Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes, Svazek 143Harvard University Press, 1974 - Počet stran: 221 Market signaling, a phrase formulated by Mr. Spence, means the activities and characteristics of individuals which are visible to somebody else and convey information in a market, such as the job market. This study attempts to explain the informational content of market signals. |
Obsah
Introduction | 1 |
Appendices | 4 |
Job Market Signaling | 5 |
Autorská práva | |
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Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related ..., Svazek 143 Michael Spence Zobrazení fragmentů - 1974 |
Běžně se vyskytující výrazy a sousloví
active signaling allocation assumed assumption average blacks characteristics competitive conditional distribution conditional probability conspicuous consumption context convex set cooperative game decisions defined depend differential signaling costs discrimination education costs effective signal efficiency employer employer's beliefs equi equilib equilibrium configurations example expected fact Figure firm function George Stigler given guarantee Hence high-productivity hiring II.b income individual informational structure institution invest job market signaling K₁ labor market level of education librium loan lottery marginal product market data market equilibrium market signaling game multiple equilibria naling negatively correlated no-signaling observable offered wage schedule optimal choice overinvestment perfect information ployer possible potential signals prerequisite problem productive capabilities Proposition q₁ race random risk-aversion rium score screening seller signaling activity signaling equilibrium signaling system situation statistical discrimination suppressing Thomas Schelling tion tive tivity unalterable variance-covariance matrix wage differentials Zvi Griliches
Bibliografické údaje
| Název | Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes, Svazek 143 Harvard economic studies – Vydání 143, ISSN 0073-0505 Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes, Andrew Michael Spence |
| Autoři | Andrew Michael Spence, Michael Spence |
| Vydání | ilustrované vydání, dotisk |
| Vydavatel | Harvard University Press, 1974 |
| ISBN | 0674549902, 9780674549906 |
| Délka | Počet stran: 221 |
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