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of the real estate in my name, he may do so, with the provision that my daughter Alice Croft receive two thirds of the proceeds of said sale." Croft v. Chelten Trust Co. (1922) 272 Pa. 514, 116 Atl. 479.

An expression of a "desire" that a monument, for the erection of which the testator left a sum of money, should be erected on a particular location, is precatory, and not imperative. Ogden's Petition (1903) 25 R. I. 373, 55 Atl. 933.

No trust in favor of testator's children is imposed by a will in which testator directed that, after the payment of debts and funeral expenses, the balance of his estate should "remain in the possession of my wife and children for their support and the education of my children; and, as my children shall arrive of age or marry, I desire that my wife shall advance to such child or children such an amount either in property or money as she deems prudent, but not exceeding a distributive share of my estate, as it is my intention for my said wife to keep as much of my estate as will make her comfortable during her widowhood." Rowland v. Rowland (1888) 29 S. C. 54, 6 S. E. 902.

An intention to create a trust in the residuary estate is manifested by a will in which testatrix directed that, if there should be a surplus after paying other legacies in full, $500 or such portion thereof as such surplus will pay should be paid to a person named, and then proceeded to devise the residue to the same person, adding: "It is my desire that he shall distribute the same or the proceeds thereof among my nephews and nieces and to such of them and in such proportion as he shall deem just and proper;" since, had she intended that he should take the residue absolutely, there would have been no object in making the gift of $500. Re Dewey (1914) 45 Utah, 98, 143 Pac. 124, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 475.

In Hunt v. Hunt (1897) 18 Wash. 14, 50 Pac. 578, it was held, in view of the fact that the testator's property was of the value of only $18,000, so that a payment of the amount named in the

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testamentary provision along with other legacies would more than have exhausted it, without leaving anything for the testator's wife, that no precatory trust was created by the provisions of a will and codicil in which testator gave his wife all his estate, and stated: "I desire fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) to be given to our foster son at any time convenient to my executrix. Such residue as there may be at the death of my wife I wish her to distribute by will equally between the children of my sister Sarah and my brother Howard. Should the revenues from my estate not be sufficient for my wife's support, she as executrix has full privileges to use such part of the principal as she may require without any contests or objections from any other heir or heirs."

No intention to confer upon the wife either a fee simple in the testator's real estate or absolute property in his personal estate is manifested by a will in which testator gave his wife "in trust and for her support and maintenance during her life, all my estate, both real and personal, with full power and privilege to sell and convey any, all, or so much of my real estate in such a manner as she may see fit in as full and complete manner as I myself can do, to sell and dispose of my personal estate, or so much as she may see fit, for her own support according to her condition in life, and for the benefit of my estate so far as she may see proper. At the death of my dear wife I desire the residue of my estate, both real and personal, to be distributed as follows: One half of the same, after giving my dear wife a full and liberal support to my brother," etc. Cresap v. Cresap (1890) 34 W. Va. 310, 12 S. E. 527.

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property as she would. Pushman v. Filliter (1795) 3 Ves. Jr. 7, 30 Eng. Reprint, 864.

No trust is created by a will in which testator appointed his mother his residuary legatee, "with the desire that my residuary estate be afterward left by her, in her own and my name, to charitable purposes," the words used being too vague to cut down the beneficial gift. M'Culloch v. M'Culloch (1863) 11 Week. Rep. (Eng.) 504.

No trust attaches to a gift to a testator's son by a will in which testator said: "It is my earnest hope and I particularly request my said son to keep all and single the said manors, etc., herein before devised to him,

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and not to sell, alien, or dispose of the same or any part thereof except by way of exchange or for reinvesting the value in the purchase of other estates. And in case my said son shall die without leaving issue male of his body him surviving, it is my anxious desire that he will so settle and devise the same manors, etc., . . . in such manner and to such persons that the same manors, etc., and every part thereof, may continue in the name of Oglander." Hood v. Oglander (1865) 34 L. J. Ch. N. S. (Eng.) 528.

V..

No trust is created by a will in the residue given the nieces by the words, "my desire being that they shall distribute such residue as they think will be most agreeable to my wishes," the testatrix having shown elsewhere in the will that she knew how to create a trust by apt words, and the language used showing that the nieces were to be the judges of the mode of distribution. Stead v. Mellor (1877) L. R. 5 Ch. Div. (Eng.) 225.

No intention to create a trust is manifested by a will in which testatrix gave all her property to her daughter, her heirs, and assigns, by the provision, "It is my desire that she allows to my relative and companion, Anne Gregory, now residing with me, an annuity of £25 during her life." Diggles (1888) 39 Ch. Div. (Eng.) 253. No imperative force is to be given. to the provision of a will by which testator, who had given most of his property to his son absolutely, stated:

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"I desire that out of the income thereof be appropriated a sum not exceeding £1,500 per annum for his household expenses, and that he shall, after deducting all costs and expenses of and incident to the management and working of my estate, appropriate the remainder of such income for the purpose of reducing the liabilities upon the same in such manner as he in his sole and uncontrolled discretion shall think fit." Re Sanson (1896) 12 Times L. R. (Eng.) 142.

No imperative obligation sufficient to create a trust is imposed by a will in which testatrix gave all her property unto and equally amongst her two daughters "for their own absolute use and benefit," appointing them executrixes and adding: "My desire is that each of my said two daughters shall, during the lifetime of my son, pay to him one third of the respective incomes of my said two daughters accruing from the moneys and investments under this my will." Re Oldfield (1904) 90 L. T. N. S. (Eng.) 392.

No trust is created by a will in which testator bequeathed to his sisters "the rest of my stock shares, subject to a legacy," with the further provision: "I specially desire that the sums herewith bequeathed shall . . be specifically left by the legatees to such charitable institutions of a distinct and undoubted Protestant nature as my sisters may select, and in such proportions as they may determine." Re Conolly [1910] 1 Ch. (Eng.) 219. A trust capable of being enforced is created by the words, "I desire the £300 which I have bequeathed to A to be divided by her on her death as she shall think fit amongst the daughters of my cousin B." Re Jevons (1911) 56 Sol. Jo. (Eng.) 72, as digested in Mews, Eng. Cas. Law Dig. 1911-1915, col, 1819.

Only precatory force is to be given. to the provisions of a will by which testator bequeathed to his son shares in companies of which the testator was a director, by the provision: "I hereby specially desire that at the death of my son, should he die without issue, his portion shall pass to my daughter. In the event of my daughter

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predeceasing her brother, this portion shall pass on to her issue." Kinsey-. Morgan v. Campbell (1915) 52 Scot. L. R. 289.

No trust is created by a will in which testator gave all his property to his wife, adding: "It is my desire that she takes good care of all my children as much as it is possible to do, and I also desire that at her death she will divide the estate that I now give her among our children in the most just manner possible." Re Soulliere (1913) 4 Ont. Week. N. 1092, 9 D. L. R. 879.

n. "Desire and belief."

No trust is created by a will in which testator gave his residuary estate to his wife, her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, "with the desire and belief that she will execute a will giving and bequeathing whatever property she may have received from me" to his brothers and sisters and their children, in such proportions as she might think best. Estate (1919) 28 Pa. Dist. R. 778.

o. "Desire and direct."

Taylor's

A trust in favor of testator's unmarried daughters is imposed by a will by which he devised and bequeathed all his property to his children, naming them, "and to their heirs forever," adding: "But I desire and direct that my said children shall keep my real estate intact and entire if they can do so, and that the income of all my property, both real and personal, shall be paid to my said daughters above mentioned excepting those who may be married at and after my death, until they all are married, or, in the event of the aforesaid daughters not marrying, until such time as they shall find in [it] convenient without loss to themselves, my said daughters, to divide the income of all said property equally among all my children named herein, sons as well as daughters." Plaut v. Plaut (1908) 80 Conn. 673, 70 Atl. 52.

p. "Desire and hope."

No trust is imposed in favor of the relations of the testator by a will in which he gave his residuary estate to

his son, with words of inheritance, subject to certain charges, by the provision: "I hereby signify to my said son my desire and hope that he will so provide by will or otherwise that, in case he shall die leaving no lawful issue living, the property which he will take under this will shall go in equal shares to" certain named relations of the testator. Hess v. Singler (1873) 114 Mass. 56.

q. "Desire and intention.”

A trust is created where testator, who had devised certain realty to his grandchildren, went on to say: "It is my desire and intention that Adeline Sibert, the mother of said children, shall use and occupy said land until the youngest of said children shall become twenty-one years of age, to support and educate such children." Sibert v. Cox (1885) 100 Ind. 392.

r. "Desire and request." See also "Requesting and desiring." No trust is created by a will by which testatrix devised to her husband certain land, adding: “It is my desire and I hereby request my said husband to convey in such manner and as at such times he may deem best" such property to a Masonic lodge in such manner as to impose upon the lodge obligation properly to care for, protect, and maintain the cemetery lot in which the testatrix was buried, and further gave the residue of her real estate to her husband for life, with the following provision: "Out of the rents, issues, and profits of the land herein before devised to my said husband for life, I request him to invest the sum of $1,000 in some satisfactory security, and transfer the same to" such lodge, under a contract with such lodge that so much of the income or principal as might be necessary should be used for the proper care, repair, and maintenance of testatrix's burial lot; where the will further provided that, in case of the death of testatrix's husband before her own death, all that portion of her real estate specifically devised to him in fee simple, with the request that it be conveyed to such lodge, should go to the executor of the

will in trust to convey said real property to said lodge under a contract from such lodge to carry out the wishes previously expressed regarding the care of her burial lot, the latter provision showing that, when testatrix desired to create a trust, she did not use words of a precatory character. Kauffman v. Gries (1903) 141 Cal. 295, 74 Pac. 846.

The absolute character of a bequest is not affected by the further provision: "It is my desire that at the death of my said wife whatever property may be left shall thus be disposed of, and request of my said wife that she will and provide that the property so received from me shall be devised after her death as follows." Rona v. Meier (1878) 47 Iowa, 607, 29 Am. Rep. 493.

In Deacon v. Cobson (1914) 83 N. J. Eq. 122, 89 Atl. 1029, it was held, adhering to the early English rule, that a trust was created where testatrix, after giving all of her property to her daughter, "her heirs, and assigns forever," added: "But it is my wish and desire, and I hereby request, my said daughter [naming her] to keep intact, so far as may be possible and practicable, the body of my estate, which she is to receive by virtue of this third item of my will, using only the rents, issues, profits, and income therefrom for her own separate use and maintenance. And I further desire and hereby request my said daughter, Theodosia Borden, to make a will wherein and whereby she shall devise and bequeath all the corpus of my estate which she is to receive by the third item of this will, or so much as may be intact and remaining at the time of her death, as follows."

No intention to create an imperative trust is evidenced by a will in which testator gave his household goods and residence to his wife, "and to her heirs and assigns forever," and, after legacies to various relatives, gave the residue of his estate to his wife and "to her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns forever," and then stated as follows: "And it is my desire and request that my said wife do sustain, provide for, and educate Lu

cretia M. Wood, the daughter of my said adopted daughter, Josephine M. Wood. And it is my further desire and request that my wife do make the said Lucretia M. Wood, Josephine M. Wood, and my nephews and nieces, the children of my brothers Caleb S. Clay and George Clay joint heirs after her death in the said estate which by this will I have bequeathed to my said wife." Clay v. Wood (1897) 153 N. Y. 134, 47 N. E. 274, affirming (1895) 91 Hun, 407, 36 N. Y. Supp. 317.

No legal obligation is imposed by a will by which testatrix provided: "It is my desire and request that Frank L. Smith mentioned in the preceding clause in my will shall watch over and care for my friend Lena Wilde, who at one time lived in my family, and see that at no time is she allowed to suffer or want for the necessaries of life," and appointed said Frank L. Smith executor, and by codicil gave all her residuary estate to said Smith. Wilde v. Smith (1883) 2 Dem. (N. Y.) 93.

No trust is created by a will in which testator, after stating that it was his main object to provide for his wife, gave her all his estate, by the provision that "if at her death she should have unconsumed any of said property, I desire and request that she give to" a Mrs. Clark the sum of $200, adding: "But this provision in favor of Mrs. Clark is in no way to interfere with the enjoyment of said property by my wife. It is to be hers to dispose of as she sees proper, and only in the event there is more than will be necessary for her wants and needs is she to give the $200 to Mrs. Clark." Clark v. Hill (1897) 98 Tenn. 300, 39 S. W. 339.

r-1. "Desire and wish." See also "Wish and desire."

Successive life estates in the testator's wife and daughter, with remainder in fee to the son, are created by a will in which testator gave his wife all his real estate "to her sole and separate use, behoof, and control forever," adding: "It is my desire and wish, after my wife's death, that" certain property should go to testator's son,

and that certain other property should go to his daughter for life, and after her death to testator's son. Taylor v. Martin (1887) 6 Sadler (Pa.) 125, 20 W. N. C. 27, 8 Atl. 920.

8. "Direct."

See also "Desire and direct;" "Request and direct;” “Wish and direct.'

The term "direct" is mandatory in its signification. Beakey v. Knutson (1918) 90 Or. 574, 174 Pac. 1149, rehearing denied in (1919) 90 Or. 583, 177 Pac. 955.

It is a word of command, and is presumably used as such. Plaut v. Plaut (1908) 80 Conn. 673, 70 Atl. 52.

No trust is created by a will in which testator gave his wife certain real and personal property, with the provision: "At the death of said wife, I direct that she give certain real property so given her by me or the remainder thereof to my son" and another; the description of the property as that which was "given her by me," and the use of the words "or the remainder thereof," showing that testator recognized the effect of the previous devise as investing the wife with an absolute power of disposition. Re Hull (1926) Cal. App. —, 247 Pac. 1093.

A trust was held to be created in favor of testator's niece, who was a member of his household, by the following provision: "I direct my wife, Amelia A. Scranton, out of the property hereinafter given and bequeathed to her by this will, to use so much thereof for the support and benefit of my niece Georgie S. Collister as my said wife shall from time to time in her discretion think best so to do," the matter intrusted to the discretion of the wife being the amount of the gift, and not whether it should be made. Collister v. Fassitt (1900) 163 N. Y. 281, 79 Am. St. Rep. 586, 57 N. E. 490, affirming (1897) 23 App. Div. 466, 48 N. Y. Supp. 792.

Collister v. Fassitt (N. Y.) supra, is said in Post v. Moore (1905) 181 N. Y. 15, 106 Am. St. Rep. 495, 73 N. E. 482, 2 Ann. Cas. 591, to have turned very largely upon facts and circumstances which appeared in the records dehors

the will itself, and that much stress was laid upon the fact that the provision in favor of the niece appeared first in the will.

In Carroll v. Adams (1907) 105 N. Y. Supp. 967, it was held that, in view of the fact that the whole scheme of the will seems to have been to devise the estate to the nephews and nieces of the testatrix, the children of her deceased brother and sisters, a trust was created by the following provision: "The remainder of my property, both real and personal, I direct to be divided into three shares, one share to my brother Horace's daughter Ida Mank, for her to divide as she thinks best with her mother . . . and sister . . and four brothers."

No trust is created by a will in which testator, after giving his wife the income of his estate during her life, "subject to the direction contained in the third clause," provided in such clause: "I direct my wife, Ellen R. Lynch, from the surplus of the net income of my estate in each year to set aside such portion as she deems just and proper to create a sinking fund for the benefit of my grandchildren . . . until said sinking fund shall amount to the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000) to be divided between said grandchildren, share and share alike upon the death of my wife. If at the death of my wife said sinking fund shall not have amounted to five thousand dollars ($5,000) I direct the trustees hereinafter named to add such amount as will, with the amount then in the sinking fund, make a total of five thousand dollars ($5,000) to be distributed to my grandchildren as hereinbefore directed." Re Lynch (1918) 102 Misc. 650, 169 N. Y. Supp. 321.

A trust is created by a will giving all testator's property to his executrix, and stating: "I desire that my

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executrix shall sell such property as she shall deem proper, that she shall take care of, educate, maintain, and nourish our three children. For the purpose of so doing, I direct and request that she use such or all of the money which may be the proceeds of any property she may sell as

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