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ing all the property she shall receive from me or my estate other than so much thereof as shall have been expended by her and for her during her lifetime for her comfort, maintenance, and support," half to his wife's children and the other half to his own, adding: "I make this request because all the property we have has been accumulated by us jointly as husband and wife and is as much hers as mine, and it is just and right that, upon our deaths, the one half of it should go to her children and the other half to my children, and we have mutually agreed that it shall be so divided." Re Sowash (1923) 62 Cal. App. 512, 217 Pac. 123.

No trust is created by a will by which testator gave his wife all his estate, adding: "And I do request my wife, if she should not require the whole of my estate as her support, that she will at her death the remainder to the children of my brother," the subject of the gift claimed as precatory not being certain. Bryan v. Millby (1890) 6 Del. Ch. 208, 13 L.R.A. 563, 24 Atl. 333.

No trust in favor of testator's children is created by a will by which he gave his wife all his real and personal estate, "with full power to use and dispose of, to sell and reinvest the proceeds in lands or otherwise for her use while living, requesting her to make at her death such equitable distribution of what remains among my children, giving first, before such disposition of the property that may at her death remain," various sums to each, there being not sufficient certainty as to the subject-matter. Coulson v. Alpaugh (1896) 163 III. 298, 45 N. E. 216.

The widow takes the whole interest in property given to her, to have, use, and enjoy the same as she may choose, and to dispose of the same in such manner as she may desire, notwithstanding the added words: "Yet I request that if, at the time of her decease, any of the personal property shall remain undisposed of, it be given to the children of my son and the children of my daughter." Fullenwider

v. Watson (1887) 113 Ind. 18, 14 N. E. 571.

No trust in favor of testator's son is created by a provision following an absolute devise in fee of certain land to the testator's wife, that "it is my request and wish that, in the event that my wife survives me, that she will during her life make such provisions by will or otherwise, so that at her death my son William C. Mitchell may share equally of the estate and property herein willed to her with my other children." Mitchell v. Mitchell (1895) 143 Ind. 113, 42 N. E. 465.

The absolute character of an estate created by a bequest of testator's entire estate to his wife is not affected by the provision: "I request that, at the death of my wife, that my estate that I am now seised of be equally divided between my children." Snodgrass v. Brandenburg (1904) 164 Ind. 59, 71 N. E. 137, 72 N. E. 1030.

In Bohon v. Barrett (1881) 79 Ky. 378, a trust was held, in view of the circumstances, to have been created by a childless testator having an adopted daughter, to whom he was much attached, and a brother of ample means, who did not need his bounty, by a will by which he appointed his brother his executor and requested two other men to give him the benefit of their advice in certain business matters, and devised all his estate after the payment of debts to such brother, adding: "But it is my request of him (but not as a condition upon which this devise is to take effect) that he take charge of, raise, and educate Lillie Barrett [the adopted daughter], who is now with me, in his family, and that if she is obedient to him and his wife, Mary J. Barrett, and is governed by their advice and counsel and conducts herself in such a manner to merit the same, and does not marry without their consent and contrary to their advice, and she remains with my said brother and his wife, and is not taken from them or does not voluntarily go away from them or abandon their home, then I request him to expend for her benefit in such manner, at such time, in such time, or to settle upon her in such way, at such time,

and on such terms as he, in his judgment, may think her interest requires, the sum of $10,000; but these requests are not to be legally binding upon him, but I desire to leave the same entirely to his discretion, and to make no requirement of him that would be legally binding upon him in a court of equity or elsewhere-it being my wish to leave the whole matter to his sense of right and discretion, he being fully advised of my wishes concerning the said Lillie and also concerning the said sum of $10,000, which I request him to use for her benefit on the conditions aforesaid, if he sees fit to do so, and the condition of his family is such that he can do so without embarrassment, but not otherwise."

No trust is created by a will by which testator gave the residue of his estate to his wife "in her own right in fee simple," adding: "I only make this request of her, and only as a request, for I feel that her own kind heart and good judgment will prompt her to do so without, viz. that in the event she should marry again, she will see that the interests of our children in said property are protected." Sale v. Thornberry (1887) 86 Ky. 266, 5 S. W. 468.

No trust is created by a will by which testator gave the residue of his estate to his wife, "to have, control, use, and enjoy as her own absolute property if she should survive me long enough to enjoy, or take possession or control of the same; and, in the event of her surviving me, it is my desire that it may suit her pleasure, and, if so, I request but without intending to create any trust therefor, that she allow and pay Ann Tasco, a mulatto, who has been for some time in our service, the sum of fifteen dollars per month at the end of each month so long as said Ann may live, to be used and applied toward her maintenance and support," notwithstanding a further provision devising all the testator's estate to an adopted daughter in case his wife should not survive him, and charging it with the payment of $15 per month to Ann Tasco. Enders v. Tasco (1889) 89 Ky. 17, 11 S. W. 818.

All the elements which go to create a precatory trust are lacking in a will by which testator gave his residuary property to his wife, adding: "It is my request that my law library be kept intact for a period of five years, and if at that time my brother B. H. Wood shows in the judgment of my wife sufficient promise, it is my further request that she give to him the said library. It is my further request that should my wife die without heirs of her body and the estate herein devised to her be intact, that, with the exception of the sum of $5,000, she will and devise the remainder to such of my brothers and sisters as may seem proper to her." Wood v. Wood (1907) 127 Ky. 514, 106 S. W. 226.

A fee not charged with any trust is given to the devisee by a will by which testator bequeathed to a son certain specified tracts of land, and containing the following provisions: "I make it as a request of my children that, if any of them should die without issue, that in so far as they may have received any estate from me that at their death they 'will' the same to my surviving children or the issue of those that may be dead. I think this is but a reasonable request, and I have confidence that it will be complied with by my children." Igo v. Irvine (1909) 139 Ky. 634, 70 S. W. 836.

No trust is created by a will by which the testator gave his wife his entire estate, and the following codicil: "I hereby request of my said wife, Sarah J. Gross, who is the sole beneficiary in fee simple of all my estate of whatsoever kind or character, that she arrange at her death that, if there be any property left which shall pass to her under my will, that such residue shall be divided into equal parts, one part to be given to" various persons named. "I hereby declare this to be only a request upon my part I make of my said wife, and that in no wise shall this request be construed as meaning that I am placing any limitations whatever upon the right of my said wife to do as she desires with all of said property, which shall be hers in fee simple."

Gross v. Smart (1920) 189 Ky. 338, 224 S. W. 871.

No trust is created by a will by which testator devised to his son certain land, adding: "I make it as an earnest request of my said son . . . that, if he should die without having issue, that he give said 305 acres of land or its value to my daughter Sarah I. White, if living, if not, then to her children." White v. Irvine' (1903) 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2458, 74 S. W. 247.

No trust is created by a devise of the ownership of a slave absolutely, coupled with the request that the slave be transferred to some other state or country where slavery is not recognized by law. Young v. Egan (1855) 10 La. Ann. 415.

No trust is created by a will by which testator, who had given certain property to his grandson Josiah absolutely, further provided: "Should my said grandson Josiah Pierce or his guardian or guardians during his minority decide to sell the said real estate, then I request him or them to first offer the property to the sons of my brother Lewis Pierce in order of seniority at the value at which the property was last previously assessed for the purposes of taxation," there being nothing else in the will to indicate any intention of the testator to make such nephews and nieces partakers of his bounty. Pierce v. Pierce (1916) 114 Me. 311, 96 Atl. 143.

A trust was held to be created by a will by which testator devised to his sons, their heirs, and assigns, to be equally divided between them, all the residue of his estate, adding: “I request my seven sons above named to take care of their brother John Tolson and his family," although the trust was held too indefinite in respect of the term "family." Tolson v. Tolson (1838) 10 Gill & J. (Md.) 159.

There is no such definiteness and certainty as to the subject-matter as to permit the implication of a trust from a will in which testator gave all his property to his wife "and her heirs and assigns forever," adding: "And it is my request and desire that my . . . should by last will and testament devise and bequeath all

said wife

of the said property at her death remaining in her possession to," certain persons. Williams v. Worthington (1878) 49 Md. 572, 33 Am. Rep. 286.

In Handley v. Wrightson (1883) 60 Md. 198, a trust was held to be created by a will in which testator provided that, if his son should die without issue, the testator's wife should have the land devised to his son, "with a special request that at her death she give the said land to be equally divided between her near relatives and mine." The court said: "The property to which the supposed trust attaches is clearly described. It is 'all my lands' first devised to his son but which his wife is to have in case his son dies without lawful issue, a contingency which happened. With the devise to his wife are coupled the words, 'with a special request that at her death she give the said lands to be equally divided between her near relatives and mine.' The wish expressed is clear and emphatic; the person addressed is his own wife; the time indicated for her disposition of the property is at her death, when she could no longer enjoy it herself; the mode of disposition is distinctly prescribed, the lands are to be equally divided between two classes of beneficiaries; these two classes are his wife's near relatives and his own,persons whom he would have a strong motive to make partakers of his bounty, the one class from natural affection for his own blood, the other from affection for his wife and regard for her interest in her own kindred. Thus the objects of his bounty are clearly pointed out and their selection is in consonance with his relations to all concerned. To disregard his 'special request' would be to operate a discrimination against the testator's own kin and to pass his estate upon the death of his wife intestate wholly to her heirs; a result repugnant to natural instincts and in violence to his expressed desire. In all respects the conditions here exist which justify the application of the rule of implied. trusts from precatory words in the present case."

No obligation is imposed by a pro

vision in a will by which testator gave his wife all his estate "to her sole use, benefit, and disposal," that "whatever may be left of my estate, if any, she may, by will or otherwise, give to those of my heirs that she may think best, she knowing my mind upon that subject. It am willing to leave the matter entirely with her, feeling satisfied that she will do as I have requested her to in the matter." Davis v. Mailey (1883) 134 Mass. 588.

No trust is created by a bequest of a fund to each of two persons "as her absolute property," followed by the words: "I request said Susan and Lucy to use said fund thus given to further what is called the Woman's Rights Cause. But neither of them is under any legal responsibility to anyone or any court to do so," the testatrix having made it clear that her request was in no way mandatory. Bacon v. Ransom (1885) 139 Mass. 117, 29 N. E. 473.

No trust affecting the title of the husband is created by a will by which testatrix gave the residue of her property to her husband, his heirs, and assigns forever, adding: "It being my request that my dear husband assign by will what of this property I now leave him he has not expended to such of my relatives as he in his judgment may think may need it." Durant v. Smith (1893) 159 Mass. 229, 34 N. E. 190.

In McCurdy v. McCallum (1904) 186 Mass. 464, 72 N. E. 75, it was held (applying the law of Nova Scotia) that, in view of the circumstances, a trust was created by a will in which testatrix, who had provided for her children other than her son Hugh, gave a legacy to Susan, the wife of Hugh, stating: "This amount is to be free from the control of her husband and her son Guy McCallum, and I request the said Susan McCallum at her death to give the same to her two daughters Vesta Vane McCallum and Marion McCallum, but the receipt of the said Susan McCallum for the said amount shall be a sufficient discharge to my executors therefor." The court relied largely on the provision that the receipt of Susan should be a sufficient

discharge, and on the fact that the relation of the testatrix to the objects of the trust were such as to indicate a strong motive for the bounty and for this method of providing it, and on the fact that there were no qualifying words giving the legatee a clear discretion or choice.

No trust is created by a will by which testator gave his residuary estate "to my sister Fanny Young, who has contributed so much to make my home a happy one. I direct and desire that the amount received from my estate should be kept entirely separate and distinct from her own property, and I earnestly request her at once to make a codicil to her will, leaving my bequest to her to my brothers and my sister," the request showing that the testator expected his brothers and sister should take under her will, and not under his. Dexter v. Young (1920) 234 Mass. 588, 125 N. E. 862.

No trust is created by a will of one who had conveyed, through an intermediary, property formerly owned by him, to himself and his wife as tenants by entirety, by which he made certain gifts, but provided that, should his wife survive him, then she should take his entire estate absolutely, adding: "But it is my request that she shall either before her death by gift or in such other manner as she shall deem proper, or after her death by will, transfer, grant, and give to the foregoing legatees the sums and amounts hereinbefore set forth out of whatever may remain of the proceeds of my property, real and personal, over and above what she may have used or desire to use during her lifetime for her own maintenance or for other purposes to which she may desire to apply it," since, having conveyed his property in such a way that his wife would be the legal owner thereof after his death, he had no legal authority to direct its disposition. Hillsdale College v. Wood (1906) 145 Mich. 257, 108 N. W. 675.

The provision for the testator's wife is subject to a trust, notwithstanding such trust is too vague to be enforceable, where he bequeathed to her the balance of his estate, adding: “I re

quest that at my death my said wife

.. make her will, and will at least two thirds of what she receives under this, my will, to some charities named and designated by her, said charities to be in the city of Alpena, Michigan, and the amount so willed to be payable at her death, as it is my wish that she have and use all the income from that portion of my estate willed to her as long as she lives." Gilchrist v. Corliss (1908) 155 Mich. 126, 130 Am. St. Rep. 568, 118 N. W. 938.

No obligation is created by the provisions of a will by which a testator gave his wife all his property, adding: "I direct that, out of my estate and after my death, such sums be expended from time to time for the support of my brother John" as in the judgment of the executors might be necessary to keep him from want and to provide him with a suitable burial, "and also request at the death of my wife . . . that all the real and personal property remaining of my estate shall be distributed as follows: To my adopted daughter, Carrie Maud Atherton, that she be given $1,000 a year during her lifetime. Any of my estate remaining shall go to" a charitable institution. Holloway v. Atherton (1919) 205 Mich. 129, 171 N. W. 413. No trust in favor of testator's children is created by a will in which, after stating that at the time of making it he felt unable to make such disposition of his property as ought to be made, and that he had implicit confidence in his wife, the testator gave all his property to her "in fee, simply requesting her to do with the property when she is done with it or can spare it, or any portion thereof, as I know she intends to do and as I desire shall be done with it; that is, divide all property equally among our children." Long v. Willsey (1916) 132 Minn. 316, 156 N. W. 349.

An obligation to pay the annuity is created by a will by which testator devised certain lands to another, "with one request that he give my father $200 a year as long as he lives."

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Red v. Powers (1891) 69 Miss. 242, 13 So. 586.

No trust beyond the minority of the

children is created by a will in which testator gave his wife all his property, "the proceeds of which to be appropriated for her support and that of my children, and the payment of my debts. if any. It is my desire that all claims against my estate shall be amicably settled without recourse to law. And it is my further request that no sale or mortgage be made of any of my real estate during the minority of any of my children. After which time my wife will be at liberty to make such disposition of the property here bequeathed as she may deem proper for the use and benefit of my children." Courtenay v. Courtenay (1907) 90 Miss. 181, 43 So. 68.

A trust is created by a bequest to one of a sum of money, "with the request that upon his death he leaves the same in equal portions to" certain persons named, so that, upon his death in the lifetime of the testatrix, the legacy does not lapse, but goes to the persons to whom she requested him to leave it at his death. Eddy v. Hartshorne (1881) 34 N. J. Eq. 419.

No trust is created by a will in which testator gave all his property to his wife, adding: "Only requesting her at the close of her life to make such disposition of the same among my children and grandchildren as shall seem to her good." Foose v. Whitmore (1880) 82 N. Y. 405, 37 Am. Rep. 572.

Where a testatrix made certain charitable bequests in her will which would not be valid should she fail to survive for two months after the making of the will, and made a codicil stating: "Doubts having arisen as to the validity of the bequests made for charitable purposes in my said will, I hereby modify said will . . . by making my friend Townsend Wandell my residuary devisee and legatee, and hereby request him to carry into effect my wishes with respect thereto, but this is not to be construed into an absolute direction on my part, but merely my desire"-it was held that no trust was created. Re Keleman (1891) 126 N. Y. 73, 26 N. E. 968.

No trust is created by the following provision in a will: "I appoint Ellen

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