from the journals, and were enjoined to absolute

secrecy.

The debates were long and arduous, for the difficulties of the subject were all but insuperable. Each State was a sovereign power, and it was the duty of its Commissioners to consult its special interests before any other consideration. And the elements of conflict were numerous, for there were small States confronting the larger-maritime interests competing with agricultural-States exclusively Atlantic against those having Western territory-slave States and those expecting soon to be free; and on the leading questions these various interests contended, each for itself, with a tenacity proportionate to the critical nature of the decisions to be formed. On more than one occasion, the Convention was on the point of breaking up in despair. Eventually, step by step, the various clauses were arranged by a series of compromises, which have remained the incongruities and bane of the Constitution.

The decisions of the Convention were not to be final or binding upon any State, until ratified by its own people. It was anticipated there would be great difficulty in obtaining these ratifications; and provision was made that the new Constitution should come into force, limited in operation to themselves, whenever nine of the thirteen States should have ratified it. The people of each State elected a Convention, to which the decision was unreservedly left whether to accept or reject it, so

far as that State was concerned. There was no direct action of the people in the nature of a popular vote; nor were the respective Conventions elected by any uniform or unqualified suffrage. They met at various dates, without any co-operation. Severe contests occurred in many cases. New York ratified by a majority of three only; in Massachusetts the votes were 187 to 168; North Carolina declined to act; Rhode Island continued aloof altogether.

It will be necessary to keep these facts in view, in weighing the arguments of those who deny the right of secession. The whole of them appear to be taken from Webster's speech on the nullification of South Carolina, one of the finest examples of rhetorical power in our language, yet obviously the address of an advocate; singularly forcible in language, not less barren in facts; based on epithets, parts of sentences, informal phrasesthese used with consummate ability, as the narrow foundation for so imposing a superstructure of rhetoric, and so sonorous a volume of eloquence as overwhelm the hearer, and sweep the judgment from historical records of undisputed authenticity.

These arguments, whenever used, are accompanied by glowing descriptions of the progress and prosperity of the Union, and by appeals to Nationality. The rapid extension of the United States has produced, of late years, a new school of political belief. Under its influence a wide change has occurred from the views of those who framed

the Constitution. There is no longer a citizen of the United States; he has become an American. Intense jealousy of centralized power has changed into admiration of administrative unity, and has even ripened into a craving for "strong government." The words nation and nationality appear almost in every sentence of every argument on this subject, although it is on record that the term "National Government," which appeared in the first draft of the Constitution, was struck out in the Convention, on the ground of its being inapplicable to the facts, and opposed to the intentions of the parties. It is remarkable, too, that this motion was carried unanimously.

Here is at once a remarkable discrepancy between the views of those who framed the Constitution, and the doctrines prevailing at the present day. We shall soon arrive, as in all such cases, at questions of interpretation. Whom are we to take as our guides-the framers of the instrument whose evidence is on record, or those who read it, influenced by the altered feelings of the present day? Mr. Lincoln lately observed that the intention of the lawgiver is the law. If so, we shall be more likely to find what the law really is by studying the intentions of its framers, as expressed in their own words, than through the eloquence, however graceful, of partial advocates of the present period.

It will be necessary to discard from our view all consideration of the prosperity of the United

States, from whatever cause arising. Were the inquiry into the wisdom or expediency of secession, this would have great weight, but with an examination of legal right it has no concern. The descriptions put forward are offered as proof of possession, and presumptive evidence against the right asserted. But a person may be in possession of a magnificent estate, enjoying the reputation of owner, endowed by it with wealth and surrounded with authority; yet when there is occasion to examine the title deeds, it may be found that another, remote, unheard of, has just and legal rights in the property. That distant man, be he never so poor, must have a hearing. Questions of right may not be debarred because they are inconvenient to discuss, or by holding it absurd to question the title, with him who derives such wealth and advantages from possession of the estate.

Secession is by no means a novel doctrine. In the first session of Congress under the new Constitution, it was threatened in the first serious contest that arose; and this in the presence of several of the framers of the Constitution. Again, when Washington expressed reluctance to be elected as President for a second term, Jefferson wrote to urge his assent; and the weightiest reason he assigned, in proof that the country required experience at the head of affairs, was this, that the coming election would involve great danger of a "secession from the Union" of those who should be defeated. It can hardly be supposed that this

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right would have been openly declared by members of Congress, or that the probability of the event would have been thus urged on Washington, had it been regarded by public opinion as an illegal or treasonable act. It seems rather to be inferred that there existed in the minds of those, who with the facts so recent were most competent to judge, a conviction that the right existed and might be exercised-that able and just government would avoid it—but still that it was there.

The doctrine, indeed, has been maintained and loudly declared, both in the North and South, at frequent periods in the history of the Union. Jefferson, in his Ana, refers to that occasion of its being first raised in Congress, and observes that it was the Eastern, that is, the Northern States, who especially threatened to secede. He describes a walk with Hamilton, in which the latter painted pathetically the danger of the secession of their members, and the separation of the States. And the Northern States were the first to raise it practically. The war of 1813 was highly unpopular in that district, and when called upon by the President to supply their quotas of militia, they absolutely declined. In the words of Jefferson to Lafayette: "During that war four of the Eastern States were only attached to the Union, like so many inanimate bodies to living men." But they went far beyond inaction. They called a Convention at Hartford, of which the proceedings

16 See Notes in Appendix,