tions, the carrying away of the young women of Lille, torn from their families and thrown defenceless into the most promiscuous environment, the systematic devastation without military justification of entire territories, the unrestricted submarine warfare including the inhuman abandon of victims on the high seas, the innumerable acts committed by the German authorities against non-combatants in contempt of the laws of war, etc. The responsibility for all these acts, at least the moral responsibility, lies with the supreme chief who commanded and who took advantage of his power to break, or to permit to be broken, the most sacred rules of the human conscience.

The Powers cannot conceive that the Dutch Government could consider the tremendous responsibility of the ex-Emperor with less disapproval than they themselves.

Holland would not be fulfilling her international obligations if she refused to join the other nations within the means at her disposal in carrying out or at the very least in not hindering the punishment of the crimes committed.

In addressing this request to the Government of the Netherlands, the Powers deem it their duty to dwell especially on the particular character of this request. It is the duty of the Powers to insure the execution of Article 227 without being held back by argumentation, because the case under discussion does not fall within the lines of a public accusation of a fundamentally legal nature, but is an act of high international policy, imposed by the conscience of the universe, for which the procedure was provided in order to give the accused such guarantees as have never been known before in international law.

The Powers are convinced that Holland, a country that has always asserted its respect of Law and its Love of Justice, and which, among the first, asked for a place in the League of Nations, will not attempt to help cover with her moral authority, violations of the essential principles of the solidarity of nations, all equally interested in preventing the return of a similar catastrophe.

The people of the Netherlands have the highest interest in not appearing to protect or to shelter the principal author of these crimes on their territory, and in facilitating the trial which the voices of millions of victims demand.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03801/8

ICP-21

Notes of a Meeting Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Monday, January 19, 1920, at 10:30 a. m.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

MR. CLEMENCEAU: The first question that arises is that of the telegram that ought to have been sent dealing with the arrangement with the Russian Co-operatives. That telegram has not been sent. Why?

1. Commercial Policy With Russia

on the point. could be sent.

to its despatch.

MR. KAMMERER: We were waiting for instructions Last night Mr. Berthelot told me that the telegram I stated that, for my own part, we had no objection

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Were you in a position to raise objections to the despatch of that telegram?

MR. KAMMERER: Not at all, but I had to say that I had not any instructions and that I was awaiting them. In any case the telegram is ready and is going to be sent.

889

MR. NITTI: To arrange the details of execution of the question in the best way possible, it would be well to send it to the Supreme Economic Council.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I am in entire agreement. All that ought to be done by the Economic Council and not by the Foreign Ministers. MR. CLEMENCEAU: We are then agreed upon that.

It was decided:

that economic questions involving the commercial policy of the Allies in Russia should be dealt with by the Supreme Economic Council.

Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: We will go on to the Caucasian question. I think that Marshal Wilson or Marshal Foch ought first to be heard. MARSHAL FOCH: A question on this subject was put

2. Situation in the Caucasus

to the Interallied Military Committee at Versailles: the committee pronounced an opinion. It is to that

opinion that I am now going to refer.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: You mean, I take it, the pronouncement of the 12th January: that has been circulated; everybody here knows it; have you nothing to add to that? (See Appendix “A”).

MARSHAL FOCH: No, Mr. President, I have nothing to add unless it be that since that time the situation cannot have appreciably changed, that in any case, if it has changed, that can only be to our disadvantage, and consequently that the restrictions we formulated are perhaps even more justified at the present moment.

SIR HENRY WILSON: I also am in the position of having nothing to add.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: What is necessary at the very outset is to collect all available information so as to be in a position to discuss the matter profitably later on.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: We are agreed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: The military advice, if I have understood it correctly, is that no barrier, consisting of less than three divisions would be effective against the Bolsheviks; and Lord Beatty could not send his sailors unless there were already assurance of such effective military measures.

LORD BEATTY: I have nothing to add to that statement of the situation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: The situation may be regarded from another point of view. With the object of holding up the Bolsheviks, would it be any good to supply the Caucasian Republics of Azerbaidjan, Daghestan and Georgia with guns and war materiel? And if so, ought it to be done immediately?

MARSHAL FOCH: That question is very difficult to answer from here. Only an officer on the spot would be in a position to say what effective force those countries can muster and whether therefore it is worth while supplying them with anything whatsoever.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Does the Marshal suggest entrusting such a mission to an Allied general?

MARSHAL FOCH: There is an English general with Denikin and the French general Mangin is also there.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: But what I want now is military advice. We have already been asked to send material to those tribesmen. I want to know if that is militarily expedient.

MARSHAL FOCH: I am entirely without information as to whether those populations are ready to receive materiel and to employ it to advantage or whether all that we might send would not simply fall into the hands of the Bolsheviks.

SIR HENRY WILSON: In the meeting that took place the day before yesterday and at which we examined the defence of the BatoumBaku line, the conclusion was reached that unless the British Navy effectively held the Caspian, that line could not be effectively defended: and, inversely, that unless there existed the means of defending that line, it was impossible to send Naval forces into the Caspian. For that matter, unless the Caspian is occupied and held, Baku will certainly fall.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I take it then to be Sir Henry Wilson's advice that we ought not to send war materiel to those peoples to help them to defend themselves against the Bolsheviks.

SIR HENRY WILSON: That, Sir, is undoubtedly my opinion if the Caspian is not effectively held by the British Navy—I should then send nothing.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: I entirely agree with Sir Henry's opinion on that point. Indeed, if the Caspian were not held, all that we might send would almost immediately pass into the hands of the Bolsheviks.

LORD CURZON: I should like to add a word. If, as General Wilson says, an Allied military expedition could not succeed, then obviously we ought not to send one, but the present question it seems to me, is not so comprehensive. I have been speaking with the representatives of the Caucasian republics who are at this moment in the adjoining room. They have told me already that the Bolsheviks will attack them; they are anxious to defend themselves, provided we supply them with food, arms and munitions. So supplied, they believe that the danger could be averted. Without supplies, their fall, they say, is inevitable. In any case I suggest that we take no decision upon the matter without first of all hearing them.

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MARSHAL FOCH: I repeat my question: can we inform ourselves sufficiently here? I am willing to accept the discussion which ought to be profitable, but I think that we cannot have really adequate information unless we send actually on to the spot a representative of the Allied Powers.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: The reason for your remark is, I believe that you did not quite understand what has just been said, to wit, that the representatives of the republics of the Caucasus are at present within the building and that it would be possible to hear them now.

(The representatives of the Republic of Georgia, Messrs. Tsheidze, Tseretelli and Avaloff and of Azerbaidjan, Messrs. Topchibacheff and Magaramoff, were then introduced.)

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Gentlemen, the Conference has been discussing the urgency of sending to Georgia, Daghestan and Azerbaidjan food, arms and ammunition. We are told that you can give us information about an intended Bolshevist attack upon your people and of the means at your disposal for defence. We wish to know if at this juncture you would be in a position to exploit the help that we might be able to send you. We are quite disposed to do something effective but we want to know the present state of your countries and whether such aid would be effectively used against the Bolsheviks, or whether it is more likely to happen, as it did with Denikin, that the Bolsheviks would be strong enough simply to capture from you the materiel sent and thus to make matters worse.

MR. TSERETELLI: I speak in the name of the Georgian Delegation as well as in that of the Delegation of Azerbaidjan. We are equally likely to be attacked by the Bolsheviks but we do not know whether we shall be or not. Were we helped by the Entente, the Bolsheviks might hesitate to attack us. In any case, we need the material assistance of the Great Powers if we are to defend ourselves.

MR. CLEMENCEAU: Am I to understand that you are asking us to send troops also?

MR. TSERETELLI: That would be better still; but the mere fact of being protected on the sea and receiving the arms, munitions and food we require, would be an invaluable help. The state of mind of our people is such that, should the Bolsheviks attack, and if at the same time we received the material support of the Entente, we hope to defeat every attack. But such material aid is necessary immediately. We would like in any case to point out that the present situation in the Caucasus is dangerous from the point of view of the morale of the populations. When Denikin was in our land, our despairing peoples fought his troops by every means in their power, and a current of sympathy with the Bolsheviks appeared. Today, our people see their independence recognized and we are convinced that