendant traffic hazards, and assigned to the youth as his place of employment. The streets were used. not only as a means of conducting the business, but were also occupied as supply stations at three separate points along the route of distribution. This, it will be observed, is not a case where an outside worker, such as a solicitor or agent, selects his own territory or working district ad libitum, but it is a case where the employer has definitely fixed the boundaries of a district within which the employee is required to labor without any right upon his part to change them in any respect whatsoever. Under the facts of this case, the district thus established and controlled by the employer will be held to be the employee's place of employment. No unreasonable expansion of the Industrial Accident Act (Stat. 1913, p. 279, as amended) is required to bring the instant case within its compensatory provisions.

It is a further contention of petitioner that the injury was inflicted without the working district of the respondent, and, therefore, is not compensable. This contention is predicated upon the theory that respondent Craig's district was limited by the center line of Grove street, and not by the street considered with reference to its entire width. There was no other way by which respondent could have returned to the initial point at which he entered without crossing to the westerly half of Grove street. Had he attempted to return on the easterly side of said street he would have violated the traffic laws of the state, and would thereby have subjected himself to arrest and imprisonment.