(4) that the request of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation proposing the grant to that Government for five years of the exploitation of the mines of Pecs, should be referred to the Committee for the study of Territorial Questions relating to Roumania and Yugo-Slavia. 7 2. M. BERTHELOT informed the Council that the Germans had given to the Press a fairly complete summary of the note and annexed protocols sent to them by the Council. He inquired Publication of the Note and the Annexed Protocol Addressed to the German Government by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers if, under the circumstances, it would not be advisable to publish the complete text of that note. After a short discussion, It was decided: to publish the text of the note addressed to the German Government relative to the putting into force of the Treaty of Peace as well as the draft protocol annexed to that note. 3. (The Council had before it a letter from General Nollet dated October 21, 1919 (See Appendix "F"), a note from the Drafting Salaries of the Committee dated October 28th [29th] 1919 (See Appendix "G"), and a letter from Marshal Foch dated November 3, 1919 (See Appendix "H".).) GENERAL WALCH read and commented upon Marshal Foch's letter. MR. POLK, with respect to the organization of the personnel of the Commissions of Control, asked why it was necessary to call upon civilian engineers? GENERAL WALCH explained that the military technical personnel was inadequate to control the manufacture of war material. It was necessary to call upon competent specialists who could not be found in the regular army. GENERAL NOLLET had called upon about 10 engineers and about 40 university graduates. In so doing he had only followed the example furnished by the British Commission of Control. (It was decided: that the payment of the salaries of the personnel of the Military Commissions of Control in Germany not belonging to regular military forces, should be assumed by Germany.) 4. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation dated November 3, 1919 (See Appendix "I") Publication of the trian Delegation SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the note of the British Delegation specified that extreme care should be exercised with respect to the publication of the Austrian Notes marked "Confidential". 'Appendix B to HD-80, vol. vii, p. 863. Appendix C to HD-80, ibid., p. 865. MR. POLK said that evidently such notes could not be published without the consent of Chancellor Renner. SIR EYRE CROWE Suggested that Dr. Renner could be asked if he still objected to the publication of those Notes. M. DE MARTINO observed that the publication of the notes raised some questions which were delicate from an Italian point of view, and he asked that a decision on this point be postponed. (The question was adjourned) 5. (The Council had before it a letter from Marshal Foch to the President of the Peace Conference dated October 30th, 1919 (See Appendix "J"), and a note from the Drafting Committee dated November 5th, 1919 (See Appendix "K") M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon these Demobilization of the Men of Haller's Army documents. (After a short discussion. It was decided:' to approve the recommendations of the note of the Drafting Committee relative to demobilized Poles who had borne arms against Germany.) 6. (The Council had before it a note from the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission dated October 31st, 1919 Financial Measures of Coercion Taken Against Germany on Account of the Nonevacuation of the Baltic Provinces (See Appendix “L”) M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon this note. He observed that it was not correct to speak of the annulment of authorizations which might have been given the question was one of revocation of said authorization. Germany could not now create new pledges by availing itself of authorizations previously given, inasmuch as any such authorizations were now revoked. (It was decided: that the Drafting Committee should prepare a reply to M. Loucheur's letter dated October 31st, 1919, relative to the interpretation of the financial measures of coercion taken against Germany on account of the non-evacuation of the Baltic Provinces (See the Note of September 27th, 1919). 7. (The Council had before it a note from the Drafting Committee (See Appendix “M”) Liquidation of the M. FROMAGEOT stated that the Danish Government had pointed out that after the plebiscite the inhabitants of Schleswig would become Danish citizens. What would become of the interests of those newlymade Danish subjects whose property in the meantime might have been liquidated by one of the Allied and Associated Powers as be 'Appendix E to HD-62, vol. vш, p. 419. longing to enemy subjects? The Drafting Committee had considered this contingency in the note which the Council had before it. It appeared that answer might be made to the Danish Government along the lines of the last paragraph of the said note; the Allied and Associated Powers, however, would always be at liberty to avail themselves of their rights of liquidation with respect to such new Danish subjects as did not seem to merit the consideration therein contemplated. Moreover, if the Principal Allied and Associated Powers arrived at such a decision, they should notify the other Allied Powers who, doubtless, would raise no difficulty over adopting the same procedure. M. PICHON Suggested that the Drafting Committee should come to an agreement with the Economic Commission, which had the question in hand, on the draft of a resolution to be communicated to the other Allied Powers. SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the Danish Government would have to be approached. MR. POLK took it as understood that the draft resolution would be submitted to the Council. He pointed out that he would have to refer the matter to his Government. Military Missions at Riga 8. M. BERTHELOT reminded the Council that at a previous meeting the question of an American Military Mission reported to be at Riga had been brought up.10 According to his present information there appeared to be at Riga, besides a mission of relief and supply and a Red Cross mission, a mission under Colonel Holliday, who was reported to have arrived at Riga on October 15th. The Colonel was reported to have stated that he did not desire to collaborate with the Anglo-French Mission. MR. POLK explained that Colonel Holliday was there alone. His duties were purely to collect information, and he had no political role to play. Moreover, General Cheney would see that he did not exceed his powers. 9. M. DE MARTINO informed the Council that the Italian delegates to the Plebiscite and Delimitation Commissions would arrive at Paris on November 10th. They would be ready from that day on to confer with their Allied colleagues. M. PICHON said that Marshal Foch would be in Plebiscite and formed of this. 10. M. DE MARTINO said that he had been informed from Vienna that Serbian and Roumanian representatives wished to participate in the work of the Commission, presided over by Sir Francis Dent, which was charged with the distribution of rolling stock. This claim seemed inadmis Commission at 10 HD-79, minute 5, ibid., p. 838. sible, inasmuch as neither Serbia nor Roumania had signed the Aus trian Treaty. SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the Commission in question was only a provisional one. M. DE SAINT QUENTIN explained that it had been decided to send to Vienna a provisional Commission which would become a permanent Commission when the Treaty came into force. The character of the Commission was apparent from the fact that Hungary, an enemy country, was represented on it; it would therefore be difficult to deny representation to the Serbs and Roumanians. M. DE MARTINO said that he would examine the question anew. 11. M. POLK said that his Government wished to know if the question of the recognition of Luxembourg was to be decided by the Council. Luxembourg M. BERTHELOT Summarized the history of the question: when the question first arose five or six months ago the French Government declared that, from a political point of view, it would refrain from active participation in the Luxembourg question, and that it thought that the Belgian Government should be the first to make a decision. Belgium had told the French Government that it was opposed to recognizing the Grand Duchess. The French Government had transmitted this information to Rome, Washington and London and the Principal Powers abstained from recognizing the Grand Duchess. Eventually, and after at first refusing, Belgium consented that the fiancé of the Grand Duchess should be allowed to go to Luxembourg. The marriage was taking place that very day. Two days previously the Belgian Government had asked the French Government if it intended to recognize the Grand Duchess and to be represented at the marriage ceremony. He himself had replied by putting the same question to the Belgian Ambassador, since France had decided that Belgium should have the first word in political questions concerning Luxembourg. The Belgian Government had not yet replied. The French Government had been informed from other sources that the British Government intended to recognize the Grand Duchess and to be represented at the marriage ceremony. The French Government had then acquainted the British Government with the exact situation, at the same time informing the Italian Government. M. PICHON said that the Council would arrive at a decision on the Luxembourg question. (The meeting then adjourned.) HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, November 6, 1919. Appendix A to HD-85 Telegram From Sir G. Clerk to the Supreme Council, No. 3 BUDAPEST, November 4, 1919. Monsieur Diamandy came to see me this afternoon to tell me officially that Rumanian troops would begin their evacuation from Budapest November 9th and finish on November 11th. He was immediately followed by Count Somssich, Minister for Foreign Affairs, who told me that Friedrich was absolutely defiant; that if Allies insisted on his giving up post of Minister President he would go into opposition with nine of his present ministers and that after all it was not Hungary but Allies who wanted peace. I told Count Somssich that I still hoped that wiser counsels would prevail but that if Friedrich maintained this short-sighted attitude I could do no more and should have to leave when Roumanians withdrew. I was not here to turn out Friedrich government and set up Opposition as a government; I was only here to ask Hungarians to form a temporary coalition government with whom Allies could deal. I still hope that Friedrich may be induced to see reason but it is all the more necessary that I should have authority to recognise coalition government immediately on its formation if that proves to be possible. Appendix B to HD-85 Telegram No. 4 From Sir George Clerk to the Supreme Council BUDAPEST, November 5, 1919. Monsieur Cerruti, civil member of Italian mission, has just informed me of a telegram received by mission from Paris from which I understand following proposals are under consideration by Supreme Council. 1. That Friedrich shall be required to resign at once as he has been unable to form democratic government. 2. That Roumanians shall be required to evacuate at once. 3. That two divisions composed of Czecho-Slovaks and Yugo-Slav troops under Allied command shall be sent into Hungary. With regard to (1) I venture to ask for two or three days delay. I hope I am on the point of securing coalition government which all parties in Hungary will accept. I have got so far as to get provisional consent of Friedrich to resignation of office of Minister President. It is a task of great difficulty to bring various parties together and secure general consent but I shall know by end of week whether I can really count on success. |