C. Woodbury my legatee, and give to her all not before specified in this, and request her to give as I may direct or sell from what remains." Wyman v. Woodbury (1895) 86 Hun, 277, 33 N. Y. Supp. 217, affirmed on other grounds in 153 N. Y. 243, 47 N. E. 283.

No trust is created by a will in which testatrix gave her residuary estate to the city of New York, "with the request that the same be expended, if such expenditure is sanctioned by law, in the erection of a drinking fountain in the city of New York to my memory," since to create a trust by a precatory expression, such expression must concern individuals other than the trustee. Re Crane (1896) 12 App. Div. 271, 42 N. Y. Supp. 904, affirmed without opinion in (1899) 159 N. Y. 557, 54 N. E. 1089.

No trust is created by a bequest of the testator's residuary estate to his executors "for their use and benefit, with a request to them that a portion of said residue be used for masses for the repose of my soul, and the balance given to some deserving charity." Re O'Regan (1909) 62 Misc. 592, 7 Mills, 123, 117 N. Y. Supp. 96.

No trust is created by a will giving the residuary estate to a certain person, "with the request that he sell and dispose of such property in such manner as in his judgment would be satisfactory to me." Re Jones (1921) 199 App. Div. 426, 192 N. Y. Supp. 163.

A trust is imposed by a will prepared by an unskilled person, by which testatrix gave the residue of her estate to the person holding the office of president of a theosophical society, to be used for the purposes of that society, adding: "I also request that an annuity of $500 be paid by that person (president of the theosophical society) to" a certain person, and "I also request and direct that . . my executor shall be paid the sum of $500 before satisfying any other legacy," where, by a further codicil, she referred to the bequest to the president of the theosophical society as having been made "under the above-mentioned condition," the context showing that the testatrix used the word "request" in a mandatory sense.

Re

Daintrey (1925) 125 Misc. 369, 211 N. Y. Supp. 529.

The absolute estate given to testatrix's son by a will is not qualified by the provision: "But, should my son John Faulcon die without lawful issue, then and in that case it is my request (inasmuch as it was his father's wish) that the above given legacy be by him conveyed by will in writing to his brother J. M. Faulcon or to one or more of my grandchildren." Batchelor v. Macon (1873) 69 N. C. 545.

No trust is created by a will in which the testator devised to his niece a plantation, adding: “And it is my request that my said niece, Elizabeth W. Carter, shall at her death devise said tract of land to her daughter Mertie E. Carter," where it appeared in another part of the will that the testator knew the use of apt and efficient words to create a trust when he so desired, and in another part of the will referred to the plantation as land devised to the niece, and it being evident that his niece, being nearer to him in blood, was the primary object of his bounty. Carter v. Strickland (1914) 165 N. C. 69, 80 S. E. 961, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 416.

A devise to testator's wife of all his property is not qualified by a subsequent provision: "My wish is that after the sale of my real estate by my wife, Margaret, aforesaid, without charging my said real estate, that she will, if she has a sufficient sum of money to do so, give to my daughter Mary's children as follows: . . . my further request is that at the death of my wife, Margaret, aforesaid that she will so divide what she may have among our daughters Martha and Eliza's children, share and share alike." Hopkins v. Glunt (1886) 111 Pa. 287, 2 Atl. 183.

No trust is created by the provisions of a will in which the testator gave property to his daughters in words importing an absolute interest, by the provision: "And I request my executors, in dividing and apportioning the said residue, to require of my said daughters that their respective daughters shall receive of my estate as far as practicable severally about

double the amount that my said daughters' sons received severally." Bellas's Estate (1896) 176 Pa. 122, 34 Atl. 1003.

Only a life estate is given to testator's daughter Ida by a will in which he directed that his residuary estate be equally divided among his four children, "subject, however, to the following requests: I direct that my daughter Ida . . . shall invest her share of my estate as a first judgment or mortgage, and to receive the annual interest of the same during her natural life, and at her death it shall return to such of her children as shall then be living and to the issue" of any then dead. Byers's Estate (1898) 186 Pa. 404, 40 Atl. 524.

The husband takes a fee simple, which is not cut down by the precatory words following, under a will by which his wife gave him the residuary estate: "To have and to hold to him my said husband and to his heirs and assigns forever," adding: “And after his death I request that my estate, both real and personal, be divided as follows." McBride v. Mangan (1915) 249 Pa. 515, 95 Atl. 79.

No trust is created by a will in which testator, after devising property to his son, went on to state that "it is my request and desire" that, in case the son should have no children to inherit his estate, 'so much of his estate as he receives from me under this will" should be bequeathed by him to the children of his sister. Forscht's Estate (1892) 2 Pa. Dist. R. 294.

No trust is created by a will in which testator, after making an absolute gift of all his property to his wife, added: "And above all, my lawful wedded wife must see and comply with my last request, which is as follows: She shall pay out" certain specified amounts to various persons and charitable institutions. Herskovitz's Estate (1923) 81 Pa. Super. Ct. 379.

No trust is created by a provision following a gift of all testator's residuary estate to his wife, "her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns forever," as follows: "I request that my said wife shall make a will devising and bequeathing so much of said

property as may remain at the time of my death to my two sisters." Cahill v. Tanner (1921) 43 R. I. 403, 113 Atl. 289.

On the ground that the requests made were definite and certain and left the wife no discretion, a precatory trust was held to be created by a will in which testator, after giving his wife all his real and personal property, referred to the fact that a relative had purchased certain property from him, and provided that, "in case he should be so fortunate as to meet all notes promptly, I request that, when he has paid all but the last $1,500, then this amount be given him," and also requested that another relative should have the right to purchase at a stated sum certain property. Daly v. Daly (1919) 142 Tenn. 242, 218 S. W. 213.

No precatory trust is created by a will in which testator gave his wife all his personal property and such of his real property as he had not otherwise devised, "to dispose of as she may please, requesting her that she will so dispose of her property at her death as to make my youngest son an equal legatee with the balance of my children." Speaires v. Ligon (1883) 59 Tex. 233.

A trust is created by a will in which a wife gave her husband, "his heirs, administrators, or assigns all of my estate, real and personal, with one simple request that the said estate be divided with my children or its equivalent as his better judgment may direct." Seefried v. Clarke (1912) 113 Va. 365, 74 S. E. 204.

A trust in favor of testator's sister is created by a will in which testator provided that, after the payment of debts and funeral expenses, the entire residue and remainder of his estate should go to a brother, "with the special request to my said brother that he pay to my sister . . the sum of ten thousand ($10,000) dollars out of the proceeds of my estate as soon as possible after my decease; the same may be paid to her by instalments if necessary, but request that no unnecessary delay be made, provided she may survive me." RE HOCHBRUNN (reported herewith) ante, 7.

An intention that the widow should take a life estate, coupled with a trust as to the remainder in favor of the children, is manifested by a will providing: "I give, devise, and bequeath unto my wife her heirs and assigns forever all my real and personal estate .. having full confidence in my said wife, and hereby request that at her death she will divide equally. between my sons and daughters [naming them] all the proceeds of my said property real and personal hereby bequeathed." Knox v. Knox (1884) 59 Wis. 172, 48 Am. Rep. 487, 18 N. W. 155.

No imperative force can be given to the following provision: "It is my earnest request to my son Sir John Bland, that on failure of issue of his body, he will sometime in his lifetime, either by will or any other writing, settle the said premises or so much thereof as he shall stand seised of at the time of his decease, so and in such manner as that, on failure of issue of his body, the same may come to my daughter." Bland v. Bland (1745) 2 Cox, Ch. Cas. 349, 30 Eng. Reprint, 161.

A trust is created by a will in which testator devised property upon trust to dispose and convey the same in such manner as his daughter should direct or appoint, and for want of such direction or appointment to apply the money arising thereby to certain purposes; and then declared that, though his meaning was to give his daughter the absolute disposal of the property, to prevent the expense and trouble that must attend the management of affairs of such nature under the direction of the court of chancery, he requested his said daughter to direct the money arising therefrom to be applied in such manner as he had directed the same in default of her direction and appointment,-where to give the daughter the absolute dominion and property of the premises in question would be repugnant to and inconsistent with the general plan and tenor of the will, and the expressed declaration of his reason and motive for intrusting her with such a power. Bute v. Stuart

(1762) 1 Bro. P. C. 476, 1 Eng. Reprint, 700.

In Blacket v. Lamb (1851) 14 Beav. 482, 51 Eng. Reprint, 371, where testator, in execution of a power, appointed a fund in favor of the objects of the power, and also bequeathed to them his own property, adding: "I especially request each of my six children will not sink into or spend their respective shares thereof, but leave them for the benefit of their respective children," it was said that, if the words had been used by the testator with reference to property which was wholly within his control to deal with, these words would have created a trust, and that his children, taking the gifts under the will of the testator, would have taken them charged with the duty of disposing of them according to that will; but it was held that they would not be given that effect as to the property over which the testator had only the power of appointment.

A trust is created by a will in which testatrix gave a sum of money to her husband absolutely, adding: "But it is my request to him that, after reserving for his own absolute use and benefit the sum of £2,000, and applying all the interest, rents, and dividends arising from the above-settled property to his own sole use and benefit during the term of his natural life, he will make such disposition of the remainder by will, deed, or settlement as he may deem most desirable to carry out my wishes often expressed to him by word," the testatrix having indicated in the plainest and most distinct terms what it was she intended her husband to have for his own use and benefit, and said in effect that the remainder should be otherwise disposed of. Bernard v. Minshull (1859) 1 Johns. V. C. 276, 70 Eng. Reprint, 427.

No trust is created by a devise to testator's son, "requesting him that, if he should not find an opportunity to dispose of my freehold estate at Whitchurch greatly to his advantage and for the benefit of his family, that the said estate should belong after him to his eldest son." House v. House (1875) 23 Week. Rep. (Eng.) 22.

A trust is created by a will in which jewels were bequeathed to the nephew of testatrix, "to go and be held as heirlooms by him and by his elder son on his decease, and to go and descend to the eldest son of such eldest son, and so on to the eldest son of his descendants so far as the rules of law or equity will permit. And I request my said nephew to do all in his power by his will or otherwise to give effect to this my wish as to these things so directed to go as heirlooms as aforesaid." Shelley v. Shelley (1868) L. R. 6 Eq. (Eng.) 540.

A gift of diamonds to a daughter-inlaw upon her marriage, with the request that at her death they may be left as heirlooms, does not impose any obligation upon her. Hill v. Hill [1897] 1 Q. B. (Eng.) 483-C. A.

Imperative force is to be given to the words of request in a will by which testator devised property to his brothers, John and James, "to be divided equally; with a request to John that, should he die without lawful issue, the property which I bequeath him shall revert back to my nephews." Re O'Bierne (1844) 1 Jones & L. (Ir.) 352.

A trust is created by a will in which testator gave all his property to his wife for her use and benefit, and then added: "I request my wife to pay to [an adopted son] at her death or, should she sell the farm on which I now live, before her death, $400. I also give [such son] the sorrel horse now in my possession." Renehan v. Malone (1897) 1 N. B. Eq. Rep. 506. The court said: "It is clear to my mind that, while the testator was willing that his widow might enjoy the use of the farm if she chose during her life, and thus postpone the payment of the plaintiff's $400 until after all need of the farm for the widow's use had ceased, it was equally his intention that, if she sold it, her interest in his estate was then and there to be reduced to the extent of the $400 then payable out of the proceeds." The gift of the horse was also referred to as indicative of the testator's view that the $400 was a gift from him pay

able out of his property, and in no sense dependent upon the widow's option.

Mandatory effect is to be given to the words of a will by which testator devised property to his wife, "requesting her to will the same to our children as she shall think best." Finlay v. Fellows (1867) 14 Grant, Ch. (U. C.) 66.

qq. "Request and direct."

An intention to secure to the surviving brothers and sisters of the testator all that was left of his estate at the decease of his widow is evidenced by a will in which testator gave the residue of his estate to his wife during her life, going on to say: "It is my intention and desire that said [wife] shall hold and use to her benefit all the property, both real and personal, owned by me at the time of my decease during her life, the same as if absolutely hers, and at her death whatever may be left I wish equally divided among the survivors of my brothers and sisters. To avoid all contentions and disputes, it is my request and direction that said [wife] shall immediately upon my decease by will devise and direct that such portion of said estate as shall be left at her decease be divided between the survivors of my brothers and sisters according to my intention as expressed in this will." Hall v. Otis (1880) 71 Me. 326.

rr. "Requesting and desiring.” See also "Desire and request."

The early English rule was applied and a trust held to be created in Harrison v. Harrison (1845) 2 Gratt. (Va.) 1, 44 Am. Dec. 365, by the following testamentary provision: "In the utmost confidence in my beloved wife I leave to her all my worldly goods to sell or keep for distribution amongst our dear children as she may think proper. My whole estate, real and personal, are left in fee simple to her, only requesting her to make an equal distribution amongst our heirs; and desiring her to do for some of my faithful servants whatever she may think will most conduce to their wel

fare, without regard to the interest of my heirs."

88. "Require,” or “requiring.”

A trust is impressed on the land devised by a will to testator's son "to do with as he may think proper, requiring him to pay to my little niece $500 when she arrives at the age of twenty-one or when she gets married." Curd v. Field (1898) 103 Ky. 293, 45 S. W. 92.

A trust in favor of the person named, who at the age of thirteen years had been taken into the home of a childless couple and had remained a member of the household for twentyseven years, assisting in the household and farm work without compensation other than her food and clothing, was created by a will in which testator gave his wife all his property, by the provision: "At the death of my wife . . . I require her to make necessary provisions for to pay Grace Ellen Hamilton well for faithfulness in my home, as she has been in my home since childhood," the only discretion left in the wife being as to the amount; and it was further held that such discretion was abused by leaving such person only the sum of $1,500. Bare v. Montgomery (1925) 143 Va. 303, 130 S. E. 230.

tt. "Satisfied."

No trust is created by a will in which testator gave his residuary estate to his wife, her heirs, and assigns forever, "being fully satisfied that, if it please God to take me first, she will dispose of the same by will or otherwise in a fair and equitable manner to our united relatives, bearing in mind that my relatives are generally in better worldly circumstances than hers are." Reeves v. Baker (1865) 18 Beav. 372, 52 Eng. Reprint, 147.

uu. "Suggest."

The word "suggest," without qualifying or explanatory words, cannot be regarded as a precatory word sufficient to create a trust as to property previously given absolutely, suggestion alone, without other words or circumstances to affect the ordinary

meaning, being a mere placing before another a matter for consideration, and under ordinary circumstances in no wise carries with it an expression of desire, will, or entreaty. Williams v. Baptist Church (1901) 92 Md. 497, 54 L.R.A. 427, 48 Atl. 930.

No trust is created by a bequest in words importing an absolute interest to a church, by the words, "and I suggest, if the spire or steeple of the said church property be unfinished at the time of my death, that the funds received or such part thereof as may be necessary, be used for the purpose of completing the same, and further suggest, if the spire is finished, that the said funds or whatever may be left after completing the said spire be invested by the church committee and the income devoted to the work of the church mission known as Williams's Chapel, but, if the work has been abandoned, then said income to be used for relief of the poor of said church." Ibid.

vv. "Trust," or "trusting.” See also "Hope and trust."

No trust is created by a will in which testator gave his wife all his estate "absolutely, trusting her to make proper disposition amongst our children as she may think proper." Billington v. Canerin (1901) 32 Pittsb. L. J. N. S. (Pa.) 172.

A trust is imported by a will in which testator stated: "I may have given to one more than I intended," and then added: "I trust to the sense of justice of my said sons that, if I have given more to one than the other, that they will do right and authorize my wife as trustee to assist them in arriving at justice." Hadley v. Hadley (1897) 100 Tenn. 446, 45 S. W. 342.

No trust for testator's children is created by a will in which he gave all his property to his wife, her heirs, executors, and administrators, with the provision, "Trusting that she will, in fear of God and in love to the children committed to her care, make such use of it as shall be for her own and their spiritual and temporal good, remembering always according to circumstances the church of God and the