whole affair shows a curious phase of life in the South half a century ago, and it seems probable from the account that no important vacancy in society was caused by the elumination of the two Kentuckians in question, so that no very serious shade is cast on the picture. THE TREACHEROUS BEDSTEAD. (White v. Oakes, 88 Me. 367.) "Caveat emptor" is an ancient saw One Oakes kept furniture already made, On which the tasteful housewife might display They meant no joke, they were in earnest quite, Disturbed and overcome its gravity; It quick "went back". and forward -on the pair, They scrambled out, faint, angry, bruised and scared, But when the bed came home the second time To try it first upon a "single boarder." So when he vowed his hostess he would sue And use the bedstead only in the day. Then Mrs. White sued Oakes to reimburse Her injuries in body and in purse. "This Oakes 'doth murder sleep!'"' her counsel cried; But the judiciary calm replied: "The bed was not of Oakes's manufacture; He did not know its tendency to fracture; No warranty was made nor is implied; It is not shown that he deceived or lied; The bed was open and exposed to view; And all was equal as between the two; The case is really hard; we grieve to disappoint, But had she prudent been she would have tried the joint! And when she heard the smooth commercial tempter, Should have recalled the maxim, "Caveat emptor." So Agnes White went home, and shut her bed, A stationary, permanent wall-flower, The law above declared is different very And broke off prayers and bone and promised nap. And warranted the bed as sound in all respects. such corporations and the people where there is room PRACTICAL JOKING. Judge Dent of West Virfor doubt or casuistry, as to create the painful impres-ginia, although evidently possessed of a sense of the Ision that that court sits as a sort of stakeholder for private corporations." This language is held of a decision that a railroad company is not bound to lock or guard a turntable on its own lands for the protection of trespassing infants. We believe that the decision is wrong, but there is nothing in it to justify such intemperate and disrespectful language. The decision was foreshadowed in that court some years ago in a case between individuals, and is in harmony with decisions in Massachusetts and New Hampshire. The statement in the same article that a Missouri judge once entertained the New York opinion, but was converted by the death of a near relative of his, "a bright and promising boy," while playing on an unfastened turntable, strikes us as very funny. Causes are not decided on such emotional and personal considerations in the Eastern States. The turntable cases are distinguished in a very recent case in Texas (Missouri &c. Ry. Co. v. Edwards, 32 L. R. A. 825), in which it was held that – "Injury to a child while playing on a pile of railroadbridge ties in the railroad yard, which is fenced except on the side along the railroad track, and out of which the servants of the company always ordered any children found there, does not render the railroad company liable, as it was not under obligation to so pile the ties as to prevent injury by a child climbing upon them." The court adverting to the ground on which the turntable cases are put, namely, the attractiveness of the machine to children, observe: "The question suggests itself, what object or place is not attractive to young persons who are left free to pursue their innate propensity to wander in quest of amusement? What object at all unusual is exempt from infantile curiosity? What place, conveniently accessible for their congregation, is free from the restless feet of adventurous truants? Here the language of an eminent judge in disposing of a similar case is appropriate: There are streams and pools of water where children may be drowned; there are inequalities of surface where they may be injured. To compel the owners of such property either to inclose it or fill up their ponds and level the surface so that trespassers may not be injured would be an oppressive rule. The law does not require us to enforce any such principle even where the trespassers are children. We all know that boys of eight years of age indulge in athletic sports. They fish, shoot, swim, and climb trees. All of these amusements are attended with danger, and accidents frequently occur. It is part of a boy's nature to trespass, especially where there is tempting fruit, yet I never heard that it was the duty of the owner of a fruit-tree to cut it down because a boy trespasser may possibly fall from its branches. Yet the principle contended for by the plaintiff would bring us to this absurdity if carried to its logical conclusion. Moreover, it would charge the duty of the protection of children upon every member of the community except their parents.' Paxson, J., in Gillespie v. McGowan, 100 Pa. 144, 45 Am. Rep. 365.” humorous, does not believe in practical joking. In the recent case of Plate v. Durst (32 L. R. A. 404), it appeared that the plaintiff, in 1885, when twelve years old, went to live with the defendant, her brotherin-law. For three or four years she was sent to school, clothed and treated like a daughter, rendering in return a daughter's natural service in the family. She also acted as clerk in the defendant's store. This lasted till 1894, when the defendant and his wife quarreled and separated, and the plaintiff was turned adrift, without compensation or provision. It conclusively appeared that in 1890 the defendant asked her if she was tired. She said she was. Then he asked her how long she had been with him. She said five years. Then he replied, "When you are with me ten years I will give you $1000." On another occasion he promised to give her on her marriage $1000 and a $500 diamond ring. The defense was that the defendant was joking. The Judge observes: "It must be admitted, in any view of the matter, that this was jesting on a very serious subject to this unfortunate and parentless young girl - still in the eyes of the law an infant engaged early and late, week days and Sundays, at home and abroad, actively, earnestly, and faithfully endeavoring to promote the worldly interests of the defendant. Jokes are sometimes taken seriously by the young and inexperienced in the deceptive ways of the business world, and if such is the case, and thereby the person deceived is led to give valuable services in the full belief and expectation that the joker is in earnest, the law will also take the joker at his word, and give him good reason to smile. The services were rendered in advancement of the defendant's business. They were valuable and necessary, and so he regarded them. Until she was seventeen, nothing was said as to compensation; but she was clothed, fed, furnished spending money, and received some so-called presents from the hands of the defendant. She had then arrived at an age when she had become quite proficient in his business, that of a caterer and confectioner; was very useful to him, and diligent and attentive about his business. It was also quite time for her to begin thinking about her own future. He, as a sensible business man, undoubtedly realized this fact, and also that he was receiving gratuitously services to which he was not entitled, and that as soon as she became fully informed as to her own worth and rights, she would ask compensation at his hands, or seek other employment. The defendant says he was not in earnest, but only jesting. Admitting such to be the case, these conversations, whether he was in earnest or not, were calculated to mislead her, and leave the impression on her mind that in any event he would deal justly by her, and fully compensate her for her services; and in this manner he retained her in his employ until it suited his convenience to discharge her without compensation, which he did, to say the least, in an unkind and heartless manner, ill becoming to a stranger, much less a brother-in-law. And now it devolves upon us to say whether she is entitled to pay for what her services were actually worth, or does the law, from the fact that he was only misleading her, and never intended to pay her, excuse him from doing so? A person is estopped from denying sincerity of his conduct, to the injury of a person misled thereby. We therefore must conclude that these promises, in spite of the declaration of the defendant to the contrary, were made in sincerity, as an inducement to her future service." Counsel for defendant complained of "useless verbiage and trifling repetitions" in the record; to which the Judge answers: "In view of the many exceptions and instructions' useless in verbiage and trifling in repetition,' with which the counsel have encumbered the record, their attention is respectfully called to the celebrated decision of a beam against a mote, with which they are familiar." MALPRACTICE. A curious history is shown in Richards v. Willard, 176 Pa. St. 181. This was an action against a surgeon for malpractice in the gratuitous treatment, at a hospital, of an alleged fracture of the tibia. The first jury gave $5,512.50 damages evidently a quotient verdict. The second disagreed. The third awarded $12,000, although the plaintiff had asked for only $10,000, and the court reduced it to $4,000. On appeal from this a new trial was awarded. The court observed: "It must not be overlooked that the medical and surgical service rendered by the defendant to the plaintiff was entirely gratuitous, the defendant receiving therefor no compensation of any kind. For many years Dr. Willard had been rendering such service to the hospital to which the plaintiff was brought after receiving his injury. He was one of a corps of physicians who, from motives of benevolence and charity, contribute, as they do in many other cities and towns, their time, their skill, their labor, and their most valuable and humane service in relief of the sickness and suffering of their race. If such gentlemen are to be harrassed with actions for damages when they do not happen to cure a patient, and are to incur the hazard of having their estates swept away from them by the verdicts of irresponsible juries, who, caring nothing for law, nothing for evidence, nothing for justice, nothing for the plain teachings of common sense, choose to gratify their prejudices or their passions by plundering their fellow-citizens in the forms of law, it may well be doubted whether our hospitals and other charitable institutions will be able to obtain the gratuitous and valuable service of these unselfish and charitable men. It is much more than probable that if this plaintiff had been content to remain at the hospital a week or two longer he would have been cured of his hurt. Because he would not submit to such a reasonable detention he apparently brought upon himself all his subsequent sufferings. If he chooses to take snch risks he must take the consequences himself." head-note is as follows: "The plaintiff, being the only passenger in a street-car, became suddenly ill, told the conductor she felt sick, and twice requested him to stop the car so that she might get off. He failed to do so, and, going to the front of the car, began talking to the motorman. The plaintiff, growing worse, and becoming frightened and dazed, rose to her feet, and staggered towards the rear of the car, and there fell, unconscious, through the door. Held, that whether the plaintiff was guilty of negligence, whether the conductor was guilty of negligence, and whether the plaintiff's injuries were the natural and proximate consequence of the conductor's negligence, were all questions of fact for the jury." To this statement, perhaps, might well be added the fact that the plaintiff testified that her purpose in going to the rear of the car was to endeavor to get someone on the street to stop the car. Five of the judges of this numerous court dissented, but why, it is difficult to understand. The connection between the conductor's gross negligence and the plaintiff's conduct seems to us quite natural and reasonable. 1 AN ARCADIAN ELECTION. The account of the election at Lake Precinct is a breeze from Arcady,” says Hensha J., in Tebbe v. Smith, 108 Cal. 101; 49 Am. St. Rep. 68. This was a highly important contest. Smith had 13 votes, Tebbe 20, in this precinct, which was a ranch. The polls should have opened at sunrise, but did not until nearly 10 o'clock. At dinner time the officers adjourned and took the ballot-box with them to a house one hundred yards from the polling-place, and set it on the dining table while they dined with others. They left the ballots unpolled in the poll-room. The witness who gave this account testified that he served on the election board in my father's place." Nobody was deprived of his vote, but the Court felt constrained to throw out the vote of the precinct on account of the failure to open the polls at sunrise. This is certainly careful. MENTAL DISTRESS. The Texas doctrine that damages are recoverable for the non-delivery of a telegram received a set-back in the place of its origin, in Rowell v. Western U. Tel. Co., 75 Tex. 512. The plaintiff had received information of the dangerous illness of his mother-in-law. A subsequent dispatch, announcing her improved condition, was not delivered. The Court declined to allow for the continuance of the mental anxiety thus occasioned, on the ground that it would give rise to intolerable litigation." The action was by husband and wife, and the former estimated his distress at $100 and that of his wife $2400, which seems to be a reasonable apportion. PUBLISHED MONTHLY, AT $4.00 PER ANNUM. SINGLE NUMBERS, 50 CENTS. Communications in regard to the contents of the Magazine should be addressed to the Editor, HORACE W. FULLER, 15%1⁄2 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass. The Editor will be glad to receive contributions of articles of moderate length upon subjects of interest to the profession; also anything in the way of legal antiquities or curiosities, facetiæ, anecdotes, etc. FACETIE. "LAWYERS are a good deal like baseball players, after all." "How so?" “The ones that can't make a hit are put on the bench."-Ex. "YOUR honor," said a lawyer in a recent trial in England, “the argument of my learned friend is lighter than vanity. It is air; it is smoke. From top to bottom it is absolutely nothing. And therefore, your honor, it falls to the ground by its own weight." A GOOD story is related of a juryman who outwitted a judge, and that without lying. He ran into court in a desperate hurry, and quite out of breath, and exclaimed: — "Oh! Judge, if you can, pray excuse me. I don't know which will die first, my wife or my daughter." "Dear me, that's sad," said the innocent judge. "Certainly, you are excused." The next day the juryman was met by a friend, who, in a sympathetic voice, asked: dent of avoiding a rock to fall into the whirlpool, electrified judge and audience by telling the jury that the opposing counsel, "like the mariner of old, in avoiding 'Squealer' had run squarely into 'Cherrybobus. As the jury were not well acquainted with Scylla and Charybdis, his simile went down all right. IN the same State, up to 1868 many offenses were punishable by fine or whipping, at the discretion of the Court. Counsel at the Warren bar, who had his client convicted of a bad case of larceny, told the Court: "My client is a very poor man, and I hope no fine will be imposed. It will be really a punishment on his poor wife and children, who sadly need every dollar of his earnings. Let the punishment be placed on his back, as he alone is the offender, and he knows that he alone should, in justice, bear the punishment." The client nervously clutched his lawyer's coat-tail: "Good God, Mr. J————, don't talk so! It hurts my feelings to hear you.' A GOOD story is told of a couple of wagers in which Daniel Webster, Tazewell and Gen. Jackson's secretary of the navy were concerned, and of which the last named was the victim. The three were walking together on the north bank of the Potomac, and while Webster lingered a little in the rear, Tazewell offered to bet Branch a $10 hat that he could prove him to be on the other side of the river. "Done," said Branch. not being so advanced as the justice, held that the acknowledgment was wanting in all the substantial requirements of the statute respecting deeds of married women. IN the United States the names applied to lawyers are usually attorney and counselor-at-law. In Great Britain there are barristers-at-law who are counselors, learned in the laws, qualified and admitted to practice at the bar; solicitors who are Well," said Tazewell, pointing to the opposite attorneys, advocates or counselors-at-law who are shore, "isn't that one side of the river?" "Yes." authorized to practice in the English Court of Chancery; serjeants-at-law who are lawyers of the highest rank and answer to the doctor of the civil law; only after sixteen years of practice at the bar can one become a serjeant. Queen's counsel are eminent lawyers who are given by the government that title, and from their number all the judges are chosen. In Spain and countries settled by Spaniards the name is notary. In France the name is avocat. In ancient Rome the name was juris consultus, or in English, jurisconsult. CURRENT EVENTS. BARONESS HIRSCH has given twenty million dollars for the continuance of her late husband's labors for the emigration of poverty-stricken Jews from Russia to the Argentine Republic. ONE of the possible effects of the rise and rapid progress of the new woman is indicated in a certificate of acknowledgment found in an Illinois case, decided in 1872 (Board of Trustees v. Davison, 65 Ill. 124). A justice of the peace, in certifying the acknowledgment of a deed executed by husband and wife, after reciting the acknowledgment by the wife in due form, continued his certificate as follows: "And that said A., husband of said B., personally known to me, etc., and being examined. separate and apart, and out of the hearing of his said wife, and the contents being made known and fully explained to him, acknowledged said instrument to be his free act and deed; that he executed the same, and relinquished his dower, etc., voluntarily and freely, without the compulsion of his wife, and did not wish to retract." The Court, COMMENCING with January 1, 1897, the city of Glasgow, Scotland, will cease to levy taxes of any kind upon its citizens. The entire expenses of the city will be borne in future by the income from its public works. The city operates water-works, gas and electric light plants, street tramways, sewage farms and other institutions, and all pay large profits. A LONDON Company, known as the Hot Water Supply Syndicate, has been given a charter for the very latest in the line of penny-in-the-slot machines. It has been granted permission to erect, experimentally, a number of long columns and fittings for supplying hot water to the public at the rate of a halfpenny per gallon. The apparatus ingeniously uses the heat given off by the gas burned in the street lamps. The idea is said to have worked satisfactorily in Manchester, and for several years a similar apparatus has been working successfully in households. |