appropriating our goods for its own use, without any control or authorization, thus violating the principles which had been established by four Entente Powers, and to which the Rumanian Government had agreed. The Military representative of the Russian Armies at Bucarest, has employed all possible means in order to obtain the shipment promised. But, in spite of all the steps of the plenipotentiaries of the Entente Powers in Rumania, the Rumanian Government goes no further than making promises. On account of the foregoing, I deem it indispensable to beg you to kindly place on the calendar the question of the restitution to the Armies of Southern Russia of the Russian material and supplies which remain in Rumania, and to have sent, in the first place, rifles, cartridges and munitions, heavy artillery, and machine guns. As the Entente Powers consented to protect the property of Hungary, their former enemy from the exaggerated pretensions of Rumania, they cannot (Were it only for the sacrifices made by Russia) ignore the plundering of Russian property which remained in Rumania, including war material of forty-three infantry divisions of twelve battalions each. These goods are recognized as our property by the Entente Powers; and were only turned over for temporary safe-keeping to the Rumanian Government, and they are at the present time, indispensable to the Russian Armies, which are waging a hard war against the Bolchevists. I beg you to kindly inform me of the decisions taken in this matter. GENERAL TCHERBATCHEFF Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/101 HD-101 Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, November 28, 1919, at 10:30 a. m. The following were also present for items in which they were concerned : Distribution of 1. M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. George Leygues to discuss the last British proposal relative to the distribution of enemy surface warships, dated November 14th, (See Appendix "A"). M. GEORGE LEYGUES said that for many months the naval experts had discussed the question of distribution of enemy warships without being able to reach an agreement. Great Britain and the United States were of the opinion that those ships should be destroyed. France asked to keep the ships which would be allotted to her, and desired, on the other hand, to obtain an additional share owing to its inability to build warships on account of the war, France having been forced to concentrate all her energies towards the production of war materiel, not only for herself but also for her Allies. The British note of November 14th was an effort to bring together the different points of view and to come finally to an agreement. The French Navy was equally very desirous to settle a question which had been under discussion for such a long time, and although the British proposal did not agree on important questions with the French point of view, he felt ready on his part to accept it as a basis for discussion. He then read and commented upon the different paragraphs of the British proposal. M. CLEMENCEAU said he did not understand the purpose of paragraph 6, which allotted to each one of the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers a certain number of ships for the period of one year. SIR EYRE CROWE stated that it had been pointed out that certain Powers were anxious to have ships temporarily allotted, which they might use either for propaganda, or experimental purposes. The British Government did not, however, attach much importance to that proposal, and would not disapprove the omission of the paragraph in question. M. LEYGUES said those ships might to some extent be considered as trophies. Furthermore, they might be of use from the point of view of instruction, and also for firing practice. He was not averse to accepting the paragraph as proposed by the British Delegation. MR. POLK said he would have to offer objections on certain points of the British proposal. SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that under those circumstances, it would be preferable to discuss the proposal submitted to the Council paragraph by paragraph. CAPTAIN FULLER then read paragraph 1 of the British proposal. MR. POLK wished to ask why the question of distribution of surface enemy warships had been treated separately from that of submarines. The American point of view was that the submarines should likewise be destroyed. CAPTAIN FULLER said those two questions had always been discussed separately and it was to be feared that if they were to mix them up at this time, they would find it impossible to come to an agreement. MR. POLK asked what advantage there was in discussing those questions separately. Did certain Powers wish to keep enemy submarines? M. LEYGUES stated that France and Italy desired to keep some. (Paragraph 1 was accepted): CAPTAIN FULLER then read paragraph 2. MR. POLK said the American Government could not accept the ratio of two percent given to the United States, which it considered as being manifestly insufficient. The United States did not desire to keep those ships, but considered it was a question of principle which affected the national feeling. They had the impression that the basis adopted for the distribution was not fair. The amount of tonnage sunk ought not to be the only factor estimated, and they thought that other factors should be taken into account, such as the effort made by the different navies in the course of hostilities. America had thought that all those ships should be destroyed, and for that reason had not attached great importance to the question of distribution. But it was now different. He had made some mistakes in his life; and one of the mistakes he regretted the most was to have agreed to accept the principle that a reparation was due by the Germans for the sinking of their fleet at Scapa Flow. He did not wish to discuss anew a decision taken by the Supreme Council and which held; he could not but regret however that the Council should have thought it necessary to exact from Germany the delivery of a part of her civil materiel, which resulted in placing the Allies in a better situation than the one they had before the Scapa Flow incident, and which rewarded them to some extent with the crime committed by the Germans. At any rate, he considered that the ratio of two percent attributed to the United States was not fair, and that they should get more. CAPTAIN FULLER said they had only given round numbers, and for that reason the results indicated in the note were not absolutely final. Those figures, however, should not be greatly changed if the criterion of losses suffered by the different navies was maintained, which criterion had formed the basis for their work. As far as the British share was concerned, they did not absolutely insist upon having a ratio of seventy percent given them, although that represented the exact percentage of their losses as compared with the losses of the other navies. 1 HD-79, minute 2, vol. VIII, p. 834. MR. POLK asked whether the naval experts could not examine once more those percentages and make the necessary changes. CAPTAIN FULLER said that in order to accomplish that work successfully, they should know precisely what basis to adopt. It had been suggested on the American side that the national effort of the different Allies should be taken as a basis for distribution. It seemed, however, extremely difficult, if not impossible, to calculate the national effort of a Power, and they had preferred not to embark upon a course which would lead them to making delicate comparisons. MR. POLK stated his instructions did not allow him to accept the figure of 2%. He admitted that the national effort of the different Powers was indeed difficult to figure out and compare, but he thought that by discussing the question with the naval experts he might succeed in putting together the foundations of an agreement. He would find it impossible to make a definite proposal on that day, but he hoped to be able to do so the following day. He wished to repeat that as the United States meant to destroy their share of the enemy warships it only entailed as far as they were concerned a question of principle, but that question interested the national American feeling to a very high degree. SIR EYRE CROWE said that before starting to change the percentage, it was necessary to agree on the general basis to be adopted. of M. CLEMENCEAU thought it would be wise to adjourn the discussion paragraph 2 of the British proposal until the next meeting. One might hope that in that time an agreement would be arrived at between Mr. Polk and the naval experts. (The discussion of paragraph 2 of the British proposal was adjourned to the following day.) CAPTAIN FULLER then read paragraph 3. (The principle of paragraph 3 was adopted.) CAPTAIN FULLER then read paragraph 4. MR. POLK said he did not object to accepting that paragraph; he, however, wished to state once more that they considered that a decision of the Council in demanding reparations from the Germans for the scuttling of their fleet at Scapa Flow had been a mistake. It was an entirely questionable principle, that of profiting by the enemy's crimes in order to reward themselves. (Paragraph 4 was adopted). CAPTAIN FULLER then read paragraph 5. (Paragraph 5 was adopted). CAPTAIN FULLER then read the 6th and last paragraph of the British proposal. MR. POLK said he did not have any fundamental objection to that paragraph, but considered the wording might well be modified. He 518640-46-VOL. IX-23 |