tail of R. G., she had the same time for bringing an ejectment as he would have had if he had continued alive, viz. twenty years from the year 1822, when his remainder came into possession (y).

When a tenant in tail shall have made an assurance, which shall not operate to bar an estate to take effect after or in defeasance of the estate tail, and any person shall, by virtue of such assurance, at the time of its execution, or afterwards, be in possession of the land, or rent, and the same person, or any other person (other than some person entitled to such possession in respect of an estate, which shall have taken effect after or in defeasance of the estate tail), shall continue in such possession for twenty years next after the time at which such assurance, if then executed by the tenant in tail, or the person who would have been entitled to his estate tail, if such assurance had not been executed, would, without the consent of any other person, have operated to bar such estate or estates as aforesaid, then, at the expiration of such period of twenty years, such assurance shall be effectual as against any person claiming any estate, interest, or right, to take effect after or in defeasance of such estate tail. Sect. 23.

By sect. 6, an administrator claiming the estate or interest of a deceased person, shall be deemed to claim as if there had been no interval between the death of the deceased person and the grant of administration.

Any archbishop, &c. or other corporation sole may make an entry within such period next after the time at which the right shall first have accrued, (that is to say,) the period during which two persons in succession shall have held the office or benefice, in respect whereof the land or rent is claimed, and six years after a third person shall have been appointed thereto, if the times of such two incumbencies, and such term of six years, taken together, shall amount to sixty years; and if such times, taken together, shall not amount to sixty years, then during such further number of years, in addition to such six years, as will, with the time of the holding of such two persons, and such six years, make up sixty years; and no entry, &c. shall be made or brought at any time beyond the determination of such period.

At the determination of the period limited to any person for making an entry, or distress, or bringing any writ of quare impedit, or other action or suit, the right and title of such person to the land, &c. for the recovery whereof such entry, &c. might have been made within such period, shall be extinguished. Sect. 34. Former statutes of limitations did not extinguish the right, but only barred the remedy (z). "The effect of this act is to make a parliamentary conveyance of the land to the person in possession (y) Doe v. Edmonds, 6 M. & W. 295. (z) See Higgins v. Scott, 2 B. & Ad. 413.

VOL. II.

E

after the period of twenty years has elapsed" (a); that is, if the same person, or several persons, claiming one from another have been in possession for the twenty years (b). And no re-entry, or, it seems, re-possession, by a claimant will revest his title on the doctrine of remitter, after the lapse of the statutable period (c).

By sect. 35, the receipt of the rent payable by any tenant from year to year, or other lessee, shall, as against such lessee, or any person claiming under him (but subject to the lease), be deemed to be the receipt of the profits of the land for the purposes of the

act.

IX. Of the Statute of Inheritance.

By 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 106, s. 2, descent shall be traced from the purchaser; and the person last entitled to the land shall be considered to have been the purchaser, unless it shall be proved that he inherited the same, in which case the person from whom he inherited the same shall be considered to have been the purchaser, unless it shall be proved that he inherited the same; and in like manner, the last person from whom the land shall be proved to have been inherited, shall in every case be considered to have been the purchaser, unless it shall be proved that he inherited the same. Where land descends to the son of an illegitimate father, who is proved to have been the purchaser thereof, and the son dies seised and intestate and without issue, such land does not devolve on the heir ex parte maternâ, but escheats to the crown (d).

By sect. 3, when land shall have been devised by any testator to his heir, such heir shall take as devisee, and not by descent; and when land shall have been limited by any assurance to the person or to the heirs of the person who shall thereby have conveyed the same, such person shall be considered to have acquired the same as a purchaser, and not to be entitled thereto as his former estate.

By sect. 4, when any person shall have acquired any land by purchase, under a limitation to the heirs, or to the heirs of the body of any of his ancestors, contained in an assurance; or under a similar limitation contained in a will, such land shall descend and the descent thereof shall be traced, as if the ancestor named in such limitation had been the purchaser.

By sect. 5, no brother or sister shall inherit immediately from brother or sister, but every descent from a brother or sister shall be traced through the parent.

By sect. 6, every lineal ancestor is made capable of being heir

(a) Per Parke, B., Doe v. Sumner, 14 M. & W. 42.

(b) Doe v. Barnard, 13 Q. B. 952.

(c) Brassington v. Llewellyn, 27 L. J., Exch. 297.

(d) Doe v. Blackburn, 1 M. & Rob. 547.

to any of his issue; and where there shall be no issue of the purchaser, his nearest lineal ancestor shall be his heir in preference to any person who would have been entitled to inherit, either by tracing his descent through such lineal ancestor, or in consequence of their being no descendant of such lineal ancestor, so that the father shall be preferred to a brother or sister, and a more remote lineal ancestor to any of his issue other than a nearer lineal ancestor or his issue.

By sects. 7 and 8, it is declared that the male line is to be preferred, and the mother of the more remote male paternal ancestor to be preferred to the mother of the less remote; and the mother of the more remote male maternal ancestor to the mother of the less remote.

By sect. 9, persons of the half blood are made capable of inheriting; those of the half blood on the part of the male ancestor to inherit next after the relation in the same degree of the whole blood and his issue; and those of the half blood on the part of a female ancestor next after such female ancestor.

By sect. 10, when a person through whom a descent is to be traced shall have been attainted, and died before such descent shall have taken place, the attainder shall not prevent the heir from inheriting, unless the land shall have escheated in consequence of such attainder, before the 1st January, 1834.

The act does not extend to any descent taking place on any death before the 1st January, 1834. Sect. 11. And where the heir or heirs of any person take an estate by purchase, under an assurance executed before the 1st January, 1834, or a will of any testator dying before the same day, such heir or heirs will be determined by the old law, whether the person named as the ancestor shall be living or not on the 1st January, 1834. Sect. 12.

X. Evidence.

For the Plaintiff.-The evidence required to support an ejectment will vary according to the title of the plaintiff.

Possession is primâ facie evidence of seisin in fee simple: the declaration of a deceased possessor that he was tenant to another, makes most strongly against his own interest, and consequently is admissible to cut down his own title (e); but it must be shown that he was in possession of the premises (f), for the declaration of a deceased tenant, who had parted with his interest, is not admissible to cut down the title of his alienee (g). So the admission of a

(e) Peaceable v. Watson, 4 Taunt. 16; Carne v. Nicoll, 1 B. N. C. 430.

(f) Crease v. Barrett, 1 C. M. & R.

931, per Parke, B.

(g) Doe v. Webber, 1 A. & E. 733.

deceased person in receipt of the rent, that he held under another, whether as tenant by sufferance, or as receiver of the rents, is evidence that he himself was not the owner of the legal estate, and, evidence being given aliunde of the title of the plaintiff, the plaintiff had judgment (h). In order to prove that the land for which ejectment was brought was part of the estate of the plaintiff's ancestor, the counterpart of a lease purporting to demise the land in question, which was dated in the lifetime of the ancestor, and apparently executed by the lessee, but by no one else, was produced from the muniment room of the ancestor. The evidence was held admissible, although no reason was given for the non-production of the lease itself, and no privity was shown to exist between the lessee and the defendant in ejectment (i).

It is not competent to a party, who has taken a beneficial interest under a deed, to dispute its execution (k). Therefore, where in an action by the lessee against the assignee of a lease, the plaintiff having proved the delivery of the original lease to the defendant, and the execution of the counterpart, the defendant put in the original lease, which was produced by a party to whom defendant had assigned it by a deed reciting the lease; it was held, that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to call the subscribing witness to prove the execution of the lease (7). But the interest taken must be an abiding one; and therefore, where, to prove a partnership between the plaintiff and defendant, the defendant produced a contract for work to be done, purporting to be made by them as partners with a third party; it was held, that proof of execution must be given (m). To the general rule that regulates the proof of deeds there are two exceptions, 1. Where they are of a certain age; 2. Where an adverse party produces, on notice, a deed under which he claims an interest (n). Secus, where it is produced from the custody of the other party (o). Where a notice to produce is given, and not complied with, and it appears on the plaintiff producing a copy that there was an attesting witness to the original, such witness need not be called (p).

Devisee of a Term (q).- Where the plaintiff is devisee of a term, he must produce in evidence the probate of the will (r), and

(h) Doe v. Coulthred, 7 A. & E. 239. (i) Doe v. Pulmer, 3 Q. B. 622. (k) Carr v. Burdiss, 1 C. M. & R. 782. (1) Burnett v. Lynch, 5 B. & C. 589. (m) Collins v. Bayntun, 1 Q. B. 117. (n) Laythoarp v. Bryant, 1 B. N. C. 421. (0) Vacher v. Cocks, 1 B. & Ad. 145. (p) Poole v. Warren, 8 A. & E. 582. (4) For evidence on ejectment brought by the devisee of land, see post, tit. "Satute of Frauds." Sect. III.

(r) See 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77, establishing a Court of Probate. By sect. 64, in cases

where proof of the original will was formerly requisite, i. e., in all devises of real property, other than chattels real, the probate or an office copy thereof is made evidence of the will, unless, within four days of receipt of notice that such proof will be given (which notice must be given ten days before trial), the party receiving gives notice that he disputes its validity. By sect. 65, if the original will be produced, the judge may direct by which of the parties the costs of such production and proof shall be paid.

prove the assent of the executor to the devise; for where a person devises, either specially or generally, goods or chattels, real or personal, and dies, the devisee cannot take them without the assent of the executor (s). Lessee for years devised the term to his executor for life, paying 50l. to J. S., remainder to the plaintiff. The executor dying, his executrix entered upon the residue of the lease, and possessed herself of the term. An ejectment having been brought, it was held, that the executor took as executor, and not as legatee; and then the remainder over was not executed, and that it was incumbent on the remainderman to prove a special assent thereto, as to a legacy; whereupon plaintiff proved payment of the 501.; and that was held to be a sufficient assent, and the plaintiff recovered (t). To prove the title of the plaintiff in ejectment, claiming as executor, the will was produced from the registrar's office, with a memorandum at the foot of it, signed by the surrogate, that the executor had proved the will, and that the probate had been sealed. The probate was not produced or accounted for; but it was proved that such a memorandum was never made till probate had been granted, and that, by the practice of the particular court, no other record of such grants was kept. The evidence was held sufficient (u).

Administrator.-Where the plaintiff claims title as administrator, in strictness he ought to produce the letters of administration under the seal of the Ecclesiastical Court-now the Court of Probate, established by the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77 (see sect. 23). But before that act it was held that the original book of acts, wherein the orders of the Ecclesiastical Court for granting letters of administration were entered (r), or an examined copy of the entry in that book (y), or a certified copy of such book, under the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, s. 14 (z), or an exemplification of the letters of administration, if the originals were lost (a), were also evidence.

Boundary. - Reputation is admissible evidence in questions of boundary. Hence where the question was, whether land was in the parish of A, or in the parish of B., the land in B. being tithefree; it was held, that ancient leases granted by the ancestor of the plaintiff's landlord, in which the land was described as being in parish B., were admissible as evidence of reputation that the land was in that parish (b). So verdicts and presentments at a manor court are admissible, but not awards (c).

Copyhold.—If the plaintiff make title in the lessor as lord of a

(s) 1 Inst. 111, a. See ante, p. 702.
(t) Young v. Holmes, 1 Str. 170.
(u) Doe v. Mew, 7 A. & E. 240.
(1) Elden v. Keddell, 8 East, 187.
(y) Ray v. Clerk, 13 East, 238.

(z) Dorrett v. Meux, 15 C. B. 142. (a) Shepherd v. Shorthose, 1 Stra. 412. (b) Plaxton v. Dare, 10 B. & C. 17. (c) Evans v. Rees, 10 A. & E. 151. See Daniel v. Wilkin, 7 Exch. 429.