that period. Her commerce has been depressed ever since, and there are now the enormous losses of this event. Will the present excitement be followed by no reaction was that destined to be the last of panics? If such an effect was produced, so recently, by a mere derangement of Western exchanges, the conclusion is irresistible that under the agencies now at work, there will come again a day of panic, when every man's face will turn pale as before, and the whole financial fabric crumble again into dust.

In all wars success has mainly depended on the military genius of the commander. As neither side can as yet claim to possess a general of established reputation, we are forced to inquire with whom military talent is most likely to be developed. General Scott has indeed proved himself an able commander, but his age and physical infirmities forbid exertion in the field, and to direct operations from Washington would be to repeat errors already well exposed. Several of the pages of history would probably read differently if the Archduke Charles had never been directed by the Aulic Council. Besides General Scott, although but three months since the popular idol, is already cast aside. The eventual hero of the war is yet to be discovered; on which side is he the more likely to appear?

On this point expectation must be guided by past experience; and the fact is remarkable, that so far all the generals of any eminence whom the

United States have produced, have been Southerners. Happily for the country, the list is not yet a long one, and Washington, Jackson, Taylor, and Scott, are the only names that occupy a distinguished rank. The probabilities of the future are therefore greatly in favour of the appearance of the ablest general on the side of the South, and up to the present time none can doubt on which side the greater military talent has been displayed. Closely allied with this consideration is that of excellence in the regimental officers, and probably in the present war (where great combinations, and elaborate manœuvres are not likely to be attempted) this may exercise a decisive influence. In this respect the advantage of the South is admitted by all. The natural disposition of the Northerner leads him to commerce, manufactures, inventions. Speaking generally, there is no class of landed gentry in the North. Those who have acquired or who inherit fortunes, instead of sharing our taste for country life, regard magnificent houses in the cities and splendid furniture as objects of ambition. In the South, on the contrary, the large landed proprietors form a body of gentry, with many tastes and habits similar to our own, and their sons enter the army as naturally as those of the Northerner take to the counting-house.

Mr. Olmsted, by no means a friendly witness, observes: "It is undoubtedly true that the Southerners, compared with ourselves, are more ready to violence, more familiar with deadly

and more

weapons, and

accustomed to resort to

physical means of self-defence. It is also true, that they are generally less accustomed to luxury, and are more ready for camp life than we are. The wealthy young men have also been more accustomed to command, than the corresponding class with us." Familiarity with the use of arms, and the power of enduring camp life, are no mean advantages when a war suddenly occurs. From his youth, the Southerner is habituated to command others, and where there is the habit of command, there will be a correlative instinct of military obedience. The Northerner will obey with impatience, under feelings of restraint that seek escape. His position is repugnant to all his former theories; impatient of control as a child, impatient of authority as a youth, it is impossible he can be docile under the bonds of discipline. The constant idea torments him also, that his officer is no better than himself, and has no right to be so. The Southerner, on the other hand, will accept his position, whether to command or obey, as the proper order of things. Of personal courage

there is abundance on both sides-no braver

people exist. The Northerner undoubtedly is naturally as courageous as the Southerner; but all qualities are strengthened by use and association, and the Southerner is habituated to an indifference to danger and recklessness of life, unknown in the North. Such a people are not easily subdued. Conquests should only be

attempted by the more martial race; but here the invaders are decidedly a less martial people than those to be subdued.

The late history of India strikingly proves how greatly the value of any military force depends upon the officers. The sepoys had proved their excellence as soldiers, in a century of war; when the mutiny ejected their officers, they had abundance of their own well schooled in regimental knowledge. The force appeared the same; its evolutions were perfect, it retained to the last an unbroken sense of discipline. But events soon proved it a mechanical thing out of which the spirit had passed, and the troops that for a hundred years had conquered, from Plassy to Sobraon, were miserably routed in every encounter. In the war

of the Punjaub, the sepoy led by British officers overthrew the Sikh. A few years later the two races are again opposed, the sepoys under officers of their own, and now the Sikhs, whom they had vanquished before, drive them in terror from the field.

There is a direction, apart from, yet associated with military aptitude, in which the advantage is unquestionably with the South. Political ability

will not decide the fate of a battle, but will tell with decisive effect on the result of a war. The superiority of the Southerners in this respect, none will question. Webster observed that it would be vain to dispute, that the lead in the politics of the United States, had been a Southern

lead. We have seen how great a majority of the statesmen of the Union they have supplied. The Southerners, indeed, are just as superior to the men of the North in political and military talent, as the Northerners are superior in mercantile skill, literary ability, and inventive genius. There seems a natural division of mental powers, in which, whilst those of the Northerner have a wider range, and may be greater in the aggregate, it so happens that those allotted to the Southerner are precisely such as are effective in war. Of this political capacity there has been clear evidence, already, in the history of the contest. On the part of the South has been witnessed from the first one direct, able, resolute line of action. Starting from the bare ground, with a village for a capital, they organized at once a complete system of government-placed their ablest men in office-passed laws adapted to their position-instead of insulting other powers, endeavoured to conciliate them— and in place of occupying their time in speeches, at once proceeded resolutely to prepare for the conflict that might ensue. In this there is power -stern, manly power-such as grasps the victory in war.

There is another difference between the belligerents, which, when forming an estimate of probabilities, we cannot overlook cannot overlook difference of motive. The people of the North invade the South for the avowed purpose of maintaining the Constitution-for the real purpose of sustaining