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course the protest had no effect whatever at Washington, though it is possible it had and was intended to have some effect at home in Colombia, where the Government was in desperate straits to keep the states of Cauca and Antioquia from following the example of Panama and seceding.

General Reyes, accompanied by Generals Ospina, Holguin, and others, arrived at Colon on November 19, on the French steamer Canada. Like their predecessors from Bolivar, they were not permitted to go ashore, but they had a conference with the Panaman commissioners on shipboard. It, too, was without practical result, unless to demonstrate further the irrevocable nature of the step which Panama had taken. At its termination, General Reyes came on to the United States, having been commissioned to do so as a special envoy with extraordinary powers. He reached Washington on November 28, and was received with the courtesy and consideration to which his character and attainments, as well as the nature of his errand, entitled him. He pleaded, or argued, the cause of Colombia with consummate ability, and with frank integrity; and with the zeal of a double interest, for he was not only a loyal and patriotic representative of President Marroquin, but also, as he and all men then realised, he was practically designated to be President Marroquin's successor as the Chief of the Colombian State. He went so far as substantially to offer, if the United States would only compel the return of Panama to Colombian allegiance, to have the defunct Hay-Herran treaty resurrected, revivified, and ratified, with an amendment waiving the $10,000,000 bonus and giving the United States the right of way across the Isthmus gratis. It does not appear to have occurred to him, though it should have done so, as it did to others, that this offer was a practical confirmation of the charges that the Marroquin government could have had the treaty ratified if it had wished, and that it deliberately strangled and killed that thing of its own creation.

This extraordinary proposition appears to have originated at Bogotá and to have been considered and approved by Dr.

AN AMAZING PROPOSITION

185

Marroquin, according to an authentic despatch from that capital quoted as follows by President Roosevelt in his annual message of December 7, 1903:

"Knowing that revolution has already commenced in Panama (an eminent Colombian) says that if the government of the United States will land troops to preserve Colombian sovereignty, and the transit, if requested by Colombian chargé d'affaires, this government will declare martial law; and, by virtue of vested constitutional authority, when public order is disturbed, will approve by decree the ratification of the canal treaty as signed; or, if the government of the United States prefers, will call extra session of the Congress -with new and friendly members-next May to approve the treaty. (An eminent Colombian) has the perfect confidence of Vice-President, he says, and if it became necessary will go to the isthmus or send representative there to adjust matters along above lines to the satisfaction of the people there."

"This despatch," said President Roosevelt in that message, "is noteworthy from two standpoints. Its offer of immediately guaranteeing the treaty to us is in sharp contrast with the positive and contemptuous refusal of the Congress which had just closed its sessions to consider favourably such a treaty; it shows that the government which made the treaty really had absolute control over the situation, but did not choose to exercise this control. The despatch further calls on us to restore order and secure Colombian supremacy in the Isthmus, from which the Colombian Government has just by its action decided to bar us by preventing the construction of the canal."

The identity of "an eminent Colombian" will, of course, be obvious to the reader of the narrative. President Roosevelt was by official propriety and courtesy constrained thus to designate him with the bracketed phrase, but there was no secret and no doubt as to who he was.

The mission of General Reyes thus came to naught, and the American recognition and protection of Panama were properly maintained. In rapid succession many other gov

ernments also recognised the new Republic, until all had done so save Colombia itself. The dates of official recognition-which in most cases were delayed long after practical but informal recognition-were as follows: United States, November 7; France, November 16; China, November 22; Austria-Hungary, November 27; Germany, November 30; Russia, December 7; Denmark, December 8; Belgium, December 9; Peru, December 21; Sweden and Norway, December 22; Cuba, December 23; Great Britain, December 26; Switzerland, Japan, and Italy, December 28; Costa Rica, December 29; Nicaragua, January 1, 1904; Persia, January 11; Portugal, February 16; Corea, February 23; Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, March 3; Siam, March 4; Ecuador, September 21. The long delay of Ecuador was doubtless due to the close and sympathetic relations between that country and Colombia. For a time Colombia refused to recognise Panama in any way, even to the extent of honouring Panaman postage stamps in the mails. After the accession of President Reyes at Bogotá, however, a more reasonable spirit began to be developed, in 1905 actual recognition of postal service between the two countries was effected, and the way to an ultimate establishment of amicable relations was opened.

Meantime the Provisional Government took prompt steps toward placing the Republic upon a permanent constitutional basis, and on December 13 it issued a call for a general election, to be held on January 15, 1904, for members of a National Constitutional Convention, by which the organic and fundamental law of the Republic would be formulated and decreed.

CHAPTER XI

AMERICAN POLICY IN PANAMA

THE policy of the American Government toward the Panama revolution was severely criticised in two quarters: to wit, by Colombians, and by a certain class of partisan opponents of the administration in the United States. By the world at large it was generally approved. That such approval was deserved should be evident to all who regard the matter impartially, logically, and with a proper historical perspective. The major part of criticism has been directed against the orders to our naval forces, which have been said to have prevented, and to have been intended to prevent, the Colombian Government from suppressing rebellion. (The charge that the revolution was conceived and planned in this country, "in the shadow of the Capitol at Washington," with the connivance of our Government, is too absurdly false to require attention. The indisputable facts of the record completely disprove it, and show it to have had its origin in nothing better than either ignorance or malignance.) The orders in question were, however, based upon long-established treaty rights and duties, and were consistent with the policy and practice of our Government for more than a half century before. I have already indicated that the sending of the Nashville to Colon on November 2 was a mere repetition of what had been done before several times, whenever there seemed to be need of protection to American interests there. It was perfectly well known, not only to the Government but to the general public, that a revolution was imminent on the Isthmus, and that Colombian troops were on their way thither to suppress it. In such a case, the lives and property of Americans were sure to be

endangered, and free transit on the railroad to be interrupted. Certainly it was incumbent upon the Government to take prompt steps to prevent such wrongs, rather than to wait until they were committed and then vainly try to undo or savagely to avenge them. What was the order to the commander of the Nashville? It was identical with that sent on the same day, November 2, to the commanders of the Boston and the Dixie, and ran as follows:

"Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption threatened by armed force, occupy line of railroad. Prevent landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either Government or insurgent, either at Colon, Porto Bello, or other point."

That amounted simply to an order to maintain our treaty rights and to fulfil our treaty obligations, concerning transit on the Isthmus, and it was directed against the Panaman revolutionists as much as against the Colombians. Neither party was to be permitted to interfere with the free working of the railroad. Neither was to be permitted to land armed forces with hostile intent at the terminals of the railroad, where they would certainly convert the road into a theatre of hostilities, or at any other point-such as Porto Bellofrom which their sole purpose would be to march against the railroad and interrupt traffic. On the same day this order was sent to Rear-Admiral Glass at Acapulco, directing him to proceed at once to Panama with all available forces.

"Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption threatened by armed force, occupy line. Prevent landing of any armed force either government or insurgent, at any point within fifty miles of Panama. If doubtful as to the intent of any armed force, occupy Ancon Hill strongly with artillery. Government force reported approaching the isthmus in vessels. Prevent their landing, if in your judg. ment landing would precipitate a conflict."

As before, the object was to maintain our treaty rights and fulfil our treaty obligations It is true, the order was

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