Donald comes of a family of lawyers. His father was Thomas Donald, Writer and Commissary-Clerk in Glasgow; his grandfather, Colin Dunlop Donald, was of the same profession, and held the same office; and his great-grandfather was John Maxwell of Dargavel, who in 1769 founded the firm of C. D. Donald & Sons. It is not often that one profession is followed, as in this case, by four generations of one family, and the present repre conducted the greater part of the work of the Board of Trade in the West of Scotland, such as Wreck and Boiler Explosion Inquiries, &c., &c. This often difficult and delicate work Mr Donald is universally admitted to have done admirably. He has always taken a deep interest in the history and topography of "Old" Glasgow, and he has written various papers on the subject. He is Vice-President of the Glasgow Archæological Society, and Secretary, and indeed founder, of "The Regality Club," a society formed for the pur pose of publishing pictures of Old Glasgow houses. Among his intimate friends he is deservedly popular, from his genial disposition and high intellectual abilities. Mr Donald is one of the best types of what a lawyer ought to be a man of high ability and attainments, of the sentative of the family is certainly not the least strictest honour, and, in the highest sense of the worthy member of it. Mr Donald was born in 1848. He was educated at Glasgow and at St Andrews, and afterwards attended the Universities of Glasgow and Edinburgh. In 1870 he obtained the first prize in the Civil Law class at the latter University. He served his legal apprenticeship with Messrs Towers-Clark, Roberton & Ross in Glasgow, and was admitted a member of the Faculty of Procurators there in 1872. His firm, Messrs M'Grigor, Donald & Co., was founded in 1871 by the amalgamation of the other firms, of long standing in Glasgow, viz., Messrs C. D. Donald & Co., founded in 1769, and M'Grigor, Stevenson & Fleming, founded before 1800. In addition to taking an active part in the large business so successfully carried on by his firm, Mr Donald has since 1884 VOL. II.-No. 4. term, a gentleman. "THE LAW OF IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT." W. D. L. writes again on this subject as follows: "The author of the original article on this subject has, if I may be allowed to say so, considerably improved his position by his short reply published in this journal on June 2nd. So far as I am concerned, I am content now to admit that the Legislature may have caused the deletion of the words and imprisonment' from the 13th Clause and Schedule A. (7) of the Small Debt Act of 1837, without properly appreciating its possible effect on decrees for aliment pronounced in the Small Debt Court. With sorrow one must allow that even the British Parliament is comparatively human, and has been known now and then to place laws on the Statute Book so utterly self-contradictory that no ordinary human being can understand, far less interpret, them. But, with that trifling proviso, I still maintain my previous position, viz.: (1) that the Small Debt Court is a competent court in which to sue for and decern for aliment up to the amount of the statutory limit; (2) that it is now competent, under the provisions of the Civil Imprisonment Act, 1882, for a creditor in the sum so decerned for, to proceed against the person who wilfully fails to pay within the days of charge. -- Now your correspondent seeks to explode my previous argument in the following somewhat patronising manner,-(I am not complaining; I am only stating a fact,' as Lord Deas once observed), It seems to proceed on the assumption that the Civil Imprisonment Act was introducing something entirely new; while, as a matter of fact, it was only very considerably modifying and altering the procedure relating to the existing law.' This distinction may be of importance when you grasp it. I have not done so yet; but I think the writer will agree with me that, if the Act did not introduce something entirely new, it at any rate entirely abolished something old, viz., imprisonment for alimentary debt by warrant of the Sheriff's decree in terms of Schedule A. (7) of the Small Debt Act. Let us see what the procedure was in regard to the matter before the passing of the Act of 1882. The successful pursuer in the Small Debt Court obtained an extract in terms of Schedule A. (7), which contained a warrant for instant execution by arrestment, and for execution by poinding and sale, and by imprisonment (if competent) after a lapse of ten free days if the defender had been personally present when judgment was pronounced; if not, then after a charge of ten free days. The result of that was that, ten days after judgment, if the defender had been personally present, the pursuer could instruct the officer to proceed to imprison the defaulting debtor; if he had not been personally present, then, after a charge of ten free days, imprisonment might follow. All that procedure has been wiped out by the 3rd section of the Civil Imprisonment Act; and, as you cannot now imprison upon the decree, either after a lapse or a charge of ten free days, it does appear that the words and imprisonment occurring in it are useless and unnecessary. ' But then observe the importance of the words above italicised. It is only one who wilfully fails to pay within the days of charge who can be proceeded against under the Act. The fact that no charge is necessary on a Small Debt decree if the defender has been actually present when the decree was granted, seems to have been left out of view. And therefore it seems obvious that, in every case, before the Sheriff can be asked to imprison, the debtor must have been charged, and the days of charge expired. The mere lapse of ten days will not do. And here comes in the very relevant criticism of your correspondent. If the decree itself contains no warrant to charge on pain of imprisonment, how can the officer charge on pain of imprisonment? And if he does not charge on pain of imprisonment, then, says your correspondent, you cannot proceed to ask for imprisonment in terms of the Civil Imprisonment Act. The answer to that seems to me to be found when we look at the wording of a charge under the Small Debt Act, as prescribed by the statute. We are not dealing here with the forms under the Personal Diligence Act and the Act of Sederunt of 1881. The only form of charge given in the Act is in Schedule A. (11); and it requires implement of the decree merely under pain of poinding and sale without further notice,' which obviously never applied to debts where imprisonment was competent. It therefore seems that there is a certain elasticity given to the wording of a charge; and the proper form of the sanction now would seem to be under pain of law.' Or, on the other hand, if the words of the statutory charge are to be held unsuitable, then they do not contain now, and never did contain, any mention of imprisonment. Be that as it may, all that the creditor needs to do is to get his decree, charge on it--whether the defender has been present or not—and, after the days have expired, come to the Sheriff alleging that the debtor has wilfully failed to pay, and leave the debtor to get out of it as best he can." News. The subject of the portrait in next week's issue will be: E. T. SALVESEN, Esq., Advocate. SOCIETY OF SOLICITORS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURTS.-At a stated general meeting of the S.S.C. Society, held on, Tuesday, the following appointments were made for the ensuing year, viz.:-President, Mr John Smart; vice-president, Mr Charles Ritchie; fiscal, Mr W. B. Glen; librarian, Mr Wm. Drummond; treasurer, Mr John Galletly; collector of widows' scheme, Mr Wm. G. Roy; secretary, Mr A. Ellison Ross; assistant librarian, Mr Wm. Black; censors, Messrs W. B. Rainnie and J. Gordon Mason; examiners, Messrs T. W. Buchan, LL.B., John Shaw, Alexander Campbell, and Charles Munro; auditors, Messrs W. Kinniburgh Morton and Archibald Oliver. Mr G. Robert Stewart was admitted a member of the society. GOLF AND THE REVISED REPORTS.-In the dreary process of winnowing decisions the editors of the Revised Reports occasionally light upon something from which they can apparently extract amusement. In the opening sentences of his preface to the last issue of the Revised Reports, Sir Frederick Pollock dwells facetiously upon the case of Dempster v. Cleghorn, where Lord Eldon, after discharging the "laborious but, at the same time, not altogether unentertaining duty" of looking through all the pleadings, was satisfied that "this game of golf was an useful exercise, and appeared to be a very favourite pastime in North Britain." Sir Frederick says:-"South Britain has now been led captive in the matter of golf; even among the learned professions one may hear talk of niblicks and mashies, and 'those rugged names to our like mouths grow sleek.' It might be too curious to consider whether a custom to play golf could be supported in an English Court, say, by a fiction that golf must have been played under some other name from time whereof memory is not." The case of Dempster v. Cleghorn, which has had the extraordinary effect of moving Sir Frederick Pollock to facetiousness in a volume of law reports, was an action by certain inhabitants and golfers of St Andrews, who sought, inter alia, to put a stop to the keeping of rabbits on the St Andrews Links. While the case was progressing the Golf Club and the magistrates of St Andrews caused "a multitude of the inhabitants to be assembled who proceeded to destroy the rabbits." The "not altogether unentertaining duty" of reading the pleadings seems to have given Lord Eldon a very considerable insight into the dangers and annoyances to which the golfer is subject, for, in delivering judgment, he says:— "Your lordships probably never have seen any of these nice golf balls, but if they happen to get into what black cattle sometimes left behind them, it would be as bad as getting into a rabbit scrape." Graham Murray moved the postponement of one THE SALARIES OF THE SCOTTISH LAW moved the postponement of the clause. OFFICERS. In the Scottish Grand Committee of the House of Commons on the 31st May, during a discussion on the Local Government (Scotland) Bill, Mr Some Sir George Trevelyan said he was perfectly aware of the strong and, he believed, almost unanimous feeling which existed on this subject among Scottish members. There was one expression in the speech of the hon, and learned member to which he must take exception, and that was that they proposed in the Bill to place on the Solicitor-General fresh duties. They did not propose anything of the kind. They merely proposed that the Solicitor-General should be a member of the Local Government Board for Scotland, just as he was at present a member of the Board of Supervision. He would not argue the question whether the Solicitor-General ought to be a member of the new Board. There was an amendment down on the paper raising that point. It would be in the highest degree inconvenient to postpone the clause at this moment, and there was no reason why the hon. and learned member should persevere with his motion. There was no occasion for him (Sir George) to consult his colleagues on this matter. They had had a very striking return laid before the House, which seemed to have opened the eyes of a good many people, and he thought he might say, without raising a controversial topic, it had opened the eyes of those who sat on the Opposition side of the House, because the present salary of the Solicitor-General was a matter which might have been raised at any time during the last five or ten years, and by any Government then in power, and it might have been settled. His colleagues were as strongly impressed with this view as the great body of Scottish members, and the Government were going to deal with the question effectively, and, he believed, at once. Under these circumstances he earnestly hoped his hon. and learned friend would withdraw his motion. Mr Graham Murray said that after the perfectly clear and unambiguous statement of the right hon. gentleman on the part of the Government, he had no reason to persevere with his motion, which he begged leave to withdraw. The motion was accordingly withdrawn. REPORTS. Court of Session. (Reported by PATRICK SMITH, Esq., LL.B.; Edwin ADAM, Esq., LL.B.; R. E. M. SMITH, Esq., LL.B.; C. DICK PEDDIE, Esq., LL.B.; ALASTAIR DAVIDSON, Esq., LL.B. ; and J. C. S. SANDEMAN, Esq., M.A., Advocates.) FIRST DIVISION. (The LORD PRESIDENT (ROBERTSON), and Lords ADAM, M'LAREN, and KINNEAR.) 40. INTERDICT BREACH RELEVANCY OF AVERMENTS.-Pursuer, proprietor of certain subjects in Glasgow, brought an action against the Glasgow Subway Company, "to ordain them to take down and remove all scaffolding, piles, battens, and other materials and erections of every description affixed or placed by them in or upon all and whole," &c., and to interdict them from "interfering with or encroaching upon the plot or area of ground before described." The encroachment complained of was, "in particular, they have erected a scaffold or platform upon a retaining wall on the northern portion of the pursuer's property, and have driven battens and piles and spikes into the eastern and western boundary walls of pursuer's property, and have otherwise encroached thereon." Decree was granted as craved. Thereafter, pursuer brought two actions for breach of said interdict, and also damages. The encroachments now complained of were, in the first action, that defenders "encroached on the northern corner of the pursuer's property before described, by excavating a portion thereof under his boundary wall, and are constructing a tunnel or part of such tunnel under pursuer's said wall." In the second action, the complaint was that defenders "commenced to erect in the bed of the river Kelvin, and on the side thereof belonging to pursuer, and immediately adjoining the north-east corner of his property, a large coffer dam, some of the beams of which they have filled into large holes made by them in pursuer's retaining wall, and are now in course of completing said coffer dam." After various procedure in the Sheriff Court, an appeal was brought before this Court. Held that the alleged acts of encroachment now complained of were not those from which defenders were interdicted. actions for breach and damages were therefore dismissed.—M'CALLUM 7. THE GLASGOW DISTRICT SUBWAY COMPANY; 1st June 1894. Salvesen; The Counsel for Pursuer, Guthrie, Agents, Boyd, Jameson & Kelly, W.S.-Counsel for Defenders, Vary Campbell, W. Thomson; Agents, W. & J. Burness, W.S. P.S. 41. REPARATION SLANDER JUSTIFICATION -COUNTER-ISSUE-SPECIFIC AVERMENTS TO SHOW HABIT (Reported ante, Vol. II., No. 24).-The defender reclaimed against the judgment of Lord Stormonth Darling refusing his counter-issue. The Court, reversed, and allowed the counter-issue as proposed. The record gave sufficient notice to pursuer of various specific alleged instances of drunkenness The issue might be in general terms; the specific occasions, with reference to which proof would be led, being those of which notice was given in record. The question whether the pursuer was "addicted to taking strong drink to excess," was not the same as whether on the occasions alleged he was drunk; but there were a sufficient number of occasions set forth on record to go to the jury, and it would be for them to say whether these were isolated cases or specimens of a habit.—HUNTER v. M'NAUGHTON; 5th June 1894. Counsel for Pursuer, M'Lennan, D. Anderson; † Agent, P. J. Purves, S.S.C.-Counsel for Defender, Comrie Thomson, C. N. Johnston; Agent, J. B. M'Intosh, S.S.C. P. S. 42. NOBILE OFFICIUM-TRUST-POWER TO CONFIRM SALE OF HERITAGE.-G. S. Waters died on 15th March 1893, leaving a trust disposition and settlement, by which he appointed the petitioner and Alexander Clyne trustees and executors. They accepted office. Prior to his death the truster had purchased certain lands at the price of £8000, but the price had not been paid. The trustees were called upon to complete the transaction, and to pay the price. There were not sufficient trust funds for this purpose. The trustees therefore convened a meeting of the beneficiaries under the trust disposition and settlement, and got their consent to sell the said lands in order to pay the price, as the deed gave no power to the trustees to sell heritage. The lands were then exposed for sale, under articles of roup, at the upset price of £8000, but failed to find a purchaser. Thereafter the said Alexander Clyne desired to offer for the lands, and resigned his trusteeship. The petitioner, now sole trustee, re-exposed the lands for sale by public roup at the reduced upset price of £7000. They were purchased, after competition, by Alexander Clyne for £7320. The purchaser now discovered that the petitioner had no valid authority to sell the lands, as certain of the beneficiaries are minors, and therefore the trustees could not be authorised by the whole beneficiaries to sell without consent of Court (Trusts Acts, 1867, sect. 3). The petitioner, being called upon to give a good and unexceptionable title, presented a petition for the purpose of having the sale confirmed. The Court refused the petition; holding, that although they could grant power to sell, they had no power to confirm a specific sale. -Petition, JAMES CLYNE; 5th June 1894. Counsel for Petitioner, Cooper; Agents, Auld & Stewart, S.S.C. P.S. 43. HUSBAND AND WIFE-PARENT AND CHILD -ALIMENT CHILD LIVING WITH MOTHERAGREEMENT BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE.—Mrs Scott raised an action of separation and aliment against her husband. After certain procedure therein, an arrangement was come to between the parties. In accordance with this arrangement a trust deed was executed by Scott, dated 4th August 1891, by which he conveyed to trustees a sum of £1100 for behoof of his wife. (1) The income was to be paid to her "so long as she shall live and cohabit with me as my wife, said annual income to be applied by her pro tanto towards the upkeep of the household ;" (2) "the said trustees shall have power to purchase furniture to the extent of £100 out of the funds so vested in them, to furnish any residence which my said wife shall choose;" (3) "said trustees shall pay over the remainder of the annual income or produce of the remaining £1000 during all the days of her life." On 17th October 1891 a child (pursuer) was born. Pursuer is the only child of the marriage. Pursuer, with consent of her mother, now sues her father for aliment. She alleged that defender had made no provision for her. She had lived since her birth with her mother, separate from defender. She also alleged that defender was possessed of considerable means, "from between £2000 and £3000." Defender denied this. He maintained that he had made ample provision for the maintenance and upbringing of pursuer by the foresaid trust deed. He also offered to receive her in family and maintain her. After a proof, the Sheriff-Substitute of Roxburgh, at Jedburgh, found that the defender was entitled to the custody of the pursuer, and that his offer to maintain her in family was a conclusive answer to the claim. The Sheriff reversed, finding (1) that the purposes for which the sum of £1100 was vested in trustees did not include the upbringing of the pursuer; and (2) that defender's offer was elusive, in respect that in his evidence he deponed that he had no money and had no house, but lived with his sons by a former marriage, and was maintained by them. The offer was therefore insufficient. A sum of £1 per month was awarded as aliment. The defender appealed. The Court recalled the Sheriff's interlocutor and dismissed the action. This action was substantially by the mother, who sought additional aliment for the child. The agreement and trust deed referred to were entered into two months before pursuer's birth. The parties must therefore have had this in contemplation at the time, and agreed that the sum settled in trust was sufficient for the maintenance of wife and child. This sum was a fair proportion of the defender's means, even on the pursuer's estimate thereof. ISABELLA ANDISON SCOTT AND MRS SCOTT v. THOMAS SCOTT; 6th June 1894. Counsel for Pursuers, N. J. D. Kennedy, Cooper; Agents, Thomas M'Naught, S.S.C.; James Riddoch, Solicitor, Jedburgh. Counsel for Defender, - |