Appendix E to HD-117

Note" Relative to the Swiss Note of December 18, 1919, Concerning the Adherence of Switzerland to the League of Nations 12

C) "1. It is evident that the Swiss Note does not authorize Switzerland's adherence to the League of Nations, as is, moreover, recognized by Switzerland herself, as she referred to an ulterior formal declaration.

"2. According to Article 1 of the Covenant, the declaration of adherence must be made without reservations. Consequently, Switzerland cannot, expressly or implicitly subordinate her adherence to a referendum, which she contends is compulsory by her constitutional law. Questions of Swiss Constitutional law, such as the necessity of a referendum, concern Switzerland only and are not of interest to the other Powers.

"3. It can be sustained that the date for the commencement of the two month period, allowed the Powers in which to make their declaration, is not necessarily connected with the ratification of the German Treaty, since the Covenant, of which the Powers can take advantage, is also incorporated in the Austrian and Bulgarian treaties, and that the entry into force of those two Treaties will doubtless be subsequent to that of the German Treaty. It is known that China, which is neither among the signatory Powers of the German Treaty nor the invited Powers, is, nevertheless, a signatory of the Covenant, by the fact that she has signed the Austrian Treaty.

"In the event that Switzerland would allow the two months following the entry into force of the German Treaty to lapse, she could still demand the delay provided for by the Covenant in the Austrian or Bulgarian Treaties, and adherence to this Covenant within the period of two months which will follow the entry into force of these Treaties.

"If, the non-adherence of Switzerland at the time of the entry into force of the German Treaty, cannot prevent the constitution of the League of Nations and the commencement of its functions, it can, on the other hand, seriously interfere with the establishment of the League at Geneva.

"4. The Swiss Note quotes April 28, 1919, as the date upon which the Covenant was adopted.

"It should be noted that the only official text is that which was signed, that is to say the text of the Treaties, and first of all, that of the German Treaty of June 28, 1919.

"5. The theses of the Swiss Note, according to which the realization of the League of Nations is dependent on the ratification of the five Principal Powers, cannot be accepted.

"On this point, it is clearly stipulated in the final clauses of the Treaty, in all its parts, inclusive of Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations) will enter into force for all the Powers which will have ratified at that time, upon ratification by three of the Principal Powers and Germany.

"6. The decision of the Federal Council, [text] of which was annexed to the Note from the Swiss Government, contains various considerations in its preamble concerning the relation between the adherence of the Helvetic Confederation to the League of Nations and the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland, as well as between Articles 21 and 435 of the Treaty.

"Regarding this question, which was the object of certain developments in the Message of the Supreme [Federal] Council of August 4, 1919, it would be advisable to not appear to silently acquiesce purely and simply in the views of the Federal Council, but to hold the entire question for examination and whatever solution it may be deemed proper to adopt."

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/118

HD-118

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Monday, 29 December, 1919, at 10: 30 a. m.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned :

GREAT BRITAIN

Capt. Fuller, R. N.

Cdt. MacNamara, R. N.
Mr. Malkin

FRANCE

M. Leygues,

M. Loucheur,
Marshal Foch,
Gen. Weygand,
Adl. Levavasseur,
M. Laroche,
M. Fromageot.

ITALY

Gen. Cavallero,

C. Adl. Grassi,

M. Dell'Abbadessa,

M. Pilotti,

JAPAN

M. Shigemitsu,
M. Nagaoka,

Cdt. Osumi.

M. DUTASTA said that in accordance with the Council's instructions1

he had had a conversation on Saturday evening with Mr. von Lersner.

[1.] Conversation Between M. Dutasta and Mr. de [von] Lersner [on?] the Subject of the Protocol

He had taken great pain not to commit the Council in anything whatever and to give to his conversation a purely unofficial and personal character. Mr. von Lersner after hearing his exposition had told him that without committing his Government he was himself of opinion that an immediate agreement was possible upon the basis outlined. He had also said that he would telegraph to Berlin immediately, and that he would visit him that evening. It was probable therefore that they would know immediately exactly where they stood. SIR EYRE CROWE asked what exactly were the suggestions made by M. Dutasta to which Mr. von Lersner had agreed.

M. DUTASTA answered that he had said the Conference was ready to confirm in writing the declarations made verbally to the Head of the German Delegation in the course of the previous conversation; that he had added that the Allies would be satisfied provisionally with the 192,000 tons offered by the Germans allowing them the additional time required for handing over the remainder of the materiel. In that way they were answering the objection raised by the Germans to the effect that the immediate handing over of all the materiel claimed would imperil their economic existence. As he had said, Mr. von Lersner had shown himself satisfied on the whole with those proposals. The only objection Mr. von Lersner had made, one which, in his opinion, might easily be taken into consideration was that the date of signing the Protocol 1a ought to coincide with that of the coming into force of the Treaty. The Germans seemed to attach great importance to the point since that affected intimately the burning question of prisoners of war. He had considered that he might tell von Lersner that he did not anticipate any difficulty on that subject. He had further drawn M. von Lersner's attention to the fact that the negotiations which were proceeding might be disturbed if the German Government were to send the Council a note refusing to sign the Protocol as it stood. M. von Lersner had answered that he did not know whether a note to that effect were not already on the way; if it were so it was probable that the German Press would publish it, but in any case he would not submit such a note to the President of the Conference, and he hoped that no notice would be taken of anything that might appear in the German Press.

SIR EYRE CROWE felt that Mr. Dutasta's report was on the whole satisfactory. Concerning the question of sending naval experts to Germany, he had, at M. Clemenceau's request, telegraphed to London. He had received a telegram from the British Admiralty, saying that the experts who had been appointed would not be ready to start before the following day.

Appendix C to HD-80, vol. VIII, p. 865.

MR. DE MARTINO thought that there need be no difficulty in granting the German request to have the date of signing the Protocol coincide with that of the coming into force of the Treaty.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that they need only fix the date in such a way as to render possible the military arrangements required by the occupation of the plebiscite areas.

GENERAL WEYGAND added that certain political questions which were then being discussed by General Le Rond and the German experts relating to the conditions under which the transfer of authority would take place in the plebiscite zone, must be taken into consideration.

M. DE MARTINO considered that it would be well to advise those commissions to conclude their work as quickly as possible.

GENERAL WEYGAND explained that the negotiations were commencing that very day.

M. CAMBON thought if M. Dutasta's impressions were correct they might well expect the signing of the Protocol by the Germans within four or five days.

GENERAL WEYGAND was afraid that the negotiations between General Le Rond and the German experts were perhaps already finished. The General Staff of the Army itself required four or five days to prepare the transportation of troops. On the other hand, as he had already indicated to the Council there was something to be said, if a sort of hiatus between the departure of the French and the Italian troops on the one hand and of the British troops on the other were to be avoided, for postponing the transport until about the 12th or 13th January.

SIR EYRE CROWE considered it unnecessary to start the transportation of troops on the very day of the Treaty's coming into force; there was, of course, a decision of the Supreme Council to that effect,2 but it was for the Council itself to modify the decision if it thought it necessary.

GENERAL WEYGAND pointed out that there was nothing to prevent them really from delaying the transport until perhaps 10 days after the Treaty's coming into force. If that were to take place on the 3rd January, for instance, the troops might start moving on the 13th. SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the General's proposal was the best procedure to adopt.

M. DUTASTA explained further that Mr. von Lersner had anticipated no objections on Germany's part to the handing over of the five light cruisers.

M. DE MARTINO asked if he might draw the Council's attention for a moment to a question that did not appear on the agenda. The Ital

' HD-72, minute 1, ibid., p. 684.