and his wife, víz. in 1776, sold part of the negroes in question to the defendant, Cunnington." The special verdict then submits the points of law to the court, whether Mrs. Dott had a life estate only in the negroes, with a limitation over on her death, or whether the whole vested in her at first. The case was fully argued before Rutledge, Ch. J. Burke, Grimke, Waties and Bay justices, who were unanimously of opinion, that the words, "at the death to the heirs of her body," were words of limitation and not words of purchase; that the court must be governed by the plain rules of law, and the legal import of the phrases which constitute an estate tail, which being too remote and tending to a perpetuity of a chattel, the whole vested in Mrs Dott the first taker. There are many other American cases which apply and give effect to the rule in Shelly's case to devises and conveyances of personal property. Upon the whole, therefore, we feel very clear that the gift from Elizabeth Strain to Agnes Brown for life, with remainder to the heirs of her body, vested the entire interest in Agnes Brown; and therefore, that the statutes of limitation have barred the right of the complainants. The decree of the Chancellor, which dismissed the bill, must consequently be affirmed. GREEN, J. I fully concur with the result of the foregoing opinion; but I adhere to the views expressed by me in Loving vs. Hunter, as to the reason an' policy of the rule in Shelly's case, Judgment affirmed. JACKSON, April, 1836. Gasget & Co. V Scott, etc. GASGET & Co. vs. SCOTT, TRUET and others. A, a non-resident, is indebted to B, also a non-resident. A owned property in this State, which be conveyed to his son-in-law, in fraud of his creditors, as the bill alleged. B, without having obtained a judgment at law, filed a bill in this State to subject this property to the payment of his debt under the provisions of the Act of 1832, c. 11. Held, that the provisions of that act did not extend to such case, and that the Court of Chancery had no jurisdiction of the cause. This is a bill filed under the Act of 1832, c. 11, § 4, to subject property in this State to the payment of a debt due from Scott and Truet, two of the defendants, to the crmplainants, and charges, that in 1829, Scott and Truet, who are both non-residents of the State of Tennessee, bought goods of the complainants, at that time and yet citizens of New Orleans, State of Louisiana, to the amount of $1232 92, for which they drew a bill of exchange on the house of John G. Banks and Brother, New Orleans, dated 19th February, 1829, and payable twelve months after date. That when said bill fell due, it was protested for non-payment, and legal notice thereof given to the drawers; that Truet and Scott are insolvent, and that Truet subsequently to the drawing of the bill of exchange, without consideration and to defraud his creditors, conveyed to his co-defendants, his sons-in-law, the property in controversy; that they reside within this State, and prays that this roperty may by a decree of the Court, be subjected to the payment of the bill of exchange. The answer of Truet admits the drawing of the bill of exchange and its dishonor, as charged in the bill, and that the property was conveyed to his children by way of advancement, but denies most expressly that it was done with a fraudulent intention. The answers of the other defendants allege that Truet is amply solvent, that the property was conveyed to them without fraud, and demand proof cf the debt. Upon the hearing of this cause below, the Chancellor was of opinion the evidence established the facts stated in the bill, and decreed that the defendants should pay to the complainants the sum of $1041 40 within one month from the date of the decree, or deliver to the Clerk and Master of the Court the property in dispute, to be by him sold in satisfaction thereof, from which this appeal is prosecuted. V. D. Barry, for complainants. 1st. The act of 1832, c. 11, §4, enacts, "That in all cases where service of process cannot be made at law, and where no original attachment at law will lie, and no judgment at law can be obtained; and also, in cases where the demand is purely of an equitable nature, a Court of Equity shall have jurisdiction, to subject legal and equitable interests in every species of stock and other property, with the exception therein before stated; and also in real estate, provided, that in case of a legal demand, the amount due shall be ascertained by the verdict of a jury. In this case, "personal service of process could not be made," because the debtors resided, one in Mississippi and the other in Arkansas. "No original attachment at law would lie," because both creditors and debtors were non-residents. Cooke R. 49, Kincaid vs. Francis, and, "No judgment at law could be obtained," for want of service of process. 2d. A conveyance of property to a child without valuable consideration, by one indebted at the time, is void against creditors. 1 Atk. 15, Russel vs. Hammond: 2 Atk. 600, Taylor vs. Jones: 1 Atk. 93, Walker vs. Burrows: 1 Ves. 1, Lord Townshead vs. Windham: 3 John. Ch. R. 500, Reale vs. Livingston: 1 Halsted R. 450, Den vs. De Start: 4 Am. Dig. 195, pl. 104. It is fraudulent, without reference to the amount of his debt, or other property. property. To say the least, it is prima facie evidence of fraud, and the onus lies on the defendants. 4 Eng. Ch. R. 264, Richardson vs. Smallwood: 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 260: 12 Ves. 136, Kidney vs. Coosmaker: 3 John. Ch. R. 450, Bayard vs. Hoffman: Rob. on Fr. Con. 20: Jer. Eq. Juris. 513: 1 Fonb. 271. John Read, for Defendant. JACKSON. April, 1836. Gasget & Co. V Scott, etc. JACKSON. April, 1836. Gasget & Co. V Scott, etc. TURLEY, J. delivered the opinion of the court. From the facts in this case, it appears that the complainants Wm. A. Gasget & Co., and the defendants, Scott and Truet, who are the persons indebted, are non-residents; that no judgment has been obtained at law; that the demand is of a legal and not of an equitable character, and that no personal service of process has been had in this case. The question then arises, had the Court of Chancery power to entertain jurisdiction of this cause and to give the decree complained of? Clearly there is no principle of equity jurisprudence which gives this jurisdiction, and if it can be sustained, it must be by legislative enactment, which it is said is to be found in the act of 1832, c 11. Before proceeding to construe this statute, let us examine what will be the result of the construction contended for by the complainants. There is no principle of the common law more sacred, than that no man shall be deprived of his property by the judgment of a court, without personal notice that he has been impleaded therein. This great principle, which has always been considered so important to the safety of the citizen, has been violated in but few instances, and in those only, where the evils resulting from requiring the notice, would more than counterbalance those arising from proceeding withotit; or when some peculiar privilege is intended to be given to the citizen of the State, as in the cases of attachments against absconding or non-resident debtors; motions against the public officers of the State, and of securities against their principals. Attachments against absconding debtors are given, because it is the policy of the law and the honest right of the creditor, that his contract shall be tried where it was made. Attachments against non-residents are given as matter of favor to our own citizens, without regard to the right, in order that they may not be compelled to go abroad for the collection of their debts if the means of satisfaction can be had at home; and all judgments on motion without notice are given merely from what is considered to be the sound policy of the country. Such violations of the common law are watched with great jealousy; they can only be made by express enactment, and In the cities of New York, Philadelphia and New Orleans, there is perhaps scarcely a merchant who is not the owner of either property, stocks or debts to a large amount in the State of Tennessee; under this construction of the statute, every man to whom they may be indebted, may harrass them with suits in our courts, compel them to submit to injustice, or litigate their rights at an immense consumption of time and money; and all this for whose good? Not for the citizens of the State of Tennessee, for their rights are protected without this construction; but, as is argued, solely for the benefit of citizens of other governments, who stand in no need of our protection, and so far as this statute is concerned, might well exclaim, "let us and our goods alone." A construction from which JACKSON. April, 1836. Gasget & Co. V Scott, etc. |