collection and observation, by which he is to make his complex idea called man.

§ 17. Secondly, Another that hath gone farther in framing and collecting the idea he calls man, and to the outward shape adds laughter and rational discourse, may demonstrate, that infants and changelings are no men, by this maxim, " it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be:" and I have discoursed with very rational men, who have actually denied that they are men.

§ 18. Thirdly, Perhaps another makes up the complex idea which he calls man, only out of the ideas of body in general, and the powers of language and reason, and leaves out the shape wholly: this man is able to demonstrate, that a man may have no hands, but be quadrupes, neither of those being included in his idea of man; and in whatever body or shape he found speech or reason joined, that was a man: because having a clear knowledge of such a complex idea, it is certain that "what is, is."

§ 19. Little use of these maxims in proofs where we have clear and distinct ideas.-So that, if rightly considered, I think we may say, that where our ideas are determined in our minds, and have annexed to them by us known and steady names under those settled determinations, there is little need, or no use at all, of these maxims, to prove the agreement or disagreement of any of them. He that cannot discern the truth or falsehood of such propositions, without the help of these, and the like, maxims, will not be helped by these maxims to do it: since he cannot be supposed to know the truth of these maxims themselves, without proof, if he cannot know the truth of others, without proof, which are as self-evident as these. Upon this ground it is, that intuitive knowledge neither requires nor admits any proof, one part of it more than another. He that will suppose it does, takes away the foundation of all knowledge and certainty: and he that needs any proof to make him certain, and give his assent to this proposition," that two are equal to two," will also have need of a proof to make him admit, that "what is, is." He that needs a probation to convince him, that two are not three, that white is not black, that a triangle is not a circle, &c. or any other two determined distinct ideas, are not one and the same, will need also a demonstration to convince him, "that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be."

§ 20. Their use dangerous where our ideas are confused.-And as these maxims are of little use where we have determined ideas, so they are, as I have shewn, of dangerous use where our ideas are not determined; and where we use words that are not annexed to determined ideas, but such as are of a loose and wandering signification, sometimes standing for one, and sometimes for another, idea: from which follows mistake and error, which these maxims (brought as proofs to establish propositions, wherein the terms stand for undetermined ideas) do by their authority confirm and rivet.

CHAP. VIII.

OF TRIFLING PROPOSITIONS.

§ 1. Some propositions bring no increase to our knowledge.-Whe ther the maxims treated of in the foregoing chapter, be of that use to real knowledge as is generally supposed, I leave to be considered. This, I think, may confidently be affirmed, that there are universal propositions, which, though they be certainly true, yet they add no light to our understandings, bring no increase to our knowledge. Such are,

§ 2. As, first, identical propositions. First, All purely identical propositions. These obviously, and at first blush, appear to contain no instruction in them: for when we affirm the said term of itself, whether it be barely verbal, or whether it contains any clear and real idea, it shews us nothing but what we must certainly know before, whether such a proposition be either made by, or proposed to, us. Indeed, that most general one, "what is, is," may serve sometimes to shew a man the absurdity he is guilty of, when by circumlocution or equivocal terms, he would, in particular instances, deny the same thing of itself; because nobody will so openly bid defiance to common sense, as to affirm visible and direct contradictions in plain words: or if he does, a man is excused if he breaks off any farther discourse with him. But yet, I think, I may say, that neither that received maxim, nor any other identical proposition, teaches us any thing: and though in such kind of propositions, this great and magnified maxim, boasted to be the foundation of demonstration, may be, and often is, made use of to confirm them; yet all it proves, amounts to no more than this, that the same word may with great certainty be affirmed of itself, without any doubt of the truth of any such proposition; and let me add also, without any real knowledge.

§ 3. For at this rate, any very ignorant person, who can but make a proposition, and knows what he means when he says, Aye, or No, may make a million of propositions, of whose truth he may be infallibly certain, and yet not know one thing in the world thereby; v.g. what is a soul, is a soul; or a soul is a soul; a spirit is a spirit; a fetiche is a fetiche, &c. These all being equivalent to this proposition, viz. "what is, is ;" i. e. what hath existence, hath existence; or who hath a soul, hath a soul. What is this more than trifling with words? It is but like a monkey shifting his oyster from one hand to the other; and had he had but words, might, no doubt, have said, "Oyster in right hand is subject, and oyster in left hand is predicate:" and so might have made a self-evident proposition of oysters, i. e. oyster is oyster; and yet with all this, have not been one whit the wiser, or more knowing: and that way of handling the matter, would much at once have satisfied the monkey's hunger, or a man's understanding; and they would have improved in knowledge and bulk together.

I know there are some, who, because identical propositions are selfevident, shew a great concern for them, and think they do great service to philosophy by crying them up, as if in them was contained all know

ledge, and the understanding were led into all truth by them only. I grant, as forwardly as any one, that they are all true and self-evident. I grant farther, that the foundation of all our knowledge lies in the faculty we have of perceiving the same idea to be the same, and of discerning it from those that are different, as I have shewn in the foregoing chapter. But how that vindicates the making use of identical propositions, for the improvement of knowledge, from the imputation of trifling, I do not see. Let any one repeat, as often as he pleases, that the will is the will, or lay what stress on it he thinks fit; of what use is this, and an infinite the like propositions, for the enlarging our knowledge? Let a man abound as much as the plenty of words which he has will permit, in such propositions as these; a "law is a law," and "obligation, is obligation;"" right is right," and "wrong is wrong;" will these and the like, ever help him to an acquaintance with ethics? Or instruct him or others in the knowledge of morality? Those who know not, nor perhaps ever will know, what is right, and what is wrong, nor the measures of them, can with as much assurance make, and infallibly know the truth of these, and all such propositions, as he that is best instructed in morality can do. But what advance do such propositions give in the knowledge of any thing necessary or useful for their conduct?

He would be thought to do little less than trifle, who, for the enlightening the understanding in any part of knowledge, should be busy with identical propositions, and insist on such maxims as these; substance is substance, and body is body; a vacuum is a vacuum, and a vortex is a vortex; a centaur is a centaur, and a chimera is a chimera, &c. For these, and all such, are equally true, equally certain, and equally selfevident. But yet they cannot but be counted trifling, when made use of as principles of instruction, and stress laid on them, as helps to know ledge; since they teach nothing but what every one, who is capable of discourse, knows without being told, viz. that the same term is the same term, and the same idea the same idea. And upon this account it was that I formerly did, and do still, think, the offering and inculcating such propositions, in order to give the understanding any new light or inlet into the knowledge of things, no better than trifling.

Instruction lies in something very different; and he that would enlarge his own or another's mind, to truths he does not yet know, must find out intermediate ideas, and then lay them in such order one by another, that the understanding may see the agreement or disagreement of those in question. Propositions that do this, are instructive: but they are far from such as affirm the same term of itself; which is no way to advance one's self or others in any sort of knowledge. It no more helps to that, than it would help any one in his learning to read, to have such propositions as these inculcated to him: an A is an A, and a B is a B; which a man may know as well as any schoolmaster, and yet never be able to read a word as long as he lives. Nor do these, or any such, identical propositions, help him one jot forwards in the skill of reading, let him make what use of them he can.

If those who blame my calling them trifling propositions, had but read, and been at the pains to understand, what I have above writ in very plain English, they could not but have seen that by identical propositions,

I

mean only such wherein the same term importing the same idea, is affirmed of itself: which I take to be the proper signification of identical propositions; and concerning all such, I think I may continue safely to say, that to propose them as instructive, is no better than trifling. For no one who has the use of reason, can miss them, where it is necessary they should be taken notice of; nor doubt of their truth when he does take notice of them.

But if men will call propositions identical, wherein the same term is not affirmed of itself, whether they speak more properly than I, others must judge; this is certain, all that they say of propositions that are not identical, in my sense, concerns not me, nor what I have said; all that I have said relating to those propositions wherein the same term is affirmed of itself. And I would fain see an instance, wherein any such can be made use of, to the advantage and improvement of any one's knowledge. Instances of other kinds, whatever use may be made of them, concern not me, as not being such as I call identical.

§4. Secondly, when a part of any complex idea is predicated of the whole.-Secondly, Another sort of trifling propositions is, when a part of the complex idea is predicated of the name of the whole; a part of the definition of the word defined. Such are all propositions wherein the genus is predicated of the species, or more comprehensive of less comprehensive terms; for what information, what knowledge, carries this proposition in it, viz. “ lead is a metal," to a man who knows the complex idea the name lead stands for? All the simple ideas that go to the complex one signified by the term metal, being nothing but what he before comprehended, and signified by the name lead. Indeed, to a man that knows the signification of the word metal, and not of the word lead, it is a shorter way to explain the signification of the word lead, by saying, it is a metal, which at once expresses several of its simple ideas, than to enumerate them one by one, telling him it is a body very heavy, fusible, and malleable.

§ 5. As part of the definition of the term defined.-A like trifling it is, to predicate any other part of the definition of the term defined, or to affirm any one of the simple ideas of a complex one, of the name of the whole complex idea: as" All gold is fusible." For fusibility being one of the simple ideas that goes to the making up the complex one the sound gold stands for, what can it be but playing with sounds, to affirm that of the name gold, which is comprehended in its received signification? It would be thought little better than ridiculous, to affirm gravely, as a truth of moment, that "gold is yellow;" and I see not how it is any jot more material to say," It is fusible," unless that quality be left out of the complex idea of which the sound gold is the mark in ordinary speech. What instruction can it carry with it, to tell one that which he hath been told already, or he is supposed to know before? For I am supposed to know the signification of the word another uses to me, or else he is to tell me. And if I know that the name gold stands for this complex idea of body, yellow, heavy, fusible, malleable, it will not much instruct me to put it solemnly afterwards in a proposition, and gravely say," All gold is fusible." Such propositions can only serve to shew the disingenuity of one, who will go from the definition of his

own terms, by reminding him sometimes of it; but carry no knowledge with them, but of the signification of words, however certain they be.

§ 6. Instance, man and palfry.-Every man is an animal or living body, is as certain a proposition as can be; but no more conducing to to the knowledge of things, than to say, "A palfry is an ambling horse," or a neighing ambling animal, both being only about the signification of words, and make me know but this: that body, sense, and motion, or power of sensation and moving, are three of those ideas that I always comprehend and signify by the word man; and where they are not to be found together, the name man belongs not to that thing; and so of the other, that body, sense, and a certain way of going, with a certain kind of voice, are some of those ideas which I always comprehend and signify by the word palfry; and when they are not to be found together, the name palfry belongs not to that thing. It is just the same, and to the same purpose, when any term standing for any one or more of the simple ideas, that altogether make up that complex idea which is called man, is affirmed of the term man: v. g. suppose a Roman signified by the word homo, all these distinct ideas united in one subject, corporietas, sensibilitas, potentia se movendi, rationalitas, risibilitas, he might, no doubt, with great certainty, universally affirm one, more, or all of these together of the word homo, but did no more than say, that the word homo, in his country, comprehended in its signification all these ideas. Much like a romance knight, who, by the word palfry, signified these ideas; body of a certain figure, four-legged, with sense, motion, ambling, neighing, white, used to have a woman on his back: might with the same certainty, universally affirm also any or all of these of the word palfry; but did thereby teach no more, but that the word palfry, in his, or romance language, stood for all these, and was not to be applied to any thing, where any of these were wanting. But he that shall tell me, that in whatever thing sense, motion, reason, and laughter were united, that thing had actually a notion of God, or would be cast into sleep by opium, made indeed an instructive proposition: because neither having the notion of God, nor being cast into sleep by opium, being contained in the idea signified by the word man, we are by such propositions taught something more than barely what the word man stands for; and, therefore, the knowledge contained in it, is more than verbal.

§ 7. For this teaches but the signification of words.-Before a man makes any proposition, he is supposed to understand the terms he uses in it, or else he talks like a parrot, only making a noise by imitation, and framing certain sounds which he has learnt of others; but not as a rational creature, using them for signs of ideas which he has in his mind. The hearer, also, is supposed to understand the terms as the speaker uses them, or else he talks jargon, and makes an unintelligible noise. And therefore he trifles with words, who makes such a proposition, which, when it is made, contains no more than one of the terms does, and which a man was supposed to know before, v. g. a triangle hath three sides, or saffron is yellow. And this is no farther tolerable than where a man goes to explain his terms, to one who is supposed, or de