has ever exported so much as one billion dollars' value of domestic products in a single year. Let us see, then, what the effect of protection has been upon sales abroad by the United States and Germany, the world's most conspicuous examples of protectivetariff countries, as compared with the effect of free trade upon exports from the United Kingdom, the world's most marked example of low-tariff countries. The Statistical Abstract, above re ferred to, compiled from the official figures of the countries in question and issued by the Bureau of Statistics, shows that the exports of domestic products from free-trade United Kingdom grew from 1,085 million dollars in 1880 to 1,380 millions in 1902, an increase of 28 per cent; while those from protection Germany grew from 688 millions in 1880 to 1,113 millions in 1902, an increase of 62 per cent; and those from protection United States grew from 824 millions in 1880 to 1,355 millions in 1902, an increase of 64 per cent. In other words, exports from the world's greatest example of free trade the United Kingdomincreased 28 per cent in 22 years; those from protection Germany increased 62 per cent, and those from protection United States increased 64 per cent in the same period. This certainly does not justify the assertion that other countries discriminate against and reject the merchandise of the country having protective tariff laws and favor that of countries having free trade.

While of course the general law of supply and demand influences in a greater or less degree the volume of exports from year to year, the experiences above cited are sufficient to clearly indicate that the existence of a protective duty on imports does not result in an exclusion of our exports by other countries, since our exports have increased enormously during the operation of protective tariff laws.

EXPORTS UNDER THE UNITED STATES TARIFF.

Another and even more striking illustration of the growth of exports under low tariff and protection, respectively, is found in a study of the detailed history of the tariffs and export trade of the United States. The only protective tariffs which the United States had prior to 1861 operated during the years 1813-16, 1825-33, and 1843-46, an aggregate of 17 years prior to 1861. Since that time protective tariffs have covered the years 1861-94 and 1897-1903, making the total of the period covered by protective tariffs 58 years, against 57 years of low tariff, counting the formative period from 1790 to 1812 as low tariff. Thus the history of the United States under the Constitution is about evenly divided between protective tariff and low tariff. Now, let us see the result in its effect upon our exports during those two great periods of protection and low tariff-58 years of protection and 57 years of low tariff. During the 57 years of low tariff the imports exceeded the exports by $514,954,931; during the 58 years of protective tariffs the exports exceeded the imports by $4,099,026,861. These statements are compiled from official reports of the United States Bureau of Statistics, and their accuracy can not be called into question. During 57 years of low tariffs imports exceeded exports by 514 million dollars; during 58 years of protection exports exceeded imports by 4,099 millions. Does this look as though protective tariffs had the effect of reducing or destroying the export trade?

To sum up these official statements of exportation under low tariffs and protective tariffs-the statements being in every case from the official records of the country in question-it may be said that exports from the United Kingdom under free trade increased 28 per cent from 1880 to 1902; while those from Germany and the United States, under protection, increased 62 per cent and 64 per cent, respectively, in the same period, and that in the history of the United States, under the present form of government, 57 years of free trade gave an excess of imports over exports amounting to 514 million dollars, and 58 years of protection gave an excess of exports over imports amounting to. 4,099 million dollars. This is the practical test, the "proof of the pudding in the eating," and should put an end forever to the assertion that protection destroys or injures the foreign markets of the country adopting it. Of the 57 years of low tariff, 47 show an

excess of imports over exports, while of the 58 years of protective tariff, 33 show an excess of exports over imports. A table printed on page 62, compiled from the official reports of the Treasury Department and the Department of Commerce and Labor, shows the years in which low and protective tariffs, respectively, were in operation, and the excess of imports or exports in each year, also the total excess of exports under low and protective tariffs, respectively.

Is There Danger of European Combinations Against the United States on Account of Our Tariff?

Statements have been made from time to time that European countries were likely, by reason of the high protective tariff in the United States, to enter into an agreement for the exclusion of our products from their markets. This assertion has been made over and over again for years, but more especially in comparatively recent years. But such action seems highly improbable, for the following reasons: 1. The countries in which these threats of retaliation are most frequently heard are themselves, in all cases except the United Kingdom, protective-tariff countries, and it is unlikely that they would seriously and through official action complain of a protective tariff established in any other country. 2. The European countries can not afford to exclude our staple products, which are required in such large quantities by their people and which would advance in price in their markets if the supply from the world's largest producer were cut off. 3. The exclusion of these necessary products from the United States would necessitate their importation from other countries, and by reducing the supplies in these other countries would make markets for our products in those countries drawn upon or in other countries from which they had been accustomed to draw their supplies. 4. Experiments of this kind for the exclusion of our meats from certain European countries have not resulted in a reduction of our total exports of meats and other provisions. 5. The countries which have complained most bitterly of the tariff of the United States have steadily and rapidly increased their impor'tations of our products meantime. 6. During the very period in which the talk of exclusion from European countries of American manufactures have been made, our exports of manufactures to those countries have most rapidly increased.

As to the first proposition, it is from the European countries that the threats of retaliation against the protective-tariff laws of the United States are most frequently heard. Yet all of the leading countries of Europe, with the exception of the United Kingdom, have within comparatively recent years adopted protective-tariff systems and in most cases are now increasing or proposing to increase their rates of duty for the avowed purpose of making their tariffs more thoroughly protective. In the case of the United Kingdom, the only European country of importance not having a protective tariff, the adoption of a protective system is being strongly urged. It seems highly improbable that a country officially adopting a tariff system with the explicit purpose of protecting its own industries would complain of like action on the part of any other country, even if the rates which that country imposes were higher than those which it imposes.

RETALIATION A BOOMERANG.

The European countries in question are large consumers of the great products of the United States-cotton, wheat, corn, meats, and other forms of provisions-as well as of manufacturés. The United States is the world's largest producer of every one of these articles. She produces three-fourths of the cotton of the world; three-fourths of its corn; three-fifths of the wheat entering the European markets from extra-European countries; and twofifths of the meats which enter into international commerce. The European countries, with possibly one or two exceptions, do not produce a sufficient supply of these articles for their respective home markets. They must buy them in large quantities from some other part of the world. One important effect of excluding from their markets the products of the world's principal source of these various articles must be to increase in their home markets the prices of those articles. If through concerted action by these countries three-fourths of the world's supply of cotton (pro

duced in the United States) were excluded from their markets naturally the price for the remaining one-fourth of the world's cotton, wherever produced, would advance greatly, and this principle would apply in the exclusion of any of the great products of which the United States exports a sufficiently large percentage to make absence of its product a factor in determining prices. Imagine the effect upon the price of wheat if three-fifths of the extra-European supply for European markets were destroyed in a single hour or day. Imagine the effect upon prices of meats if 40 per cent of the world's available supply for the international trade were wiped out of existence. Note the effect upon the price of cotton due to a small shortage in the crop of the United States last year, and consider what would be the effect if all of the cotton supply of the United States-three-fourths of that which the world produces were shut out of the markets demanding that cotton.

Even if certain countries were to exclude the great products of the United States from their markets they would be compelled to draw their supply from some other country or countries, and the products of the United States would find her markets in those countries thus drawn upon or in the countries to which they had formerly furnished their surplus. The world's production of the requirements of man-cotton, corn, wheat, provisions is no more than the quantity required by the various parts of the world which are now brought into such close commercial relationship by reason of cheap transportation, and if through the exclusion of our products from certain countries the products of other countries were drawn upon to supply those markets our products would in turn find a sale in the other parts of the world thus affected by that change in supply. These great requirements of man for food and clothing, demanded as they are in every part of the world, and easily transported to any given spot, like water, seek their level, and the exclusion of our products from one country or group of countries would simply result in their finding markets in the spot from which those consuming countries might draw their supply.

RESULTS OF EXPERIMENTS IN RETALIATION.

Certain experiments in the exclusion or attempt to exclude American products have been made in European countries during the past twenty years, and the effect of those experiments upon our sales of the articles in question is worth noting. Beginning about twenty years ago certain of the European countries began the exclusion of certain classes of meats from the United States, charging that they were dangerous to public health by reason of the presence of trachinæ in hogs, Texas fever and other diseases in cattle, and upon other but somewhat similar grounds. These rulings or legislation against American meats extended from country to country upon various pretexts during a series of years down to a very recent date, proving in each case more or less a barrier against the meat products of the United States. They resulted in some cases in more stringent export regulations by the United States, and in some cases in a modification of the legislation or. regulations in the country of importation, and the net result has been a steady growth in the exportation of provisions from the United States during the very period in question. The total value of provisions and animals for food exported from the United States in 1880, the approximate date at which this adverse movement against provisions from the United States began, was 130 million dollars, and 235 millions in 1902, a growth of more than 100 million dollars in exports of provisions and live animals for food purposes during the very period in question, and a very large proportion of this growth was in exports of those articles to European countries.

Another evidence of the indisposition of other countries to attempt to exclude the required products of the United States from their markets is found in the fact that although a dozen of the great countries of the world simultaneously protested against the Dingley tariff act, no one of those countries excluded any of the products of the United States following the enactment of that law or even reduced by a single dollar the value of their purchases from this country. These protests, while not a joint action, and while relating in some cases to different features of

the act from those complained of by other protesting countries, were practically simultaneous, and as the passage of the act without recognition of their protest was a simultaneous rejection by the United States of those protests, the occurrence offered to them a special and unique opportunity for combined action in excluding our products from their markets. Yet not a single one of those countries took such action, and in no case did they reduce their purchases from the United States. On the contrary, our exports to every one of the 12 countries have increased. Our exports to the 12 countries which protested against the act in question were in 1896 $618,688,000, and in 1903 $925,447,000, an increase of 50 per cent as compared with 1896, the year prior to that in which these protests were made. (See table of countries protesting against Dingley law, and exports to them, page 30.)

Even in manufactures, of which the European countries are large producers, and against which they have most vigorously protested, our exports to those countries have steadily grown during the years in which threats of exclusion have been most frequently made. Expressions of hostility to manufactures from the United States and threats of legislation or rulings to bring about their exclusion have been most strongly marked during the short period since 1895. Yet in that period exports of manufactures from the United States to Europe, the very section of the world from which these threats of exclusion came, have doubled, our total manufactures exported to Europe in 1896 being $96,961,020, and in 1902, $197,572,992, while those of the fiscal year 1904 exceed 200 million dollars.

Besides, the complete power of the United States to protect itself against retaliation must not be overlooked. The only countries from which there could be any possibility of danger are the leading industrial and commercial nations of Europe. Their policy is protective, so is ours. But if they are compelled to buy largely of our products from necessity, we buy largely of theirs from choice. We are among their best customers. Our imports in 1903 were from Germany, $119,772,511; from France, $77,285,239; from Austria-Hungary, $10,569,929; from Belgium, $22,567,337; from Italy, $36,246,412; from the Netherlands, $22,868,978. What they buy of us are necessaries; what we buy of them are chiefly luxuries. If they were to proscribe our products we could more easily proscribe theirs. So long as we maintain the protective policy we can defend ourselves; the more we ad vance towards free trade the fewer weapons of defense we hold. Thus, both the logic of the situation and our actual experience with adverse legislation and threats of such legislation fail to justify the assertion that our products of any class are being excluded or are likely to be excluded from the markets of other countries by reason of our protective tariff.

TRADE OF THE UNITED STATES WITH COUNTRIES PROTESTING AGAINST THE DINGLEY TARIFF ACT.

The table which follows shows the trade of the United States with each of the 12 countries which protested against the Dingley tariff act during its pendency in Congress in .1897. The figures cover the period from 1896, the year prior to the enactment of that law, to and including the fiscal year 1903. It will be seen that the exports to each of the countries have increased. This record is deemed important in its bearing upon the claim that other countries are likely to reduce their imports from the United States by reason of the protective tariff. In this case, 12 leading commercial countries of the world had almost simultaneously protested against certain features of this act, not all of them against any single feature, but each of them had made a protest; yet the act was passed in the original form without modification so far as related to the features referred to in the protests, and instead of a reduction in exports to those countries there has been a steady increase in all cases, and the total exportation from the United States in 1903 to the 12 countries in question was $953,585,567, as against $618,687,429 in 1896, having thus increased $335,898,138, or 54 per cent, over the exports to those countries in 1896.

Exports from the United States to the countries which protested against the Dingley tariff bill, showing increase in exports after enactment of the law.

Protective Tariff as a Revenue Producer.

In the matter of revenue the contrast between low and protective tariffs is equally striking. In the 57 years of low tariff no less than 22 of the total showed an excess of expenditures over receipts by the Government; while in the 58 years of protective tariffs 44 of the total showed an excess of receipts over expenditures. Of the 14 years under protective tariffs in which the expenditures exceeded the revenues no less than nine were war periods, when, necessarily, expenditures exceeded receipts from ordinary sources, while in only two of the years in which deficits occurred under low tariffs could that deficiency be charged to war conditions. The war of 1812-14, the civil war, and the war with Spain all occurred during protective-tariff periods; while the war with Mexico occurred during a low-tariff period. Excluding the war periods from consideration, it may be said that of the 55 years of peace, during which low tariffs were in operation, 20 years showed a deficit; while of the 49 years of peace, during' which protective tariffs were in operation, only five showed a deficit.

Considering the entire history of the country, under the Constitution, but excluding the war years, it may be said that the revenues of the Government during low tariff periods fell $33,143,242 below expenditures, while under protection, still excluding the war years from consideration, the revenues exceeded the expenditures by the enormous sum of $2,122,189,005.

To sum up in a single sentence the revenue records of low and protective tariffs, respectively, during years of peace, low tariffs showed a deficit in 20 out of the 55 peace years in which they were in operation, while protective tariffs showed a deficit in but 5 of the 49 peace years in which they were in operation, the low tariffs producing a total deficit during their entire 55 peace years of operation amounting to 33 million dollars, and the protective tariffs a surplus of 2,122 millions during the 49 years of peace in which they were in operation. "The proof of the pudding is in the eating." Fifty-five peace years of low tariff,