spects intended to intimidate or influence the conduct of voters in respect to one office or another, would be inefficient, because easily evaded. Once concede that the indictment for bribery of a voter, in order to be good under the Federal statute, must charge an attempt to affect the Congressional election, and the speedy result will be, not less bribery in respect to that election, but more likely a large increase, contrived and conducted in such way as to prevent proof of the real purpose, by pretences of different purposes."-(29 Fed. Rep., 898-9.)

The purport of legislation requiring publicity in respect to campaign expenditures is to secure the freedom of elections from improper influences. To this end, the indirect restraints of the Corrupt Practices Acts are more effectual than the direct prohibitions and penalties of statutes, Federal or State, penalizing bribery.

The adequacy of existing laws to punish one proved guilty of bribery may be admitted as a general proposition. That specific legislation of this nature has not proved effective to protect the free exercise of the franchise from the undue influence of campaign expenditures must also be admitted. It is a crime which is not readily susceptible of direct proof. The remedy sought in the statutes already cited and in the suggested Federal legislation is rather one of prevention by indirection. It is the limitation and regulation of the possible sources and agencies of corruption which is of primary practical importance. The chief inducement to bribery must be removed by throwing safeguards about the present irresponsible use of campaign funds. The chief remedy proposed by such legislation is publicity, not purely police or penal regulation of the grosser forms of bribery.

It can not be successfully contended that Congress has not constitutional power to insure, by enforcing publicity, an end which in the exercise of its undoubted authority it has sought to reach by more direct but less effective legislation.

The Supreme Court has declared:

"If this government is anything more than a mere aggregation of delegated agents of other States and governments, each of which is superior to the general government, it must have the power to protect the elections on which its existence depends from violence and corrup

tion. . . .

"If this be so, and it is not doubted, are such powers annulled because an election for State officers is held at the same time and place? Is it any less important that the election of members of Congress should

be the free choice of all the electors, because State officers are to be elected at the same time?

"In a republican government, like ours, where political power is reposed in representatives of the entire body of the people, chosen at short intervals by popular elections, the temptations to control these elections by violence and by corruption are a constant source of danger.

"If the government of the United States has within its constitutional domain no authority to provide against these evils, if the very sources of power may be poisoned by corruption or controlled by violence and outrage, without legal restraint, then, indeed, is the country in danger, and its best powers, its highest purposes, the hopes which it inspires, and the love which enshrines it, are at the mercy of the combinations of those who respect no right but brute force, on the one hand, and unprincipled corruptionists, on the other." (110 U. S., p. 661.)

Upon all existing precedent and authority, a Federal statute forbidding the secret expenditure of money to influence an election at which a Congressman is to be chosen, would be valid and effectual to compel publicity in respect to all expenditures tending to influence the election of any candidate at such election. This would include Presidential electors. A large number of the States having already required publicity of expenditures by political State committees, Congress may, on such initiative, require of political committees engaged in promoting the election of Presidential and Congressional candidates a similar publicity, such elections being held at the same time.

VI.

Concurrent enactments could be adopted in the several States, in accordance with the encouraging tendency of the legislation of the fifteen States already enumerated.

It is especially incumbent upon the State of New York, having, in 1890, taken the initiative in this form of legislation, to at once supplement its deficient and ineffective law. New York, an important centre of political activity in national campaigns, should place itself in line with the most advanced legislation of other States. Owing to the failure of the New York statute to require any statement from political or campaign committees, it is possible to avoid publicity in respect to expenditures for any amount or for any purposes. If an irresponsible committee and not the candidate can be made the medium of disbursements, evasion of the existing law is invited. Should publicity be required of com

mittees, under penalty of forfeiture of office and other effective punishments, such as are provided in several States, the New York law would be rendered operative.

VII.

Should publicity of expenditures by political committees have the effect of reducing campaign contributions, political machinery and party efficiency would not be harmed. The reduction would cut off the camp followers, whose slight party affiliations serve no other purpose than to give occasion for utterly useless and extravagant expenditures. A political organization cannot be too perfect to be effective, but managers of national, State and local committees have often experienced the injury caused by the employment of unnecessary campaign funds, absorbing and diverting from their normal and more effective functions the vital energies of political leadership.

Party organizations are essential to party government; their importance and usefulness in our political system should be fully recognized. They can not be maintained without the expenditure needed in legitimate and honest politics, but no popular organization, commanding a sufficient amount of interest among its followers, will suffer permanent disability because of limitations and restraints upon contributions and expenditures. The great denominational religious organizations of this country are supported in great part by small contributions. When political organizations are sustained by the large subscriptions of the few, their activities become paralyzed by the development of a spirit of dependence on the few.

Voters should be informed by unrestricted and general diffusion of facts and arguments pertinent to the issues before the country. The great mass of voters reach their conclusions with little assistance from the instrumentalities toward which campaign expenses are too often directed. Newspapers and periodicals are a more effective educational force than tons of pamphlets usually distributed during elections.

Voters depend upon the great parties to frame issues to command their support, and to nominate properly qualified candidates. If a party organization does not prove equal to this task, it is a matter of small moment that it succeeds in raising large sums, or in perfecting a machine that absorbs and distracts the major

portion of the political activity at the command of the party.

Contributions by corporations should be restricted. The freedom of individuals to contribute according to their means and inclinations to party organizations need not be interfered with by legislation. There is, however, no inherent individual right to secrecy in respect to activities influencing the great court of public opinion, which, as the result of each national election, passes upon the rights and property of all. The turning on of the light cannot be deemed an unconstitutional increase of Federal or State control.

PERRY BELMONT.

THE SPANISH TREATY CLAIMS.

BY CRAMMOND KENNEDY.

By article VII of the Treaty of Peace with Spain it was provided that:

"The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims for indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of either Government, or of its citizens or subjects, against the other Government, that may have arisen since the beginning of the late insurrection in Cuba and prior to the exchange of ratifications of the present treaty, including all claims for indemnity for the cost of the War.

"The United States will adjudicate and settle the claims of its citizens against Spain relinquished in this article."

These individual claims of citizens of the United States "of every kind," which were thus relinquished as against Spain, and the adjudication and settlement of which were assumed by our Government, were described by the Secretary of State, Mr. Day, in his note of July 30th, 1898, to the Duke of Almodovar, Prime Minister of Spain, as "the claims of our citizens for injuries to their persons and property during the late insurrection in Cuba." In defining the conditions of peace, Mr. Day said that, to these individual claims, as well as to the losses and expenses of the United States incident to the war, the President could not be insensible, and that he must, therefore, require the cession to the United States, and the immediate evacuation by Spain, of the island of Porto Rico and other islands then under the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies, and also the cession of an island in the Ladrones to be selected by the United States. He added:

"On similar grounds the United States is entitled to occupy and will hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines."

1

Treaty Papers, Doc. No. 62, Part 1, Sen., 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., p. 274.