or even to a collection of individuals; it must be such a nuisance as to permanently impair the value of property, and by such impairment to inflict an injury upon the owner of such property for which he can have no adequate remedy at law. 'When the injury complained of is not, per se, a nuisance, but may or may not become so," says Mr. High, "and when it is uncertain, indefinite or contingent, or productive of only possible injury, equity will not interfere.” In the same line are the remarks of Mr. thing shall be a nuisance to some individual, Justice Baldwin in the case of Bonaparte v. Camden and Amboy Railroad Company (I Baldwin's Cir. R. 218) where he says: "There is no power, the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation, and sound discretion, or is more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuing an injunction. It is the strong arm of equity, that never ought to be extended, unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages. The right must be clear, the injury impending or threatening, so as to be averted only by the protecting preventive process of injunction." The right of the people "peaceably to assemble" (a right inherent in all governments in which the sovereignty rests in the people) being conceded, there are but two possible conditions which could justify the courts in resorting to the process of injunction the one to prevent their becoming a public nuisance by obstructing the highways to the exclusion of other persons, and the other to prevent such a permanent trespass as to constitute a private nuisance within the meaning of the law. So long as they were peaceably assembled they were within the special protection of the Constitution, and they had a perfect and inalienable right to the use of the highways in thus peaceably assembling, or in passing to or from such place of assembly, either singly or in a body as they might elect. The moment they ceased to be peaceable, that moment they passed beyond the jurisdiction of a court of equity, and came within the jurisdiction of the law, where each became answerable for his conduct to a jury of his peers, and not to the arbitrary will of a single judge. "The principles upon which this court. should proceed in granting or refusing relief by injunction in cases of this kind," says Chancellor Walworth in a quoted case, “are correctly laid down by Lord Brougham in the recent case of the Earl of Ripon v. Hobart (Cooper's Rep. Temp. Brougham, 333). If the thing sought to be prohibited is in itself a nuisance, the court will interfere to stay irreparable mischief, where the complainant's right is not doubtful, without waiting for the result of a trial. But where the thing sought to be restrained is not in itself noxious, but only something which may according to circumstances prove to be so, the court will refuse to interfere until the matter has been tried at law by an action." Again the same authority is quoted that "It is always to be borne in mind that the jurisdiction of this court over nuisances by injunction at all, is of recent growth, has not till very lately been much exercised, and has at various times found great reluctance on the part of learned judges to use it, even in cases where the thing or the act complained of was admitted to be directly and immediately hurtful to the plaintiff... also very material to observe, what is indeed strong authority of a negative kind, that no instance can be produced of the interposition by injunction in the case of what we have been regarding as eventual or contingent nuisance." It is It is necessary to a proper understanding of this question that we briefly consider what constitutes such a trespass, or such a nuisance, as to justify courts of equity in It is evident from these careful statements issuing injunctions. It is not enough that a¦ of learned judges in the decision of impor tant questions, that the peaceable assemblage of miners in the vicinity of the coal mines, in the hope of inducing their fellow-laborers to engage in a common cause for the promotion of their own interests, was not such a nuisance as to bring them within the jurisdiction of a court of equity, or to warrant the issuing of its process to restrain them from making use of the public highways in the promotion of their cause. We come, then, to the question of trespass, and upon this point the courts have been equally clear. They demand not only that a trespass shall be shown, but that it shall be of such a permanent nature, entailing actual irremediable damages, that the defendant may not be able to compensate for the loss. The mere encampment of a peaceable body of miners upon the surface of the ground owned or controlled by a corporation engaged in the mining of coal, while constituting a trespass, is not such a trespass as to justify a court of equity in issuing an injunction to restrain them from this action, because it cannot be shown that it is a direct injury to the property of the company any resulting damage is contingent, and not within the jurisdiction of the court under any fair construction of its powers, as understood and exercised for centuries. Therefore, while there can be no doubt as to the right of the court to issue an injunction, and to enforce it with the military power, restraining persons from interfering with the transportation of goods over the which would result in irreparable damage to interstate highways, the loss or delay of people in all parts of the country, or to the corporations engaged in such transportation, this action ought not to be allowed to become a precedent for interference for no other purpose than to prevent the possible commission of crimes. Crime is not within clusively to the law, and it is the high duty the jurisdiction of equity; it belongs exof good citizenship to demand that our courts shall be preserved in all of their oldtime integrity, and that they shall not be prostituted to the service of selfish interests in the suppression of honest, if misdirected, efforts to ameliorate the condition of the human race. TH A LEGAL RELIC. HE seal is perhaps the greatest relic of all our legal treasures of to-day. Its archetype must date with the first formation of society, more ancient than the prophets and the judges, more honorable than the oath and affirmation or any other custom which we practice and revere today. It appears concomitant with the first business transactions of mankind. Our first great book of precedents records that Judah, more than thirty-seven centuries ago, constantly carried his signet with him. (Gen. xxxviii, 18.) And it was an ordinary occurrence for Moses to affix his seal to doc to the whole Israelitish nation desired In re Jeremiah approaches the nearest day Jeremiah attests, for he says (verse 44) that "men shall buy fields for money and subscribe evidences and seal them, and take witnesses." But Israel has not the exclusive claim to the origin of the seal, for among the remains of Assyria, Babylon, Egypt, and all other eastern nations, seals abound. Little do we think, in the ordinary transactions of our offices, that some thousands of years hence some of them may be examined as historical curiosities. Just so when the heirs of Petepsais sold eight hundred cubits of vacant land near the city of Thebes to Neuchetes, in the reign of Cleopatra, one hundred and six years before Christ. Their sole thought doubtless was of the one talent of brass money, the consideration; but he who will may now examine the deed itself and its authenticating seal. Throughout the East every governor of a village has at this day his own private seal or signet with which he seals and authenticates his writings and decrees. From the East the use of the seal passed to Greece. Thence to Rome, where it was ordained that the seal be affixed to a thread drawn three times through holes perforated through the parchment. And they were held so sacred that counterfeiting them was punished by the most horrible penalty known to Roman Law. Tit. XVIII, §7.) (Justinian, Inst., Lib. 4; During the mediaval period, they were considered the main proof of the authenticity of all sorts of documents, both public and private. But coming to the land from which our law directly takes its rise, it appears that among the Saxons seals were not in general use. For the Saxon, to whom the pen was generally a stranger, smeared his right hand with ink and laid it upon the paper under the words, "Witness my hand." Then he Then he made the sign of the holy cross in black or gold, and a great number of witnesses attested his act. (Sheppard's Touchstone, 121.) Then came the Norman conqueror, and legislating his own customs upon his vanquished subjects, he decreed the use of the waxen seal in lieu of the manual daub and cross but not being in the least more scholarly than the Saxon, he impressed his signet. on the wax and said, "Witness my seal." So the phrase, "Witness my hand and seal," under which thousands now daily write their names, meant something then, though they are but hollow words now, in the use of which we pay unconscious tribute to our noble ancestor who used this form of attestation because it was the very best he could do. And the mark of the illiterate man is the Saxon sign of the holy cross. All our modern law on this subject issues from the opinion of the greatest legal dogmatist of English writers, Lord Coke, who in his third Institute established for centuries the great common law definition of a seal, viz., "wax with an impression." (3 Inst. 169.) But why this history? Merely to see for what reason this custom of sealing was introduced and revered so highly that to-day we are governed in many jurisdictions of this country by rules giving it an artificial character. It first began when king, prince, and peasant were alike illiterate. Somet means of identifying their execution of documents must be adopted, and in the multifariousness of designs which could be impressed on wax was their salvation; so that a seal came to be regarded as essential to a deed, while signing was not. (Sheppard's Touchstone, 121.) But great is precedent. And it has prevailed. vailed. So when ability to write became common, the courts dared not discard the seal, and being at a loss to ascribe sensible existing reasons therefor, have invented the fiction that the affixing of this attachment gives the document a certain solemnity and tends to excite caution in the illiterate. And since it must stand for something, they have attached to it the doctrine still followed nearly all over our broad land, that the consideration for a sealed instrument is conclusively to be presumed. Well did the court in Jones . Logwood (1 Washington Va., 42,) say that "there is neither an act of Parliament nor an adjudged case" to substantiate this position. "It was his (Lord Coke's) opinion, merely founded on the practice of that day, and if it gives a binding rule, we may, by going further back, discover a period of time when the impression was made with the eye tooth. There was some utility in that custom, since the tooth impressed was the man's own, and furnished a test in case of forgery. But both are founded on the usage of the time." Justice, however, became bound and fettered. Then the harshness of the convention became apparent, and one by one the perquisites of this so-called "solemn" piece of impressed wax have been taken away. Its conclusiveness has been lost in Equity. Its distinctiveness faded when many were permitted to use the same design, and vanished with the adoption at a later day of the words of Baron Clark, who thought that "twentie men may seal with one seal . . . upon one piece of wax onely." (1 Leonard, Pt. 2, P. 21.) The learned baron was in the minority of the court in 1659, though unknown to him he was supported by Justinian. (Inst., Lib. 11; Tit. x. 5.) He would have added a row of curls to his wig if he knew how the world was to come to his opinion. Later, the necessary impression has become so slight that a Supreme Court in banc seriously declared that, in the case of our little piece of paper with scalloped edges, the act of causing cohesion made "a sufficient impression to comply with the requirements of the law." (33 Mo. 35-) Lo! the iconoclast has been studying iconography. The seal has seen it and shuddered. Ever and anon it has parted with the variegated and distinctive garments which are its ancient heritage; for from time immemorial it has been the object of the keenest scrutiny and the subject of the most searching criticism, of the profoundest judicial reasoning, and of refinement of distinctions. But the iconoclast has found it and it is doomed. It is such unhealthy growths upon the body of the law which give irrefutable occasion for the contemptuous remarks of laymen. And when by skillful surgery we remove these excrescences which burden the law but do not benefit it, its devotees will value it more, and the public will value it more, because divested of refinements that impede the righteous administration of jus tice. Soon may we have occasion in every state to carve that epitaph which may be found in Mississippi, "Beneath this lies all that remains of Locus Sigilli, a character of ancient date, whose mission was to give peculiar solemnity to documents. Emigrating to this state in its earliest days, he served his day and generation to a good old age. and was gathered to his fathers, generally mourned by the members of the legal profession. He has left surviving only one relative, who is now in the keeping of corporations. His last request was that his epitaph should be epitaph should be under seal." seal." (Miss. Anno. Code, Ch. 40, Note. [4079]) LONDON LEGAL LETTER. London, Nov. 1, 1897. THE manner of making judges in England must be a matter in which lawyers in America are deeply interested. To begin with, there are, not counting the law lords of the House of Lords, no less than twenty-nine judges of the High Court of Justice. At the head of this large staff is the Lord Chancellor, who has a salary of $50,000 a year. Next comes the Lord Chief Justice with a salary of $40,000, and after him the Master of the Rolls with a salary of $30,000; then there are five judges of the Court of Appeal, who receive $25,000 each. The puisne judges are five chancery justices and fourteen Queen's bench justices, and there are two judges of the probate, divorce and admiralty division. All of these judges receive $25,000 each. As all of these appointments, except that of the Lord Chancellor, are for life, and any of the judges may retire after fifteen years' service on a pension of two-thirds of the salary, there are therefore no less than thirty very large plums within the reach of the practicing members of the bar, from whom alone these appointments can be made, for no member of the solicitors' branch of the profession is eligible for promotion to the bench. Besides these large-salaried officials, there is an attorney general who receives a salary and fees, and a solicitor general who is compensated in like manner. Last year the attorney general's combined income from salary and fees amounted to over $65,000, and that of the solicitor general to over $41,000. These law officers must also be barristers, no solicitor being within the range of appointment to these distinguished and lucrative posi tions. All of these appointments are part of the patronage of the Lord Chancellor. Theoretically and practically, in the majority of cases, the vacancies on the bench are filled by promotion from the ranks of the leaders of the bar, those who have earned the right to selection by large experience in the trial of cases and general fitness and position. The Lord Chancellor is the only one of the judges who is not appointed for life, he coming in and going out with every change in the politics of the ministry. Naturally he selects for appointment to the bench one of his own party, but it not infrequently happens, to the great credit of the system, that a lawyer of eminence at the bar of the opposite party is promoted over the head of a partisan of the ministry. Within the past fortnight no less than six appointments have been made to the bench, a greater number than has occurred within the same space of time for many years. First Mr. Justice Cave resigned, and before his resignation took effect he died. To fill the vacancy on the Queen's bench the Lord Chancellor appointed Mr. Bigham, Q. C., who for twenty years has been a leader of the Northern Circuit and more recently of that branch of the High Court to which is assigned the trial of purely commercial cases. This was the beginning of the judicial changes, for Mr. Bigham's appointment was hardly announced before Lord Esher, the Master of the Rolls, who for thirty years has occupied a conspicuous position on the English bench, resigned, closely followed by his friend, Lord Justice Lopes of the Court of Appeal, upon his elevation to the peerage as Lord Ludlow. As the Master of the Rolls is ex officio president of the Court of Appeal, two vacancies were thus created. These were filled by the promotions of Mr. Justice Henn Collins from the Queen's bench, and Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams from the Bankruptcy branch of the Queen's Bench Court, two of the ablest of the puisne judges. To fill their places two new Queen's bench judges have been selected from the bar Mr. Darling, Q.C., and Mr. Channell, Q.C. The latter is an able and skillful lawyer, and his appointment has been received with general approbation; but the former owes his new and responsible position to political influence as he has had but little practice, although having been at the bar for nearly thirty years. The fact that only one out of six appointees to judicial positions by the Lord Chancellor is open to the charge of political favor speaks well for the system and to the strong control which is exercised over the ministry by public opinion. Unfortunately there have been other appointments within a comparatively recent date which have been severely criticised, and there are now four judges on the bench whose selection has unquestionably been dictated by political pressure. Still, four out of twenty-nine is a small proportion, and the bench as now constituted is quite up to the average. It is a matter of congratulation that the appointees have no participation in politics and that once appointed they endeavor to live up to the high traditions of the English judiciary. In a recent letter I referred to the recently enacted Employers' Liability Act. The provisions of that law, so far as the scale and conditions of compensation are concerned, are strikingly at variance with recent findings of juries in the United States, particularly in the West. It is provided by the Act that where death results from the injury if the workman leaves anyone wholly dependent upon his earnings the compensation shall be a sum equal to his earnings during the three years next preceding the injury which resulted in his death, but not exceeding in any case £300, or $1500. If the workman does not leave anyone wholly, but only in part, dependent upon his earnings, then the amount payable shall be such sum not exceeding £300 as may be agreed upon or may be determined upon by arbitration. In case he leaves no dependents, the employer shall pay the reasonable expenses of his medical attendance and his burial, not exceeding £10. Where the injury is not fatal, but results in total or partial incapacity for work, the injured man's compensation is a weekly payment during the incapacity not exceeding fifty per cent of his average weekly earnings during the previous twelve months, but such weekly payment is not to exceed one pound. In fixing this amount, regard shall be had to the difference between the amount of the average weekly earnings before the accident and the average amount which the injured man may be able to earn after the accident, and also to any payment other than wages which he may receive from his employer in respect of his injury during the period of his incapacity. To prevent fraud upon the employer, the Act provides that |