in the highest degree censurable if he had not taken every proper precaution to prepare for the event which the reports of the disturbance on the Isthmus suggested. He was bound to carry out the provisions of the treaty of 1846. We have always construed that treaty to mean that we were charged with the responsibility of keeping open the transit across the Isthmus; that we were not charged with the duty of enforcing the power of Colombia if there was a revolt; that we were there to protect it against foreign aggression, but that our primary duty was to keep it open and uninterrupted.

All this information had come in upon the President, and he had as in duty bound considered it and watched events. Finally there came what constitutes the first act of our Government. There came news that Colombia was about to land a force of 6,000 men at Colon, and the Acting Secretary of the Navy on November 2 sent this dispatch:

"Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption threatened by armed force, occupy the line of railroad. Prevent landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either Government * or insurgent, either at Colon, Porto Bello, or other point. Send copy of instructions to the senior officer present at Panama upon arrival of Boston. Have sent copy of instructions and have, telegraphed Dixie to proceed with all possible dispatch from Kingston to Colon. Government force reported approaching the Isthmus in vessels. Prevent their landing if in your judgment this would precipitate a conflict. Acknowledgment is required."

That was the first step. The next day, November 3, a press bulletin having announced an outbreak on the Isthmus, the Acting Secretary of State telegraphed to the consul at Panama:

"Uprising on Isthmus reported. Keep Department promptly and fully informed."

The reply goes back that there was no uprising, that it was expected that night. Within a short time, a little more than an hour, came the dispatch:

"Uprising occurred to-night, 6; no bloodshed," etc.

We The land

Mr. President, the preparations that have been very largely talked about, and which I have no doubt were adequately made, really resulted in the presence of one vessel of war at Colon. landed from that vessel forty-two sailors and marines. ing party was commanded with judgment. The captain of the Nashville showed the utmost discretion and firmness. He prevented with an even hand either party from using the railroad. He prevented bloodshed. He kept peace on the Isthmus.

Now, Mr. President, the President has been assailed for landing troops. He has landed no troops. Some sailors and some marines have been landed, and he has been charged with having made war by that act of recognition and by the landing of the forces of the United States.

It is perfectly certain. Mr. President, that the act of recognition by all the best authorities is held not to be in itself an act of war. As for the landing of those sailors and marines to keep order, we have done it over and over again. We did it in 1900; we did it in 1901; we did it in 1902.

*

The United States recognized Panama on November 13, then France, China, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Denmark, Russia, Sweden and Norway, Belgium, Nicaragua, Peru, Cuba, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Costa Rica, and Switzerland.

List of Governments which have recognized the independence of Panama with dates of recognition:

Those recognitions indicate that the rest of the civilized world do not think it was a very unreasonable thing for us to have recognized that new Republic quickly.

"The Panama Canal."

[Extracts from an address by Hon. Elihu Root, at Chicago, February 22, 1904, printed in Congressional Record, June, 1904.]

Reluctantly, and with a sense that it was unjust exaction, the United States agreed to pay $10,000,000 down, and $250,000 per annum in perpetuity-substantially the entire amount exacted by Columbia. We were not going into the enterprise to make money, but for the common good. We did not expect the revenues of the canal to repay its cost, or to receive any benefit from it, except that which Colombia would share to a higher degree than our

The concessions made in the treaty to the Government of Colombia, however, seemed merely to inspire in that Government a belief that there was no limit to the exactions which they could successfully impose. They demanded a further $10,000,000 from the Panama Canal Company, and upon its refusal they rejected the treaty.

This rejection was a substantial refusal to permit the canal to be built. It appears that the refusal contemplated not merely further exactions from us, but the spoliation of the canal company. That company's current franchise was limited by its terms to the 31st day of October, 1904. There was an extension for six years granted by the President and for which the company had paid 5,000,000 francs. These patriots proposed to declare the extension void and the franchise ended and to confiscate the $40,000,000 worth of property of the company and take from the United States for themselves, in payment for it, the $40,000,000 we had agreed to pay the company.

*

By becoming a party to this scheme we might indeed have looked forward to the time when, the appetite of Columbia being satisfied at the expense of the unfortunate stockholders of the French company, we could proceed with the work, but such a course was too repugnant to the sense of justice that obtains in every civilized community to be for a moment contemplated. We had yielded to the last point beyond reason and justice in agreeing to pay for a privilege to which we were already entitled, and we could not with self-respect submit to be mulcted further. We could negotiate no further. Rejection of the treaty was practically a veto of the canal.

* * *

These were the conditions existing when the revolution of November 3 happened. To an understanding of that revolution a knowledge of the character and history of Panama is essential. Some uninformed persons have assumed that it was merely a number of individual citizens of Colombia living in the neighborhood of the proposed canal who combined to take possession of that part of Colombian territory and set up a government of their own. No conception could be more inadequate. The sovereign State of Panama was an organized civil society possessed of a territory extending over 400 miles in length, from Costa Rica on the west to the mainland of South America on the east. It had a population of over 300,000.

* * *

The people of Panama were the real owners of the canal route; it was because their fathers dwelt in the land, because they won their independence from Spain, because they organized a civil society there, that it was not to be treated as one of the waste places of the earth. They owned that part of the earth's surface just as much as the State of New York owns the Erie Canal. When the sovereign State of Panama confederated itself with the other States of Colombia under the constitution of 1863 it did not part with its title or its substantial rights, but constituted the Federal Government its trustee for the representation of its rights in all foreign relations and imposed upon that Government the duty of protecting them. The trustee was faithless to its trust; it repudiated its obligations without the consent of the true owner; it seized by the strong hand of military power the rights which it was bound to protect; Colombia itself broke the bonds of union and destroyed the compact upon which alone depended its right to represent the owner of the soil.

The question for the United States was, Shall we take this treaty from the true owner or shall we take it from the faithless trustee, and for that purpose a third time put back the yoke of foreign domination upon the neck of Panama, by the request of that Government which has tried to play toward us the part of the highwayman? There was no provision of our treaty with Columbia which required us to answer to her call, for our guaranty of her sovereignty in that treaty relates solely to foreign aggression. There was no rule of international law which required us to recognize the wrongs of Panama or the justice of her cause, for international law does not concern itself with the internal affairs of state. But I put it to the conscience of the American people, who are passing judgment upon the action of their government, whether the decision of our President and Secretary of State and Senate was not a righteous decision.

By all the principles of justice among men and among nations that we have learned from our fathers, and all peoples and all governments should maintain, the revolutionists in Panama were right, the people of Panama were entitled to be free again, the Isthmus was theirs, and they were entitled to govern it; and it would have been a shameful thing for the Government of the United States to return them again to servitude.

It is hardly necessary to say now that our Government had no part in divising, fomenting, or bringing about the revolution on the Isthmus of Panama. President Roosevelt said in his message to Congress of January 4, 1904:

"I hesitate to refer to the injurious insinuations which have been made of complicity by this Government in the revolutionary movement in Panama. They are as destitute of foundation as of propriety. The only excuse for my mentioning them is the fear lest unthinking persons might mistake for acquiescence the silence of mere self-respect. I think proper to say, therefore, that no one connected with this Government had any part in preparing, inciting, or encouraging the late revolution on the Isthmus of Panama, and that, save from the reports of our naval and military officers, given above, no one connected with this Government had any previous knowledge of the revolution except such as was accessible to any person of ordinary intelligence who read the newspapers and kept up a current acquaintance with public affairs."

} The people of the United States, without distinction of party, will give to that statement their unquestioning belief.

"The Panama Question Transcends the Narrow Bounds of Party."

[Extract from remarks of Hon. C. W. Fairbanks of Indiana, in daily Congressional Record, February 2, 1904.]

There are several conclusions which the record seems to establish. They may be summarized thus:

The revolution of the people of Panama was due to a long series of wrongs inflicted upon them by the Government at Bogota, and more particularly to the rejection of the Hay-Herran treaty.

The revolution was initiated by the people of Panama and was not inspired by the United States.

It was the duty of the President to adopt such measures as he deemed necessary to preserve the freedom of transit across the Isthmus and to protect the lives and property of American citizens, and of citizens of other countries upon the line of transit.

The independence of Panama was accomplished by the people of the Isthmus.

There was no vessel or armed force of the United States at the city of Panama, and only one vessel, the Nashville, third rate, at Colon; only 42 marines were landed at Colon. They were landed to protect the lives of American citizens who were in serious and imminent peril and were returned to the ship after accomplishing their purpose.

The President recognized the fact that Panama had secured her independence three days after the revolution.

In recognizing the independence of the new Republic the President acted solely within his constitutional rights. The duty of recognition rested upon him, and having exercised it his act became binding upon the United States.

The independence of the Republic of Panama was recognized by France and many other powers soon after recognition by the United States.

Within eight days after the recognition of the new Republic she signed a treaty with the United States, through here accredited minister to Washington, granting to the United States the requisite concessions for an isthmian canal.

When the Republic of Panama concluded the treaty with the United States she was in the exercise of sovereign power. She was discharging fully her domestic and international functions and had full capacity to enter into a valid convention with the United States.

Under the treaty of 1846 the United States obtained rights and incurred obligations in Panama. She obtained the right of free transit across the Isthmus and the right to preserve the freedom of such transit. She also guaranteed in consideration of this right and other privileges the sovereignty of the government in Panama. By the transfer of sovereignty upon the Isthmus to the Republic of Panama, the obligation to guarantee her sovereignty against foreign aggression rests upon the United States.

If the new treaty with the Republic of Panama is ratified by the Senate, the United States will obtain adequate concessions, rights, and privileges for the construction and perpetual maintenance of an isthmian canal.

Mr. President, I have endeavored to consider only the more salient features of the Panama question, and those which appear to me to be controlling. Much more might be said, but there would appear to be little profit in unduly prolonging the discussion. In one form or another the isthmian canal question has been under consideration for several centuries. The time for decisive action has come. We have but to call the roll of the Senate upon the treaty with Panama and we will instantly set in motion the machinery which will soon accomplish the great desire.

Others have said that this is an American question, and so it is. It transcends the narrow bounds of party. It is as wide as the ample limits of the Republic.

Who doubts in the present condition of affairs that the Panama Canal will be built? It will have back of it the best pledge any vast undertaking can have, for it will have the assurance of the United States. What we say for and against it will swiftly fade away and be gone forever, but the canal-the rich fruit of four centuries of hope and human effort, the colossal tribute of our people to the commerce of the world-will stand. Yes, we can well believe that it will survive the pyramids.

"Panama—The Insinuations of Complicity are Destitute of Foun

dation."

[Extract from message of President Roosevelt, in daily Congressional Record, January 4, 1904.]

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I lay before the Congress for its information a statement of my action up to this time in executing the act entitled "An act to provide for the construction of a canal connecting the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans," approved June 28, 1902.

By the said act the President was authorized to secure for the United States the property of the Panama Canal Company and the perpetual control of a strip six miles wide across the Isthmus of Panama. It was further provided that "should the President be

unable to obtain for the United States a satisfactory title to the property of the New Panama Canal Company and the control of the necessary territory of the Republic of Colombia

within a reasonable time and upon reasonable terms, then the President" should endeavor to provide for a canal by the Nicaragua route.

* * *

When this Government submitted to Colombia the Hay-Herran treaty three things were, therefore, already settled. One was that the canal should be built. * * * Second. While it was settled that the canal should be built without unnecessary or improper delay, it was no less clearly shown to be our purpose to deal not merely in a spirit of justice but in a spirit of generosity with the people through whose land we might build it. * * * Third. Finally the Congress definitely settled where the canal was to be built. It was provided that a treaty should be made for building the canal across the Isthmus of Panama; and if, after reasonable time, it proved impossible to secure such treaty, that then we should go to Nicaragua. * * *

When in August it began to appear probable that the Columbian Legislature would not ratify the treaty, it became incumbent upon me to consider well what the situation was and to be ready to advise the Congress as to what were the various alternatives of action open to us. There were several possibilities. One was that Colombia would at the last moment see the unwisdom of her position. * * A second alternative was that by the close of the session on the last day of October, without the ratification of the treaty by Colombia and without any steps taken by Panama, the American Congress on assembling early in November would be confronted with a situation in which there had been a failure to come to terms as to building the canal along the Panama route, and yet there had not been a lapse of a reasonable time-using the word reasonable in any proper sense-such as would justify the Administration going to the Nicaragua route. * * A third possibility was that the people of the Isthmus, who had formerly constituted an independent state, and who until recently were united to Colombia only by a loose tie of federal relationship. might take the protection of their own vital interests into their own hands, reassert their former rights, declare their independence upon just grounds, and establish a government competent and willing to do its share in this great work for civilization. This third possibility is what actually occurred. Everyone knew that it was a possibility, but it was not until towards the end of October that it appeared to be an imminent probability. Although the Administration, of course, had special means of knowledge, no such means were necessary in order to appreciate the possibility, and toward the end of the likelihood, of such a revolutionary outbreak and of its success. It was a matter of common notoriety. Quotations from the daily papers could be indefinitely multiplied to show this state of affairs. * * *

*

In view of all these facts I directed the Navy Department to issue instructions such as would insure our having ships within easy reach of the Isthmus in the event of need arising. * On November 2 when, the Colombian Congress having adjourned, it was evident that the outbreak was imminent, and when it was announced that both sides were making ready forces whose meeting would mean bloodshed and disorder, the Colombian troops having been embarked on vessels, the following instructions were sent to the commanders of the Boston, Nashville, and Dixie:

"Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption is threatened by armed force, occupy the line of railroad. Prevent landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either Government or insurgent, at any point within 50 miles of Panama. Government force reported approaching the Isthmus in vessels. Prevent their landing if, in your judgment, the landing would precipitate a conflict."

These orders were delivered in pursuance of the policy on which our Government had repeatedly acted.

* * *

On November 3 Commander Hubbard responded to the abovequoted telegram of November 2, 1903, saying that before the telegram had been received 400 Columbian troops from Cartagena had landed at Colon; that there had been no revolution on the Isthmus, but that the situation was most critical if the revolutionary leaders should act. On this same date the Associated Press in Washington received a bulletin stating that a revolutionary outbreak had occurred. When this was brought to the attention of the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Loomis, he prepared the following cablegram to the consul-general at Panama and the consul at Colon:

"Uprising on Isthmus reported. Keep Department promptly and fully informed."

Before this telegram was sent, however, one was received from Consul Malmros at Colon, running as follows:

"Revolution imminent. Government force on the Isthmus about 500 men. Their official promised to support revolution. Fire department, Panama, 441, are well organized and favor revolution. Government vessel Cartagena, with about 400 men, arrived early to-day with new commander-in-chief, Tobar. Was not expected until November 10. Tobar's arrival is not probable to stop revolution."

This cablegram was received at 2:35 p. m., and at 3:40 p. m. Mr. Loomis sent the telegram which he had already prepared to both Panama and Colon. Apparently, however, the consul-general at Panama had not received the information embodied in the Associated Press bulletin, upon which the Assistant Secretary of State based his dispatch; for his answer was that there was no uprising,

although the situation was critical, this answer being received at 8:15 p. m. Immediately afterwards he sent another dispatch, which was received at 9.50 p. m., saying that the uprising had occurred, and had been successful, with no bloodshed. The Columbian gunboat Bogota next day began to shell the city of Panama, with the result of killing one Chinaman. The consul-general was directed to notify her to stop firing. Meanwhile, on November 4, Commander Hubbard notified the Department that he had landed a force to protect the lives and property of American citizens against the threats of the Colombian soldiery.

Before any step whatever had been taken by the United States troops to restore order, the commander of the newly landed Colombian troops had indulged in wanton and violent threats against American citizens, which created serious apprehension. As commander Hubbard reported in his letter of November 5, this officer and his troops practically began war against the United States, and only the forbearance and coolness of our officers and men prevented bloodshed.

*

*

This plain official account of the occurrences of November 4, shows that, instead of there having been too much provision by the American Government for the maintenance of order and the protection of life and property on the Isthmus, the orders for the movement of the American war ships had been too long delayed; so long, in fact, that there were but forty-two marines and sailors available to land and protect the lives of American men and women. It was only the coolness and gallantry with which this little band of men wearing the American uniform faced ten times their number of armed foes, bent on carrying out the atrocious threat of the Colombian commander, that prevented a murderous catastrophe. At Panama, when the revolution broke out, there was no American man-of-war and no American troops or sailors. At Colon, Commander Hubbard acted with entire impartialty toward both sides, preventing any movement, whether by the Colombians or the Panamans, which would tend to produce bloodshed. On November 9 he prevented a body of the revolutionists from landing at Colon. Throughout he behaved in the most creditable

manner.

*

*

I hesitate to refer to the injurious insinuations which have been made of complicity by this Government in the revolutionary movement in Panama. They are as desitute of foundation as of propriety. The only excuse for my mentioning them is the fear lest unthinking persons might mistake for acquiescence the silence of mere self-respect. I think proper to say, therefore, that no one connected with this Government had any part in preparing, inciting, or encouraging the late revolution on the Isthmus of Panama, and that save from the reports of our military and naval officers given above, no one connected with this Government had any previous knowledge of the revolution except such as was accessible to any person of ordinary intelligence who read the newspapers and kept up a current acquaintance with public affairs. By the unanimous action of its people, without the firing of a shot-with a unanimity hardly before recorded in any similar case -the people of Panama declared themselves an independent Republic. Their recognition by this Government was based upon a state of facts in no way dependent for its justification upon our action in ordinary cases. I have not denied, nor do I wish to deny, either the validity or the propriety of the general rule that a new state should not be recognized as independent till it has shown its ability to maintain its independence. This rule is derived from the prnciple of non-intervention, and as a corollary of that principle has generally been observed by the United States. But, like the principle from which it is deduced, the rule is subject to exceptions; and there are in my opinion clear and imperative reasons why a departure from it was justified and even required in the present instance. These reasons embrace, first, our treaty rights; second, our national interests and safety; and, third, the interests of collective civilization.

*

*

That our position as the mandatary of civilization has been by no means misconceived is shown by the promptitude with which the powers have, one after another, followed our lead in recognizing Panama as an independent State. Our action in recognizing the new Republic has been followed by like recognition on the part of France, Germany, Denmark, Russia, Sweden and Norway, Nicaragua, Peru, China, Cuba, Great Britain, Italy, Costa Rica, Japan, and Austria-Hungary.

The man who tills his own farm, whether on the prairie or in the woodland, the man who grows what we eat and the raw material which is worked up into what we wear, still exists more nearly under the conditions which obtained when the "embattled farmers" of '76 made this country a nation than is true of any others of our people.-President Roosevelt at Sioux Falls, S. Dak., April 6, 1903.

We are not disposed to disturb the international peace, and we do not seek to interfere with the domestic affairs of other powers. While we are obliged to play a greater part in the affairs of the world than when Washington spoke, there is the same good reason for avoiding entangling alliances as then.-Hon. C. W. Fairbanks, at anniversary of Battle of Monmouth, Freehold, N. J., June 27, 1903.