"Trust-curber" would suit the President better. That he has abandoned his idea of curbing the trusts, those who know Mr. Roosevelt are as little inclined to believe as those who knew 'Tiberius would have been inclined to believe that he would desist from his purpose of curbing the Roman landholders. The people, who are close to President Roosevelt, and who seem to regard him as closer to them than any President since Lincoln, will wish him "Godspeed."

There is a widespread belief that a change will come over the policy of the Roosevelt administration soon after the President's inauguration. When the mantle of the martyred McKinley, so to speak, falls from Mr. Roosevelt's shoulders, and he dons the ample robe provided for him by the people,-when, in other words, he receives his commission direct from the voters, he will feel free to do and to attempt many things which he has thus far left undone or unattempted-at least, such is the general impression. The reason for his present attitude lies, doubtless, in his lofty sense of honor, which during the past three years must have made him ever mindful of his promise, made immediately on the death of his predecessor, that it should be his "constant aim to follow in the footsteps of William McKinley." On the fourth of March he will be absolved from that promise. On that day he will become President by virtue of election, and he can then inaugurate his own policies.

The Tribune, Gracchus, had but a year for the accomplishment of his reforms. He worked quickly and accomplished much. Legislation was a simpler matter in ancient Rome than it is in the United States. By the end of his term, President Roosevelt will have had nearly eight years to carry out his programme. The first year was spent in familiarizing himself with his task. By that time he saw the utter futility of proceeding against the trusts without complete information as to their status, their methods and their violations of law. Then came the establishment of the Department of Commerce and Labor. That was about two years ago, and during that period the Department must have collected a mass of data which has enabled the President to formulate, in a measure, his trust-curbing policy. His spirited action in favor of railroad-rate legislation and the prompt response of the House of Representatives in passing the Esch-Townsend bill by an almost unanimous vote, though important in themselves, are also

significant as precursors of what is likely to follow. But as Gracchus's real struggle was with the Roman Senate, so will Roosevelt's real struggle be with the American Senate. And as in the Roman Senate there was a powerful party which bitterly opposed the Tribune, so it is evident that in the American Senate there is a party, hardly less powerful, which is determined earnestly to oppose the President.

History shows that it is in the upper branch of parliamentary bodies that the conservative interests of a State manifest their chief strength. It is in the Senate that Mr. Roosevelt will find some of his strongest antagonists. Tiberius triumphed over the Roman Senate; will Theodore prevail over the American Senate? The answer must be left to the future.

It has been said that, in their methods of approaching their respective tasks, there is much similarity between Gracchus and Roosevelt. Gracchus in his work showed courage, resolution, persistency and boldness. Those who have observed Mr. Roosevelt's courage and resolution in the Cuban reciprocity matter, his persistency in the Crum case and his boldness in connection with the Panama incident need not doubt that his courage, resolution, persistency or boldness will desert him in his assault upon the trusts.

One other parallel between Gracchus and Roosevelt has not yet been noted. Roosevelt, like Gracchus, is impatient of restraint. Gracchus was more than impatient even of constitutional restraints. There are those who might say that in this respect also the American President resembles the Roman Tribune. Certain it is that, while he may emulate to advantage the noble achievements of Gracchus, Mr. Roosevelt will do well to avoid the errors of his great Roman prototype. But his is not the temperament which permits a man to derive satisfaction merely from avoiding errors!

In joining issue with the trust magnates, President Roosevelt will have the advantage, over Tiberius Gracchus, of dealing with men who are not as yet entrenched behind the prestige of centuries. He will have the disadvantage of dealing with men of vastly greater wealth, and hardly less power, than those who confronted Tiberius two thousand years ago.

CHARLES S. DANA.

THE TREATY-MAKING POWER.

BY UNITED STATES SENATOR 8. M. CULLOM, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS.

MR. GLADSTONE said, of the Constitution of the United States: "It is the most wonderful work ever struck off in a given time, by the brain and purpose of man." It is the foundation of the Republic, the enduring ledge which grips, forever, the anchor of our Ship of State. The difficulty of changing it is so great that it is almost immutable. Immediately after it went into effect ten amendments were adopted, and in the hundred and sixteen years that have followed, but five more have been found necessary; three through the abolition of slavery. Though framed for only six million pioneers, in the wilderness, it has stood the tests of time and the expansions of more than a century, and is to-day for eighty millions of people and the dominant nation of the earth as firm a foundation and safe an anchorage as it was for their forefathers.

Few important questions remain unsettled concerning the scope and intention of the Articles of the Constitution. Among them the most interesting concerns the treaty-making power. Even before its adoption, the able statesmen who framed the clause had widely differing opinions concerning its scope, and from 1796 to the present day the same diversity has caused long and heated debates in both branches of Congress.

When the President made and submitted to the Senate the treaty with Cuba, providing for the admission into this country of Cuban products, at reduced rates of duty, in contravention to the Dingley tariff, in return for like concessions from Cuba, upon our products, the treaty was duly ratified by the Senate, by more than a two-thirds vote, but it contained a provision that it should not take effect until approved by the Congress. The discussion

which arose was over the bill approving it, and the wide difference of opinion which still exists was shown in the three distinct positions which were supported, in debate, by the most learned and able lawyers in the Senate:

First, that reciprocity treaties could not constitutionally be made and ratified by the President and the Senate, even though Congress may subsequently pass a law to carry such treaties into effect, or may repeal the tariff laws with which they conflict;

Second, that reciprocity treaties can constitutionally be made by the President, ratified by the Senate, but that Congress must pass a law carrying all such treaties into effect;

Third, that the President and Senate have the power to make and ratify reciprocity treaties, and that they immediately become the supreme law of the land, repealing any law with which they may conflict; that, where the treaty does not itself provide for Congressional action, it becomes fully effective upon ratification by the Senate.

The Constitution says that the President shall have power, with and by the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties. At least, we shall all admit that the President does not derive his treaty-making power from Congress, and that no law of Congress can in any way modify or limit that power, and that, in the Constitution, Congress, as a legislative body, is not, in any way, a part of the treaty-making power.

Justice Field said upon this question:

"The treaty-making power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by those restrictions which are found in that instrument against the action of the Government or of its departments, and those arising from the nature of the Government itself, and that of the States. It would not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize that which the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the Government, or in that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter without its consent. But with these exceptions, it is not perceived that there is any limit to the questions which can be adjusted touching any matter which is properly the subject of negotiations with a foreign nation."

Justice Story said:

"The power to make treaties is by the Constitution general, and of course it embraces all sorts of treaties, for peace or war, for commerce or territory, for alliance or succors, for indemnity for injuries or pay

ment of debts, for recognition and enforcement of principles of public law, and for any other purpose which the policy or interests of independent sovereigns may dictate in their intercourse with each other."

The history of the treaty-making power is, in itself, suggestive of its intent. In the original Articles of Confederation, the power was given to Congress, only limited by the provision that no treaty should restrict the legislative power of the States to impose duties and prohibit commerce in any species of goods; and not the least of the defects which soon developed in the Articles was the defect in the treaty-making power. The result was the Constitutional Convention for the purpose of revising the Federal system of government, which met May 14th, 1787.

Early in the Convention, Alexander Hamilton suggested, practically, the treaty-clause which was afterward adopted: "That the Executive, with the advice and approbation of the Senate, have power to make all treaties, and that those treaties be a part of the supreme law of the land." Twice, in the Convention, it was proposed to add the House of Representatives, but Pennsylvania alone voted in the affirmative. An amendment was proposed by Mr. Morris, that no treaty should be binding till it was ratified by law, and this was also lost. During the last discussion of the clause, Mr. Wilson moved again to add the words, "House of Representatives," and this was also lost.

All of this is indisputable evidence, clearly showing that the subject was carefully discussed and fully understood, and that the almost unanimous voice of the Convention, of the framers of our Constitution, was that the treaty-making power should be vested in the President and its ratification rest with the Senate.

Before its final adoption, the Constitution was carefully, sometimes violently, discussed and debated in State conventions, every State taking up the treaty clause, Virginia most hotly of all, and finally suggesting the amendment that: "No commercial treaty shall be ratified without the concurrence of two-thirds of the whole number of the Senate." If the able men of Virginia who discussed this treaty-clause, as founders of the Constitution, had so construed it that, before a commercial treaty could become binding, an act of Congress would be necessary to establish it, they would not have sought to introduce an amendment providing that "no commercial treaty shall be ratified without the concurrence of two-thirds of the whole number of the Senate."