she may require for said purpose." Beakey v. Knutson (1918) 90 Or. 574, 174 Pac. 1149, rehearing denied in (1919) 90 Or. 583, 177 Pac. 955.

The word "direct" was construed as the mere expression of a desire or wish of the testator to his wife in a will by which he gave his residuary estate to her "absolutely, with full power to sell at any time she may see fit" adding: "I direct that, after the demise of my beloved wife . . . the following property be given to my son," the property enumerated being among that included in the gift to the wife. JANSEN'S WILL (reported herewith) ante, 5.

t. "Enjoin."

While the use of the word "enjoin," if specially qualified by other expressions in a will, does not necessarily mean that a trust is thereby created, yet it is a mandatory word. Clifford

v. Stewart (1901) 95 Me. 38, 49 Atl. 52. But, although the word "enjoin" is ordinarily an imperative one, it may be given less than mandatory force. Good v. Fichthorn (1891) 144 Pa. 287, 27 Am. St. Rep. 630, 22 Atl. 1032; Smith v. Bloomington Coal Co. (1925) 282 Pa. 248, 127 Atl. 627.

A trust entitling the father and mother to support from the income is created by a bequest the object of which is stated by the testator, "not only to make a provision for the said Martha, but enable her to assist in the support of her father and mother . . . as long as they shall live, and this duty I strictly enjoin upon her." Whittingham v. Scofield (1902) 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2444, 67 S. W. 846.

A trust is created by a will in which a testatrix who left four sons, three of whom were deeply involved financial ly, gave to one son one fourth of the residuum absolutely and gave the other three fourths to the wives of the other three sons, adding: “And I wish that... the property so as above given to said three wives of my three sons be for the education of their children and the support of their families respectively, and I enjoin upon them so to use and expend it." Clifford v. Stewart (1901) 95 Me. 38, 49 Atl. 52.

A trust is created in favor of the

legatee and her family by a will in which testator gave to the wife of a

her personal representatives, heirs, and assigns, a share of his residuary estate, adding: "And I earnestly advise, recommend, and enjoin it upon her, the said Sarah McClernan, and upon my son James McClernan, that the portion hereby given her be at once invested with the advice of competent counsel, so that it may be preserved for the use and benefit of said Sarah McClernan and James McClernan during their joint lives and the life of the survivor of them and for their children, to the end that it may not be squandered or jeopardized in any business scheme or undertaking or speculation, and may not be in any way liable for the debts of my said son James." McClernan v. McClernan (1890) 73 Md. 283, 20 Atl. 908.

No trust in favor of the children is created by a will by which testator devised to his wife a third of his real estate "to her sole use and behoof forever," adding: "And the other two thirds I leave in her power, and bequeath to her for her support during her lifetime, and leaving it as an injunction on her to divide it on the children at her death as she deems best and as they deserve." Gibbins v. Shepard (1878) 125 Mass. 541.

No trust is created by a will in which testator gave the residue of his estate to his daughter, “to have and to hold the same unto her and her heirs and assigns forever," by the clause, "I commit my granddaughter to the charge and guardianship of my daughter in whose honesty, good will, and integrity I repose the utmost confidence. I enjoin upon her to make such provision for said grandchild out of my residuary estate now in her hands in such manner at such time and in such amounts as she may judge to be expedient and conducive to the welfare of said grandchild and her own sense of justice and Christian duty shall dictate." Lawrence v. Cooke (1887) 104 N. Y. 632, 11 N. E. 144, reversing (1884) 32 Hun, 126.

In Good v. Fichthorn (Pa.) supra, where testator gave his wife all his

estate "as her absolute property; vesting her, my said wife, with all the powers and rights of my estate, real, personal, or mixed, that I myself possess while living," providing that she should be at liberty to dispose of any part of it, in which case the proceeds should be her absolute property, and went on to provide: "I further direct that, should my dear wife Isabella during her lifetime not consume or use all my property, real and personal, for her proper support, then I do hereby enjoin and direct her to make and publish her last will and testament, that after her decease all the rest and residue not consumed, used, or sold by her, shall be divided, the one half in equal shares among my brothers and sisters or their heirs, and the other one half in equal shares among the brothers and sisters of my said wife or their heirs," it was held that, in view of the evident intention of the husband to give his wife an absolute interest, the clause last quoted should be considered as having only precatory force, notwithstanding the words used, "enjoin and direct," are in their natural meaning mandatory and imperative.

A dominant intent to give testator's wife an absolute estate unencumbered by any trust is manifested by a will in which he devised to her his residuary estate, adding: "I hereby, however, enjoin upon my said beloved wife that she make, execute her last will and testament wherein and whereby she will make, give, bequeath, and devise all of her estate which she has derived or secured from me under this will to her heirs and to my legal heirs and devisees under this will in equal proportion." Smith v. Bloomington Coal Co. (1925) 282 Pa. 248, 127 Atl. 627.

No trust in favor of testator's nephew is created by a bequest in trust for his sisters on condition that they should "support Maria Moore," adding: "They are hereby enjoined to take care of my nephew John as may seem best in the future," since, apart from the vagueness of the provision, it is obvious that the testator drew a distinction between the quasi obliga

tion which he wished to commend to his sisters to take care of the nephew, and the positive obligation which he made a condition in the case of Maria Moore. Moore v. Roche (1886) 55 L. J. Ch. (Eng.) 418.

u. "Expect."

See also "Wish and expectation."

Words of expectation merely, not amounting to a recommendation, will not create a trust, particularly where the expectation was merely that the devisee would act under the promptings of natural affection. Spooner v. Lovejoy (1871) 108 Mass. 529.

v. "Expect and desire."

The estate given by testator to his wife in words importing an absolute interest is not qualified by the words, "and I expect and desire that my said wife will not dispose of any of said estate by will in such a way that the whole that might remain at her death shall go out of my own family and blood relation." Re Gardner (1893) 140 N. Y. 122, 35 N. E. 439.

w. "Expect and hope." See also "Hope and expectation." An intention to create a trust for the benefit of testator's illegitimate children, notwithstanding his disclaimer of such intention, is manifested by a will in which he devised and bequeathed property to certain persons "in the confident expectation and hope that they will permit my children by Sally Bryson" to enjoy it in the manner indicated, and also stating it to be his wish that such friends should hold the property thus devised to them "free from all trust whatever." Bouknight v. Brown (1881) 16 S. C. 155.

x. "Faith."

A trust is created by the will of a testatrix who was without children of her own, and who had taken into her household the two children of her deceased brother, who were without means of their own, in poor health, and incapable of supporting themselves, in which testatrix gave all her property to her husband absolutely, with the statement: "I make this bequest in the full faith that my husband

will properly provide for the two children of my deceased brother Simeon whom we have undertaken to raise and educate." Noe v. Kern (1887) 93 Mo. 367, 3 Am. St. Rep. 544, 6 S. W. 239.

y. "Faith and confidence,"

No trust is created by the following provisions: "Having full faith and. 'confidence in my beloved wife, and knowing that she will wisely and prudently manage the affairs of the family and look after the welfare of our children, and as a kind mother do them each and all justice, I, therefore, hereby give and bequeath to my said wife, Martha D. Stevens, all my estate, real, personal, and mixed of every name and description of which I may die seised, possessed, or to which I may become entitled at the time of my decease, the interest, rents, income, dividends, and profits thereof to be expended for her own use and support and for the maintenance and support of the home for herself and our children during her natural life." Lloyd v. Lloyd (1899) 173 Mass. 97, 53 N. E. 148.

2. "Hope" or "hoping." See also "Desire and hope;" "Expect and hope."

In Civil v. Rich (1689) 1 Ch. Cas. 309, 22 Eng. Reprint, 815, the Lord Chancellor said: "He also remembered a case . in the Lord Egerton's time, where one possessed of leases for years devised them to his wife and hoped she would leave them to his son, and died. Her second husband granted the leases away; the son sued to be relieved but was dismissed, for it was no trust for the son."

Only precatory force is to be attributed to the words of a will by which the testator gave certain leasehold estates to his brother forever, "hoping he will continue them in the family," the objects of the request being uncertain. Harland v. Trigg (1782) 1 Bro. Ch. 142, 28 Eng. Reprint, 1041.

The widow takes an absolute interest in property under a will by which her husband devised all his property to her, her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, absolutely and

forever, in the full assurance and confident hope that she would bring up his children in the fear of God, and educate and provide for them the same as would have been his intention had it pleased God to spare his life. Macnab v. Whitbread (1853) 17 Beav. 299, 51 Eng. Reprint, 1049.

No trust is created by a will by which testatrix gave all her property to her husband, "hoping that he will leave it after his death to my son

.. if he is worthy of it," and further stated: "My reason for leaving all I have to dispose of to my husband and in his entire power is that my son is already certain of a handsome fortune independent of his father, and that I cannot now feel any certainty what sort of character he may become. I therefore leave it to my dear husband in whose honor, justice, and parental affection I have the fullest confidence," the words of confidence being rather weak, while the expressions giving control of the object of the gift are extremely strong. Eaton v. Watts (1867) L. R. 4 Eq. (Eng.) 151.

aa. "Hoping and believing."

No trust is created by a will by which testator devised a farm to his son and daughter equally, "to them, their heirs, and assigns forever, hoping and believing they will do justice hereafter to my grandson Hiram Van Duyne to the amount of one half of the said homestead farm." Van Duyne v. Van Duyne (1862) 14 N. J. Eq. 397, s. c. on appeal in (1863) 15 N. J. Eq. 503.

bb. "Hope and expectation.” See also "Expect and hope." No trust is created by a bequest of a sum of money to a sister of testatrix "to be hers absolutely; but with the hope and expectation and perfect faith that she will expend so much of the income and principal thereof if it should become necessary in the carrying on of a certain charity in which she knows I am deeply interested," the language being that of expectation, and there being an uncertainty in the object to be benefited and the subject to be affected. Seymour v. Sanford (1913) 86 Conn. 516, 86 Atl. 7.

cc. "Hope and trust."

No trust is created by a will by which testator gave and devised all his property to his brother, to be held, used, and enjoyed by him, his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns forever, "with the hope and trust, however, that he will not diminish the same to a greater extent than may be necessary for his comfortable support and maintenance, and that at his death the same, or so much thereof as he shall not have disposed of by devise or sale, shall descend to my three beloved nieces," it being clear that the testator intended that the devisee should have an absolute power of disposal. Howard v. Carusi (1883) 109 U. S. 725, 27 L. ed. 1089, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 575.

No trust is imposed by a will in which testator, after devising his property to his grandchildren, added: "And I admonish and charge my said grandchildren that this gift is made in the hope and upon the trust that they will provide for their parents during their lives." Arnold v. Arnold (1893) 41 S. C. 291, 19 S. E. 670.

dd. "I am assured."

No binding obligation is created by a will in which testator, who had appointed a sum of money to his daughter, provided that, should such appointment prove invalid, then he appointed that the said sum should go and belong to his son Robert, "but who will, I am assured, settle the same voluntarily in the manner in which I have attempted to settle the same as aforesaid, so as thereby to carry out my wishes." Re Crawshay (1890) L. R. 43 Ch. Div. (Eng.) 615.

ee. "I am anxious."

An absolute estate, unqualified by any trust, is created by a will in which testator left all his property to his wife, notwithstanding his statement: "After her death I am anxious that the total amount which all said property, real and personal, shall bring, be divided amongst the family for the education of the children of those whom she shall before her death and by testament consider the most in

need." Re Fortier (1922) 22 Ont. Week. N. 136.

ff. "I leave to the discretion of."

No trust is created by a provision of the will in which testator gave his wife an estate for life in certain property, that "after providing for her own wants and comforts, I leave to the discretion of my dear wife to give to such of my relations such aid or assistance as my dear wife may of her own will think proper and just." Corby v. Corby (1884) 85 Mo. 371.

gg. "Instruct."

A trust or charge for the education of testator's children is created by a will in which he gave the residue of his estate to his wife "to have and to hold till my youngest child is of age, then to be divided equally between her and her children by me living at the time, and I instruct her hereby to give each of them an equal education fitted to their station in life." Waldroop v. Waldroop (1920) 179 N. C. 674, 103 S. E. 381.

hh. "Intention."

See "Desire and intention;" "Will and intention."

ii. "Invoke."

No trust is created by a will in which testator, after a provision for his illegitimate children, declared that, if such provision should be declared void, then he gave one fourth of his estate to them and the other three fourths to his friend and executor, and appointed such friend his executor, concluding with the words, "to his special kindness and protection I commit my beloved daughter and son, and invoke for them his most kind attention and protection." Taylor v. McRa (1850) 24 S. C. Eq. (3 Rich.) 96.

jj. “Knowing."

A trust is created by a will by which testatrix gave her residuary estate "as a sacred trust to my daughter Mary C. Wooldridge, knowing that she will faithfully carry out my wishes. regarding it," such wishes being stated in a separate paper accompanying and treated as part of the will.

Hughes v. Bent (1904) 118 Ky. 609, 81 S. W. 931.

No trust is created in favor of the son and granddaughter of the testator, who were entirely dependent on him, by a will in which testator gave his wife all his property absolutely, "knowing she will deal properly with my grandchild, Gertrude Snyder, and my son, Uriah Toler." Snyder v. Toler (1914) 179 Mo. App. 376, 166 S. W. 1059.

No trust is created by a will in which testator gave the widow of his deceased son the sum of $25,000 and to her son $1, stating: "I think it best to give his mother, Carrie C. McVeigh, a sufficient sum to enable her to supply his needs according to her discretion, knowing that she will do what is just and proper in the matter, and, therefore, limit my gift to him to a nominal sum," such grandson being of full age and not dependent upon the testator. Re McVeigh (1914) 181 Mo. App. 566, 164 S. W. 673.

No trust is created by a will in which testator gave all his property to his son Charles, "his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, to and for his and their only use and benefit," by the added clause, "well knowing he will discharge the trust I have reposed in him by remembering my sons and daughters," the plainly expressed intention to give the property to the son for his own use and benefit indicating that the words following amounted only to a recommendation of his other children to the kindness of the son. Bardswell v. Bardswell (1838) 9 Sim. 319, 59 Eng. Reprint, 381.

A trust is created by a will by which testatrix gave a certain person a legacy of £3,000, "and a like sum of £3,000 in addition for the trouble she will have in acting as my executrix," and gave her residuary estate to such person, "her executors, administrators, and assigns, well knowing that she will make a good use and dispose of it in a manner in accordance with my views and wishes," the separate legacy, as well as the words used by the testatrix, showing that such person was not to take the residue beneficially. Briggs v. Penny (1851) 3

49 A.L.R.-5.

Macn. & G. 546, 42 Eng. Reprint, 371.

An absolute gift unencumbered with a trust is created by a will in which a testator, whose family consisted of his wife, with whom he appeared to have lived on terms of the closest affection and trust, two younger children, and an eldest son who had shortly before the date of the will made a marriage with which the testator was much displeased, and which he had unsuccessfully attempted to have dissolved, -gave his wife an annuity, and, after other provisions, devised to her the residue of his estate, "well knowing she will religiously carry out what she knows to be my wishes in the disposal of it," it being evident that the testator, at the time of making the will, preferred not to stereotype his then wishes, but instead to extend the dominion over the ultimate disposal of his property beyond his own life, in the person of his wife. Clancarty v. Clancarty (1893) Ir. L. R. 31 Eq. 530 -C. A.

kk. "Like."

No trust is created by the following provision in a will by which a testatrix, after giving all her property to her sister, provided: "Should the $5,000 bond remain intact at her death, and should the following beneficiaries remain kind to her, I would like her to dispose of things as follows; after paying off all funeral and doctor bills and church bills [naming certain persons] a little money as remembrance for their kindness to me. . . Remainder to be divided evenly amongst my remaining nephews and nieces." Re Sweeney (1923) 120 Misc. 668, 120 N. Y. Supp. 332.

ul. "May."

An absolute interest is given by a will by which testator gave to his wife "the new house with the property thereto belonging . . and she may will it, I mean the old homestead, to any of my children at her own discretion." Ahl v. Bosler (1896) 175 Pa. 526, 34 Atl. 805.

The word "may" in a testamentary provision whereby testator gave certain land to his daughter, with the