sheviks. The British Delegation would prepare a memorandum upon the subject which would be submitted to the Versailles Military Council for immediate examination and report to the Supreme Council. 4. Organization of the Work of the Conference MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed his regret at again proposing a subject not down on the agenda. But the agenda for that meeting was rather long and might possibly occupy them for quite a considerable time. There was a danger of its being so on the following days. Mr. Clemenceau's time was extremely limited as indeed was his own, for he would doubtless have to return to England shortly on account of serious labor troubles. To save time, he would suggest recourses to a method of organization that had already been tested, namely, to constitute on the one hand a Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which would examine questions relative to the Peace Treaty with Hungary and all questions of detail on which, for that matter, Lord Curzon was much better informed than himself and to form on the other hand, a Council of the Heads of Governments who would examine only the larger questions of general policy, the discussion of which had been essentially the object of his visit. MR. NITTI supported Mr. Lloyd George's proposal. He too could not prolong very much his stay in Paris. He would remind them. that he should have to be in Italy for labor questions, the solution of which was urgent as well as for the re-opening of Parliament which was to take place before the end of the month. The Council of Heads of Governments ought naturally to deal with the question of the Adriatic, but it was desirable that it should also examine the Albanian question which he very earnestly desired to have solved before his departure. The maintenance of a force of occupation in Albania was costing them enormous sums and they anxiously desired to have it settled. It was decided: that during the presence in Paris of the British and Italian Prime Ministers, there should be constituted: (1) a Council of the Heads of Governments who would deal with questions of general policy; (2) a Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs who would deal with questions arising out of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary and all matters not examined by the Council of Heads of Governments. The meeting adjourned. THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF PREMIERS: MINUTES OF MEETINGS [The minutes here printed are only those of the meetings of the International Council of Premiers at which representatives of the United States were present prior to the termination of the Peace Conference at Paris on January 21, 1920. The files of the Department of State do not contain minutes of the meetings of this Council at which the United States was not represented.] Paris Peace Conf. 180.03801/2 ICP-2 Secretary's Notes of a Conference Held at 10, Downing Street, London, S. W. 1. on Friday, December 12, 1919, at 11:30 a. m. (1) MR. LLOYD-GEORGE proposed that the discussion should begin with the question of the Adriatic. A Joint Note had been prepared by the representatives of the United States of America, France and Great Britain, in Paris, with a view to its presentation to Signor Scialoja, and he understood that M. Clemenceau was prepared to hand the The Adriatic Note.1 M. CLEMENCEAU handed Signor Scialoja the Note. He said he had already informed his colleague Signor Scialoja semi-officially of the For text, see Great Britain, Cmd. 586, Misc. No. 2 (1920): Correspondence Relating to the Adriatic Question, p. 3. existence of this Note, and had told him that it had been signed in complete agreement by the representatives of the United States of America, France and Great Britain. The object of the Note was to try and find a final settlement. The delay on this question had kept the Conference at bay for months. The same delay had brought Italy into a situation that was veritably revolution. There could be no peace in Europe till this question was settled. The United States Government, through President Wilson, had given an indication of the concessions to which it could agree and as to what it could not accept. On that basis Great Britain and France had always sought to find a text which would be acceptable to all parties. The difficulties had been increased owing to the occupation of Fiume by D'Annunzio and owing to the fact that a part of the Italian Army and Fleet had refused to obey the orders of the Italian Government. The British and French Governments had considered the question point by point, from the point of view both of the position of Italy and of President Wilson's concessions, and had done their best to bring the views of all into accord. They knew that the Italian Government opposed resistance on certain points. They knew also that the Italian Government would accept the Note in the friendly spirit in which it was offered, but asked to be allowed to make a reply and to present observations and criticisms. In handing this Note to Signor Scialoja he asked him, as well as the Italian Government, to bear in mind that it constituted a supreme and, as they hoped, a final effort to secure a peaceful settlement. He implored the Italian Government to make an attempt to reach an agreement. No great concession on their part was required. If the Allies could succeed in settling this question it would remove one of the great obstacles to the pacification of the world. SIGNOR SCIALOJA said he would receive the Note with the same friendly sentiments as had been expressed by M. Clemenceau on behalf of the Allies. He had learned from M. Clemenceau that this Note was to be presented, and he had afterwards learned certain further details from M. Polk and Lord Curzon, who had indicated to him the broad lines of the new proposal. He doubted if Italy could accept it without certain alterations. What he attached great importance to was that the Note explained the reasons on each point. Up to now he thought that the reasons had not been sufficiently discussed in the consideration of this question, which had been treated too vaguely. The subject must be examined in close detail, with full regard to the realities of the situation. He thought if the reasons were examined on each point a solution could be found. He recog * See Great Britain, Cmd. 586, Misc. No. 2 (1920): Correspondence Relating to the Adriatic Question, p. 9. |