himself in contradictions. The confession was a consideration which Oka could not disregard, and so in spite of his conviction. of Sokichi's innocence, he remanded the latter to jail until further developments. Meanwhile he had his own hypothesis as to the guilty one. Then a strange thing happened. As Sokichi left the court house, in the rude litter used for criminals, a man passed into the court,apparently bent on legal business, whose face seemed somewhat familiar. A glance of half-recognition passed between them. It was the man who had given him the purse. For an instant it seemed to Sokichi as though the opportunity for saving himself ought not to be rejected. Then his better feelings conquered, and he put away his base impulse, and thanked fortune that he was not such a man as to gain a little longer life by bringing evil upon the man who had once saved that life. But the passer-by, too, had recognized Sokichi, and the thought instantly came over him that it must be the purse or something connected with it that had brought Sokichi into this plight. So, without taking the time to inquire, he returned to his house, got pen and paper, and wrote out an affidavit to the following effect: 'On the 3d of April, in the evening, I took a sedan chair from Bancho ward to Horsedealers' ward. The cushion was still warm from the previous occupant when I entered, and a purse was lying upon it, embroidered with wisteria, and containing some forty or fifty ryo. I put it in my pocket, intending to report its discovery next day, but after I had left the chair, and was passing along the street, I saw on the ground, insensible, a young man who had been trying to commit suicide. I restored him to consciousness, and when he told me that he had just been robbed of the last ryo he had in the world, I took out the purse, on the impulse of the moment, and forced it upon him. I then left him, but, as it seems that he has been accused of stealing the purse, I hasten to inform you that he is entirely innocent." Oka, when he read the affidavit, proceeded to summon both Yagobei (for that was the man's name) and Sokichi, and began by questioning the latter. "I learn," he said, "that you have been trying to deceive me, and that you really received the purse from this man here, and did not steal it at all." But Sokichi, now convinced utterly that his benefactor was the real thief and had confessed to save Sokichi, was determined not to be outdone in generosity, and made one last effort to complete his sacrifice. "This man is a liar," he protested, "I am the one who killed the men and stole the money, and whoever denies it speaks falsely." When Oka perceived this noble. attempt of Sokichi to defend his benefactor, he was filled with admiration, and said to himself that he had seldom seen such noble self-sacrifice in one so young. But he saw that as far as Sokichi went there was nothing more to be learned, so he turned to Yagobei and asked him about the chair-bearers, the appearance of the chair and a few other details. On the next day he had all the chair-bearers from Asakusa district to Ushigome district, a distance of several miles, summoned to court. They came in obedience to the summons, a motley throng, and ill at ease, for a summons from Oka never failed to send a thrill of apprehension to every Yedo townsman, whose conscience could not show the very whitest record. The examination proceeded, and after several clues had been followed up, the matter was narrowed down to this: That two sedan-bearers were found who had carried Yagobei that evening; that the passenger just before him had got into the chair in a drunken condition, and had gone off in an unknown direction; that the only thing noticeable about him was that he carried a lantern marked "Yorozu Mago," and that there was a tea-house near the New Bridge kept by a man named Magohachi, of the sum Yorozu House. So this man was moned. Now it happened that the Kohachi already mentioned, the nephew of the murdered man, had recently spent much money at this tea-house, and was, in fact, the man to whom Magohachi had lent a lantern on the night in question. All of this Magohachi readily confessed in great trepidation, for he had been surprised at the amount of money the man was spending, and was anxious to clear himself of all suspicion in connection with the man's conduct. So Kohachi was summoned, and Oka charged him directly with the murder of his uncle, and the robbery of the fifty ryo. But Kohachi stoutly protested his innocence, and laid the charge to the malice of his enemies. Then Oka said to the sedan-bearers, who had been brought in while Kohachi spoke: "Do you know this man?" And they answered, "He is the same drunken samurai whom we carried on the night of the 3d of April." Then Oka asked Magohachi, the tea-house keeper: "Do you know this man?" And he answered: "This is the man who has caused all the trouble. I lent you a lantern that night, and you never returned it. Sorry I am for the day I first knew you, for this disgraceful affair has brought me and my family into great trouble, and is ruining our business." But Kohachi vehe mently protested that they were all liars, and that secret malice was the motive of their declarations. Then Oka commanded silence and said: "Kohachi, you have forgotten the meaning of the phrase, the eyes of God,' which is, that though darkness is about you, Heaven does not permit your evil deeds to pass unseen. Do not hope to escape the results of your wickedness, for justice never fails to bring the evil man to his just deserts. I know you to be the guilty man, and by a confession out of your own mouth. On that day when this innocent man was arrested, I was passing, and I heard your words when you said, I was the one that did the work for this.' Know, then, that when I heard these words, and saw your hypocritical face, I divined the true robber and murderer. Witnesses have been brought who have convicted you before all men, but from the beginning I knew where the guilt lay.” Then Kohachi broke down and confessed the story of the crime from beginning to end. The people were loud in their praises of Oka, and none more than the relatives of the deceased, to whom had been revealed with the plainness of day the unwelcome truth that the murderer was the unfilial beneficiary of the faithful old retainer. A MARGINAL TRESPASS. (Cole v. Drew, 44 Vt. 49; 8 Am. Rep. 362.) The highway sides on plaintiff's land Were overgrown with weeds and grass, Which high as children's waists didst stand, And when they sought to school to pass, Wet through their pants and petticoats, And raised up white spots in their throats. So Mrs. Drew, defendant's wife, Directed by the road-surveyor, The harvest weighed but twenty pounds, But plaintiff, bent to have his own, For trespass on his lawful bounds, Sued for a crop he had not sown, And, as the circumstances showed, One which he never would have mowed. Now when this sharp penurious Yankee But rushed from court in sudden fury, For they a wholesome lesson meant, And gave him damages - one cent! But like the average of folk, Not letting well enough alone, Forgetful of the case in Coke By name "Six Carpenters" 'tis known Defendant angry " 'pealed it up," And thus he filled with wrath his cup. "A trespass ab initio, The taking and the feeding show; 'De minimis non curat lex' So plaintiff got his costly cent, Defendant paid a bill of costs; Both parties gave their passions vent, And left the weeds to heat and frosts; But little recked each wise attorney, He did not have to tramp that journey. This is the smallest case of any That lawyers con by midnight lamp; It beats that of the English penny,1 And that of the deficient stamp, 2 And shows how great a fool he is Who litigates de minimis. 66 CONNIVANCE. A very interesting point is decided in Dennis v. Dennis, 68 Conn. 186; 34 L. R. A. 449: A woman who authorizes her attorney to employ detectives to watch her husband, whom she suspects of infidelity, for the purpose of obtaining evidence which will entitle her to a divorce, and who goes with them at a time appointed to surprise him in a compromising position with a lewd woman employed by them for that purpose, may be found to have known that the woman's movements were governed by them, so as to show connivance on her part which will bar her right to divorce." The Court said : "Connivance is the corrupt consenting of a married party to that conduct of the other of which afterwards complaint is made. It bars the right of divorce because no injury is received: for what a person has consented to, he cannot set up as an injury. Connivance is a thing of the intent resting in the mind. It is the consenting. But the connivance may be the passive permitting of the adultery or other misconduct, as well as the active procuring of its commission. If the mind consents, that is connivance. Ross v. Ross, L. R. 1 Prob. & Div. 734; Pierce v. Pierce, 3 Pick. 299; 15 Am. Dec. 210. The connivance of the plaintiff is established as a fact upon evidence to the admission of which no objection was made, and we suppose this to be a conclusion which this court cannot revise." Then follows a statement of the facts, and the court continue: "Her conduct then and ever since might well be deemed to cast a reflex light on her knowledge of the purposes for which the detectives were employed, and her consent to the artifices which they practiced. These are the facts and circumstances from which the trial court held that the plaintiff was barred of all right to have a divorce for the acts of adultery she had proved. In the light of the authorities we have cited, we think the decision of the court on this part of the case should not be disturbed. Morrison v. Morrison, 136 Mass. 310; Myers v. Myers, 41 Barb. 1 Teall v. Felton, 1 N.Y., 137; 12 Howard (U. S.), 284. 2 London & B. Ry. Co. v., Watson 3 C. P. Div. 429; 4 ibid, 118. 114; Hedden v. Hedden, 21 N. J. Eq. 61; Austin v. Austin, 10 Conn. 221; Cairns v. Cairns, 109 Mass. 408; Masten v. Masten, 15 N. H. 159; Gower v. Gower, L. R. 2 Prob. & Div. 428. In this last case it was held, that 'if a person employed by a husband to watch his wife for the purpose of obtaining evidence of her adultery brings about an act of adultery, the husband cannot obtain a decree of dissolution [of the marriage] on the ground of such adultery, although he may not have directed or authorized his agent to bring it about.'" Other cases cited as supporting the same doctrine are Williamson v. Williamson, L. R. 7 Prob. Div. 76; Hawkins v. Hawkins, L. R. 10 Prob. Div. 177; Heyes v. Heyes, L. R. 13 Prob. Div. 11. The court conclude: "The State makes itself a party to all marriages, in that it requires the marriage contract to be entered into before officers designated by itself, and with certain formalities which it has prescribed. This State does this, not alone that children may be born and properly reared, but that the parties to the marriage may themselves be the better citizens; it being in accordance with the experience of all mankind that human beings are happier, and are better citizens and better disposed towards the State, when married and surrounded by the ties of a family and with children, than when they remain unmarried. The State desires good citizens. It regulates divorce procedure in its own interest. A divorce cannot be had except in that court which the State authorizes, and for those causes only, and with those formalities, which it has by statute prescribed. As the State favors marriages for the reasons stated, so the State does not favor divorces, and only permits a divorce to be granted when those conditions are found to exist, in respect to one or the other of the married parties, which seem to the legislature to make it probable that the interests of society will be better served, and that parties will be happier, and so the better citizens, separate, than if compelled to remain together. The State allows divorces, not as a punishment to the offending party, nor as a favor to the innocent party, but because the State believes its own prosperity will thereby be promoted. 'Seeley's Appeal,' 56 Conn. 202, 206. The forms of the law of divorce should never be allowed to minister to the caprices of fickle-minded persons, or to the revenges of the disappointed or vindictive, and least of all to the passions of the incontinent. Nor under any circumstances should they be used in fraud of the statute allowing divorces, nor of the court. To the end that any and all attempts to use the forms of the law of divorce for any of the purposes indicated, shall be discovered and defeated, all courts possessing divorce jurisdiction are vested with a discretion. A wise discretion should always be exercised in administering the law of divorce, lest its spirit be disobeyed by a too narrow adherence to its letter." In Morrison v. Morrison, supra, the trial judge found that the plaintiff was willing that his wife should commit adultery, provided he could obtain a divorce, founding his decision on the facts that after his suspicions of her fidelity were aroused, he frequently retired, leaving her alone with the suspected paramour, having previously arranged to have them watched by a detective; allowed her to go alone with the suspected paramour in the streets of the city where they lived, and also on pleasure excursions, and permitted him to use undue familiarity with her in his presence, without disapproval. This evidence and that finding were held to support a finding of connivance. It will be observed that the plaintiff's willingness was inferred from his conduct alone. In Hedden v. Hedden, supra, it was held that "If a husband sees what a reasonable man could not see without alarm . . . he is called upon to exercise a peculiar vigilance and care over her, and if he sees what a reasonable man could not permit, and makes no effort to avert the danger, he must be supposed to see and mean the result." The case in Barbour showed an evident procurement of the offense by the plaintiff, as the court said, "a most bungling and wicked conspiracy and connivance." The activity of the plaintiff was much clearer than in the foregoing cases. Such, but still more strongly, was the New Hampshire case. In the Hawkins case, the English court went so far as to hold that where a man had seduced his wife before marriage, and left her for sixteen years, allowing her but a small sum for her support, his conduct in leaving his wife without a husband's protection . . . conduced to her adultery,” and he was not entitled to a divorce. Opposed to this array of authority is Robbins v. Robbins, 140 Mass. 528; 54 Am. Rep. 488. There a husband, suspecting his wife of adultery with a lodger in his house, informed his wife that he was going out of town, and should not return that night or till late that night. He did not go out of town, but watched the house in the evening until he saw the lights in his wife's and the lodger's rooms extinguished, and then secretly entered and surprised them in bed together. It was found by the trial court that this particular opportunity for adultery would not have existed except for this scheme, but that there was no corrupt intent that adultery should be committed." The appellate court held that the plaintiff's conduct did not constitute connivance in law; that a husband has a right to have a wife who will remain chaste when exposed to temptations," and has a right to lay a scheme to detect her if she is guilty. It is difficult to distinguish this case from the case in 136 Massachusetts, or that in Connecticut, unless it is to be held that connivance is purely a question of fact. If a husband's willingness is inferable from his conduct, it was inferable in the Robbins case as well as in the others. We prefer the doctrine of Mr. Bishop: A husband who suspects his wife of adultery may take means to procure proof. But he must not lead her into a fresh wrong because 66 he fears she has been guilty of an old one. He may watch her; even leave open the opportunities which he finds; but he must not make new ones or lay temptations in her way." Connive" means literally to wink at. The Century Dictionary gives as a definition: To wink; to refrain from looking, in a figurative sense, as at a culpable person or act; give aid or encouragement by silence or forbearance; conceal knowledge of a fault or wrong." 66 To shut one's eyes to; wink at; tacitly permit." The Bible says that "Their wickedness God hath hitherto winked at." Will it be argued that God was willing that men should commit sin? Since the foregoing was written, a report comes to us, in the " Albany Law Journal,” 265, of a case at special term of the Supreme Court, in the city of New York (Karger v. Karger), decided by Pryor, J., which agrees with the Dennis and Morrison cases in its conclusions. The facts are stated as follows:"Suspecting a criminal connection between his wife and one Stein, the plaintiff concerted with the witness Wolf a scheme for detecting the defendant in the act. She was in the habit of visiting Stein at his room in Wolf's house, and the arrangement was that the plaintiff should go to the house, and Wolf' would show it to him.' He went to the house, and was so situated that, though himself concealed, he could observe the approach of his wife. She entered the house and met Stein. Meanwhile, Wolf, with plaintiff's privity, had so disposed the company and fastened the doors as apparently to assure the defendant of security in the illicit intercourse. From the ambush in which they lay, Wolf, in company with the plaintiff, heard Stein invite the woman to his embraces, and saw them go to bed together. Then, after waiting 'two or three minutes,' the husband and witness rushed into the room and surprised the parties in the act." The Judge observed: : "Not only did he permit it to be done, when a look or a word from him would have prevented it; not only did he suffer it to proceed in his presence, and delay interruption until he supposed it consummated, but through the agency of Wolf he promoted and facilitated the adultery. The inference is irresistible that the plaintiff was willing that the defendant should commit the act in order that he might obtain a divorce (Morrison v. Morrison, 136 Mass. 310)." ... "It would be a dangerous principle to establish, that a husband who has suspicions of the infidelity of his wife shall be allowed to lay a train which may lead her to the commission of adultery, in order that he may take advantage of it to obtain a divorce (Pierce v. Pierce, 15 Am. Dec. 210; 3 Pick. 299). I am aware of the decision in Robbins v. Robbins (140 Mass. 528), but cannot recognize it as an authority (33 Alb. Law Journal,' 401)." 6 OATHS. Mr. Rogers tells us, in his agreeable paper on this topic, that the Bedouins swear by their tent-poles. We should call that swearing by the Styx. NOTES OF CASES. BICYCLING ON SUNDAY. In Eaton v. Atlas Ins. Co., 89 Me. 570, it appeared that the plaintiff rode on Sunday on a bicycle to attend the funeral of a friend, returning by a longer route for recreation, and was injured on his return. The court held that his going was not a violation of the law against traveling on Sunday, and therefore his accident insurance policy was not avoided “while or in consequence of violating any law," but his returning in the longer way brought the accident within a clause of the policy limiting recovery to a certain amount in case of injury, "while engaged for pleasure or recreation in amateur bicycling," etc. The court intimated that the result would have been otherwise if the rider had been injured while on his direct route to or from the funeral. EXHUMATION. An interesting and almost novel point was decided by the New York Court of Appeals in Weble v. U. S. M. Acc. Association, an action on an accident policy. The insured had met his death by drowning. The policy provided that "any medical adviser of the association shall be permitted to examine the person or body of the insured in respect to any alleged injury or cause of death, when and so often as he requires,” and to attend any post mortem examination held on the part of his representatives or beneficiaries. Also that a strict compliance was a condition precedent to the enforcement of the contract. The deceased was drowned, September 4, 1893, and immediate notice thereof was given to the company. The body was buried, after a coroner's investigation, September 9th. On September 19th, written demand was made by the company's medical adviser for permission to examine the body to ascertain the cause of death, and was refused on account of the necessity of disinterment. The court held that the refusal was warranted. They observed: "The effect of the giving of immediate notice was to impose upon the defendant the obligation immediately to make such investigation of that occurrence, as to enable it to decide whether to insist upon its right of an examination of the body in order to satisfy itself as to the cause of the death. It was not at liberty to wait indefinitely, or for any unreasonable length of time. The provision, though not, as before observed, of an unreasonable nature, nevertheless was one which, in the nature of things, called for prompt action on the part of the insurer. Although no time is specified within which the permission to examine may be availed of, still, a due regard for the sentiments of the family and friends of the deceased, if not public policy, required as immediate an exercise of the option to examine as was possible. Conditions in insurance policies, as in all other contracts, should be construed strictly against those for whose benefit they were reserved (Paul v. Insurance Co., 112 N. Y., 472). It was an unreasonable delay on the |