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fouthern parts, falls into the Gulf of Cadiz, at Ayamonte, and there forms the boundary between Portu gal and Spain. Both these rivers prefented to the military eye, naturai inlets into Portugal. That of the Tagus, on the right bank, was the most natural and direct to the main force of the kingdom, Lisbon and Oporto. But the Spa niards proceeded by that of the Guadiana; though the Tagus, on the right of which Oporto and Lisbon are fituated, furnished with an army to oppose the paffage, cannot be croffed from the fouth; and that an army, which enters Alentejo, cannot extend its hoftilities beyond that province, or, at most, to Algarva. If the Spaniards had been at liberty to choose what route they pleased, the choice they made might eafily be accounted for: but it is probable that the plan of invading Portugal was concerted, or rather dictated, by Buonaparte, While the Spaniards were to pene trate into Alentejo, the French auxiliraies were to act on the other fide of the Tagus, and march to Oporto* and Lisbon.

The Spanish army, from 30 to 40,000, under the command of the Prince of Peace, from different points, entered Alentejo on the 20th of May. It would be idle, and, after the campaigns and engagements in this work, recently defcribed, might well appear uninteresting and tiresome to give a par ticular account of a campaign, where all was rapid progrefs on the one part, and precipitate retreat, with very little refiftance, on the

other. By the 6th of June, the Spaniards had reduced Elvas, Campo-Major, Arronches, Fior de Rofa, Eftrencoz, and, in a word, all the ftrong places, and all the magazines of Alentejo. A great number of prifoners, with eleven ftandards, and driven the Portuguese beyond the Tagus. On that day, the 6th of June, preliminaries of peace were figned between Portugal and Spain, at Badajoz: the principal conditions of which were, that the town, fortress, and province of Olivenza, were ceded to Spain, and the ports of Portugal fhut against the English. This pacification was ratified on June 16, but not proclaimed by Portugal, till the 20th of July. It was deemed prudent not to publifh the treaty of Badajoz till the Por tuguefe poffeffions in South Ame rica, by a reinforcement of French troops, fhould be fecured from invafion on the part of England. In the Portuguese proclamation, not a word of France was mentioned.

They

From the whole afpect of this bufinefs, between Spain and Portugal, there cannot be a doubt that the courts of Madrid and Lifbon maintained a fecret understanding with each other. The Spaniards forbore the attack on the Portu guefe, as long as poffible. had no effective army, or rather, perhaps, they chose to have none. The French government, however, urged them to raife one, which they promifed to fupport with troops from France. A French army of obfervation had been established forfome time near Bourdeaux, and detachments of this had begun to

* Next to Lisbon, the richest and most commercial town in the kingdom. It has naval arfenal.

file off, by Bayonne, toward the Spanish frontier. The French general, St. Cyr, was, at the fame time, fent to Madrid, to be with the Spanish general, and to concert with him all the operations of the war. Spain, therefore, with an apparent defire to gratify the wifhes of her republican ally, but, in reality, to prevent a greater mischief, commenced the aggreffion. She took the field with an army haftily collected, and without a fufficiency of either ftores or provifions. An army of the fame complexion, and equally devoid of energy, was fent to oppofe her. An attempt was made by marches, and a little fkirmithing, in which not more than 4 or 500 were engaged on both fides, to deceive the republicans into a belief, that both parties were seriously at war. The French haf tened to forward and crown the victorious career of their ally. But the moment they approached to the fcene of action, terms were propofed by the Portuguese court, acceded to by that of Spain, and thus all difputes between these kindred powers were amicably fettled.

The fituation of Portugal, fhut up between the prevailing power and influence of the French by land, and that of the English at fea, was extremely hard, and bore a near relemblance to that of the Danes, menaced on the one hand by the English, during the formation of the late northern coalition, and on the other by Ruffia, Mr. Friar, the English envoy at Lifbon, fent a ftrong note to the Portuguese minifter, remonftrating against the conclufion of peace, till his court fhould be confulted.

At this haughty conduct, the

Portuguese cabinet was greatly hurt, as Portugal had to complain of the conduct of Great Britain. Immediately after Mr. Friar had prefented this note, he wrote another to Mr. Arbuthnot, the English conful, defiring him to intimate to the British merchants to hold themfelves in readiness to depart at a moment's notice. But the English were invited to remain, with affurance of protection, by the prince regent of Portugal.

By a convention entered into between France and Spain, at Madrid, peace was not to be concluded between these parties on the one hand, and Portugal on the other, unless, among other conditions, certain places in Portugal fhould be given to be occupied by French troops, until the establishment of a general peace in Europe. When, therefore, the first conful of France was invited to accede to the preliminaries of the peace of Badajoz, he refuled his concurrence. He reprefented that it was contrary to the convention of Madrid, and to the general policy and intereft of the allies. And that the immediate confequence of this treaty to his Catholic majefty, if he should ratify it, feparately, would be the lofs of Trinidad; which must be ceded, as a condition of peace with the British nation, if the occupation by French troops, of fome quarter, or fome pofts in Portugal, should not enable the French government to offer, to the cabinet of London, an option, which it might prefer even to the poffeffion of the Spanish island. But the court of Lisbon, having ratified the treaty of Badajoz, feparately, the French government proceeded in its determina[S2]

tion

tion of invading Portugal. A French 'army, 30,000 ftrong, under general Leclerc, provided with a numerous train of artillery, having traverfed the Pyrenees, entered Portugal from Salamancha, on the 28th of June, invefted the town and fortrefs of Almeida, and, from that pofition, menaced both Oporto and Lifbon. It was the policy of Great Britain to counterbalance the conquefts made by the common enemy on her allies, by feizing their trant marine dependencies. While the French threatened the fubjugation of Portugal, a iquadron, with troops, was fent out by the British government for taking into our protection and poffeffion, the island of Madeira. It arrived on the 23d of July, at the place of its deftination. Early on the 24th, a negotiation was begun, and before it was dark, half the force was landed and encamped. On the 25th, the remainder was landed and colonel Clinton, who commanded the expedition, having made proper reprefentations, and fatisfied the governor of the friendly intentions of the English to the Portuguefe, was put in poffeffion of the two forts which command the bay of Funchal, the 'capital of the inland.

Edicts were again iffied by the Portuguese government, for military conferiptions. Large bounties were offered to feamen, for manning fix fhips of the line intended to join the English fleet at Cadiz. The fubfidy from England of 300,000l. which arrived early in July, in an English frigate, quickened the ex

ertions of the Portuguefe. Succours in men likewife were folicited from England, and fondly, though vainly, expected. The men were at work in the arfenals of Lisbon and Oporto day and night. The greatest activity prevailed in every branch of the war department. Portugal was ferioufly prepared to defend herfelf.

The Portuguese army, however, notwithstanding all the requifitions, and all the bounties which were offered to landfinen, as well as failors, did not amount to more than from 20 to 25,000 men, including three regiments of loyal French emigrants, and fome corps of Englifh cavalry. Its head quarters were fixed in the ftrong post of Abrantes, on the Tagus, in Eftramadura. The commander-in-chief was the duke of Alfoens.

The duke, in the beginning of July, quitting Abrantes, and leaving a ftrong corps there, under the command of general Forbes,* proceeded with the main army, to occupy fuch pofition as might enable him to check the farther irruptions of the French. But, in the mean time, while the weak, and but illprovided Portuguese army were thus employed, and the French frowned farther invafion and conquest from Almeida, a negotiation was fet on foot for peace, which was finally concluded at Madrid, on the 29th of September. By this treaty, neither Olivenza, nor any other portion of the Portagnefe territory, was given to Spain. But the interefts of France were confulted in commer

A Scotchman, who had been long in the furvice of Portugal. This is the colone! Forbes who called out the famous John Wilkes, at Pa is, for having fo much abused the color el's countrymen, in one of the numbers of the North Briton.

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CHA P. XVI.

Invafion of Britain in flat-bottomed Beats.-By whom firft projected.-The Policy of Buonaparte in his Menaces of Invafion.—To which his boasted Preparations were inadequate.—Gallant Exploits of British Gun-boats and Cruizers.-French Ports blockaded.—And Coafts infulted.-Yet French Veffels of War feal from one Place to another, alongshore.-Their great Place of Rendezvous, Boulogne.-The French and English on the oppofite Sides of the Channel keep each other on the Alert.—The Tide of War turned by the English from offenfive to defenfive.-French Preparation for Selfdefence.-The War between France and Britain affumes an Afpe&t extremely interefting. The oppofite Preparations of War feen from the oppofite Coafts.-The Harbour of Boulogne defcribed.-French Encampments and Fortifications.-Bombardment of the Vessels in the Harbour of Boulogne.— Its Effects.-Second Attack on Boulogne.-Singular Precautions of the French for defending, and fecuring their Vessels from being carried off by the English.-Plan of the Attack.-Circumflances that involved its Mifcarriage.-Defeat and Difafter.-Lord Nelfon, leaving a fufficient Force before Boulogne, returns to Deal.-Humane Attentions of Lord Nelfon to the wounded Sailors.

TH

HE plan of a defcent on Britain in flat bottomed boats, from Boulogne, was first propofed by the famous Lally, in 1744. It was for a moment adopted by the French miniftry, but quickly abandoned, as impracticable. There had not arifen any circumftances in the British army, or in the character of the British nation, and certes not in the navy, that prefented greater facilities of invafion, in the course of the last fifty years, than could be hoped for at any former period. Nor was the prefent ruler of France fo devoid of prudence, or defperate in fortune, as to hazard fo extravagant and frantic a project. At the fame time, therefore, that the he

ceffity of vigilance, and preparation for defence was allowed on all hands, the most reflecting and judicious part of the British nation were fully perfuaded that no defcent of any consequence would be attempted, unless it should be invited by too great carelessness, or contempt of the enemy. The policy of Buonaparte was two fold: to divide and distract, and to exhauft the resources of the British government, as above ftated, and at the fame time to occupy, and keep in exercife, a very numerous army. This army, he could not, in prudence or with fafety, either to the republic, as it was ftill called, or to himself, permit to languish in ab

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