These warships shall be disarmed as prescribed in Article XXIII of the Armistice of November 11, 1918,13 and they must have all their guns on board.

2. The Interallied Naval Commission determined, December 4, 1918, the conditions of disarming to be the following:

All the essential parts of the artillery and the "appareils de reglage de tir", munitions and explosives, war material and spare parts, torpedoes, wireless apparatus, etc., shall be landed.

3. The above measures, taken with regard to the warships brought to Scapa Flow and to those remaining in German ports, were measures of precaution.

They have been maintained in regard to the warships figuring in Article 185 of the Treaty, and in regard to the 5 light cruisers which are to be surrendered according to the Protocol of November 1, 1919,13 because these ships are to be brought to Allied ports by German

crews.

4. In order to leave Germany only the material and munitions necessary for arming the number of battleships determined by the Treaty, Article 192 prescribes that all the material in excess of these quantities shall be surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and is to be broken up or rendered useless.

In this material, therefore, might be included that taken off the ships as measures of precaution and now deposited in the arsenals. Such a measure is inexplicable, granted the decisions taken recently by the Supreme Council on November 28th and 29th authorizing each Power to dispose as it sees fit of the material and ships which it is to break up.1*

14

Still less justifiable is this measure in regard to the light cruisers and destroyers allotted to France and Italy which they may incorporate in their fleets. If deprived of the material described above, these ships are useless from a military point of view.

5. For this reason it is proposed:

a) that the material landed from the ships surrendered or to be surrendered by Germany be delivered in the same place as the ships. from which it was taken:

b) that this material be selected at the request of the interested Powers, by the Interallied Naval Commission of Control:

c) that only such arms, munitions and war material as remain within the hands of the German Government, in excess, after delivery of the material indicated under "a" and "b" be broken up or rendered useless.

13 Vol. II, p. 1.

13 Appendix C to HD-80, vol. vIII, p. 865.

14

HD-101, minute 1, p. 345; HD-102, minute 1, p. 360.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/114

HD-114

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, Held at M. Pichon's Room, Saturday, December 20, 1919, at 3 p.m.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

M. Rathbone

GREAT BRITAIN

Capt. Fuller

Cdt. MacNamara

M. Malkin

FRANCE

M. Leygues

Admiral Levavasseur

M. Fromageot

M. Cheysson

M. Laroche

M. de Montille

M. Escoffier

ITALY

M. Ricci-Busatti

C. Admiral Grassi

Cdt. Fea

M. Bianchi

JAPAN

M. Shigemitsu

M. Nagaoka
Cdt. Osumi

1. Compensation
Claimed by the
Supreme Council
From the German
Government
for the Scapa
Flow Affair

SIR EYRE CROWE said that, with regard to the Scapa Flow question, he had not yet received general instructions from his Government. In fact, he had only received instructions on two special points: 1, they were ready to repatriate prisoners from Scapa Flow as soon as the Germans had signed the protocol; 1 2, on the other hand, his Government was opposed to any modification whatsoever of the protocol with regard to the surrender of the five light cruisers. To agree to the German claim would, as a matter of fact, be contrary to the stipulations of the Treaty, and they were of opinion that no modification could be made to the Treaty without the assent of all the signatory Powers, a course which obviously would carry them too far. He was still waiting, as he had already mentioned, for the instructions of his Government regarding the other questions. They had, on the other hand, received a note from the French Delegation on the question of the five light cruisers, which they had not yet had time to examine, but which would entail a modification of the protocol.

MR. LEYGUES said that the French Delegation had indeed envisaged a different solution from that which had been originally proposed. It would be advantageous to accept in part the Germans' request under the following conditions: They would begin by taking delivery of the five light cruisers of the Graudenz type which they had demanded from the Germans according to the terms of the protocol. They would, however, exchange those cruisers for new cruisers under construction as they were completed. That would involve no change in the principle laid down in the protocol. But they would get material advantages in this way, that if they only left to the Germans old cruisers which would very shortly be twenty years old, Germany would be free, according to the terms of the Treaty, to build new ones as soon as the 20-year period had been reached. With the solution they proposed, on the contrary, the Germans would not be able to build new warships for eleven years and their naval forces would be diminished accordingly. They were, therefore, of the opinion that their proposal was advantageous, not only for France and Italy, but in a general way for all the Allies.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he fully admitted the force of the arguments made by the Minister of Marine, but the fact remained that his solution implied a modification of the Treaty, which the British Government would not deem possible except with the assent of all the signatories.

MR. LEYGUES replied that Sir Eyre Crowe's remark was quite correct, but they should not conceal the fact that the situation created

'Appendix C to HD-80, vol. VIII, p. 865.

by the Treaty was abnormal and illogical. They were obliging the Germans to destroy their existing ships, and inside of a year they still might build new ones, certainly a paradoxical situation.

MR. CLEMENCEAU agreed, but said that they were confronted by the Treaty, and the British Government was opposed to any modification of the Treaty. It therefore seemed to him necessary to await, in order to discuss the Scapa Flow question in its entirety, until Sir Eyre Crowe received from London the general instructions he was expecting.

(The discussion was adjourned).

MR. CLEMENCEAU stated that they were not ready to draft a reply to the German Note until they had agreed on the questions which were still pending, such as the Scapa Flow affair. He therefore proposed to adjourn the discussion.

2. Reply to the German Note of December 14 2

MR. WALLACE then stated that at the meeting of the Council last Tuesday he had been asked by the President whether he would sign the protocol on behalf of the United States. He undertook to obtain the views of his Government in the matter, and he had now to say that he had received instructions that the United States could not be a signatory to the Protocol.

He said it would be recalled that at the same meeting of the Council a draft of a declaration to Chancellor Renner was presented and approved by his colleagues. At the same time he informed the Council of his instructions and made it quite clear that he would refer such matters to his Government. The declaration in question was communicated to Chancellor Renner the day following the meeting, that was to say, last Wednesday, and he informed his Government to that effect. In reply, he had been informed that in view of the existing circumstances the Government of the United States was not in a position to take any action whatever, on account of the fact that the Austrian Treaty had not been presented to the United States Senate.

He said that, in this connection, and in order to make his position quite clear, he had been instructed to state that in view of the fact that his participation in the deliberations of the Council was merely one of an observer, it could not be presumed that the United States was a party to any action, declaration, or resolution of the Council. unless the Government of the United States expressly declared its consent thereto.

MR. BERTHELOT remarked that the situation did not present itself in the same manner in the two cases referred to by Mr. Wallace. As a matter of fact, the protocol had been signed by Mr. Polk on November 1st. No American signature was any longer necessary

'Appendix A to HD-111, p. 567.

* HD-111, minute 2, p. 559.

if the text of the protocol was not modified, and the signature of the Germans was the only one required.

MR. WALLACE said that M. Clemenceau had asked him on the preceding Tuesday whether he would be in a position to sign the protocol. He therefore assumed that the protocol would be modified, and consequently that new signatures would be necessary; and that is why he had asked for the instructions, the sense of which he had just communicated to the Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that no member of the Council had yet signed the protocol. What had been signed was the note submitting to the Germans the draft protocol. He did not believe that that would do away with the signing the protocol itself, even in the case where no modifications were adopted.

M. FROMAGEOT said that it did not seem necessary that the protocol should bear the signatures of the Allied Representatives. If they referred to precedents they found that the declaration relative to the non-application of Article 61 of the German Constitution sa had only been signed by the German Representative. The delegates of the Allied Powers had simply witnessed the fact of the German signature. There was only in the protocol the question of a unilateral agreement which Germany should undertake. Therefore Germany's signature was the only one required. The Allied Representatives, or some of them, might, however, witness the fact that the signature had been given.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the protocol presented itself in such a form that the procedure suggested by M. Fromageot would be applicable.

M. FROMAGEOT said that it certainly did. It would only be necessary to omit the word "protocol" and to replace it by the term "declaration", or some analogous expression.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that as far as the declaration made to Chancellor Renner was concerned, Mr. Wallace was not authorized by his Government to subscribe to it at this time. On the other hand he did not believe that they should foresee any difficulty on the part of Austria, who had no interest in raising doubts on the validity of their declaration. As a matter of fact, the American Government had only declared war on Austria very late. They all understood the present difficulties of the situation in America and they naturally did not wish to do anything which might increase those difficulties. On the other hand, however, they had brought to a satisfactory conclusion the important questions which had been submitted to them. They could therefore only take note of the American Ambassador's declaration and carry on the discussion in order to arrive either at a general signature; for it was likely that the situation might change in America,

For draft text of declaration, see enclosure to appendix B to HD-52, vol. VIII,

p. 193.