The actual duties payable on these descriptions of tobacco on and after the 20th instant will, therefore, be as follows: Cigars... the lb. do. £ s. d. 060 04 10 Tobacco, unmanufactured: If stemmed or stripped Containing 10 lbs. or more of moisture in every 100 lbs. the lb. 033 Containing less than 10 lbs. of moisture in every 100 lbs. the lb. 037 These increased duties will be leviable on all tea and tobacco of the specified descriptions entered on or after Wednesday the 20th instant, in accordance with Section 7 (2) of the Finance Act, 1901, and on tea and tobacco, previously entered, which are lying in bonded warehouses on that date. It should also be noted, with reference to the Customs Code, paragraphs 3 and 486, that all tea and tobacco in respect of which duty has been paid at the present rates, but which have not been delivered from bonded warehouses on the morning or the 20th instant, will be liable to the difference of duty hereby involved. The hum of industry has drowned the voice of calamity and the voice of despair is no longer heard in the United States, and the orators wthout occupation here are now looking to the Philippines for comfort. As we opposed them when they were standing against industrial progress at home, we oppose them now as they are standing against national duty in our island possession in the Pacific.-President McKinley. I am a protectionist because facts confront us, not theories. I have seen the wage-earners of Great Britain and continental Europe; know how they live; that they are homeless and landless as far as ownership is concerned; that they are helpless and hopeless as to any brighter future for themselves or their children; that in their scant wages there is no margin for misfortune and sickness, pauperism being the only refuge.-Hon. William P. Frye. Luxuries to the European laborer are necessities to the American.-Senator Frye, in the American Economist. The farmer of the West has learned and the farmer of the South ought to learn that when the factory is closed he not only loses customers for his products, but also meets additional competitors in his production. The workman, losing his employment in the factory, settles upon a truck farm and becomes a producer of the products he formerly bought from the farmer. The prosperity of the farmer depends upon the prosperity of those who buy his products.-Hon. P. P. Campbell, in Congress, April 1, 1904. The job hunts the man, not the man the job. When that condition exists labor is always better rewarded.-President McKinley. The depression and ruin that was inaugurated with that tariff revision by the Democratic party is vivid in the minds of all-Hon. P. P. Campbell, in Congress, April 1, 1904. A tariff for revenue only resulted in cheaper wool, cheaper bread, cheaper everything; there was no doubt about that; but did, cheapness produce happiness, as they said it would? No; it produced misery, just as we said it would.-Hon. M. N. Johnson, in Congress, March 24, 1897. Let us keep steady heads and steady hearts. The country is not going backward, but forward. American energy has not been destroyed by the storms of the past-President McKinley before Manufacturers' Club, Philadelphia, June 2, 1897. Experience of more than forty years in business has taught me that under a low or revenue tariff business depression and financial distress has been the rule, while under protection geɔd business and general prosperity has been the result.-Hon. N. D. Sperry, M. C., of New Haven, Conn., in the American Economist. A condition of prosperity came with the policy of protection and a condition of adversity came when the theory of free trade was yielded to and this has been without an exception.-Hon. P. P. Campbell, in Congress, April 1, 1904. We have lower interest and higher wages, more money and fewer mortgages.—President McKinley. THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES. The development of the iron and steel industries furnishes ample proof of the great benefit of a protective tariff. Before the Revolutionary War Great Britain would not permit these industries to become established in her American colonies. Everything was done to develop manufacturing in the British Islands, but the object was to prevent the colonists from manufacturing for themselves in order to compel them to take what was produced in England at whatever prices the home producers might charge. In 1750 a hatter shop in Massachusetts was declared a nuisance by the British Parliament. In the same year an act was passed permitting the importation of pig iron from the colonies because charcoal, then exclusively employed in smelting the ore, was well nigh exhausted in England. But the erection of tilt-hammers, slitting or rolling mills, or any establishment for the manufacture of steel was prohibited. A law of Virginia to encourage textile manufactures in that province was annulled in England. Lord Chatham declared that "the British colonists of North America had no right to manufacture even a nail for a horseshoe." The act passed in regard to manufacturing iron and steel read in part as follows: "No mill or other engine for slitting or rolling of iron, or any plating forge to work with a tilt-hammer, or any furnace for making steel, shall be erected or, after such erection, continued in any of His Majesty's colonies in America." A heavy fine was provided for any person using any such "mill, engine, forge or furnace," as mentioned in the act. That act was enforced down to the beginning of the Revolution. The export of wool and woolens from the colonies was forbidden and the transportation of iron wares, linens, woolens, paper, hats, and leather from one colony to another was forbidden, and even the exportation of hats was stopped. The importation of foreign iron into England was stopped by excessive duties, and the colonists were compelled to buy such articles as they might need, not produced at home, entirely from the merchants and manufacturers of England, and, besides, were compelled to sell their produce exclusively in English markets. Those were the conditions that led to the Revolution, and which left the colonies without any manufactures. Early Beginnings of the Industry. One of the first acts of the American Congress provided for a protective tariff, though it was a mere beginning in that direction. British legislation from that time forward was designed as before to prevent as much as possible the growth of manufacturing in the United States. In 1816 Lord Brougham, in a speech in Parliament advocating the increased exportation of British goods to the United States, declared that "it was well worth while to incur a loss upon the first exportation in order by the glut to stifle in the cradle those rising manufactures in the United States which the war had forced into existence contrary to the natural course of things." By means of differential duties in favor of imports in English vessels the British shipping was favored. In 1819 iron imported into England in British ships paid a duty equivalent to $32.50 a ton and if it came in a foreign ship it had to pay $39.62 a ton. A large number of articles were absolutely prohibited from entering British ports, or were subjected to duties one-half their value. In all this legislation special efforts were made to protect the British iron and steel industry. Rapid Development Under Protection. After the Revolution the iron and steel industries of the United States slowly and spasmodically developed, though foreign competition was severe. A great deal of the time down to the beginning of the Civil War the duties on iron and steel were not sufficient to afford adequate protection. With the enactment of the Morrill protective tariff in 1861, and with the added stimulus of the Civil War, the iron and steel industries entered upon a period of extraordinary development which with some interruptions has continued to the present time, greatly surpassing the development of like industries in any other country. In 1860 the United States produced 821,223 tons of pig iron and in 1890 the production reached 9,902,703 tons, and in 1903 was over 18,000,000 tons. Operation of Democratic and Republican Tariffs. During the time of the Democratic tariff act, owing to the depression in business, the production was much less than it was under the McKinley tariff law. In the year 1894 only 6,657,388 tons of pig iron were produced, which was nearly 3,000,000 tons less than were produced in 1890, and in 1896 the production was 600,000 tons less than it was in 1890. But under the Dingley law the production rapidly increased until it reached the total of 18,009,252 tons in 1903. Great Britain last year produced only 9,000,000 tons, or less than one-half the product of the United States, while Germany produced 10,000,000 tons. In five years the production of pig iron in the United States increased seventy-five per cent; in the United Kingdom eleven per cent, and in Germany forty-three per cent. Germany and the United States each have a protective tariff, while England is practically on a free-trade basis. Conditions in United States Compared with Other Countries. The world consumed in 1902 of pig iron 44,557,901 tons, of which forty per cent was made in the United States. The same great development is shown in the production of steel, of which the United States produced 15,000,000 tons in 1902; Geramny 7,700,000 tons and Great Britain 5,000,000 tons. The United States produced 2,300,000 tons more than Germany and Great Britain combined. In 1889 the United States produced 7,603,642 tons of pig iron, which at that time was the largest production ever made in this country in one year. Great Britain produced in that year 8,322,824 tons, and she had exceeded the production in the United States in each preceding year. But under the McKinley tariff the production of pig iron increased to 9,202,703 tons in 1890, in which year the product in Great Britain fell off to 7,904,214 tons. Since that time the United States has doubled its production while Great Britain has just about held its own. Germany, which went under a protective tariff in 1879, produced only 4,524,558 metric tons (2,204 pounds) of pig iron in 1889; but in 1900 Germany had increased the production so that her pig iron product was almost the equal of that of Great Brittain, and in steel she exceeded Great Britain. In 1902 Germany produced of Bessemer and open-hearth steel 7,664,158 tons, while Great Britain produced only 4,909,067 tons. The United States produced 14,826,092. Effect of Protective Tariffs Upon the Steel Rail Industry. The development of the steel rail industry in the United States has been of enormous benefit to the country, and has demonstrated beyond question the great value of the protective tariff. When it was proposed in 1870 to place a duty of $28 a ton on steel rails the Hon. S. S. Marshall, a prominent member of the House of Representatives, earnestly protested against the proposed duty because, as he alleged, it would so increase the cost of foreign steel rails that our railroad companies could not afford to import them. The average price of Bessemer steel rails in this country at that time was $106.75 a ton in currency. The duty of $28.00 a ton was imposed in that year, and the price of steel rails fell in five years to an average of $68.75 a ton, and they never rose above those figures, but steadily fell in most of the succeeding years. The reduction in price, owing to the development of this industry, has led to the substitution of steel for iron rails, which are no longer manufactured to any extent. The durability of steel rails is many times greater than that of iron rails, and this has enabled the railroads to increase the size and power of their engines and cars, so that the cost of transportation has been enormously reduced. The United States long since became the largest producer of steel rails in the world, Great Britain long ago having fallen behind. Formerly a large percentage of the rails in use were iron. Now they are practically all steel. The tariff on steel rails in 1870 was 45 per cent ad valorem. That has been gradually reduced until now it is $7.84 a ton. In 1902 the production of steel rails in the United States amounted to 2,935,392 tons. Results of British Investigations-Profits of Labor Under Protection. British investigations into a large number of British and American industries, details of which were published in Chambers' Journal and in the London "Times," gave this result: putting the joint product of labor and capital at 100 parts, in England, fifty-six parts go to labor, and in the United States seventy-two parts. The Illinois Steel Company, in which an investigation was made as to the labor cost of producing various articles, established the fact that of the entire cost of pig iron seventyseven per cent went to labor and twenty-three per cent for materials; of ingots, labor got seventy-nine per cent and the materials cost twenty-one per cent; and of steel rails labor received eighty per cent and the materials cost twenty per cent; and part of the cost of materials was due to labor. Labor secures a larger proportion now than ever before. Common labor gets on the average $1.50 a day in iron and steel mills in this country; in Great Britain it is paid from seventy-five to ninety-five cents a day, while on the continent of Europe it is paid fifty cents or less a day. Findings of the Moseley Labor Commission. The Moseley Labor Commission, which was composed of leading workmen in various British industries, made a thorough investigation of similar industries in the United States. The report of the Commission on its return to England stated that the pay of blast furnacemen in the United States was forty per cent higher than in England, while iron founders received more than twice as much in the United States as in England; iron and steel workers received pay vastly greater than in England, some rollers in this country receiving as high as $5,000 per annum, while heaters received from $7.00 to $13.00 a day. The pay of Engineers in the United States was given as seventy per cent higher than in Great Britain, while cutters received 100 per cent more in this country. It was stated that the wages of other workmen compared as follows: Cotton spinners, $16.66 per week in the United States and $9.50 in England; tailors, 100 per cent higher in the United States; bootmakers, thirty to seventy per cent higher; leather workers, ninety-five per cent higher; bricklayers, three and one-half times more in the United States than in England; plasterers, 100 per cent more; carpenters, $18.50 in New York and $6.87 in London; lithographers, $30.00 in New York and $11.25 in London; bookbinders, $20.00 in New York and $9.00 in London. Those are the figures given after investigation by British workmen, and were published in Great Britain. Cost of Living. The vastly higher wages in the United States are not accompanied by any increase in the cost of living. Mulhall, the well-known English statistician, says that the cost of living on the same quantity of food for each man is as follows: In Great Britain, eleven shillings ($2.75) per week; United States, ten shillings; Germany, nine shillings; France, eight shillings. If an American workman lived on the same quantity of food as an Englishman, it would cost him less, according to so good an authority as Mulhall, than it costs the British worker. Labor-Saving Machinery. Great improvements have been made in labor-saving machinery in this country, but that machinery is not confined to the United States. In some of the modern steel mills less than one cent per ton is paid to a roller for rolling steel rails, whereas he formerly received fifteen cents a ton, but he makes as much money now at this low price as he did before at the high price. Edwin S. Cramp, Vice-President of the Cramp Shipbuilding Com pany, in his testimony before the Congressional Commission in vestigating the shipping question, told how the exportation of labor-saving machinery has long been a marked feature of the exports of this country. Mr. Cramp said: "The argument which you have heard urged so often, that the American mechanic can do more than the English mechanic, and that the introduction and application of labor-saving devices enables the American to increase his output very largely over that of England, does not hold good. The same labor-saving devices that we have introduced and applied in America are being introduced and applied in every shipyard in Great Britain, so that the amount of work a man can do there is increasing, and will continue to increase. At the same time we are paying double the wages from 50 to 100 per cent more-than is being paid in England for the same labor." Thus any advantages which Americans have in the way of labor-saving machinery are to be found in mills in nearly all foreign countries. Mr. J. Stephen Jeans, Secretary of the British Iron Trade Association, presented to the tariff commission appointed by Mr. Chamberlain, and now investigating that question in England, an exhaustive review of the iron trade in that country. He declared that Great Britain furnished all the advantages of the general proximity of ores and fuel, but that the British iron and steel industries suffered severely from a want of confidence in their future. He said: High Tariff, High Wages, and High Efficiency go Together. "The higher wages paid in the United States is coincident with the higher efficiency of labor, which, however, is not necessarily unapproachable in this country (Britain)." Mr. Jeans stated that "a tariff does not in the iron and steel trade prevent a nation from attaining and maintaining the highest industrial efficiency." "The tariff policy of our competitors by guaranteeing within large limits the monopoly of the whole market, and what is perhaps of greater importance, keeping the home market from sudden and violent breaks, must promote continuity in running." Mr. Jeans stated that in the last ten years under free trade the British iron production had little more than held its own, while the American output trebled in the same time under a protective tariff. Britain, he said, was also beaten in steel, the form in which iron now finds its most important use. England has a 33 1-3 per cent preference in Canada in the way of lower duties, and yet the United States sells to Canada four times as much iron and steel in various forms. The British output of manufactured iron in 1903 was the lowest since 1850. The Bessemer steel output in that year was 154,000 tons less than in 1882. Export Prices-Why Lower Than Home Prices? Much has been said about United States manufacturers selling iron and steel and other products abroad lower than at home. Iron and steel at home are sold at prices fixed by competition, and the law of supply and demand. No corporation has a monopoly of their manufacture. The United States Steel Corporation does not control one-half of the iron and steel capacity of the United States, and the number of independent companies is constantly increasing. The price of steel rails was maintained at $28.00 a ton as a result of the work of the steel corporation when much higher prices could have been obtained. The policy of the corporation, as stated by its officers, was to try to make money by reducing the cost of production, not by advancing the price to the consumer. In 1893, under the Cleveland administration, there was a great depression in the iron and steel industry, and prices were abnormally low and unremunerative; wages in the iron trade were also greatly reduced. Soon afterwards there was developed a boom in the iron and steel industries of Great Britain and Germany and their prices went up. That was an opportunity for the American manufacturers of which they took advantage. A serious and prolonged strike in Great Britain subsequently broadened this opportunity. Foreign orders for iron and steel became so numerous that exports of those articles exceeded the imports for the first time in 1893. When the prices of iron and steel recovered in the United States under the Dingley tariff law there was a shrinkage in the foreign demand, and prices abroad, and the exports of iron and steel necessarily declined. In fact, the |