and the reciprocal agreements of the Allies, the Conference has striven to maintain the bonds which unite the Allies to Rumania and to bring about a compliance by this Power with the decisions of the Supreme Council; on August 4,9 August 5,10 August 6,11 August 7,12 August 14,13 August 23,14 August 25,15 September 5 [4],16 October 12,17 November 3,18 November 7, pressing requests were addressed to that effect to the Government of Bucharest. To indicate the importance which it attached to obtaining the reply from Rumania, the Conference even directed a special Delegate, Sir George Clerk, to proceed to Budapest [Bucharest]. All these patient efforts have resulted only in the answer of November 2, conciliatory in words, but, negative in fact; regarding the three questions asked, acceptance of the frontiers determined by the Supreme Council, signature of the Peace Treaty with Austria, and of the Minorities Treaty, adjustment of the situation in Hungary, the Note postpones the two first ones and answers only the third. Even on the latter question, none of the admissions asked for are, in reality accorded. The principle of the discontinuance of requisitions in Hungary is admitted, it is true, as well as the institution of an Inter-Allied Commission in Budapest to apply these principles, but Rumania, in making this concession, recognizes neither that the Commission may have the goods, now accumulated in the Hungarian freight cars, unloaded without having yet passed the verification bridges, nor that it has authority to receive the complaints and conduct investigations on the abuses committed by the Rumanian military authorities. The withdrawal of the Rumanian troops is accepted only as far as the Theiss, and Rumania does not comply with the decision of the Powers which includes the evacuation of all the Hungarian territory and the withdrawal within the definitely determined frontiers, a decision which was immediately accepted by the other neighboring States, Czechs and Serbs. In short, the Rumanian Government has continued, for the last three and a half months, to negotiate with the Conference, from Power to Power, taking into consideration no other rights or interests than her Appendix C to HD-23, vol. vii, p. 517. 10 Appendix A to HD-24, ibid., p. 541. 11 HD-25, minute 2, ibid., p. 548. 18 Appendix C to HD-38, ibid., p. 857. own, and refusing to accept the charges of solidarity, although she wishes to enjoy the benefit of them. The Conference wishes to make a last appeal to the wisdom of the Rumanian Government and of the Rumanian people before taking the grave resolution of severing all relations with Rumania. Their right to dictate rests essentially on the fact that Rumania owes the priceless service of having reconstituted her national unity, in doubling her territory and population, to the victory of the Allies. Without the enormous sacrifices consented [to?] by them, at the present time Rumania would be decimated, ruined and in bondage, without any possible hope. Rumania entered the struggle for her freedom at the end of the second year of the war, making her own conditions; it is true she made great sacrifices and suffered heavy losses, but she finally consented to treat separately with the enemy and to submit to his law; her liberty and her victory, as well as her future, she owes to the Allies. How can such a situation be lost sight of and so soon forgotten by the Rumanian statesmen? In any case, the Supreme Council can wait no longer; it invites Rumania to take without discussion, reservation or conditions, the following resolutions: 1st-To evacuate entirely Hungarian territory, withdrawing within the definite frontiers fixed by the Conference; 2nd-To accept the constitution of the Inter-Allied Commission provided for to decide, control and pass judgment upon the requisitions made in Hungary since the beginning of the Rumanian occupation; 3rd-To sign the Austrian Treaty and the Minorities Treaty, under the conditions indicated by the note of the Supreme Council of October 12. The Supreme Council will wait eight (8) days for the affirmative or negative reply of the Rumanian Government. Should this reply not give satisfaction to the Supreme Council of the Allies, the latter have decided to notify Rumania that she has separated herself from them. They shall invite her to recall immediately her Delegates at the Peace Conference and they will also withdraw their diplomatic missions at Bucarest. As to questions concerning the settlements of boundaries, still to be made, Rumania will thus, by her own action, deprive herself of all title to the support of the Powers, as well as to the recognition of her rights by the Conference. It would be with the profoundest regret that the Supreme Council of the Allies should see itself forced to sever relations with Rumania, but it is confident that it has been patient to the very last degree. No. 7 Appendix B to HD-93 Telegram From Sir G. Clerk to the Supreme Council D. November 13th, 1919. R. 10.00 November 14th, 1919. My telegram No. 6.20 On my arrival here I at once realized two things. One, that Hungarians would do nothing until Roumanians left, and the other, that since Archduke's resignation Friedrich has acquired for various reasons into which I need not enter at present, a following in country so large and so excited against Communists and Jews, that it would be fatal to seem to override or fail to take into account opinions and feelings of those who are at present his followers. I have explained position of Allies to Hungarians of all parties and opinion is generally ripe for formation of coalition government. But personal position of Friedrich is main difficulty. Since method of telling him to resign premiership and to let someone else take it and form a government will not work because it would simply mean that Friedrich and great bulk of his followers, that is, by far the majority in country, would if he went at all go into opposition, and nobody could be found to make a Government in which the Christian National Party did not participate. It has therefore been necessary to proceed by way of telling Friedrich that he must first show what he can do towards satisfying Allies. His attempts have not yet succeeded and I informed him on the morning of November 12th that unless he was prepared to summon a general conference by today, November 13th I should ask all political leaders, including himself and his Ministers, to meet me informally in order that I might explain the situation to them. As a result he has just informed me that he will at once issue invitations for a general political Conference. Meanwhile I have seen the parties of the Left, viz, Social Democrats, Liberal Democrats, National Land Party also small Proprietors and Christian Social Democratic Party. These five Parties have united themselves into a block and they will meet Friedrich the Christian National in Conference. They will probably there declare that they will not accept Friedrich as Minister President, though they are ready to work loyally with Christian National block apart from Friedrich and that they will only enter a Government in which all of their five parties are represented. Government Parties will probably say they cannot give up Friedrich and there may be a deadlock unless the Christian National Parties have sense enough to see Friedrich must go. 20 Appendix E to HD-90, p. 138. I have a meeting with the Christian National leaders to-night and may get them to see what is at stake for Hungary. If nevertheless there is this deadlock it is possible that some influential person outside party politics such as the Cardinal Primate will try to effect a solution, but if such efforts fail I shall have to explain the position in the Press and say that as Hungarians cannot in this crisis agree upon a temporary Coalition Government where all Parties are fairly represented and insist on maintaining the rule of a single party I can do no more and intend leaving Budapest forthwith. Consequences will of course be that Hungary will have neither peace nor help from the Allies but will be left severely to her own devices. It is for Hungarians to decide if this is what suits them. I shall also dispel various delusions which Friedrich has endeavoured to create in the public mind, such as that I really represent only the Paris policy which is the French policy and that when I have gone and the French policy is shown to be a failure, then the English policy which is really favourable to Friedrich will have its day. I still hope that the end may be satisfactory, but I send this telegram in order that the Supreme Council may know what I am doing and may realize that in the present state of feeling in the country, violently anti-semitic and anti-socialist, Friedrich must be gradually pushed from office and cannot simply be turned out. Process is long and extremely trying but it is the only one which will not leave Hungary worse off than she is at present. |