Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes, Svazek 143Harvard University Press, 1974 - Počet stran: 221 Market signaling, a phrase formulated by Mr. Spence, means the activities and characteristics of individuals which are visible to somebody else and convey information in a market, such as the job market. This study attempts to explain the informational content of market signals. |
Obsah
Introduction | 1 |
Job Market Signaling | 5 |
Education as a Signal | 14 |
Autorská práva | |
Další části 20 nejsou zobrazeny.
Další vydání - Zobrazit všechny
Běžně se vyskytující výrazy a sousloví
absolute advantage allocation assumed assumption average blacks characteristics competitive conditional distribution conditional probability conspicuous consumption consumption good industry convex set decisions defined depend differential signaling costs discrimination education costs educational signaling effective signal efficiency employer employer's beliefs equi equilib equilibrium configurations example fact Figure firm function George Stigler given guarantee Hence high-productivity hiring income indices individual informational structure invest K₁ labor market librium lottery marginal product market data market equilibrium market signaling game Markov chain Michael Spence multiple equilibria naling negatively correlated no-signaling observable offered wage schedule optimal choice overinvestment perfect information person of type ployer possible potential signals problem productive capabilities Proof Proposition race random risk-aversion rium score seller signaling activity signaling equilibrium signaling model signaling system situation static model Thomas Schelling tion tive unalterable variance-covariance matrix w₁ wage differentials Zvi Griliches

